Thirteen years later, a look back at the Iraq War, its motivations, and its consequences. (Part II)

Part II

At the time, the only real conflict in the region was taking place in Syria, but the revolution to overthrow Bashar al-Assad had nothing to do with the new Iraq, so there probably was not a rush to fully complete the training program.  In 2010, when the training program was still basically in the beginning stages, President Barack Obama ordered the U.S. military to depart Iraq according to a particular timeline.  At the end of the day, I believe the timeline called for the removal of all but the most essential military personnel with one year.  Allegedly, the Obama Administration was warned by the Pentagon that the Iraqi military was in no shape to take over the security of the nation, but it made no difference.  You see, mid-term elections were coming up stateside, and the Administration's political base was not happy that President Obama hadn't fulfilled his campaign pledge to bring U.S. troops home.   Because this post has already stretched into two, I will mercifully bring things to a close.  We left Iraq with an untrained army, holding a billion dollars worth of the world's most modern weaponry. 

Across the border in Syria, ISIS, which had started to draw attention to itself through its regular use of butchery and stark brutality, saw an incredible opportunity.  They took an eraser to their previous maps of "the Caliphate" and added Iraq.  Then ISIS put together a military campaign that relied heavily on its ability to be mobile and move quickly, and invaded Iraq.  The only real opposition facing ISIS were the Kurds and the Peshmerga, as first Mosul fell, and then to the south, Baiji and Tikrit, which was the real catastrophe.  The young, untrained Iraqi Army recruits deserted their positions en masse, living in the sand rifles, GPS devices, mortars, electronic warfare equipment, targeting devices, artillery, and even vehicles.  ISIS is known for its ability to adapt, and that equipment and ammunition not doubt, has been essential in subsequent operations. As for Iraq, the schools are now only half-open, many of the new highways are destroyed by artillery fire, and the Baiji refinery itself as been one of the most contested battlefields of the conflict.  From 2009 to 2016....Iraq is an example of what happens when people who don't respect or understand the military, make decisions that direct impact the battlefield.  In this instance, the decision created one.

Iraqi military and special police preparing assault to retake Ramadi.

Link: Iraqi government forces close in on Ramadi.


With recent events in Syria and Paris dominating the international press, the Iraqi government's much-publicized offensive to retake Ramadi is no longer front-page news.  Actually, the struggle to retake Ramadi has taken much longer than the government and the Iraqi people expected.  Combat around Baiji and in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have made for much more interesting journalism, as the average person begins to consider that the Ramadi campaign has become a stalemate.  Fortunately, in the last few days, news reports from the Iraqi government and the Pentagon indicate that the Iraqi Armed Forces are getting very close to recapturing the capital city of Anbar Province.  It is estimated that ISIS has roughly 600 to 1000 fighters still hunkered down in the few downtown neighborhoods that government forces have yet to reoccupy.  The fact that the Iraqi government is determined to complete this operation according to plan, with minimal casualties and damage to infrastructure, is very encouraging.  Its true that the campaign to retake the city has not followed the most ideal timetable, but the Iraqi authorities have been able to carefully search areas formally occupied by ISIS, in order to remove any improvised explosive devices or abandoned munitions.

Last Wednesday, Iraqi forces took possession of the Palestine Bridge in the northwest part of the city.  The bridge, which spans the Euphrates River, was a vital link to food and other supplies for ISIS.  The coalition air campaign continues to harass ISIS by strafing supply routes and bombing key defensive positions.  In fact, air support has proven particularly effective in destroying explosives that were purposely planted in abandoned structures in the downtown part of the city.  Aggressive action by the coalition air support has been instrumental in saving the lives of ground troops, as explosives disposal teams prepare to enter neighborhoods that have been cleared of ISIS snipers.  Iraqi authorities fully expect the remaining ISIS operatives to fight to the death.

Once the military campaign to liberate Ramadi is complete, the Iraqi military will focus on bringing relief to Haditha, which although occupied by Iraqi forces, has been under assault by ISIS for most of the year.  In recent weeks, coalition air attacks have successfully targeted ISIS positions and prevented the delivery of supplies to ISIS operatives near Haditha.  Al-Asad Air Base in outside of Haditha, and presents a valuable target for ISIS.  U.S. troops have been present at Al-Asad for some time, providing important training to Iraqi personnel.  For some inexplicable reason, the Obama Administration made no attempt to keep this particular bit of information confidential.  Once the international media got wind of the presence of U.S. troops at Al-Asad, ISIS wasn't far behind.  Can you imagine if ISIS were to overrun that base and take our young men and women prisoner?  Fortunately, recent combat in the Haditha area has severely compromised ISIS' ability to conduct offensive activity.  No doubt the Iraqis are also determined to remove ISIS from Fallujah, which sits northeast of Ramadi and is actually closer to Baghdad (as the crow flies).  The various Shi'a militias were more-or-less assigned the task of retaking Fallujah, while the Iraqi Regular Army and Special Police targeted Ramadi.  At various times over the past six months, it appeared that Fallujah would fall first.  The fact that Ramadi will indeed be reoccupied by government forces before the Iranian-backed militias have removed ISIS from Fallujah will be celebrated in Baghdad, where the populace has begun to voice its annoyance at what is perceived to be Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.

Russia and Iran; friends for the moment, or for the distance?

Links: A. Russia making military commitment in Syria.
           B. Russia warming up to Iran is part of broader Russian policy.

Earlier this year, when it became apparent that Barack Obama had ordered U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to successfully conclude a nuclear treaty with Iran, regardless of the sacrifices, there was some confusion regarding the continued closeness of Iran with Russia, who had previously been Iran's closest ally with regards to the nuclear issue.  Was it possible that this new treaty, which was actually signed by a few European nations as well, would usher in a new era of cooperation between the United States and Iran, to the detriment of Russia?  It certainly wasn't likely, and in fact, within days after the agreement was announced, Iranian religious leaders were up to their tired old bullshit of parading around mass quantities of zealots, screaming, "death to America!".  No doubt Vladimir Putin didn't even flinch when news of the treaty reached Moscow.  He had been working on his own strategy in the region, and in this plan, Iran is a major player.

Once Putin realized that U.S. President Barack Obama was content to ride out his last term in office, allowing the nuclear treaty to be his "legacy moment in foreign policy", he crafted a new direction for Russian foreign policy, which if successful, would displace the United States as the world's only superpower, to be replaced by Russia.  The advent of ISIS and Russia's long-time close relationship with de-facto Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave Putin the perfect opportunity to implement his plan.  Russia would intervene militarily in Syria, and using Assad as a proxy, defeat ISIS.  But Putin had no intention of allowing ISIS to retreat into the wastelands of western Iraq, to lick its wounds and reload.  Russia's new best friend, Iran, would be the next opponent for ISIS to confront.  In fact, Putin's plan was to confront ISIS in Syria with Assad/Russian support, and simultaneously push ISIS westward from Iraq, using the Iranian Shi'a militias, Iraqi Army, and Iranian military units, if necessary.  Russia has established itself militarily in Syria, as planned, but Iran has to negotiate its way through a bit of a diplomatic triangle in Iraq.  The United States continues to have instructors imbedded with the Iraqi Army, and the U.S.-led air coalition remains active, conducting daily sorties against ISIS targets.  Iran's plan is to support the Iraq Army and its Iranian-backed militia partners in action separate from Iraqi Army efforts which involve the U.S., with the intention that one effort will be successful and the other will fail.  Currently, the U.S.-supported effort by the Iraqi Army to retake Ramadi appears to be failing, while the recent militia-supported operation to retake Baiji and its important oil refinery was successful.  This occurred on the heels of an announcement of the creation of a joint communication cell in Baghdad between the Russians, Iraqis, and Iranians.  Putin is convinced that once Iraqi military initiatives directly supported by U.S. personnel fail, that the Obama Administration will throw in the towel.  He is betting on the likelihood that a failure in Ramadi will lead to demonstrations against U.S. involvement in Iraq.  Once the U.S. is out, then Iran will "lead" the Iraqi Army, militias, and Iranian Special Forces/Republican Guard units in confrontation with ISIS.

Putin's long-term strategy is that by defeating ISIS, Russia and Iran will increase their influence, Russia internationally, and Iran regionally.  Russia's entry into the Syrian conflict has removed the eyes of the west from Ukraine, allowing Putin to forget that within the last two years, Russia has annexed Crimea, an integral part of the Republic of Ukraine, and that Russian military equipment was responsible for the tragic destruction of a civilian airliner and the murder of hundreds of innocent people.  Putin has changed the topic of international conversation.  Today, the world is focused on Syria and the continuing refugee problem, which provides Putin with more justification for military involvement in Syria.  Someone has to do something; if not Russia, then who?  The United States is totally reactive in its international relations, and the current administration does not have the stomach for military casualties.  Certainly a united military force created by the various EU nations would handle ISIS without much difficulty, but that option has never even been suggested.  Russia had an invitation to take on ISIS, and Iran will have the opportunity to become the dominant nation in the Persian Gulf region because of its impending involvement in the destruction of ISIS.

Events in Iraq strengthen Iran's position.

On October 14, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) announced the commencement of a military ground offensive in the direction of Baiji and the strategic Baiji Oil Refinery.  Possession of the refinery has been contested since the initial early successes of the Islamic State (ISIS) in its invasion of Iraq.  This particular military initiative is being conducted in close cooperation with the Iranian-backed Shi'a militia Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, with a number of recognizable Iranian military advisers directly involved.  The announcement of this effort came as a bit of a suprise as beforehand the priority of the Haider al-Abadi Administration had been the recapture of Ramadi City and the defeat of ISIS in Anbar Province.

Early reports from Baiji indicate that the ISF and the Kata'ib militia have made impressive gains against ISIS positions.  A number a small, strategic communities to the west of Baiji have been recaptured, and The refinery itself has been returned to Iraqi government control.  We repeat these reports with a word of caution: the Iraqi press has a tendency to produce over-optimistic battlefield reporting, especially in the early stages of a new ISF offensive.  ISIS has been on the run in Baiji before, only to return quickly with stronger forces.  The Baiji Refinery has consistently been the site of heavy fighting because of its strategic value.  Additionally, the Iraqi people have expressed great interest in this particular contested location, which increases its importance from a public morale perspective.  During the next week, the actual success of the ground offensive in Baiji will become clearer.  If indeed the ISF, with strong support from the proxy militia Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, has reoccupied both Baiji City and the Refinery, it will constitute another victory for Iran over the United States in the effort to curry favor and influence with the Abadi Administration.

Because the United States was heavily involved in training the military units that are currently engaged in the effort to recapture Ramadi City, if the offensive fails, it will have a potentially catastrophic impact on U.S. influence in Baghdad.  Coincidentally, since the genesis of recent direct Russian military involvement in Syria, the Iranians have increased their visibility in Iraq.  In the past, the Iranians were content to limit their overt exposure to involvement with the Shi'a militias.  This has changed, as the Iranians,Russia and Iraq recently created a military coordination office in Baghdad, alongside offers from Moscow to the Abadi Administration to provide valuable intelligence  on ISIS.  The U.S. responded with a successful raid alongside Kurdish Peshmerga to rescue seventy Kurdish hostages from imminent beheading, but otherwise, the United States appears content to discuss cooperation with Russia regarding Syria, and to leave present military influence in Iraq to Iran.

Iraqi Security Forces beginning final push on Ramadi, while Iranian-backed Shi'a militias confront Baiji.

Link: Iraqis closing in on Ramadi.

In May, 2015, forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), sometimes referred to as ISIL, captured the Sunni controlled city of Ramadi, which is located in the far east of Anbar Province, within roughly sixty miles of Baghdad.  ISIS was also able to capture the city of Fallujah, which is even closer to the capital city.  Americans may remember the names "Ramadi" and "Fallujah", as U.S. military forces had a difficult time clearing both cities of insurgents during the Iraq conflict.  Ramadi and Fallujah are part of a string of Sunni-dominated cities in Anbar that stretch from Ramadi in the east to Qa'im in the west.  There has been some concern that the Sunni community in Iraq might eventually join ISIS in an effort to avoid domination by Iran and the Iraqi Shi'a population.  Following the occupation of Ramadi by ISIS in May, the government in Baghdad made the recapture of the city its highest military priority.  In July, amid much fanfare, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside elements of the Iraqi Police, launched an offensive aimed not only at Ramadi, but to rid Anbar Province of ISIS completely.  As a sign of cooperation, the Iranian backed Shi'a militias (or the Popular Mobilization Units, as they prefer to be called) would attack Fallujah simultaneously.  For both the militias and the ISF, the road west to Ramadi and Fallujah has been costly and increasingly difficult.  At times, the Iraqi General Command expressed frustration with what they saw as lack of support from the U.S.-led coalition air campaign.  Also, ISIS utilized distraction-attacks in other provinces to encourage respective governors to demand a return of all provincial troops taking part in the Anbar offensive.  As the ISF and the militias slowly moved closer to their targets, ISIS has increased SVBIED attacks, not to mention the booby traps left behind as ISIS strategically retreats and redeploys.  As of October 2015, it is estimated that ISIS has somewhere in between 600 and 1000 fighters hunkered down in Ramadi (I have found no estimates of the ISIS forces in Fallujah)  As the ISF and the militias begin what they hope is the last phase of the offensive, it has become apparent that ISIS has rigged the entire inner city of Ramadi with IEDs and various just-as-deadly booby traps.  The air coalition and the Iraqi General Staff have moved past any disagreements, and during the last month, air sorties in and around Ramadi and Fallujah have caused ISIS serious casualties.  Certain roads in and out of both cities have remained open, which has allowed supplies and fighters to get through.  Regardless, for the sake of the independence of the Abadi Administration in Baghdad, Ramadi must be recaptured.

If Ramadi remains under ISIS control, it will reflect negatively on the United States.  The ISF have been trained by U.S. specialists, and the coalition air campaign is perceived as basically controlled by the Pentagon.  Failure to take Ramadi would result in tremendous criticism of the Abadi Administration's close relationship with the United States.  Can you imagine if ISIS keeps control of Ramadi, but Fallujah falls to the militias?  This would provide the Iranians and their Iraqi supporters will all the ammunition they need to force Abadi into adopting a more pro-Iranian policy.  With the Shi'a community in control of the government, and the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani already spotted in Baiji, there can be no doubt that the Iranians intend to push the United States out of Iraq for good.  Certainly the success of militias operations led by Iranian military personnel, combined with the failure of the U.S.-supported ISF offensive in Anbar, will impact the amount of influence the Iranians have in Baghdad, not to mention the all-important battle for hearts-and-minds.  Since our precipitous military departure from Iraq in 2010, leaving building projects unfinished and, more importantly, military training programs incomplete, the Iranians have kept up a media campaign to portray the United States as undependable.  Once the Iranians drop the pretense and we see Iranian military forces on the ground in Iraq, then the game will be over.  Iran, alongside its ISF partner, will force ISIS out of Iraq and back into the deserts of Syria, where the Russian Air Force and Special Forces will be waiting.  The International Community will give thanks, appropriately, to Russia and Iran, for their willingness to sacrifice the lives of their sons and daughters in the noble effort to destroy ISIS.  That's when things will get really interesting...... 

ISIS continues attacks on provincial targets, as civilain casualties mount.

Link: Rare ISIS VBIED in Basra.

As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to inch closer to the strategic areas of Ramadi, ISIS reminds Baghdad of the breadth of its reach, as Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are detonated in suburban areas of Baghdad, Diyala Province, and south of Basra.  The attack in Zubair, south of Basra was especially concerning as only one previous VBIED has ever been detonated this far south.  The weekend of bloodshed is a clear indication that ISIS will not deter from its overall plan to make the provinces of Iraq more and more difficult to govern.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in Diyala Province, where a VBIED in the town of Khalis casts doubt on the success of recent security measures taken by the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).  With much of the police manpower at the front, supplementing the Armed Forces, the PMUs have taken a more visible role in providing security on the streets of Iraq.  The PMUs have elaborate mechanisms in place to defeat the attempts to successfully detonate a VBIED.  All of the roads are monitored closely, with numerous checkpoints and roadblocks.  Somehow, ISIS continues to get VBIEDs on the roads.  Almost every VBIED has been driven by a single male, usually in his 20's.  Unfortunately, in Iraq, the highways are full of cars whose only passenger is the young man behind the wheel.  The only truly effective way to eliminate the use of vehicles as moving bombs is to force everyone to either walk, bicycle, or use public transportation.  Sadly, this would probably result in the use of buses as mass killing machines.

With recent VBIED attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra and Salah al-Din Provinces, ISIS continues to demonstrate basic freedom of movement.  The ISF has also ben unable to permanently cut the roads between Fallujah and Ramadi.  ISIS is able to move personnel and supplies into Ramadi, although with the Allied Air Campaign in full swing and the ISF artillery getting more and more accurate, I wouldn't chance a trip on that road.  Why haven't all the roads leading into and out of Ramadi and Fallujah been completely destroyed?  Is it out of concern for the number of civilians who still live in these communities and rely on the roads for food, medical care, and as a means of last-minute evacuation?  No one has been able to come up with a reliable figure as to how many civilians remain in Fallujah and Ramadi (it appears that Fallujah is less deserted than Ramadi), but it can't be a pleasant place to be at the moment.  What is most frustrating is that while the government is training its resources to the breaking point in an attempt to recapture Ramadi, ISIS is able to plan and execute daily VBIED attacks in Baghdad and numerous bordering provinces.  The giant pink elephant in everyone's living room at present, though, is Ramadi- what is going on in Ramadi?  Are the special police units and military actually making daily progress in retaking the city, or have we passed the point for reasonable expectation of victory?  In fact, does evidence exist that the ISF has broken off offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah?  Is the government just waiting for the best time to spill the bad news?  Serious fighting continues in and around Baiji and in Salad al-Din Province, and the Kurds in the north regularly find ways to ambush ISIS patrols, so how important is Ramadi?  From a confidence perspective, it means everything.  If the government announces a general retreat from Anbar, then they had better be prepared to invite the Iranian Army across the border, because someone has to stop ISIS before they storm Baghdad.  Actually, a military collapse would provide just the justification for direct Iranian military intervention.  The players would then be in place for Putin's grand scheme.  The Russians destroy Assad's opposition in Syria, then tackle ISIS head-on, while the Iranians engage ISIS in Iraq.  Ideally, in the end, with ISIS vanquished, the Russians and the Iranians would meet up and shake hands, like the Russians and the Americans/British did in April 1945 at the River Elbe in Germany.  Putin would be hailed as a tremendous leader and the man of the hour, and the Iranians would have totally reformed their image, and could for the most part dictate the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.  Lets meet in year, same time, same place, and see how my prognostications played out.

Blame to go around as the Anbar Offensive against ISIS sputters to a halt on the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: The Anbar offensive appears to be failing.

Over the past few weeks, we've scoured news sources coming from Iraq, trying to get an accurate perspective on the offensive in Anbar Province that the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) launched in May.  The offensive operation, which included a simultaneous attack on ISIS-held Fallujah by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), had been planned to the smallest detail and included the training and equipment to deal with remote detonation explosives, booby-traps and urban warfare.  The last few days of May slipped away, then June.  In July, the Iraqi government started hinting that progress was being made, and that bit-by-bit, landmarks on the outskirts of the two cities had been secured.  In July, the government responded to questions about the slow pace of the offensive by reminding the media that the ISF wasn't singularly tasked with removing ISIS from Ramadi; the ISF was also responsible for locating and removing/defusing all the explosives and booby traps being left by ISIS to greet the returning residents of Ramadi.  The Iraqi government added that all the lessons learned from the last ISIS occupation of Ramadi were being considered in the staging of the current offensive.  That explanation sure sounded good to me, especially when the Iraqi government also took the time to thank the coalition air campaign for its accurate and decidedly helpful bombing sorties.  As August started to roll by, I was distracted by ISIS attacks in Diyala Province and the concerns regarding Baiji and Haditha.  Then the government announced its reform agenda, which immediately pushed Ramadi from the front page, and temporarily from my mind.  So we've waded through the reform issue, knowing as we did beforehand that Nouri al-Maliki would call in every marker owed to him to fight off this assault on his power base.  Now that the militias have cast their lot with Maliki, the political battle-lines are drawn.  But with the militias in the mix, we may end up seeing more violence on the streets of Basra than we are seeing on the streets of Ramadi.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's bold moves to reform the Iraqi political system will play out as a backdrop to developments in Anbar.  The Iraqi government's most immediate concern must be the growing impression that ISIS has not only fought off the Anbar offensive, but has started harassing the outlying villages around Baghdad as they had done before.  Iraqi Major General Qasim al-Mohammadi, the head of Anbar Operations Command, is quick with assurances that the offensive is still on track, and that it takes time to clear out every housing cluster, every shop, and every abandoned structure, taking care to remove all unexploded ordinance.  The fact that we've heard this line before doesn't make it any less accurate. From the beginning, our sources stressed that the Iraqi operational plan was built on lessons learned from previous encounters with ISIS.  Also, the Iraqi Army had a serious morale problem that had to be addressed before the Anbar operation.  One of the most frequent complaints was that officers showed indifference to the lives of the frontline troops.  The training modules for the Iraqi Army, including officers, now address that issue.  The slow rate of advance could be a reflection of Iraqi officers being more careful when putting troops in danger.  But Major General al-Mohammadi also expressed frustration with the allied air campaign.  He was very clear, as he was interviewed from his hospital bad after surviving a suicide bomb attack, that the allied air resources are stretched too thin, that there are too many competing targets.  The Pentagon was quick to deny this claim, pointing out that the U.S. spends roughly ten million dollars everyday on the allied air campaign, and that over the last year, coalition warplanes have carried out over four thousand airstrikes in Iraq. 

If history is any indication, then bad news is just around the corner.  Normally, when fingers get pointed, accountability is a no-show, and vital questions remain unanswered, then something is about to fall apart.  We were surprised to learn from the linked Washington Post article that ISIS maintains contact between its Fallujah and Ramadi cells, through the continued existence of a well-known road.  Why hasn't this road been obliterated by airstrikes?  How is it, that after months of news releases from not only the Iraqi government but on occasion by the Pentagon, pointing out the growing encirclement of ISIS units in Ramadi and Fallujah, that we now learn that ISIS forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are not isolated and are actually in regular contact with each other.  Given the ground resources poured into this operation, and the complete lack of heavy armor and very limited use of artillery on behalf of ISIS, how is it that after almost four months, the enemy is still able to re-enforce and re-supply its forces in Ramadi?  What about the F16s delivered to Iraq a few months back- its my understanding that their pilots spent years in the U.S. learning to fly those birds.  So why aren't they out there, bombing the hell out if ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah?  More training?  I know that only four planes are being delivered at a time, but when the enemy has NO air resources and very limited anti-aircraft equipment, I would imagine that those F16s would be out there everyday.  True, they will face the same obstacles as the allied air coalition, including unpredictable weather shifts and sandstorms, so maybe they are out there, doing as much as mother nature will allow.  I hope so.  At the end of the day, I don't see how the Abadi Administration can survive a failure of this magnitude.  A crippled government may be the smallest problem, though, as ISIS appears to be ready in a moments notice, to jump back on the offensive.

Block by block, Iraqi forces begin to dislodge ISIS from the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: ISIS kills two Iraqi generals in separate attacks on the same day outside Ramadi.


Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west.  For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense.  In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity.  At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion.  Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield.  Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer.  People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties.  Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine).  All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS.  The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July.  Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din.  As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji.  The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands).  Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.

Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers.  The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches.  This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable.  With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces.  The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out?  Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47?  The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse.  It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause.  Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.

The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late.  The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press.  But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi?  If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time.  You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning.  This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi.  Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies.  But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before.  ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen.  In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap.  ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule.  ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again.  One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units.  ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units.  It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped.  What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq.  At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army.  Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go.  We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks.  At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street.  We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.

The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package.  On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings.  No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias.  The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity.  Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters.  Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.

Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.

Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.

Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS).  Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah.  The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.  If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west.  After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi.  But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death.  Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication.  In this theater, nothing would surprise me.

The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts.  The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design.  Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs.  Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad.  The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority.  In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations.  While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire.  Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.

The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front.  Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time.  The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing.  Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions.  Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq.  The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack.  At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi.  The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces.  As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties.  Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply.  Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult.  But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements.  Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.  

Who lost Iraq?

Link: Politico magazine's take on "Who Lost Iraq"?


(Update: Before tackling today's unwieldy subject matter, it's time for a quick update, for any of our readers who have an interest.  The book that actually spawned this blog, Mukhabarat, Baby!, has been available at all the usual places (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Booklocker, etc.) for roughly three months.  While the blog has proven to be quite popular and continues to grow in viewership, the book has not done well.  The reviews have been tremendous; in fact, we have yet to receive a negative review.  But at the end of the day, the success of a book is measured in how much it is appreciated by readers, especially readers of its particular genre.  Its safe to say that MB has been unsuccessful with every particular genre.  Since the book has received great reviews, and does provide insight into a world that many seem to hold in fascination, what seems to be the problem?  We even have a comedy out this week with Melissa McCarthy playing a spy.  I have to be honest; it does look funny, and she always seems to make me laugh.  As for MB, the problem is simple to diagnose.  I have been unable to gain traction with regards to exposure.  People aren't buying my book because they don't know it exists.  I haven't been reviewed in the NY Times, Wall Street Journal, or Washington Post, and I haven't been invited onto any news programs to discuss my career and the book.  If an author is fortunate enough to have a good agent and publisher, they run a strong likelihood of being successful, like the Housewives from Beverly Hills and the Duck Dynasty folks (both of whom are or were on the Non-Fiction Best Seller List), while self-published authors like me, even if they follow all of the good advice out there, end up with beautiful blogs and amazing internet book sites, and spend their week nights introducing their book to a virtually deserted VFW somewhere in the middle of the desert in Arizona.  But I won't throw in the towel.  I'm still out there, setting up speaking engagements and talking up my book.  Why not hop on to Amazon and buy it?  Better yet, hop on to Amazon and buy a copy for yourself and separate copies for your friends.  Cheers, friends.)

When someone forwarded me a link to the Politico article which attempts to address the question, "Who lost Iraq?", I had no idea what to expect.  Occasionally Politico will throw a curve, and this has been a rather popular subject in recent weeks.  I read the article through twice, and I can't say that they did a bad job.  Politico assembled a group of persons that it has decided are experts on Iraq, and asked them particular questions regarding the insurgency, the surge, the draw-down, and the current conflict involving ISIS.  After taking a look at the lineup assembled to give us our answers, I couldn't help but wonder, how did they decide which questions to ask what person?  And who chose the "experts" to begin with?  For the sake of the argument, lets give Politico the benefit of the doubt, and move on with the conversation.

Let's start with two basic facts.  First, in 2009, Iraq was making great strides in its recovery from three wars and almost five decades of Saddam Hussein.  The economy was growing, the refineries were functioning, the job market was growing, and construction projects were going on everywhere.  The school were open, including a number of new institutions that were built and paid for by the United States.  In fact, we paid for just about everything, including the infrastructure repair.  The roads and bridges were usable, traffic flowed with working signals and traffic cops were around to assist with accidents and back-ups.  International flights were landing at Baghdad International and, most importantly, the job market was growing. Iraq was on its feet and nearly ready to run its own show.  The past remaining piece of the puzzle?  Iraq was in serious need of a reliable police force and a dependable, well-trained and well-supplied army.  The U.S. military can be given all the credit for the positive changes in Iraq, and should have been left alone to complete the training of the Iraqi Security apparati (police, military, border control, customs, etc.) on their own schedule.

The second point that we can all agree on is that Iraq is now in a state of war with the "Islamic State for the creation of a Caliphate in the Levant", or ISIS, as it is commonly known.  ISIS is a terrorist organization that has developed a powerful, mobile, well-armed conventional army, and it is determined to gain effective control of both Syria and Iraq (and eventually the rest of the Levant).  In 2012 and 2013, ISIS, which until then had been content to raise hell with Bashir al-Assad and his forces in Syria, decided to expand its religious war into northern Iraq.  Mosul fell, and Kirkuk and Arbil were threatened.  The Kurds were put on the defensive and had to military repel ISIS with very little assistance from the outside.  Each new bit of territory that ISIS occupied brought with it new victims; Christians or the wrong kind of Muslims, who were lined up and executed by the hundreds.  At present, ISIS controls much of northwest Iraq, including the border crossings into Syria.  ISIS also controls parts of Anbar Province, including both Ramadi and Fallujah.  Although Tikrit was recently retaken by the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIS continues to put pressure on Baiji and its valuable oil refinery, and recently has stepped up suicide attacks in Diyala Province to the east of Baghdad.  Control of Anbar and Diyala Provinces will allow ISIS to pay siege to Baghdad itself.

So given those two points, what happened to turn situation number one into situation number two?  I will save everyone a little time and answer this myself, because its really not very complicated.  The U.S. military had a timetable for all operations dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Because of the success of the surge and the positive involvement of the Sunni community in defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, it was imperative that the United States not lose that goodwill by abandoning the Iraqi people before their government and its functions were in place to work effectively.  This is exactly the action that was taken by President Obama.  Ignoring the advice of the Pentagon, Obama ordered an increase in the U.S. military departure schedule.  President Obama was bound and determined that our troops would be out of Iraq by such-and-such date.  Soldiers, including Generals, will only object for so long before they will just shut-up and carry out their orders.  We left Iraq before any of their Security forces were prepared.  In fact, we left before the police were prepared to issue speeding tickets, let alone stand up to ISIS.  In response to the growing alarm in the civilian community, the Iraqi government ordered its army to confront ISIS on the battlefield outside Tikrit.  I don't have to remind everyone about the mass desertions, the equipment left on the battlefield for ISIS to steal, and the prisoners captured for more video of mass executions.  Iraq has fallen to shit because we left before our military had sufficiently trained the Iraqis to successfully defend their country in what is obviously an evolving and very dangerous environment.  Why?  Where was the fire, as my grandma used to say?  Why was it so damn necessary to leave Iraq so quickly, instead of a few years down the road when the Iraqis were in a better position to stand up to ISIS?  Our policy not only let down the Iraqi people, it also played into the hands of Iran, who is now seen as the hero in this unfolding nightmare, because the Shi'a militias they train and advise have come to the aid of the Iraqi Security Forces, and with some success.

Let me leave you with the biggest irony of all: how is the Obama Administration dealing with the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces?  Why, we are sending in Army trainers and instructors....the same folks who should have been left to do their jobs in the first place.  Que loco.

Iraq threatening to descend into all-out war, mirroring Syria.

Link: ISIS threatens water supply to Iraqi civilians.


Last year, the Islamic State (IS) used its control of certain dams to impact the Iraqi civilian population's access to water.  In the end, their actions led to the flooding of Ramadi and other smaller, nearby communities.  The IS is again threatening to use its control of dams to further its military objectives.  The IS has already closed the Warrar Dam, north of Ramadi, jeopardizing water supplies to Habaniya and Khalidiya, two towns east of Ramadi.  There is concern that the IS as also closed the Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah.  These developments can only increase the pressure on the civilian population, and bring Iraq that much closer to a humanitarian crisis.  In the big picture, these events demonstrate the rapid break-down in civil authority throughout Iraq.  The central government in is control of maybe fifty percent of the country.  In fact, the Shi'a south, from Hillah and Najaf down to Basra (and east to the Iranian border), appears to be the only part of the country that has not been infiltrated by the IS.  Anbar and Salah al-Din Provinces are war zones, as is Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Nineveh Province in the west have been scenes of sporadic fighting and numerous SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) for the past year.  Basically, whatever authority exists in the north is attributed to Kurdish forces.  As long as the IS occupies large parts of Anbar and continues to pressure the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala, Salah al-Din, Baiji, and numerous other strategic areas, the authority of the Iraqi central government is diminished.

The operational execution of the IS forces continues to impress.  There is an obvious long-term focus on all offensive maneuvers, and every opportunity to exploit the lack of training and discipline of the ISF is exploited to the furthest degree.  The maturity exhibited by the strategic planning and decision making conflicts with the unnecessary civilian executions, although some will argue that the brutalization of the civilian population is intended to create a pliable and easy to govern people.  The IS is not a typical terrorist organization by any stretch.  With the exception of the Taliban (and this claim is open for discussion), the IS is the first terrorist organization with a true conventional military capability.  This fact is one of the reasons that we suspect a much more cordial relationship exists with Al-Qaeda than what has been demonstrated for the media.  President George Bush was determined to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional military confrontation in Afghanistan and (eventually) Iraq.  Once Saddam was defeated, it was imperative that Al-Qaeda not sit idly by as an infidel army occupied an Islamic nation.  Al-Qaeda took the bait, and from 2005 to 2008, was surprisingly resilient.  But in the end, George Bush was able to expose a flaw in the Al-Qaeda structure: it was not built for conventional combat.  By 2010 (thanks to the Sunni "Great Awakening" and the ultimate sacrifice of over 3,000 American heroes), Iraq was well on its way to building a middle class and reviving from decades of totalitarianism.  The one development which could torpedo all the progress, would be the rash and speedy withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq.  You see, the ISF was not yet prepared to defend Iraq.  The U.S. military was following a timetable that they had been led to believe, was "in stone".  The plan was to train the Iraqi security forces, police and special ops folks included, until they showed the capacity to protect their own people.  Instead, we announced to the world (and the IS, who were sitting in Syria, licking their chops, so to speak) that the U.S. military was leaving the security of Iraq to the ISF and departing Iraq on a fast timetable.

Even before the IS moved into Iraq, the organization had shown its ability to conduct conventional military operations. Syria was the ideal location to try out the world's first conventional terrorist army.  The most important factor for the IS is discipline.  Second is resources.  The IS does not seem to have any problem attracting volunteers, but, like any army, they can't be useful until they are trained and equipped.  The IS trains its recruits, and uses them where they are most useful.  Language is considered a valuable tool, especially in the media war.  The IS enjoys nothing more than shocking the folks sitting down to tea in London, with the image of a beheading carried out by a young man with a striking Cockney accent.  One of the factors that continues to impress us is the IS' ability to access and deliver resources to its units stretched out all over Syria and Iraq, and in the middle of an Allied Air Campaign, no less.    At least the IS has lost the element of surprise; they won't be sneaking up on anyone anymore, with "ISIS" being a dirty word in just about every language.  As it exists, the IS really is nothing but an army, fighting a conflict in Syria and Iraq.  The IS does not occupy the Executive Mansion of any particular country, nor does it have a representative political party that dominates a parliament somewhere.  Aside from sycophants and recruiters, ISIS is whatever we have before us in Iraq and Syria.  Which begs the question, with the dastardly and evil deeds they have committed, why haven't they been destroyed?  With the entire U.N. condemning their actions, and their every move likened to "terrorism", why are they still hanging around?

How do we fix this mess that we are in overseas?

Presently, the United States has involved itself in three conflicts raging overseas.  I'm sure some folks actually believed President Obama when he paid lip service to the Elizabeth Warren click within the Democratic Party and promised to end foreign U.S. military involvement.  I can't really pin the blame for the crisis in the Ukraine on Obama, because Russian President Vladimir Putin has obviously been the one calling all the shots.  I can, however, call into question his strategy of implementing sanctions on Russia, and keeping the sanctions in place long after it has become apparent that Russians don't give a shit about sanctions.  But Putin's ballsy decision to scoop up the Crimea practically overnight was a surprise to just about everyone.  When the move in Crimea coincided with an outbreak in separatist activity in Donbas (ESE Ukraine), it was apparent to us that Putin was looking for a bargaining chip, something he could trade in exchange for recognition of Russia's claim to Crimean sovereignty.  But Putin was taken as much by surprise as we were by the weak and limp-wristed response by the European Powers, NATO, and the United States.  Putin annexed territory belonging to a foreign state and began fomenting rebellion elsewhere, and the response from the free world is little more than a 5-minute stay in time out.  Don't agree?  Well, explain it to me then.  I am in serious need of educating.  How has the sanctions regime impacted the Russian decision to invalidate the territorial integrity of a UN and NATO member state?  It appears to me, that as of May 22, 2015, the Russians/Separatists (it will continue to get more and more difficult to tell them apart, as Russia decides to end the charade) are again on the offensive, moving further west into Ukraine, consolidating their hold on Luhansk and Donetsk, and preparing to lay siege to Mariupol.  What can be done?  Europe and the United States seem content to talk about more sanctions (you would think that they would be a bit embarrassed by now, talking about additional sanctions when the ones in place have had no impact on Russian policy whatsoever), so its up to us to talk about solutions. 

First and foremost, when dealing with Putin, a foreign leader with any hope of success must call Putin's bluff.  Inform Putin that if Russia does not evacuate Crimea and Donbas within a week, that the U.S. and NATO will begin full military deployment in the Baltic Republics, Poland, and Ukraine.  By deployment, I don't mean actual U.S. Marines, I'm talking about full military support, in equipment, tanks, planes, anti-aircraft batteries, surface to air missiles, and, if possible, implementation of the defensive, anti-ballistic missile "Dome" that everyone nicknamed "Star Wars".  Putin cannot accuse the west of militarizing Russia's borders, not when Putin is in the middle of doing it himself.  The only language Putin understands is the language of force.  His only choice for diplomacy is diplomatic aggression.  On the other hand, if he makes a move in the right direction, and starts to de-militarize eastern Ukraine, then the United States and NATO should take appropriate, similar action.  Dealing with Putin is like trying to stop a flood.  The only way to be successful is by building a dam, and saying, "no further".

The situation in Iraq and Syria is more complicated.  Formerly we would evaluate the scenarios as separate battlefields.  We have abandoned that perspective.  The Islamic Front (IS) continues to surprise analysts and military leaders alike in its ability to rebound from defeats and its ability to transport men and equipment so quickly and effectively.  Granted, the IS has become masterful at taking full advantage of sandstorms and other weather anomalies, but recent events in Anbar and also Syria have made it apparent that the IS views the conflict as one battlefield, and regroups, resupplies and conducts offensives accordingly.  Today, the Iraqi military is taking drastic measures to present an all-out disaster with the loss of the Baiji refinery.  There has been some discussion of an offensive to retake Ramadi, but if resources are allocated for just such an operation, don't be surprised to see Tikrit again fall to the IS.  It has become apparent to us that the Iraqi military has a limited number of effective, reliable troops, and they are shuttled from one crisis area to the next.  No doubt the 1500 U.S. instructors are tasked with increasing that number, but so far they haven't had much peace, with al-Asad Airbase under constant threat.  We are most concerned, as we have always been, with the security of U.S. personnel, and the possible occupation of Baghdad by the IS.  We would like to take the opportunity to repeat our warning to either move all non-essential U.S. personnel out of Iraq, or, evacuate it completely, hook, line, and sinker.  As it is, with State Dept., Intel folks, USAID, multiple private security contractors, etc., all over the place, from Mosul to Basra, I am petrified that the IS is going to get its hands on any number of U.S. persons.  We all can only imagine what would happen.

Syria is a bit different.  We don't have the same concerns regarding U.S. personnel, although given the nebulous nature of the Free Syrian Army, we may be mistaken.  We have been convinced for a few months now that Assad and the Ba'ath regime is living on borrowed time.  We cannot envision a scenario in which Assad can pull defeat from the jaws of victory.  It does appear as if Assad has been forsaken by his Russian friends, as the influx of weapons and equipment we anticipated never materialized.  Is it possible that Putin's addition of one naval port (Crimea) allowed him to shelve his designs for a Mediterranean naval base, at least for the time being?  The IS and its surrogates, including the burgeoning Jabhat al-Nusrah, are sitting in the catbird seat, with regime forces only in control of areas west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.  Sure there are outposts and isolated units in the east, but lets be realistic: Assad needs to decide if he is going to go down with the ship, a la Gadhafi, or when its best to vacate Damascus for friendlier environs (a Black Sea Dacha, maybe?).  It appears as if the IS is in no hurry to settle things in Syria, probably because it currently has the full military initiative in Iraq.

How can something positive be delivered of this difficult predicament?  Firstly, the decision must be made in the capitals of Europe and Washington DC, that there will be no negotiating with the Islamic State.  If the member States of the EU and the United States were to sign such a pledge, it would send the right kind of message to the IS, and be a move in the right direction.  The battlefield in Iraq is the key to the conflict with the IS.  They have proven to be much more strategic and adept at military planning than expected, but it shouldn't be difficult to take advantage of their limited military experience.  What the IS can ill-afford to lose is fighters.  Make the IS bleed in Iraq; make every inch, every foot, every mile carry a tremendous price tag.  This can't be achieved by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) alone, although if the Iranians were keen on a full engagement against the IS, we believe that they would win the day handily, as would the Marines that we believe should be deployed in Iraq in targeted operations, with the sole purpose being to kill as many IS fighters as possible.  Sure, we could give the Iraqis the equipment that our Marines would use, but I don't trust them.  In a week, there would be another evacuation, and all that equipment would end up in IS hands...again.  The Marines know the job, and they will clean up.  Within a month of targeted operations involving the U.S. Marines, with heavy Air Support, the IS will be on the run from Baiji and from Anbar itself.  More importantly, they will be suffering a manpower issue, which can only assist whatever policy is formulated in Syria.  We can't hypothesize about possible U.S. action in Syria because we still have no clue who or what the Free Syrian Army is, and where they are.  Its possible that the IS could be bled enough in Iraq to allow a large-enough neutral army like the Free Syrian Army, to pacify the countryside for possible elections and the arrival of UN Peacekeepers.  At this stage, in Iraq, we believe that the time has come to remind the Iraqi people that we do believe in their future, and we are willing to fight alongside them against the IS.  This effort should be worth at least two permanent Air Bases and at least one, huge Army facility.  

Tikrit Falls To The ISF

Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit

On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein.  A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers.  While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government.  The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin.  Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts.  The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces.  The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle.  It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.

Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area.  There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur.  If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself.  While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul.  There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq.  Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory.  Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement. 

The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF.  Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army.  The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention.  The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room.  The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country.  It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue.  If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides. 

The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?

Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
           B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
           C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq

We all have our routines.  In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news.  I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media.  For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq.  Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically.  As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth.  When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy.  Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network.  Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail.  The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces".  Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria.  Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army".  The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only.  About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush.  An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.

For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope.  In other words, its a mess.  Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered.  I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three.  Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive.  In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area.  I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am.  As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat.  This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well.  The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad.  Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.

I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army.  I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin.  Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus.  I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad.  Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria.  I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad.  But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon.  This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.

Back to my simple list of questions:

• What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?  
• Has the FSA been stood up?  
• Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?  
• What is the status of the air campaign?  
• What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?  
• If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?  
• If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved? 

Updates From The Ground War In Iraq

Links: A.  Iraqi Troops Retake Three Tents And A Camel Repair Shop
           B.  Women Warriors Not New To Kurdistan

I woke up late this morning and missed Mass.  When I finally got my wits about me I remembered that the Dallas Cowboys game against the Washington Foreskins was on Monday night, so I was a bit grumpy when I turned on the computer and saw the headline, "Iraqi Troops Retake Town". Allegedly the Iraqi Army already controls most of Ramadi, so if the Iraqi Army could dislodge the Islamic State (IS) from Fallujah, it would clearly disrupt the IS efforts to methodically destabilize Baghdad.  Unfortunately, the town that was retaken was not Fallujah, but Jurf al-Sakhar, a Sunni town with roughly 80,000 inhabitants.

For most folks, Jurf al-Sakhar is just another hard-to-pronounce Iraqi village in the middle of nothing.  As a former CIA Case Officer, I recall Jurf al-Sakhar as being home to Saddam Hussein's most important biological weapons research facility.  The town is part of a ribbon of Sunni communities that hug the Euphrates and are buffered to the east and west by Shia villages.  It is strategically located, with Karbala to the west and Hillah to the south.  I made light of the fact that Jurf al-Sakhar is unfamiliar to most people reading this post, but in reality the retaking of Jurf al-Sakhar disrupts any attempt by the IS to encircle Baghdad.  All in all, the deliverance of Jurf al-Sakhar from the IS is good news.  What would truly justify a celebration would be the removal of all IS operatives from Ramadi, and the retaking of Fallujah.  If the Iraqi Army could accomplish these two goals, then my readers would get a respite from daily postings about Baghdad.

I do not purposely neglect discussing the Iraqi northern front.  The truth is, I have some trouble locating dependable reporting from this area.  The Iraqi Army is active not only in and around Tikrit, but also in Baiji, Baqubah, and Kirkuk.

It can be difficult determining exactly where the Iraqi Army leaves off the front line and the Kurdish forces pick it up.  The Iraqi Army and the various Kurdish military elements recognize the need to work together against a common enemy, in this case the IS.  Interestingly enough, I haven't seen much information online regarding the actual authority that Kurdish leaders bequeath to the Peshmerga.  The Peshmerga is the largest, best equipped, best trained, and most respected of all the various military forces that have represented Kurdish interests.  I spent some time with the Peshmerga in 2003, and as I see it, they are the true representative Army of the Kurdish people.  No doubt other groups representing particular political interests will make themselves useful in the war against the IS (these include PUK, PDK, etc. who will always have their own large cadre of bodyguards). But at the end of the day, there is only one Peshmerga.  If it were possible to triple the number of Peshmerga fighters, the IS would be swept away in a month or so.  I have tremendous confidence in these Kurdish soldiers because I have watched them in action both nearby and from afar.  The Peshmerga has never been accused of "too much discipline" during down-time, and the  subject of hygiene seems to escape Peshmerga training programs, but these guys and gals know how to fight.  When the bullets start to fly, the Peshmerga seems to maneuver as one unit with one mind.  They are just as effective in small units as they are in groups of twenty or fifty, and they can transport an amazing amount of heavy weaponry over great distances in no time at all.  In reality, I believe that the IS has stolen its tactics from the Peshmerga.  When I worked with the Peshmerga, there was no consistency to the weaponry.  Some preferred to carry the M16, and others (most) were comfortable with the ubiquitous AK-47.  Any more commentary regarding the Peshmerga will require me to share parts of my book.  Suffice to say that I have great faith in the Peshmerga and only wish we had more.  The many times that I observed Peshmerga during down time made me realize that the cohesiveness that is so apparent during battle, seems to melt away during personal time. Each Peshmerga is responsible for their own personal issues such as health, hygiene, entertainment, and comfort.  In fact, the only time I saw an administrative angle was during meals (not always) and during issues related to ammunition and supply.

Link B is an important article for anyone who requires an accurate vision of the ground war in Syria and Iraq.  Women have always been militarily active in Kurdish history.  The only militaries that use women as effectively as the Peshmerga are the Israelis and the United States, of course.  Kurdish women fighters carry their own equipment and show the same level of personal independence that is such a big part of the Peshmerga way.  The Iraqi Army has a respectable number of female troops, and it is my understanding that they have shown promise on the battlefield.  Any current female troops in the Iraqi Army are part of the new structure implemented after the fall of Saddam Hussein.  This structure is very focused on military instruction and weapons training, so it shouldn't be surprising that so many female troops have achieved success early in their careers.  But at the end of the day, all soldiers must fight and fight well to be successful.  In warfare, the soldier who is unsuccessful at his or her job, never leaves the battlefield.  The IS has made a bit of a public show over the number of female recruits that have arrived from the United States and Europe.  Its one thing to display photos and videos on social media of American and European females sporting the latest in Burkha-wear and waving little Islamic State flags for the camera.  Here in Mookie World we are all about the truth, and I want to hear from these same young ladies a month after their arrival in camp.  I understand that the IS has a few (formerly English) female fighters who have taken to the life of being an Islamic Warrior.  My question is, what would The Prophet say?  Isn't "soldiering" an occupation reserved for men in the world of the "Caliphate"?