The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?

Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
           B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
           C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq

We all have our routines.  In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news.  I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media.  For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq.  Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically.  As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth.  When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy.  Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network.  Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail.  The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces".  Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria.  Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army".  The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only.  About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush.  An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.

For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope.  In other words, its a mess.  Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered.  I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three.  Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive.  In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area.  I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am.  As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat.  This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well.  The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad.  Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.

I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army.  I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin.  Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus.  I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad.  Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria.  I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad.  But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon.  This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.

Back to my simple list of questions:

• What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?  
• Has the FSA been stood up?  
• Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?  
• What is the status of the air campaign?  
• What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?  
• If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?  
• If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved? 

Extremists On The Offensive In Syria

Links: A. Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al Sham Advance In Syria
           B. Islamic State Advances On Deir al Zour

Lately I've had to come to grips with the fact that I was wrong regarding certain events in Syria.  Last month I repeatedly raised expectations that forces loyal to de facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad would have had the opportunity to refit and reorganize.  I opined that Russian military aid would have allowed the Syrian Armed Forces to reconstitute its armor brigades and possibly rebuild the Syrian Air Force.  The Allied air campaign should have occupied the Islamic State (ISIL) and the various other armed groups enough to allow the regular Syrian Army an opportunity to regain the strategic initiative, I hypothesized.  It appears that I was mistaken.  Even though in late November the international media printed a number of stories indicating a slow down in ISIL military advances, the reality is that the extremist groups were on the move just about everywhere. 

For some reason, the press and media continue to separate the groups who make up the Islamic extremist element in Syria.  Wasn't there a recognition in October that Al-Nusra, ISIL, Ahrar al Sham (and whoever else wants to throw their hat into the ring) are loyal to Al-Qaeda?  And yet we continue to see Al-Nusra being given the mantle of "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria", as if we are referring to a Lodge meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  Unless I see some usefulness in doing so, I will not refer to separate Islamic extremist factions in Syria.  I have a good idea why the U.S. media (eager to do the bidding of this administration) continues to perpetrate the falsehood that their is some significant difference between these groups. Qatar (and possibly the UAE as well), who has a couple jets involved in the "anti-ISIS" air campaign, has been suspected of supporting some of these other groups in the past.  Qatar wants to be seen as only bombing ISIL targets, because ISIL's message of an enlarged Caliphate is dangerous to the existing Gulf royal families.  Qatar wants to continue its "clandestine" support for these other groups, though, so they will only participate in ther bombing of ISIL targets.  If someone has evidence that Qatar and the UAE contingents in the air campaign have indeed participated in action against non-ISIL targets, please let me know.  Actually, I'm not even sure of the United States is bombing non-ISIL targets (although you would think that "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria" would be in line for some sort of attention).

What a mess.  We can be certain of one thing: the regular Syrian forces have been taking a beating in the northwestern province of Idlib and eastern province of Deir al Zour.  Interestingly enough, the extremists have been making effective use of American-made TOW anti-tank missiles in action against Syrian armor.  Will I be the first to consider just how the TOW anti-tank missiles ended up the hands of the extremists?  Were they originally the property of the Free Syrian Army that is being supported and armed by the United States?  Assad can only be ringing his hands in despair as the U.S.-led air campaign seems to be having no impact on the Islamic extremists offensives against the few remaining government positions outside of Damascus.  I'm one of those folks who likes to look at a big map and envision the various military elements and positions accordingly.  I have spent a decent amount of time focusing on the regular Syrian Army, and I think I'm beginning to get a grasp on the three main groups that constitute the Islamic extremist forces.  But I'm totally in the dark regarding the army that the United States government was planning on training in place of U.S. ground forces.  Last summer we were told that the United States military would be training and equipping the "Free Syrian Army" (sometimes called the "New Syrian Army").  If my memory serves me correctly, this military force was led by a group of former regime officers who were both secular and opposed to Assad.  Money was allotted for the training and equipping of this army, and I recall the Pentagon supposing that it would take somewhere around four months to stand-up the Free Syrian Army.  In October, my understanding of the situation was shaken like an Etch-a-Sketch.  The Pentagon released a statement declaring that the Free Syrian Army would be a force utilized for defensive operations only.  Then a few days later, I recall news reports indicating that elements of the free Syrian Army had been involved in a battle with ISIS, and came away the worse for it.  Was this a "defensive only" engagement? 

If I could get the answers to a few simple questions, my understanding of the conflict would be increased measurably.  What is the state of the Free Syrian Army?  Does it exist, is it active, and will the Pentagon confirm its previous statement that the Free Syrian Army has definite rules of engagement that limit is capabilities to defensive action only?  Is it true that the Qatari government requested rules of engagement for its contribution to the air campaign, which would exempt Qatari jets from bombing any targets other than ISIL?  If so, does the UAE, Kuwait or Bahrain have the same prohibition sewn into their agreement to be part of the Allied air coalition?  I can't help but feel a bit lost on the Syrian front.  The last time I spent much time on this part of the map, the Kurds were besieged by ISIL in Kobane; has this situation in Kobane changed?  Its true I have been keeping a closer eye on developments in Iraq, as the growing Iranian involvement has me reconsidering my prediction that Baghdad would eventually fall to ISIL.  The Iranians have the capacity to defeat ISIL hands-down.  At the same time, the Iranian government might decide to climb back into its hole and pull back its resources.  When it comes to efforts to obtain weapons-grade Uranium, the Iranians are easy to predict.  But when it comes to the deployment of its military, Iran can vacillate with the best of them.