The argument that we just need to show love to our adversaries continues to make the rounds.....

Link: Islam in Paris


Each time our society is faced with a tragedy involving persons who are willing to kill innocent people to make a political statement, we have to suffer through the occasional calls to "meet anger with compassion", and to "love your enemy". The attacks in Paris on November 13 were no different, as I continue to see determined posters spreading the message that we need to accept our part of the blame in this situation.  Not surprisingly, persons who swing way off to the left of the political persuasion actually blame the French people for the terrorist attacks in Paris.  You see, the Muslim immigrants, many who live in the Strasbourg Saint-Denis neighborhood and the 13th and 18th Arrondissements, have been obliged to struggle to find work while native Frenchmen and women have much greater access to the system.  To continue the argument, those who arrive from North Africa or the Middle East as small children or infants, or were born to immigrant parents, have it worst of all, because they can't understand why they are denied the same opportunities as "white" French folks.  The anger that leads young Muslim men to depart from Paris suburbs like Aubervilliers and Gennevilliers and find their way to Syria, so they can be trained with deadly weapons and ammunition and return to kill French civilians, is justified because of the tortuous life they were forced to live in France.  This is just another phalange of "the West is always guilty" diatribe that never seems to go away.  It doesn't take a PhD in World History or Sociology to know that different ethnics of our species have always fought each other, usually over territory but at times also over food, women, or just plain hatred for one another.  The international disease of leftism, or Liberalism if you like, is obsessed with revisionism  when it comes to our cultural and political history. This is the reason that 99% of grade school students in the United States believe that white Europeans invented slavery, even though African tribes were engaging in slavery centuries before the first European stepped foot in sub-Saharan Africa, as were native Americans and Asians.  This is the same thought process that blames U.S. greed for 9-11 and endemic French racism for the Paris attacks.

I am here to announce that its OK to hate ISIS. Its not required to pour of newspapers and history books to try and create a scenario which in some way blames the United States for ISIS' existence.  Actually, I'm sure someone has already done the job for you.  But this issue really isn't that complicated.  I always ask people whether or not they would have demanded "understanding" for the Nazis.  That usually does the trick.  ISIS is a special kind of nasty group that deserves absolutely no consideration, and anyone who knowingly aligns themselves with that type of ideology is my enemy and yours, and truly deserves what they get.  In the past, its been easy for Americans to look across the ocean and express sympathy with people who claim to be representing just causes.  But the world has become a much smaller place, and we are not allowed to sit safely on the sidelines anymore.  This struggle is about freedom, and about the world you want to leave your children and grandchildren.  The perpetrators of the Paris attacks were acting as representatives of the Islamic extremist group "The Islamic State", or ISIS, which has made the choice to use fear as its method of subjugating the people of the world.  When ISIS releases a video of a poor prisoner being burned alive in a cage, the message has been carefully crafted and edited before it reached the international media.  ISIS isn't concerned about the anger this scene creates, they are interested in the fear it provokes.  If I learned one thing during my career, I learned that fear is a very effective weapon.  ISIS is determined to drive us into our homes, bolted in behind heavy doors and suppressing our natural inclination to socialize and explore.  They also have refined the art of distraction, and some within our own society continue to drink the "guilt" Kool-Aid.  Everytime some tenured, Ivy League Professor distracts his classroom full of students with sad stories about U.S. imperialism and economic fascism being the root cause of international poverty and the rise of terrorism, ISIS wins.  While this absurd debate rages within our own schools and water-cooler conversations, ISIS is able to grow stronger.  One of the reasons this group is so much more dangerous than its predecessors is that ISIS functions in the 21st century.  They utilize high-tech methods to recruit and raise money, and they have a growing conventional army fighting in both Iraq and Syria.  ISIS is also patient and devious.  They will use fear and distraction as long as these weapons remain useful.  We can neutralize both right now.     

The world is in need of leader in the fight to destroy ISIS; is it time to reconsider Vladimir Putin?

Link: Number of victims of Paris terror attack continues to grow.

On, Friday, November 13, in Paris, the terror group ISIS carried out an organized, well-supplied attack outside the Stade de France and also at a handful of restaurants and bars.  The first sign of trouble was an explosion that took place outside the Stade de France, during an international "friendly" soccer match between Germany and France.  The terrorist attempted to gain entry to the stadium, and after being refused, exploded his suicide vest.  This started the contagion of violence that moved to the 11 Arrondissement and a cluster of restaurants and bars.  The terrorists also forced their way into a heavy metal concert, shooting people at random.  Three of the four who forced their way into the concert also detonated suicide vests; the fourth had a vest as well, but it didn't detonate until after he had been shot by French police. It has been reported by multiple witnesses that the terrorists claimed that the attacks were in response to French policy in Syria.  Following the January 7 terrorist attack at the offices of French political magazine Charlie Hebdo, the French government instituted measures which were designed to disrupt any further terrorist attacks.  The presence of police and the military at French Airports, Ports, and public places was increased, as were efforts to collect human intelligence.  Working closely with the United States other European nations, France also keep a close eye on the trafficking of weapons, especially the black market transport network which effectively can deliver automatic weapons from eastern Europe to France in a matter of days.  French authorities were also very interested in the number of young Arab-French men and women who had recently travelled to Syria.  But the increased law enforcement and intelligence efforts were unable to prevent Friday's tragedy.  Its apparent that ISIS has the capacity to plan and carry out relatively simple but well-staged attacks on multiple urban locations.  The weapons used were the well-known Kalashnikovs and AK-47s, and the suicide vests did not require a great deal of know-how to make.  It likely that at least some of the perpetrators of these attacks had recently visited Syria, and were probably received weapons and explosives instruction at the hands of ISIS.

With this attack, ISIS has demonstrated its ability and willingness to conduct attacks in public places, regardless of the casualties.  Every city in Europe is a potential target, and security measures will have to be increased.  ISIS has particular goals in mind by conducting these attacks, and will use this event to learn how to be more effective in an urban environment.  It is no secret that Islamic extremists are bound and determined to impact the western, "Christian" way of life.  The aim is to disrupt the transportation systems that keep our society functioning.  Vehicles and planes are necessary for personal and business purposes, and any success in shutting the roads and airports can cause havoc with everyday lives.  The bad guys also get a kick out of creating enough fear in the minds of families that children are kept home from schools and streets are deserted by sundown.  When we enjoy ourselves publicly, in places like parks, beaches and sporting events, it is a celebration of our freedom, the ability to laugh and share in each other's good company in safety.  Scenes such as I have just described can be observed at any time of the year in many different places, from Tokyo to Adelaide to Durban, up to Rome and Paris, and over to the Americas.  There are parts of our world where you rarely see moments of public celebration, unless its male-only political rallies.

North America and South America are different in many ways, as are Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia.  But its time we focused on what we have in common.  Each and every one of us needs to ask ourselves that all-important question, "just how important is my freedom?"  If you turn on the TV or radio, and find a news channel, you will find that everyone seems to agree on the danger posed by ISIS.  Is the Islamic State for the Caliphate movement more dangerous that National Socialism (Nazis?).  Absolutely; this Islamic extremist organization has created a force which can engage our military in conventional warfare, while at the same time they are refining, improving and engaging in the old, horrendous methods of traditional terrorism.  In mid-1941, the entire world except the Americas (excluding Canada, who was already at war, standing side by side with Britain) were engaged in a titanic struggle to overcome expansionist fascist regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan.  Once the United States entered the war, the balance began to tilt in the direction of the righteous.  We have this history of coming together, once we recognize the mutual threat.  Why is it so difficult for us to come together today?  Why hasn't a leader from Europe, Africa, the Americas, or Asia made a speech at the United Nations, calling for a military coalition of all freedom loving nations, to work together and eliminate this evil from the face of the earth?  If a united military force, including the armies and air forces of the United States, the EU, Russia, China, Japan, India, and whoever else was able, surrounded the forces of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, and just obliterated them, it would be such a great step forward for the cause of freedom in our culture and society today.  Why has it been so difficult to find a leader to take that walk to the podium, and point the world in the right direction?  Actually, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been on a bit of a campaign to become just such an international leader, not only rehabilitating Russia's image, but the image of Russia's ally Iran at the same time.  I have been very critical of Putin in recent months, holding out hope that maybe Barack Obama would step up to the plate and answer the call of history.  That hasn't happened; is it time that I give Putin a chance?

Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.

Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.

Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS).  Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah.  The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.  If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west.  After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi.  But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death.  Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication.  In this theater, nothing would surprise me.

The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts.  The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design.  Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs.  Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad.  The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority.  In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations.  While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire.  Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.

The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front.  Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time.  The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing.  Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions.  Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq.  The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack.  At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi.  The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces.  As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties.  Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply.  Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult.  But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements.  Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.  

Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
           B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.

Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache.  I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias".  But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard.  Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A.  In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS).  The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved.  A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army.  For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s.  Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881.  Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt.  Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad).  The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers.  Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject.  Back to the subject at hand...

The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion.  Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented.  In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets.  On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias.  The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran).  The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly.  The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government.  Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group.  Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office.  But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias.  Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields".  This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias.  Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias.  To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise."  Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.

The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians.  Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda.  But what can we expect after the IS is defeated?  And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again.  In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office.  His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him.  Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani.  At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites".  Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds!  On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future.  We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries.  With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq.  And when did all this happen?  While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime.  This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments.  The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us?  As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty.  Quel bordel!

Hezbollah keeping Assad regime from rapid contraction.

Link: Hezbollah assists regime forces to retake Syrian border city.

We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria.  The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus.  The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo.  We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia.  We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel.  I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran.  Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels. 

If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo.  Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated.  It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq.  Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq.  Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni.  Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran.  With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict.  As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.

All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit.  Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other.  It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention.  But those type of operations are a thing of the past.  The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature.  As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever.  How much are we spending on those two initiative?  When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted?  Isn't this a bit of waste as well?  If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?


(Separate Comment)

The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.

We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again.  Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority.  Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"?  For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street.  The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality.  But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.

Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks.  Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path?  The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations.  No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth.  We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.

Do you know where your children are?

Is Hamas working with ISIS in Sinai?

Link: A.  Is Hamas working with ISIS?
          B. Developments in Sinai.

The Islamic State has a new name, folks.  First, we struggled with ISIS; then we were challenged with "The Islamic State for the Creation of a Caliphate in the Levant", which, I guess, could become "ISCOCIL".  Thank goodness someone had better sense.  As for the new name on the scene, it has been selected to identify the nascent establishment of an armed element of the Islamic State that has been active in the Sinai region, and its name is "Wilayat Sinai".  I'm no Arabic scholar, but the name "Wilayat" reminds me of "Vilayet", a term used to describe communities in the Ottoman Empire.  My superior skills of deduction tell me that "Wilayat Sinai" identifies what the Islamic State has decided is a part of its future Caliphate.  When they organize an armed group for a part of Jordan, it may be named, "Wilayat Amman".  This new group located in north Sinai, traditional home of Hamas, introduced itself with a bang last week, by attacking an Egyptian Army checkpoint and killing all the soldiers on duty.  The attack was coordinated to coincide with vehicle/suicide attacks on other Egyptian military targets, but things didn't go exactly as planned.  The Egyptians acquitted themselves admirably and gave hell to the Wilayat Sinai fighters.  Interestingly enough, this action took place under the noses of the U.S. military, which currently has a presence in Sinai.  Task Force Sinai, a regiment-sized U.S. Army contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers, the U.N. peacekeeping organization in pace in Sinai since 1982.  Aside from the Explosives Ordinance Disposal Unit, what exactly are these U.S. troops doing in Sinai?

When I think of Sinai, I think of that large land-mass that separate Egypt and Israel.  When I was a child, I used to imagine the plight of the poor Israelites, crossing the Sinai desert, with Moses at the lead, to escape Pharaoh and slavery.  The Sinai has been the location of a number of recent terrorist attacks against Egyptian soldiers and police.  Last week, the ISIS-baby Wilayat Sinai got in on the act.  The attacks against the Egyptian military were obviously a probing operation, to test the reaction time and effectiveness of the Egyptian contingent.  The Pentagon has estimated that the Islamic State has roughly 200 fighters in north Sinai.  We estimate the number to be closer to 500, but this includes new recruits, some of whom were probably present in last week's attacks, and gained experience through one helluva baptism of fire.  We know that ISIS is spreading, and has established branches as far away as Nigeria.  Yesterday Barrack Obama publicly announced that ISIS was on is heels.  This guy really has Chutzpah.  Only a few years ago, he described ISIS as being a "JV" (junior varsity) organization.  They now control most of Syria and Iraq.  He's a keeper, that's for sure.  We can only imagine how Israel is digesting this recent news of ISIS presenting itself so near Israel's southern border.  ISIS in the north, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and now ISIS in the south.  I have a degree in Geography, so when I say that Israel is looking a bit "boxed in", you can take it to the bank.

I wasn't so much shocked about the coming-out party for Wilayat Sinai as I was the rumors of cooperation between the Islamic State and Hamas.  I would have thought that ideologically, there would be some problems with this relationship, not to mention that Hamas considers itself the sage of terrorist activity, with ISIS being the snot-nosed upstart.  But it does appear as if some level of cooperation has taken place, which really complicates an already muddy picture.  For the moment, though, my concern is with Task Force Sinai.  Again, I'm really confused about the marching order for these young men and women.  Are they armed?  Do they patrol?  If they're peacekeepers, are they under the command of a foreigner?  It wasn't so long ago that Hamas had militarized Gaza, and turned schools and hospitals into missile depositories, forcing the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to enter Gaza.  This is a dangerous place, folks.  What kind of peacekeeping are our soldiers doing?  For now, lets forget about yesterday and deal with today and tomorrow.  If ISIS has decided to extend its war for the Caliphate to the Sinai, I demand that our troops be armed all the time, with orders to defend themselves as appropriate to any self-defense situation.  If the Administration is going to insist that our troops be unarmed, then its time to pull back our soldiers and replace them with diplomats.  That would be there function after all, n'est pas? 

Jabhat al-Nusra: the evolution of Al-Qaeda and the need for conventional warfare.

Link: Tension between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria.

We have always expressed the opinion that Al-Qaeda and its representative groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), were really not that far removed from motivations and intentions of the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS).  In fact, we have always been surprised and a bit frustrated at the mainstream media's obsession with separating each and every Sunni-based Jihadi group.  No doubt Al-Qaeda and ISIS have done everything they can to perpetuate this idea that these groups work exclusively of each other.  This impression encourages the idea that Sunni-based jihadism is much more entrenched in the Sunni community than it really is.  We have argued that because of their mutual goals, orientation and teachings, that it was virtually impossible for ISIS and JN to be working against each other.  In the last six months, both ISIS and JN have enjoyed tremendous success on the battlefields of Syria, as the regime forces have to defend from almost daily attacks, sometimes from different directions.  Although we have gone to some lengths to illustrate the common ideology and genesis of ISIS and Al-Qaeda/JN, we have never discounted the probability that the groups would have disagreements that might lead to actual violence.  But we continue to strongly believe that any such conflicts would be temporary (and have actually proven to be so).

An interesting trend that we have noted previously is becoming more visible on the battlefields of Syria.  We have discussed in some depth the efforts of ISIS to create an effective conventional military, complete with departments, promotions and letters from home.  We opined that the numerous former Ba'ath Party members who had found a home in ISIS, were useful to the group because of the organizational and planning experience and skills that they possessed.  For a short time it was popular to consider the idea that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had some level of influence within ISIS, when actually the opposite is true.  These former bureaucrats and armchair Generals of the Saddam regime are survivors, and ISIS just happened to be in the hiring business.  Believe me, it has nothing to do with ideology.

But the need for ISIS to recruit individuals with certain skills outside of bomb-making and decapitation is obvious.  ISIS has created the first conventional terrorist army, and to keep that army supplied and effective, a support mechanism must exist.  Their effort is evolving, and they have met with some difficulties, but their success can't be denied.  We have previously explained the justification for the Islamic extremist cause to pursue a conventional army.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United State Armed Forces proved time and again, that small groups if ill-prepared and inconsistently equipped tribesmen can't defeat a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force (Vietnam was a diplomatic failure but a military success; the American people lost the stomach for daily casualties highlighted by politically-driven new coverage).  In 2009, with the apparent successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the decision was made to support the creation of a conventional fighting force loyal to Al-Qaeda, and Syria provided the ideal nursery.  Al-Qaeda in Iraq had relocated from Iraq to Syria (or should I say they had been "booted out"), so the platform was in place.  Fighters were recruited, many from Africa and the West, and equipment was either purchased or purloined from the Syrians.  The group changed its name, probably as a purposeful effort to separate itself from Al-Qaeda and strengthen the suggestion that the region was full of Sunni-based extremist military groups.  The head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, did move the group away from Al-Qaeda to a certain extent, a move which no doubt infuriated Ayman al-Zawahiri, hold up back in Pakistan somewhere (probably at the Pakistani Intel Service main headquarters), and the link indicates that the two groups are not necessarily coordinating their operations or sharing their battle plans.  This mild declaration of independence by ISIS, forgive the phrase, is the reason JN has become so successful on the battlefield.

Al-Qaeda was the original genesis of the idea to create a conventional military capability to pursue the goals of international Sunni Jihad.  When ISIS began showing  bit of free will, JN, which was in direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership and much more representative of the group's most recent persona, began to follow the same plan which proved so successful to ISIS.  JN, although on a much smaller scale, started to morph into a conventional military force.  In the past, Al-Qaeda has relied on its small size to stay mobile, hidden, and able to strike targets and disappear.  JN created a supply mechanism, mostly utilizing its popularity with the local population, that kept its fighters fed and well-equipped.  Personnel were selected for various jobs according to background and training, and formalized planning became an integral part of every operation.  Communications were strengthened, liaison to the local community were chosen by ethnic background and language skills, and as more fighter arrived on the scene, the variety of military hardware increased.  Is it no surprise that JN has been just as successful on the Syrian battlefield lately, if not more, than ISIS.  The one life-line that both ISIS and JN rely on seems to be flowing stronger than ever: the financial support from the gulf states.  This support is not necessarily directly from the coffers of the various Emirates and Sheikdoms (some is), but it is coming from millionaire and billionaire families with loyalties to the extremist cause.  The financial support has increased as of late as Iran and the despised Shi'a stretch their legs in Yemen and Iraq.  No doubt some of these fanatics are expecting to re-fight the Battle of Karbala.

As things stand now, ISIS is a much more entrenched and evolved military machine.  In size and in capabilities, JN can't hold a candle to the Islamic State forces.  But everyday JN grows stronger, and JN has proven to be much more popular with the local communities than ISIS (probably has something to do with the burning of that young Jordanian pilot; families from the Hashemites in Jordan and the rural communities of Syria have a history of good relations).  With JN and ISIS both trying to outdo each other in capturing former regime towns, and the Sunni and Shi'a threatening to start an Islamic Civil War in Yemen and Iraq, the West has a bit of breathing room.  But once JN and ISIS merge, and they will, and the Iranians pull back behind the walls of secrecy they value so much, we will be faced with a tremendous foe.    

Who lost Iraq?

Link: Politico magazine's take on "Who Lost Iraq"?


(Update: Before tackling today's unwieldy subject matter, it's time for a quick update, for any of our readers who have an interest.  The book that actually spawned this blog, Mukhabarat, Baby!, has been available at all the usual places (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Booklocker, etc.) for roughly three months.  While the blog has proven to be quite popular and continues to grow in viewership, the book has not done well.  The reviews have been tremendous; in fact, we have yet to receive a negative review.  But at the end of the day, the success of a book is measured in how much it is appreciated by readers, especially readers of its particular genre.  Its safe to say that MB has been unsuccessful with every particular genre.  Since the book has received great reviews, and does provide insight into a world that many seem to hold in fascination, what seems to be the problem?  We even have a comedy out this week with Melissa McCarthy playing a spy.  I have to be honest; it does look funny, and she always seems to make me laugh.  As for MB, the problem is simple to diagnose.  I have been unable to gain traction with regards to exposure.  People aren't buying my book because they don't know it exists.  I haven't been reviewed in the NY Times, Wall Street Journal, or Washington Post, and I haven't been invited onto any news programs to discuss my career and the book.  If an author is fortunate enough to have a good agent and publisher, they run a strong likelihood of being successful, like the Housewives from Beverly Hills and the Duck Dynasty folks (both of whom are or were on the Non-Fiction Best Seller List), while self-published authors like me, even if they follow all of the good advice out there, end up with beautiful blogs and amazing internet book sites, and spend their week nights introducing their book to a virtually deserted VFW somewhere in the middle of the desert in Arizona.  But I won't throw in the towel.  I'm still out there, setting up speaking engagements and talking up my book.  Why not hop on to Amazon and buy it?  Better yet, hop on to Amazon and buy a copy for yourself and separate copies for your friends.  Cheers, friends.)

When someone forwarded me a link to the Politico article which attempts to address the question, "Who lost Iraq?", I had no idea what to expect.  Occasionally Politico will throw a curve, and this has been a rather popular subject in recent weeks.  I read the article through twice, and I can't say that they did a bad job.  Politico assembled a group of persons that it has decided are experts on Iraq, and asked them particular questions regarding the insurgency, the surge, the draw-down, and the current conflict involving ISIS.  After taking a look at the lineup assembled to give us our answers, I couldn't help but wonder, how did they decide which questions to ask what person?  And who chose the "experts" to begin with?  For the sake of the argument, lets give Politico the benefit of the doubt, and move on with the conversation.

Let's start with two basic facts.  First, in 2009, Iraq was making great strides in its recovery from three wars and almost five decades of Saddam Hussein.  The economy was growing, the refineries were functioning, the job market was growing, and construction projects were going on everywhere.  The school were open, including a number of new institutions that were built and paid for by the United States.  In fact, we paid for just about everything, including the infrastructure repair.  The roads and bridges were usable, traffic flowed with working signals and traffic cops were around to assist with accidents and back-ups.  International flights were landing at Baghdad International and, most importantly, the job market was growing. Iraq was on its feet and nearly ready to run its own show.  The past remaining piece of the puzzle?  Iraq was in serious need of a reliable police force and a dependable, well-trained and well-supplied army.  The U.S. military can be given all the credit for the positive changes in Iraq, and should have been left alone to complete the training of the Iraqi Security apparati (police, military, border control, customs, etc.) on their own schedule.

The second point that we can all agree on is that Iraq is now in a state of war with the "Islamic State for the creation of a Caliphate in the Levant", or ISIS, as it is commonly known.  ISIS is a terrorist organization that has developed a powerful, mobile, well-armed conventional army, and it is determined to gain effective control of both Syria and Iraq (and eventually the rest of the Levant).  In 2012 and 2013, ISIS, which until then had been content to raise hell with Bashir al-Assad and his forces in Syria, decided to expand its religious war into northern Iraq.  Mosul fell, and Kirkuk and Arbil were threatened.  The Kurds were put on the defensive and had to military repel ISIS with very little assistance from the outside.  Each new bit of territory that ISIS occupied brought with it new victims; Christians or the wrong kind of Muslims, who were lined up and executed by the hundreds.  At present, ISIS controls much of northwest Iraq, including the border crossings into Syria.  ISIS also controls parts of Anbar Province, including both Ramadi and Fallujah.  Although Tikrit was recently retaken by the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIS continues to put pressure on Baiji and its valuable oil refinery, and recently has stepped up suicide attacks in Diyala Province to the east of Baghdad.  Control of Anbar and Diyala Provinces will allow ISIS to pay siege to Baghdad itself.

So given those two points, what happened to turn situation number one into situation number two?  I will save everyone a little time and answer this myself, because its really not very complicated.  The U.S. military had a timetable for all operations dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Because of the success of the surge and the positive involvement of the Sunni community in defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, it was imperative that the United States not lose that goodwill by abandoning the Iraqi people before their government and its functions were in place to work effectively.  This is exactly the action that was taken by President Obama.  Ignoring the advice of the Pentagon, Obama ordered an increase in the U.S. military departure schedule.  President Obama was bound and determined that our troops would be out of Iraq by such-and-such date.  Soldiers, including Generals, will only object for so long before they will just shut-up and carry out their orders.  We left Iraq before any of their Security forces were prepared.  In fact, we left before the police were prepared to issue speeding tickets, let alone stand up to ISIS.  In response to the growing alarm in the civilian community, the Iraqi government ordered its army to confront ISIS on the battlefield outside Tikrit.  I don't have to remind everyone about the mass desertions, the equipment left on the battlefield for ISIS to steal, and the prisoners captured for more video of mass executions.  Iraq has fallen to shit because we left before our military had sufficiently trained the Iraqis to successfully defend their country in what is obviously an evolving and very dangerous environment.  Why?  Where was the fire, as my grandma used to say?  Why was it so damn necessary to leave Iraq so quickly, instead of a few years down the road when the Iraqis were in a better position to stand up to ISIS?  Our policy not only let down the Iraqi people, it also played into the hands of Iran, who is now seen as the hero in this unfolding nightmare, because the Shi'a militias they train and advise have come to the aid of the Iraqi Security Forces, and with some success.

Let me leave you with the biggest irony of all: how is the Obama Administration dealing with the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces?  Why, we are sending in Army trainers and instructors....the same folks who should have been left to do their jobs in the first place.  Que loco.

Islamic State focuses on Diyala Province

Link: Suicide bomber kills 14 in Iraq

Operative from the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization continue to utilize suicide bombings in their efforts to take control of strategic areas of Iraq.  In recent weeks, the IS has increased its activity in Diyala Province, just east of Baghdad.  Normally, the media focuses on events on Baiji, Anbar (Ramadi) and Salah ad-Din (Samarrah) Provinces, although the IS has been active in Diyala for many months.  This week, an IS suicide bomber killed fourteen people at a gathering of Sunni tribal leaders in Baqubah.  Analysts might be tempted to assume that this event will drive the Sunni community further away from the IS and its mission.  But to predict the actions of the various different Iraqi groups is dangerous business.  During my career, I learned to never forget that different cultures respond in different ways to particular stimuli.  Its very possible that the IS is using violence to portray strength, which in turn might (ideally) frighten the Sunni community into joining their cause.  One thing is certain - if the Sunnis of Iraq sense that an IS victory is inevitable, you can guarantee that they will start setting up their tents under a different flag.

Diyala Province presents a strategic target for the IS for a number of reasons.  The people of Iraq are already aware of IS aggression in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, not to mention the initial incursion into northern Iraq, which resulted in the occupation of Mosul and Tikrit (since retaken), and the apparently never-ending struggle for Baiji and its oil refinery.  Adding Diyala Province to the mix, effectively surrounds Baghdad, and provides a visual impression of IS domination.  Also, the IS would like nothing better than to see the Iranians decide that Iraq isn't worth the sacrifice, and stop its support for the government in Baghdad and the various Shi'a militias that have actually had some battlefield success against IS forces.  Since Diyala Province shares a lengthy border with Iran, no doubt the Iranians will feel a bit of pressure, as the boundaries of Iran have not been legitimately threatened since the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran War.  You can be sure that the IS will turn up the heat in just the right way, so that the Iranians will be forced to consider just how much their involvement in Iraq is worth.  Its actually a bit of a gamble; the IS military campaign in Diyala might also force Iran to recognize how much its national security equities are inexorably tied to a peaceful Iraq.  We've always considered the possibly that Iran might tip over the entire table by launching a full invasion of Iraq.  We believe that the Iranian military has the capability of destroying IS' conventional military capability, as long as the Syrian border does not present a problem.  Chasing the IS into Syria will only grant them a reprieve.  If the Iranians were to invade Iraq with their regular Armed Forces, they should be prepared to finish the job, which may require an incursion into Syria, all the way to the doorsteps of Aleppo and Damascus.  You would be hard pressed to find someone as opposed to the current Iranian regime as we are, but it would be nice to see someone with a pair of balls, no matter from what corner of the ring the emerge.  And the Iranians have been known to pull a few surprises.  Its probably unlikely that the Iranians would commit their regular Armed Forces in this manner, but its getting more and more difficult everyday to handicap this conflict.

Sure, the Islamic State has its share of Ex-Ba'athists; but its still a religiously motivated organization at heart.

Links: A. ISIS fighters in Ramadi are ex-Ba'ath Party members.
           B. Ex-Ba'athists helping organize ISIS.

In the past few weeks, I have repeatedly heard a bit of information that is taking on a life of its own.  I have been told by persons I respect and persons whose news sources are dubious at best, that the Islamic State/ISIS, is being controlled and run by ethnic Iraqi former Saddam loyalists and Ba'ath Party members.  Last year I had a long conversation with a good friend who happens to be a retired Iraqi General and a former Ba'ath Party member (his brother and father, now deceased, were both party representatives from Baghdad).  He informed me, almost off-handedly, that some of his former colleagues were involved with ISIS.  He elaborated that these individuals were assisting in the creation and expansion of different departments within the organization, including intelligence and recruitment.  He laughed as he pointed out that like many Iraqis, they were desperate to bring home a paycheck, and at least someone was willing to compensate them for their skills.  So the demographic that is the Islamic State now includes a number of former Ba'ath Party hacks, I thought.  It only strengthened my existing opinion that the Islamic State is determined to develop the characteristics of a conventional military force.  When George Bush (and more importantly Donald Rumsfeld) was considering the best way to defeat Al-Qaeda, the decision was made to force the terrorist organization to fight a conventional war, something it was not designed to do.  Although the insurgency and the Abu Ghraib fiasco dragged things out way longer than should have been necessary, the strategy actually worked, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Al-Qaida and the Taliban just did not have the personnel, the equipment, the resources, or the infrastructure to combat the U.S. military.  Interestingly enough, the Islamic State has been successful since it started behaving more as a legitimate armed forces, which requires a plan for resupply and reinforcements, and also must include a transportation and communication network.  When Al-Qaeda works in small units, transportation and communication are much simpler.  But the Islamic State now commands tens of thousands of personnel, and it can be no surprise that former regime elements, Sunni no doubt, have joined the cause, and that ISIS, which had a definite need for that expertise, welcomed them with open arms.

But this development can be easily misunderstood.  In no way does the motivation expressed by the Islamic State dovetail with the Socialist manifesto of the Arab Ba'ath Party that at one time controlled both Iraq and Syria.  Do not read too much into the fact that the intelligence branch of the Islamic State is run in the same manner as the intelligence branch of the Iraqi Army.  Certainly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, is ethnic Iraqi.  But he was not a supporter of Saddam Hussein.  Because the roots of the ISIS movement can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", it should be no surprise that a number of Iraqis are prominent in the organization.  But I am beginning to see this perspective take root that the ghost of Saddam and Ba'ath Party adherents are dictating policy for the Islamic State.  Do not be distracted by this red herring.  Do not forget what the Islamic State represents and exactly what methods it has used to achieve its ends. No doubt Saddam did some heinous things, but is always attempted to cover-up or deny the existence of such government-sanctioned activity.  The Islamic State WANTS you as a first-row witness to its execution of persons because of religious persuasion.  More importantly, don't forget that the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein were interested in political motivation as opposed to religious.  Saddam (and his buddy Bashir al-Assad) were in fear of the Islamic Extremist movement, and directed their security forces to deal with it harshly.  In its inception and at the height of its popularity, the Ba'ath movement was inherently political.  It sought to enfranchise the Arab worker in all nations and create a political movement with Socialist leanings that would sweep the party into power in places like Egypt and Turkey.  The Islamic State exists for the purpose of the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, a nation ruled by a Caliph (religious leader) with the Quran as the law of the land. 

The former Iraqi Ba'ath Party members who are active in the Islamic State are the ones being co-opted, not vice versa.  And that should have been expected.  When the U.S. arrived in Iraq in 2003 and the Iraqi military has ceased to exist, everyone wanted to become a part of the U.S. military force that now appeared to hold the reigns of power.  In reality, its just a circumstance of survival.  People have families to provide for, and they  will do what is necessary to reach that goal.  What would I do to feed my family?  Just about anything.

Iraq threatening to descend into all-out war, mirroring Syria.

Link: ISIS threatens water supply to Iraqi civilians.


Last year, the Islamic State (IS) used its control of certain dams to impact the Iraqi civilian population's access to water.  In the end, their actions led to the flooding of Ramadi and other smaller, nearby communities.  The IS is again threatening to use its control of dams to further its military objectives.  The IS has already closed the Warrar Dam, north of Ramadi, jeopardizing water supplies to Habaniya and Khalidiya, two towns east of Ramadi.  There is concern that the IS as also closed the Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah.  These developments can only increase the pressure on the civilian population, and bring Iraq that much closer to a humanitarian crisis.  In the big picture, these events demonstrate the rapid break-down in civil authority throughout Iraq.  The central government in is control of maybe fifty percent of the country.  In fact, the Shi'a south, from Hillah and Najaf down to Basra (and east to the Iranian border), appears to be the only part of the country that has not been infiltrated by the IS.  Anbar and Salah al-Din Provinces are war zones, as is Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Nineveh Province in the west have been scenes of sporadic fighting and numerous SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) for the past year.  Basically, whatever authority exists in the north is attributed to Kurdish forces.  As long as the IS occupies large parts of Anbar and continues to pressure the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala, Salah al-Din, Baiji, and numerous other strategic areas, the authority of the Iraqi central government is diminished.

The operational execution of the IS forces continues to impress.  There is an obvious long-term focus on all offensive maneuvers, and every opportunity to exploit the lack of training and discipline of the ISF is exploited to the furthest degree.  The maturity exhibited by the strategic planning and decision making conflicts with the unnecessary civilian executions, although some will argue that the brutalization of the civilian population is intended to create a pliable and easy to govern people.  The IS is not a typical terrorist organization by any stretch.  With the exception of the Taliban (and this claim is open for discussion), the IS is the first terrorist organization with a true conventional military capability.  This fact is one of the reasons that we suspect a much more cordial relationship exists with Al-Qaeda than what has been demonstrated for the media.  President George Bush was determined to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional military confrontation in Afghanistan and (eventually) Iraq.  Once Saddam was defeated, it was imperative that Al-Qaeda not sit idly by as an infidel army occupied an Islamic nation.  Al-Qaeda took the bait, and from 2005 to 2008, was surprisingly resilient.  But in the end, George Bush was able to expose a flaw in the Al-Qaeda structure: it was not built for conventional combat.  By 2010 (thanks to the Sunni "Great Awakening" and the ultimate sacrifice of over 3,000 American heroes), Iraq was well on its way to building a middle class and reviving from decades of totalitarianism.  The one development which could torpedo all the progress, would be the rash and speedy withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq.  You see, the ISF was not yet prepared to defend Iraq.  The U.S. military was following a timetable that they had been led to believe, was "in stone".  The plan was to train the Iraqi security forces, police and special ops folks included, until they showed the capacity to protect their own people.  Instead, we announced to the world (and the IS, who were sitting in Syria, licking their chops, so to speak) that the U.S. military was leaving the security of Iraq to the ISF and departing Iraq on a fast timetable.

Even before the IS moved into Iraq, the organization had shown its ability to conduct conventional military operations. Syria was the ideal location to try out the world's first conventional terrorist army.  The most important factor for the IS is discipline.  Second is resources.  The IS does not seem to have any problem attracting volunteers, but, like any army, they can't be useful until they are trained and equipped.  The IS trains its recruits, and uses them where they are most useful.  Language is considered a valuable tool, especially in the media war.  The IS enjoys nothing more than shocking the folks sitting down to tea in London, with the image of a beheading carried out by a young man with a striking Cockney accent.  One of the factors that continues to impress us is the IS' ability to access and deliver resources to its units stretched out all over Syria and Iraq, and in the middle of an Allied Air Campaign, no less.    At least the IS has lost the element of surprise; they won't be sneaking up on anyone anymore, with "ISIS" being a dirty word in just about every language.  As it exists, the IS really is nothing but an army, fighting a conflict in Syria and Iraq.  The IS does not occupy the Executive Mansion of any particular country, nor does it have a representative political party that dominates a parliament somewhere.  Aside from sycophants and recruiters, ISIS is whatever we have before us in Iraq and Syria.  Which begs the question, with the dastardly and evil deeds they have committed, why haven't they been destroyed?  With the entire U.N. condemning their actions, and their every move likened to "terrorism", why are they still hanging around?

Can Erdogan recreate the Ottoman Empire from the existing Turkey?

Links: A. Turkey goes to the polls on 7 July.
           B. Turkey's Prime Minister Davutoglu caught between a rock and a hard space.
           C. Turkish President Erdogan revives the ghosts of Ottoman glory.

If there is one thing that I really appreciate about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it is his taste for history.  Erdogan enjoys reminding the Turkish people of the long history of Turkish military conquest, when the Ottoman Empire stretched from Algeria to Oman and up to the gates of Vienna in Europe.  Oddly enough, when I hear the Islamic State ramble on about the creation of an Islamic Caliphate, I can't help but think of the Ottomans.  In reality, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic Caliphate.  The Sultan wasn't only the head of state for the Empire, he was also the Caliph, or leader of the faithful, with the authority to issue fatwas and declare war not just for the Empire, but for all Muslims.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't this appear to be very similar to what the Islamic State is demanding?  In reality, the Ottomans were nothing like today's terrorist bad-boy of the moment, the Islamic State (IS).  Millions of practicing Christians lived within the Ottoman Empire, and with very few exceptions, enjoyed the protection of the state.  Jews were also welcome in the Empire, as the Ottomans recognized the importance of international trade and banking.  The Ottoman Empire also had close, personal diplomatic relationships with France, England, Austria and the United States.  If it weren't for European banks, the Ottoman Empire would have lived up to its nickname as "the sick man of Europe" and expired long before the actual end came in 1923.  What happened to the Ottomans, that they went from world power to an impoverished state, rife with revolutionaries and anarchists?  In a word, corruption.  And interestingly enough, the word continues to be in vogue a century later.

Turkey's Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, is a member of President Recep Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and considered a close ally of the President.  Davutoglu had an auspicious start as Prime Minister when he publicly proclaimed that fighting corruption would be a top priority.  Davutoglu hinted that he would support the nation's Supreme Court if it chose to put on trial the four government ministers who were forced to quit in 2013 after a large-scale corruption probe produced evidence of their involvement in bribery and influence peddling.  Davutoglu was even quoted as saying that he "would break off the arm of anyone who gets involved in corruption, even if its my brother."  But timing got in the way, and Davutoglu was forced to eat his words, so to speak.  Erdogan had no intention of allowing the Supreme Court to air the AKP's dirty laundry, and the motion to call for a trial by the Supreme Court was voted down in Parliament by the AKP.  This incident is not the only example of Erdogan's opposition to Davutoglu's stated goal of combatting Turkish political corruption.  Erdogan has no intention of fighting corruption.  It has become the military wing of his political ambitions.  Erdogan can no longer play the game successfully without the use of some phalange of corruption, whether it be bribery or intimidation (a favorite of his).  Davutoglu has been given the crash course in Erdogan politics 101, highlighted by the Jan. 19 meeting of Davutoglu's cabinet.  Erdogan called the meeting, chaired the meeting, and ended the meeting, with Davutoglu having not a word to say.  It was an obvious reminder to Davutoglu that Erdogan was the real Prime Minister.  More importantly, it sent a message that from Erdogan's optic, the actual position of Prime Minister itself was on borrowed time.  Erdogan has been discussing the possibility of Turkey adopting a Presidential system of government that does not include a Prime Minister.  It would consist of an Executive Branch (President and Cabinet), a Legislative Branch (Parliament), and a Judicial Branch (Supreme Court of Turkey).  For someone who is so critical of the United States, he certainly seems to appreciate our style of government.  Be that as it may, Erdogan's idea of a presidential system does not include our checks-and-balances.  Erdogan sees the Executive as having full authority over the other two, which would leave the office of president with increased powers.  And who would be the president in this system?  Why, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  For more than just a couple reasons, it was in Davutoglu's best interest to sit still and keep quiet.

There are times when I see similarities between Erdogan and Italy's former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.  Erdogan, like Berlusconi, never gives up; he realizes that in most instances all you have to do is show more staying power than your opponent.  Erdogan uses national ideals to stir up the people, especially near election time, another useful habit of Berlusconi.  The exist some obvious differences between the two, though.  Italy's electoral system is not as easy to manipulate as Turkey's, and its very difficult to bribe or unfairly influence the Italian judiciary.  Also, everywhere Berlusconi goes, his businesses follow like a heavy shadow.  Most of the offenses of which he has been accused have to do with manipulation for the benefit of his companies.  Erdogan has no business obligations to weight him down, at least none that are known to us.  He is a political animal, through and through.  When his political party originally burst onto the scene, I was concerned that he was an Islamic extremist, or at least an ideologue.  I was worried that Turkey, such an important part of NATO, with a large, well-trained and equipped military, would lose its identification as a secular state.  In reality, the AKP and Erdogan approached power with a much more pragmatic, long-term perspective.  Then I became concerned that he was playing up to the nationalist element in Turkish politics (in Turkey, there is a fine-line between the Islamist parties and the Nationalist parties, although they wouldn't agree).  Now, after more than a decade of Erdogan, I think I finally have an accurate assessment.  Erdogan isn't about Islamic domination, nor is he about Turkish nationalism.  Erdogan is about Erdogan.  He is determined to create a new niche in Turkish politics that allows him to govern as a king, but with the title of president.  And he wants his Turkey to be militarily and economically powerful and dominant in the region, a 21st century Ottoman Empire, more or less.  I'm not convinced that he will succeed; a growing number of very brave Turks have become vociferously opposed to Erdogan, led by a few independent journalists.  And I've always wondered if he was completely successful in excising all the military brass who were dedicated to keeping Turkey secular and free.  Maybe the Turkish Military has one coup still left in the pipeline.  Now would be a good time.........

The rise of a terrorist superpower: the Islamic State in 2015.

Most analysts and military strategists in the United States have focused on the activities of Daesh (Islamic State) in Syria and Iraq.  After all, our equities appear to be most at risk in those two particular theaters.  We have been conducting an Allied Air Campaign  in both areas of conflict for roughly a year, and today, for the first time, we have learned exactly how aggressive this Air Campaign has been.  The Allied Air Campaign (which includes the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain) is averaging fourteen missions per day against Daesh targets.  In comparison, the U.S. Air Force averaged 800 missions per day against Iraqi and insurgency targets in Operation Enduring Freedom.  When questioned about the low number of missions, the Pentagon pointed out that the targets are more complicated, and the coalition is determined to avoid hitting civilian targets in error.  I will leave that comment to stand on its own.  Recently, Daesh has become more visible in its efforts to expand into other countries.  Saudi Arabia has started to suffer from internal bombings conducting by Daesh operatives, and the presence of Daesh has been noted in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, and Armenia (this includes countries with Islamic extremist groups who have declared their allegiance to Daesh).  Currently, the Islamic State has the momentum in both Iraq and Syria.  In fact, with only the remnants of the regime left to oppose their advance, Syria is beginning to look like a done deal, at least as far as Assad is concerned.  Last week, Daesh operatives captured the Syrian/Iraqi border town of al-Tanf (al-Waleed in Iraq), which is a major victory for the extremist group.  Controlling this entry point will allow Daesh to resupply its forces in Iraq more quickly, and vice versa.  It solidifies their communication and transportation network between the two countries, and will undoubtedly bring more pressure on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Anbar Province.

Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies.  No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers.  Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria.  But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies.  We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit.  But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets.  Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target.  It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves.  The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh.  Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters.  No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.

From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries.  This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale.  It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda.  These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame.  Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities.  We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya.  There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships.  Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation.  One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent.  But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target.  As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms.  It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.

How do we fix this mess that we are in overseas?

Presently, the United States has involved itself in three conflicts raging overseas.  I'm sure some folks actually believed President Obama when he paid lip service to the Elizabeth Warren click within the Democratic Party and promised to end foreign U.S. military involvement.  I can't really pin the blame for the crisis in the Ukraine on Obama, because Russian President Vladimir Putin has obviously been the one calling all the shots.  I can, however, call into question his strategy of implementing sanctions on Russia, and keeping the sanctions in place long after it has become apparent that Russians don't give a shit about sanctions.  But Putin's ballsy decision to scoop up the Crimea practically overnight was a surprise to just about everyone.  When the move in Crimea coincided with an outbreak in separatist activity in Donbas (ESE Ukraine), it was apparent to us that Putin was looking for a bargaining chip, something he could trade in exchange for recognition of Russia's claim to Crimean sovereignty.  But Putin was taken as much by surprise as we were by the weak and limp-wristed response by the European Powers, NATO, and the United States.  Putin annexed territory belonging to a foreign state and began fomenting rebellion elsewhere, and the response from the free world is little more than a 5-minute stay in time out.  Don't agree?  Well, explain it to me then.  I am in serious need of educating.  How has the sanctions regime impacted the Russian decision to invalidate the territorial integrity of a UN and NATO member state?  It appears to me, that as of May 22, 2015, the Russians/Separatists (it will continue to get more and more difficult to tell them apart, as Russia decides to end the charade) are again on the offensive, moving further west into Ukraine, consolidating their hold on Luhansk and Donetsk, and preparing to lay siege to Mariupol.  What can be done?  Europe and the United States seem content to talk about more sanctions (you would think that they would be a bit embarrassed by now, talking about additional sanctions when the ones in place have had no impact on Russian policy whatsoever), so its up to us to talk about solutions. 

First and foremost, when dealing with Putin, a foreign leader with any hope of success must call Putin's bluff.  Inform Putin that if Russia does not evacuate Crimea and Donbas within a week, that the U.S. and NATO will begin full military deployment in the Baltic Republics, Poland, and Ukraine.  By deployment, I don't mean actual U.S. Marines, I'm talking about full military support, in equipment, tanks, planes, anti-aircraft batteries, surface to air missiles, and, if possible, implementation of the defensive, anti-ballistic missile "Dome" that everyone nicknamed "Star Wars".  Putin cannot accuse the west of militarizing Russia's borders, not when Putin is in the middle of doing it himself.  The only language Putin understands is the language of force.  His only choice for diplomacy is diplomatic aggression.  On the other hand, if he makes a move in the right direction, and starts to de-militarize eastern Ukraine, then the United States and NATO should take appropriate, similar action.  Dealing with Putin is like trying to stop a flood.  The only way to be successful is by building a dam, and saying, "no further".

The situation in Iraq and Syria is more complicated.  Formerly we would evaluate the scenarios as separate battlefields.  We have abandoned that perspective.  The Islamic Front (IS) continues to surprise analysts and military leaders alike in its ability to rebound from defeats and its ability to transport men and equipment so quickly and effectively.  Granted, the IS has become masterful at taking full advantage of sandstorms and other weather anomalies, but recent events in Anbar and also Syria have made it apparent that the IS views the conflict as one battlefield, and regroups, resupplies and conducts offensives accordingly.  Today, the Iraqi military is taking drastic measures to present an all-out disaster with the loss of the Baiji refinery.  There has been some discussion of an offensive to retake Ramadi, but if resources are allocated for just such an operation, don't be surprised to see Tikrit again fall to the IS.  It has become apparent to us that the Iraqi military has a limited number of effective, reliable troops, and they are shuttled from one crisis area to the next.  No doubt the 1500 U.S. instructors are tasked with increasing that number, but so far they haven't had much peace, with al-Asad Airbase under constant threat.  We are most concerned, as we have always been, with the security of U.S. personnel, and the possible occupation of Baghdad by the IS.  We would like to take the opportunity to repeat our warning to either move all non-essential U.S. personnel out of Iraq, or, evacuate it completely, hook, line, and sinker.  As it is, with State Dept., Intel folks, USAID, multiple private security contractors, etc., all over the place, from Mosul to Basra, I am petrified that the IS is going to get its hands on any number of U.S. persons.  We all can only imagine what would happen.

Syria is a bit different.  We don't have the same concerns regarding U.S. personnel, although given the nebulous nature of the Free Syrian Army, we may be mistaken.  We have been convinced for a few months now that Assad and the Ba'ath regime is living on borrowed time.  We cannot envision a scenario in which Assad can pull defeat from the jaws of victory.  It does appear as if Assad has been forsaken by his Russian friends, as the influx of weapons and equipment we anticipated never materialized.  Is it possible that Putin's addition of one naval port (Crimea) allowed him to shelve his designs for a Mediterranean naval base, at least for the time being?  The IS and its surrogates, including the burgeoning Jabhat al-Nusrah, are sitting in the catbird seat, with regime forces only in control of areas west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.  Sure there are outposts and isolated units in the east, but lets be realistic: Assad needs to decide if he is going to go down with the ship, a la Gadhafi, or when its best to vacate Damascus for friendlier environs (a Black Sea Dacha, maybe?).  It appears as if the IS is in no hurry to settle things in Syria, probably because it currently has the full military initiative in Iraq.

How can something positive be delivered of this difficult predicament?  Firstly, the decision must be made in the capitals of Europe and Washington DC, that there will be no negotiating with the Islamic State.  If the member States of the EU and the United States were to sign such a pledge, it would send the right kind of message to the IS, and be a move in the right direction.  The battlefield in Iraq is the key to the conflict with the IS.  They have proven to be much more strategic and adept at military planning than expected, but it shouldn't be difficult to take advantage of their limited military experience.  What the IS can ill-afford to lose is fighters.  Make the IS bleed in Iraq; make every inch, every foot, every mile carry a tremendous price tag.  This can't be achieved by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) alone, although if the Iranians were keen on a full engagement against the IS, we believe that they would win the day handily, as would the Marines that we believe should be deployed in Iraq in targeted operations, with the sole purpose being to kill as many IS fighters as possible.  Sure, we could give the Iraqis the equipment that our Marines would use, but I don't trust them.  In a week, there would be another evacuation, and all that equipment would end up in IS hands...again.  The Marines know the job, and they will clean up.  Within a month of targeted operations involving the U.S. Marines, with heavy Air Support, the IS will be on the run from Baiji and from Anbar itself.  More importantly, they will be suffering a manpower issue, which can only assist whatever policy is formulated in Syria.  We can't hypothesize about possible U.S. action in Syria because we still have no clue who or what the Free Syrian Army is, and where they are.  Its possible that the IS could be bled enough in Iraq to allow a large-enough neutral army like the Free Syrian Army, to pacify the countryside for possible elections and the arrival of UN Peacekeepers.  At this stage, in Iraq, we believe that the time has come to remind the Iraqi people that we do believe in their future, and we are willing to fight alongside them against the IS.  This effort should be worth at least two permanent Air Bases and at least one, huge Army facility.  

Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.

[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.


A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed.  The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government.  They would be absolutely correct in their assessment.  They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through.  Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow.  Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition.  The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone.  All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar.  The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar.  The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit.  If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit.  As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit.  Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.

Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed.  We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block.  Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass.  What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi!  I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them?  We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I.  At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military.  But this time around, I expect some accounting!  Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability?  How about, "once-burned, twice shy"?  I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery,  rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition?  Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS?  From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment. 

Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA).  That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it.  True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines.  The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict.  Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue.  Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself.  I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action.  In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting.  We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target?  Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.

I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA.  I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime.  Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis.  So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point?  All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely.  The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles.  What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS.  Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move.  But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies.  If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.   

The Shit is About to Hit The Fan, Folks.

Links: A. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Iraq.
           B. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Syria.
           C. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Ukraine.

Before we take a graceful swan-dive into the subject of today's post, I want to bring attention to the three links that I have provided.  All three links are generated from the same blog, "The Institute for the Study of War" (ISW).  At times I have praised certain websites and blogs, especially if I find myself becoming a regular visitor.  But I must truly take my hat off to the people behind this blog.  I am repeatedly amazed by the detail, accuracy, and familiarity with ground truth, that is so evident in ISW updates.  I am most impressed with ISW's ability to provide the same high-caliber reporting from three separate battlefields.  Personally, I'm already combining the Syrian and Iraqi zone of conflict, but Ukraine is entirely different nut altogether.  Everyday I wait for my email from ISW; kudos to whoever runs the show for turning me into and out-and-out ISW junkie!

After taking a few minutes to praise another blog, allow me to take a few more to praise my own.  We have been raising the warning flag regarding the Islamic State's (IS) ability to threaten Baghdad for some months now.  Yesterday, the IS launched a furious assault on Ramadi and also NW of Ramadi in the direction of al-Asad Air Base, a location that had received a great deal of attention from just about everyone.  It is likely that the IS will occupy Ramadi, at least most of it, and also probable that the ISF, and or a Shi'a militia, will snatch it back.  But this game of give-and-take is accomplishing something strategic and tremendously valuable to IS.  You see, the continued battles for the Sunni communities on the road to Jordan provide the IS with the opportunity to seed the bedroom communities of Baghdad with sympathizers, and eventually operatives.  The style of semi-urban warfare takes a page out of Vietnam.  One of the many reasons that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were initially so successful in the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pre-positioning of sympathizers and irregular forces in the close suburb communities outside Saigon, DaNang, and Hue.  We are convinced that the IS has been seeding various Sunni residential areas outside the capital with supporters and operatives, waiting for the order to become operational.  The IS also seeded the Yarmouk Refugee Camp just outside of Damascus, and they were so successful that analysts are already conceding that territory to the IS.  Its not rocket science.

We at Mukhabarat, Baby! are growing more concerned every day for the still-substantial number of American and European non-combatants in Baghdad.  Its my understanding that certain agencies have re-deployed officers back to Iraq after the Obama drawdown.  Here is a very important question: if the U.S. has non-combatants (intelligence officers, engineers, instructors, linguists, support staff, etc.) widely dispersed in places such as Basra, Erbil, Mosul, and Baghdad, who do these people look to for protection?  I'm not exactly sure how many U.S. troops are in Iraq and what their designation happens to be, by last November President Obama was given approval to send 1,500 troops (specifically in a training posture) to Iraq.  So whatever civilians the U.S. government and its contractors have in Iraq are relying upon the lightly-trained Iraqi Security Forces and possibly the odd Shi'a militia for protection.  Forgive me, but we find this arrangement unacceptable, given the IS' track record in dealing with prisoners.  We must be proactive, and either move our people out, or take steps to ensure their safety by the U.S. military.

Syria also appears to be nearing the finishing line, but we've been beating this horse to death lately.  Because of the myriad of equities involved, the IS may not go in for the "coup de grace" for some time yet.  If Russia had given the slightest inclination of providing Assad the military support he needs, then possibly it would be best for the IS to strike while the iron's hot. But Russia seems solely interested in dumping its excess weaponry and equipment in eastern Ukraine, where it is greedily gobbled up by the various separatists groups. I saw a video clip last week that I haven't been able to relocate, otherwise I would have included it on my links.  It was a clip of a group of separatists trying to make heads or tails out of a relatively small missile or grenade launcher of some sort.  To cut to the chase, the evil guerilla driving accidentally ran over one of his guerilla buddies.  I haven't laughed so much since the photo of the Pakistani guy catching his arm on fire as he tries to ignite a U.S. flag.  Priceless.  Back to Syria.....certainly it appears that the IS is in position to pick off regime-held towns along the Anti-Lebanon mountain chain, until reaching Damascus.  If Assad were still in town, then the IS could seal up the place and starve him out.  But by then, Assad will have vacated the premises for more pleasant digs.  But the IS must eventually address a few political issues regarding the various factions that have been opposing Assad as well, some of them for a much longer period of time.  We have argued that the numerous groups, including Jabhat al-Nusrah, Khorasan, and the IS, are, at the end of the day, loyal to the Sunni cause and the leadership of Osama bin-Laden.  Would the IS share authority with the others?  And what of the Free Syrian Army?  Obviously they can't be abandoned after volunteering to fight as a proxy ground force for the Pentagon.  Something tells me that the lot of 'em, families in tow, will be receiving Resident Alien status.  And who am I to complain?  At least its something that this administration does well.

Of the three trouble spots that we've been examining (with the expert guidance of the ISW), Ukraine appears to be the one with the most staying power.  I can't imagine that the Russian Army will roll across the Ukrainian border, make short work of the Ukrainian Army, and then occupy the entire country.  This festering boil will continue to fester for some time to come.  Putin is obviously committed at some level.  Russian troops and tanks are in Ukraine, and Russian Migs and Sukhois are patrolling the skies in the east.  At one point, it appeared that Putin was attempting to use the Donbas region as a bargaining chip, to ensure that Kiev and the west recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea.  As Putin, who still thinks like an intelligence officer, sees it, a simple trade would have been sufficient.  We stop destabilizing Donbas, you forget about Crimea.  But we've moved quite a bit down the road since then.  The Ukrainian Army has shown itself to be far less effective than originally thought.  In fact, in many instances, it has been the separatists who have won the day in direct clashes with the Ukrainian Army.  Its possible that the government of Ukraine is holding back its major military resources in case a defense of Kiev of the heartland is necessary.  We can't say.  One thing is for sure...the Ukrainian Army currently in the field in the southeast, will be chewed up quickly if the anticipated offensive takes place as expected.  Its true that members of the U.S. military are currently in Ukraine, assisting in the training of the many new recruits that have poured into the recruitment offices in the west of the country.  But what the Ukrainian military needs more than anything else (short of western military intervention), is a dump of military weapons and equipment.  If the G.I. from Savannah, Georgia is going to tech the young Ukrainian private how to shoot an M16, it would be nice if an M16 were available for the private to use.  Back to the bigger picture....we still aren't convinced that Putin has in interest in swallowing up the entire Ukraine. It would be more trouble than its worth.  A struggling economy, reliance on Russia for energy, a vocal, agitated youth movement, and issues with NATO would be waiting for Vladimir if he managed to occupy the entire country.  Its possible that he simply wants to bring Ukraine back into the fold, and at the same time, annex both Donbas and Crimea.  Crimea is worth the hassle....but Donbas?