Russia's latest bombing sorties require closer evaluation.

Link: Russia bombs 448 ISIS targets in Syria.

In the last three days, the Russia Air Force in Syria has conducted 137 bombing sorties against 448 ISIS targets.  This latest uptick in the Russian bombing campaign in Syria comes as ISIS continues to claim responsibility for the October 31 destruction of a Russian passenger airliner over the Sinai.  It is beginning to appear likely that ISIS is behind the tragedy, with the recent high-intensity Russian bombing sorties considered to be a response.  Russia claims that the bombing raids have targeted ISIS' infrastructure, in particular destroying a munitions warehouse near Damascus which hosted makeshift unguided missiles.  The attacks have also resulted in numerous civilian casualties, with multiple claims that non-military targets were bombed.  As ISIS and Russia become more familiar dealing with each other as battlefield opponents, and civilian targets on both sides become more frequent, many more episodes of retaliation-type attacks can be expected.  If ISIS was able to plan and execute the destruction of the Russian airliner in question, it will signify an expansion of ISIS' ability to reach beyond the battlefield and attack non-combatants outside of the Middle East.  If Russia continues to conduct its air sorties with little concern for civilian casualties, ISIS have less trouble recruiting supporters and soldiers from the local population.  And if another airliner affiliated with Russia or one of the members of its budding "coalition" becomes victim of ISIS sabotage, expect the Arab community to be less than sympathetic.  After all, its their families who are being indiscriminately blown to pieces and their farms and homes that are being destroyed by Russian bombs.

One development that warrants closer review is Russia's claim to have targeted multiple ISIS infrastructure locations and munitions factories.  When Russia entered the Syrian conflict, one of its priority concerns should have been the lack of intelligence sources.  On the other hand, the United States, with its sponsorship of ISIS opposition groups and its historic close ties to Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and the Kurds, must have a well-developed network of sources providing timely intelligence.  Its true that Russia has always been very close to the Assad regime, but the intelligence that is most needed, information on ISIS and its movements, is in no way accessible to elements of the Assad regime.  Be that as it may, Russia has managed to locate many important ISIS targets.  The question is, if the United States has a well-developed network for collected intelligence in Syria, then why did those ISIS targets exist to be the recipients of Russian bombing sorties? Why hasn't the U.S.-led air coalition already destroyed those facilities and munitions warehouses?          

Russia has declared war on any groups opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Assad; who are they?

Link: Russian missiles crash in Iran.

Russia is demonstrating its military capabilities in the Syrian theater, by launching multiple bombing raids and missile launches, targeting ISIS positions.  After initially focusing on internal Syrian opposition targets, Russia has expanded its hit list to include ISIS-held positions.  The missile barrage, launched from Russian warships in the Caspian Sea, was apparently intended to reinforce the message that not only does Russia have the determination to conduct all-out war, it also has the capacity and reach to do so.  Although the Russians have started conducting bombing sorties against ISIS forces, the Free Syrian Army, an anti-Assad organization with very close ties to the United States, was also among today's targets.  As the Russians become more familiar with the Syrian political environment, they will realize that the participants in this conflict are not limited to the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Free Syrian Army, Syrian Kurds, and forces loyal to de facto President Bashar al-Assad.  Since Russia has declared war on all the organizations opposing the Syrian Ba'ath Party and Assad, lets review some of the groups who are determined to implement regime change in Damascus:


Aleppo Province:
Aleppo Conquest is an anti-regime, anti-ISIS group that is singularly focused on    
the liberation of Aleppo City.
 Ansar al-Sharia is also active in Aleppo and is opposed to the Assad regime.  But Ansar al-Sharia is a fundamentalist group with possible ties to ISIS.  Their goal is to introduce Sharia Law to Aleppo City.
The group Euphrates Volcano is an interesting group, who do not necessarily oppose the Assad government, but fights against ISIS and other Islamist and Kurdish extremist factions.

Idlib Province:
Jaysh al-Fatah Idlib is exclusively focused on eliminating all regime forces in Idlib Province.
The group Battle of Victory is opposed to the Assad regime, and is determined to occupy the city of Jisr al-Shughour.

Hama Province:
Jaysh al-Fatah Idlib is also active in Hama Province, and is determined to keep the Sahel al-Ghab plain from remaining in government hands.
Jaysh L-Nasr is opposed to the Assad regime, and can be found in small units, operating throughout Syria.

Homs Province:
Victory of the Oppressed is opposed to both the Assad regime and ISIS, and works to provide support to the local population.

Damascus Province:
The Eastern Ghouta Unified Command is a group focused on liberating the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus from regime occupation.  Ghouta envisions a community without the Assad puppets, that provides representation and works to improve the lives of the local population.
One Flag Alliance is dedicated to the total overthrow of the Assad regime.
Jaysh al-Fatah Qalamoun fights to liberate the Qalamoun region from regime and Hezbollah forces. The Gathering of Western Qalamoun is also opposed to the Assad regime and the presence of Hezbollah in Syria.
The Eastern Qalamoun Operations Room is opposed to both the regime and ISIS.

Dera'a and Quneitra Province:
Jaysh al-Harmoun is focused on eliminating the Assad regime elements southwest of Damascus. Jaysh al-Fatah al-Janoub fights to liberate the suburbs of Western Ghouta in Damascus from the Assad Regime.
The Southern Front is opposed to tyranny and extremism, and fights to bring representative government to the Syrian people.

Russia steps up aid to Syria's Assad.

Links: A.  Russia providing military aid to Syrian regime forces.
           B.  Russia delivers military aid to Syria's Assad.


Last Spring, when ISIS started to become a household word in Europe and the United States, the Obama Administration made clear its feelings by announcing the formation of the Allied Air Coalition.  This coalition, which included warplanes from Kuwait, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom, allows European nations and the United States the opportunity to militarily strike against ISIS, without risking the lives of one soldier.  Russia chose not to be a coalition member, probably because it would have impacted in some way Russia's close relationship with de facto Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  How did Syria and Russia become so close?  Decades ago, when Israel was being threatened by its neighbors with the Six-Day War, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War, the United States aggressively supported Israel, both diplomatically and with military aid.  At the time, Russia was still the biggest part of the Soviet Union, and played the part of America's foil on the Cold War game board.  When the Arab states would begin to plan attacks on Israel, the Russians were always nearby with T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, Artillery, and Mig warplanes.  I always assumed that the Russians supported the enemies of Israel solely because the United States supported Israel so strongly.  I'm sure the issue is a bit more complicated, but the close relationship between Damascus and Moscow survived the death of the Soviet Union (1991) and of Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez (2000).  In earlier posts we commented on Vladimir Putin's often stated goal of having a port on the Mediterranean Sea for the Russian Navy.  Long before ISIS appeared on the scene, the idea of Russia building a naval port on the Syrian coast near Latakia or Tartus was something considered by NATO intelligence experts and the Pentagon.  Over the years, the Russians certainly built up enough good will.  The issue probably didn't become a serious topic for the Russians until Putin took office.  Given the invasion of Crimea and the support for separatists in Ukraine, he obviously pictures Russia as a nation with expanding national boundaries.  Giving the Russian navy (and submarines in particular) a base from which to repair, refuel, rearm, etc. on the Mediterranean Sea would be a coup for Putin.

Most of the summer, when the media provided the world with daily stories from Syria of regime defeats, Putin seemed to be purposely keeping a low profile.  Granted, the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, not to mention the destruction of a civilian airliner by a Russian-made Buk surface-to-air missile, must have kept Putin quite busy.  We began to wonder if maybe Assad's plight had become so precarious that even the Russians had jumped ship.  I was half-expecting to see loads of family members boarding flights to exile in Russia, with their suitcases filled with money and antiquities.  But no such luck.  Assad has shown a willingness to see this thing through.  I think Gadhafi expressed the same willingness, though, and look where it got him.  Basically, Assad's regime forces are limited to defending everything west of the Anti-Lebanon mountain range.  Two-thirds of Syria are presently occupied by either ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and its allies (give a few towns in the north to the Kurds, who as always, have fought with tremendous courage and determination).  Putin may have arrived just in the nick of time, as JN has been expanding its attacks in the northwestern province of Hama, and onto the strategic al-Ghab plain.  The Alawites of northwest Syria, always so loyal to the Assad's, are coming under great pressure from JN, and they are making their feelings known in Damascus. 

Last week saw the arrival of  Russian T-90 tanks to Latakia (the number of tanks is still being debated), and enough living pods for 1,500 persons.  One can assume that the Russians will also be sending in intelligence officers and humanitarian aid personnel, so it can't be assumed that all 1,500 are earmarked for use by soldiers.  Russia has also delivered artillery and loads of smaller arms, ammunition, and military equipment.  Putin obviously believes that Assad can yet win the day.  That cannot be accomplished with the military forces at Assad's disposal today.  For ISIS to be defeated, the Russians either have to join a coalition with Europe and the United States to destroy ISIS for good, or move in enough Russian forces to combine with the remaining regime units, and finish off ISIS on the battlefield.  ISIS is strong, but ISIS cannot defeat the Russian Army.  In fact, ISIS would be hard-pressed to last more than a month against the military of France, the UK, Germany, Israel, China, even Iran.  Putin doesn't scare easily, and he doesn't blink very often either.  We believe he still has intentions for building a Russian Naval Base in Syria, and in order to accomplish this, he must keep his puppet as head of state.  If the Russians lead a military offensive that sends ISIS packing, and Assad is hailed as a hero, how will Erdogan in Turkey take the news?  Many of Syria's neighbors are anxious to see Assad deposed, but not at the risk of creating the ISIS Caliphate.  What would be in the best interest of all, is if a western leader would emerge, who would lead a military coalition including the United States and Europe, and destroy ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  Where can we find such a leader?  Lets hope one shows up soon, because ISIS is only getting stronger.

Anti-regime forces target northwest Syria, Alawite community, and Assad's hometown of Qardaha.

Link: A. Anti-regime elements put pressure on Assad stronghold.
         B. Wikipedia definition of Alawite.


For the third time in three years, anti-regime forces are putting pressure on pro-Assad strongholds in northwest Syria, including the port city of Latakia and Assad's ancestral home at the base of the Coastal Mountain Range, Qardaha.  Regime forces, who have heavily fortified local communities and strategic passes and transportation avenues, have seen a marked increase in free-fire and missile attacks from Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State for Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  The former two groups do not make use of SVBIEDs and similar weapons, at least not to the extent that has been demonstrated by ISIS.  Be that as it may, these groups currently share a common enemy, and have no compunction to piggy-back on one-another's successful military encounters.  On many occasions, regime forces have little identifiable knowledge regarding their adversaries, until after the encounter has concluded.  Both previous operations by anti-regime elements in northwest Syria did not succeed in dislodging Assad's forces, but ISIS units were present long enough to go about their usual agenda, de-populating communities of anyone seen as an infidel or an enemy to the cause.  In some instances, entire towns disappeared.  Northwest Syria is home to a number of Shi'a communities, most prominently the Alawites, who practice a highly controversial vein of Shi'a Islam (see Link B).  No doubt, the Alawites do not fit into the demographic plans of the ISIS Caliphate, which promises to be an extremist singularly Sunni affair.

The Alawites, like the Druze community, have found a relatively safe country in Syria to practice their faith without pogroms, that is until the arrival of ISIS.  Both the Alawites and the Druze support de-facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, as they supported his father Hafez before him.  The Assad regimes have allowed the two unique communities to more-or-less flourish, without any targeting by the established religious community.  In fact, Syria is also home to numerous Christian communities, especially in and around Damascus.  These groups and their leaders consider Assad to be their protector.  Unfortunately, the Alawites may be forced to re-assess that designation, if this third attempt by anti-regime forces to reach the Mediterranean Sea is successful.  Understandably, the Alawites have been very vocal regarding the need for an increased military presence in the northwest, especially around the strategic al-Ghab plain of Hama Province.  In the past few weeks heavy fighting has moved onto the al-Ghab plain, threatening the command and control node of both the Syrian Arab Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), located in the town of Joureen.  Obviously Assad and his military commanders recognize the importance of Hama Province and the northwest, especially in light of the overall negative direction of the war to date.  Regime forces have suffered one defeat after another, usually east of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range and in the more isolated communities of Syria.  The loss of Latakia and the al-Ghab plain might bring a split with the Alawite community, and leave Assad with one less dependable ally.

Why Bashir al-Assad will not leave Syria on his own accord.

Link: New Syria peace plan focuses on ISIS, not Assad.

The reality of the situation obliges us to concur with the latest statement from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding the current crisis in Syria.  All groups involved in the Syrian conflict who are opposed to wanton slaughter and the execution of countless innocent men, women and children, must form a line behind one banner.  The movement known as the Islamic State for Iraq and al-Sham has started developing long tentacles, which are reaching out of the Middle East and into Africa, South America, Asia and Europe. No doubt ISIS has its supporters in the United States as well, given that the freedoms and civil liberties that Americans hold so dear, can also put them at risk.  Does ISIS have dangerous sleeper cells in position in U.S. cities, or are its supporters limited to the odd deranged individual with access to a firearm?  I'm sure the FBI and CIA have opinions on the matter, but it may not make a difference.  If ISIS continues to grow, then its presence in the United States will be only a question of time.  In the past, the UNSC has connected the removal of Bashir al-Assad to the issue of peace in Syria, which gave serious heartburn to both China and Russia.  I guess the UN decided that a united front in defeating ISIS is more important than Assad, and we agree.  What has puzzled many people is why Assad hasn't already collected his family and his ill-gotten loot, and bugged out?  The answer isn't very complicated.

Bashir al-Assad's father, Hafez al-Assad, was Prime Minister of Syria from 1970 to 1971, and President from 1971 until his death in June, 2000.  Hafez was the epitome of an Arab strongman, and he built a political support network that did not continence internal dissention.  His tool of construction was the Syrian Arab Ba'ath Party, sister organization to Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Ba'ath Party, although the two eventually evolved into completely independent and disconnected movements.  Anyone who wanted to be successful in Iraq needed to be a member of the Ba'ath Party.  Hafez' son and successor, Bashir al-Assad, recognized a good thing, and continued to rely on the party.  Today Damascus is choked with Ba'ath Party members, whose safety in other Syrian cities was jeopardized by the swift advance of ISIS.  The number of Syrian civil servants and functionaries who belong to the Ba'ath Party must be in the thousands, and many of these individuals are retired, and still support their families on their pensions.  Its no secret that both Hafez and Bashir controlled an effective intelligence service, which was quick to act against anything perceived to be a "threat to the state."  Many Syrians, both innocent and guilty, fell victim to the aggressive actions of the Syrian police and intelligence service.  If Bashir were to leave Syria, he wouldn't be able to fit all his remaining loyal subjects into his suitcase, and those that are forced to remain behind will no doubt suffer the vengeance of the wronged and their family members.

But as altruistic as Bashir al-Assad may be, I don't think his reason for staying put has anything to do with the thousands of Ba'ath Party folks left over from the good ol' days.  Assad still controls Damascus, and if he were to leave, the city would probably be occupied by a United Nations peacekeeping force of some kind, at least until the situation in the rest of the country could be sorted out.  I would hope that the UN wouldn't allow ISIS to sweep in uncontested and take control of the capital city.  Now that we think about it, if Assad were to high-tale it out of Syria overnight, does the International Community have a plan of action to keep Damascus and its millions of innocent civilians safe from ISIS?  Another question that we are unable to answer.  But Assad has been hesitant to leave because of his family's connections to all parts of Syrian society.  If a forensic team were allowed to review the financial habits of both Assad regimes, they would likely uncover theft that dwarfs what Mobutu Sese-Seko was able to accumulate in Zaire.  And since the world and its financial markets and banks have become much more closely connected, the International Court in the Hague would undoubtedly move to freeze all the mysterious bank accounts registered to members of the extended Assad family.  I assume that Bashir and his cronies have attempted to cover as much as they can, because sooner or later, he will have to leave.  The freezing of international bank accounts would only be a part of the potentially disastrous results of a forensic audit of the Syrian Treasury, National Bank, and foreign investments.  Assad would be powerless to stop the flow of information implicating his family in every kind of graft possible.  In all seriousness, the Assad family ran Syria as if it were a family enterprise.  Assad's family will have to live somewhere (I can't imagine any staying in Syria if he leaves), and they will be hounded forever by a legacy of greed and gluttony unparalleled in our time.

We believe that Assad continues to look for a solution that will allow him to keep some semblance of authority in Syria, so that his family dirty laundry is aired, and the international bank accounts confiscated.  In the best interests of the Syrian people, some consideration should be given to an arrangement with Assad for the safe evacuation of his family, a retirement to some dacha in Russia and a life of comfort, in exchange for returning all the dough.  Another factor to consider: Assad is a bit of a megalomaniac; he is missing his father's pragmatic nature, and he doesn't want to lose.  I can't imagine that Bashir has ever lost at anything.  If he takes a close look at a map, he mas to realize that his control is limited to a small stretch of land in far western Syria, and the area around the capital.  We believe that Assad is playing a waiting game, hopeful that the United States, Europe, China and Russia will decide that he should be part of the solution to the ISIS problem.  He is counting on Russia and China to save his neck.  After today and the UNSC statement, he might just end up surviving after all.

Islamic State focuses on Diyala Province

Link: Suicide bomber kills 14 in Iraq

Operative from the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization continue to utilize suicide bombings in their efforts to take control of strategic areas of Iraq.  In recent weeks, the IS has increased its activity in Diyala Province, just east of Baghdad.  Normally, the media focuses on events on Baiji, Anbar (Ramadi) and Salah ad-Din (Samarrah) Provinces, although the IS has been active in Diyala for many months.  This week, an IS suicide bomber killed fourteen people at a gathering of Sunni tribal leaders in Baqubah.  Analysts might be tempted to assume that this event will drive the Sunni community further away from the IS and its mission.  But to predict the actions of the various different Iraqi groups is dangerous business.  During my career, I learned to never forget that different cultures respond in different ways to particular stimuli.  Its very possible that the IS is using violence to portray strength, which in turn might (ideally) frighten the Sunni community into joining their cause.  One thing is certain - if the Sunnis of Iraq sense that an IS victory is inevitable, you can guarantee that they will start setting up their tents under a different flag.

Diyala Province presents a strategic target for the IS for a number of reasons.  The people of Iraq are already aware of IS aggression in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, not to mention the initial incursion into northern Iraq, which resulted in the occupation of Mosul and Tikrit (since retaken), and the apparently never-ending struggle for Baiji and its oil refinery.  Adding Diyala Province to the mix, effectively surrounds Baghdad, and provides a visual impression of IS domination.  Also, the IS would like nothing better than to see the Iranians decide that Iraq isn't worth the sacrifice, and stop its support for the government in Baghdad and the various Shi'a militias that have actually had some battlefield success against IS forces.  Since Diyala Province shares a lengthy border with Iran, no doubt the Iranians will feel a bit of pressure, as the boundaries of Iran have not been legitimately threatened since the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran War.  You can be sure that the IS will turn up the heat in just the right way, so that the Iranians will be forced to consider just how much their involvement in Iraq is worth.  Its actually a bit of a gamble; the IS military campaign in Diyala might also force Iran to recognize how much its national security equities are inexorably tied to a peaceful Iraq.  We've always considered the possibly that Iran might tip over the entire table by launching a full invasion of Iraq.  We believe that the Iranian military has the capability of destroying IS' conventional military capability, as long as the Syrian border does not present a problem.  Chasing the IS into Syria will only grant them a reprieve.  If the Iranians were to invade Iraq with their regular Armed Forces, they should be prepared to finish the job, which may require an incursion into Syria, all the way to the doorsteps of Aleppo and Damascus.  You would be hard pressed to find someone as opposed to the current Iranian regime as we are, but it would be nice to see someone with a pair of balls, no matter from what corner of the ring the emerge.  And the Iranians have been known to pull a few surprises.  Its probably unlikely that the Iranians would commit their regular Armed Forces in this manner, but its getting more and more difficult everyday to handicap this conflict.

The Shit is About to Hit The Fan, Folks.

Links: A. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Iraq.
           B. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Syria.
           C. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Ukraine.

Before we take a graceful swan-dive into the subject of today's post, I want to bring attention to the three links that I have provided.  All three links are generated from the same blog, "The Institute for the Study of War" (ISW).  At times I have praised certain websites and blogs, especially if I find myself becoming a regular visitor.  But I must truly take my hat off to the people behind this blog.  I am repeatedly amazed by the detail, accuracy, and familiarity with ground truth, that is so evident in ISW updates.  I am most impressed with ISW's ability to provide the same high-caliber reporting from three separate battlefields.  Personally, I'm already combining the Syrian and Iraqi zone of conflict, but Ukraine is entirely different nut altogether.  Everyday I wait for my email from ISW; kudos to whoever runs the show for turning me into and out-and-out ISW junkie!

After taking a few minutes to praise another blog, allow me to take a few more to praise my own.  We have been raising the warning flag regarding the Islamic State's (IS) ability to threaten Baghdad for some months now.  Yesterday, the IS launched a furious assault on Ramadi and also NW of Ramadi in the direction of al-Asad Air Base, a location that had received a great deal of attention from just about everyone.  It is likely that the IS will occupy Ramadi, at least most of it, and also probable that the ISF, and or a Shi'a militia, will snatch it back.  But this game of give-and-take is accomplishing something strategic and tremendously valuable to IS.  You see, the continued battles for the Sunni communities on the road to Jordan provide the IS with the opportunity to seed the bedroom communities of Baghdad with sympathizers, and eventually operatives.  The style of semi-urban warfare takes a page out of Vietnam.  One of the many reasons that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were initially so successful in the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pre-positioning of sympathizers and irregular forces in the close suburb communities outside Saigon, DaNang, and Hue.  We are convinced that the IS has been seeding various Sunni residential areas outside the capital with supporters and operatives, waiting for the order to become operational.  The IS also seeded the Yarmouk Refugee Camp just outside of Damascus, and they were so successful that analysts are already conceding that territory to the IS.  Its not rocket science.

We at Mukhabarat, Baby! are growing more concerned every day for the still-substantial number of American and European non-combatants in Baghdad.  Its my understanding that certain agencies have re-deployed officers back to Iraq after the Obama drawdown.  Here is a very important question: if the U.S. has non-combatants (intelligence officers, engineers, instructors, linguists, support staff, etc.) widely dispersed in places such as Basra, Erbil, Mosul, and Baghdad, who do these people look to for protection?  I'm not exactly sure how many U.S. troops are in Iraq and what their designation happens to be, by last November President Obama was given approval to send 1,500 troops (specifically in a training posture) to Iraq.  So whatever civilians the U.S. government and its contractors have in Iraq are relying upon the lightly-trained Iraqi Security Forces and possibly the odd Shi'a militia for protection.  Forgive me, but we find this arrangement unacceptable, given the IS' track record in dealing with prisoners.  We must be proactive, and either move our people out, or take steps to ensure their safety by the U.S. military.

Syria also appears to be nearing the finishing line, but we've been beating this horse to death lately.  Because of the myriad of equities involved, the IS may not go in for the "coup de grace" for some time yet.  If Russia had given the slightest inclination of providing Assad the military support he needs, then possibly it would be best for the IS to strike while the iron's hot. But Russia seems solely interested in dumping its excess weaponry and equipment in eastern Ukraine, where it is greedily gobbled up by the various separatists groups. I saw a video clip last week that I haven't been able to relocate, otherwise I would have included it on my links.  It was a clip of a group of separatists trying to make heads or tails out of a relatively small missile or grenade launcher of some sort.  To cut to the chase, the evil guerilla driving accidentally ran over one of his guerilla buddies.  I haven't laughed so much since the photo of the Pakistani guy catching his arm on fire as he tries to ignite a U.S. flag.  Priceless.  Back to Syria.....certainly it appears that the IS is in position to pick off regime-held towns along the Anti-Lebanon mountain chain, until reaching Damascus.  If Assad were still in town, then the IS could seal up the place and starve him out.  But by then, Assad will have vacated the premises for more pleasant digs.  But the IS must eventually address a few political issues regarding the various factions that have been opposing Assad as well, some of them for a much longer period of time.  We have argued that the numerous groups, including Jabhat al-Nusrah, Khorasan, and the IS, are, at the end of the day, loyal to the Sunni cause and the leadership of Osama bin-Laden.  Would the IS share authority with the others?  And what of the Free Syrian Army?  Obviously they can't be abandoned after volunteering to fight as a proxy ground force for the Pentagon.  Something tells me that the lot of 'em, families in tow, will be receiving Resident Alien status.  And who am I to complain?  At least its something that this administration does well.

Of the three trouble spots that we've been examining (with the expert guidance of the ISW), Ukraine appears to be the one with the most staying power.  I can't imagine that the Russian Army will roll across the Ukrainian border, make short work of the Ukrainian Army, and then occupy the entire country.  This festering boil will continue to fester for some time to come.  Putin is obviously committed at some level.  Russian troops and tanks are in Ukraine, and Russian Migs and Sukhois are patrolling the skies in the east.  At one point, it appeared that Putin was attempting to use the Donbas region as a bargaining chip, to ensure that Kiev and the west recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea.  As Putin, who still thinks like an intelligence officer, sees it, a simple trade would have been sufficient.  We stop destabilizing Donbas, you forget about Crimea.  But we've moved quite a bit down the road since then.  The Ukrainian Army has shown itself to be far less effective than originally thought.  In fact, in many instances, it has been the separatists who have won the day in direct clashes with the Ukrainian Army.  Its possible that the government of Ukraine is holding back its major military resources in case a defense of Kiev of the heartland is necessary.  We can't say.  One thing is for sure...the Ukrainian Army currently in the field in the southeast, will be chewed up quickly if the anticipated offensive takes place as expected.  Its true that members of the U.S. military are currently in Ukraine, assisting in the training of the many new recruits that have poured into the recruitment offices in the west of the country.  But what the Ukrainian military needs more than anything else (short of western military intervention), is a dump of military weapons and equipment.  If the G.I. from Savannah, Georgia is going to tech the young Ukrainian private how to shoot an M16, it would be nice if an M16 were available for the private to use.  Back to the bigger picture....we still aren't convinced that Putin has in interest in swallowing up the entire Ukraine. It would be more trouble than its worth.  A struggling economy, reliance on Russia for energy, a vocal, agitated youth movement, and issues with NATO would be waiting for Vladimir if he managed to occupy the entire country.  Its possible that he simply wants to bring Ukraine back into the fold, and at the same time, annex both Donbas and Crimea.  Crimea is worth the hassle....but Donbas?     

What can we expect if Bashir al-Assad is forced to abandon Damascus?

Links: A. Assad forces losing more ground in Syria.
           B. Assad's weaknesses being exploited.


Everyday the headlines bring news of more territory lost to pro-government forces, as the hodge-podge of various anti-Assad groups push closer and closer to Damascus. In recent weeks, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a well-organized group that many identify as Al-Qaeda's proxy in the Syrian conflict, has taken the lead, and delivered a string of defeats to the regular Syrian Army near the northwest town of Idlib.  Syria's second-largest city of Aleppo, which is just north of Idlib, presently is not controlled by either side.  Within the last year, regime forces have suffered losses in every corner of the country.  The Iraqi border area is controlled by the Islamic State, while the northeast border with Turkey appears to be under mostly Kurdish control.  The Jordanian border area in the southwest has seen a successful push by Jabhat al-Nusrah as of late, with the regime no longer able to claim control of any of the towns.

Although I have argued on numerous occasions that the IS, JN, and the Khorosan group were basically separate digits connected to the same hand, the hand of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda.  I have always based my opinion on the strong historic links between all the groups and Al-Qaeda, and the usefulness of having the enemy imagine ten separate opponents on the battlefield as opposed to one.  In truth, I'm sure these groups do have certain issues of ideology or ceremony that aren't the same, but at the end of the day, they share they same basic goal: creating an Islamic Extremist state in Syria (and the entire Levant, for that matter).  Interestingly enough, now that the Kurds have solidified their defensive positions in the north eastern border region, all of these groups can focus exclusively on regime military targets.  I would imagine that if they truly were opposed to each other, then we would eventually see some sign of conflict; it's human nature.  Even the nebulous "Free Syrian Army", equipped and trained by the United States, appears to be focused on Syrian military units.  In a nutshell, Its all against one.

If the regime is unable to respond effectively, what can be expected?  Right now, Assad's control basically is limited to everything west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range, which includes the entire Mediterranean coast, and the area around Damascus, although the Yarmouk refugee camp just outside Damascus has apparently been co-opted by the IS.  As difficult as it is to imagine, Assad controls roughly one-eighth of Syria, the enemy is collecting at the gates.  No doubt, when it becomes necessary, Assad and his family will be able to find asylum in Iran, Oman, or some friendly country, and plenty of money has been squirrelled away in various banks to keep him and his henchmen living comfortably for the remainder of their days.  The question is, will Assad recognize the moment, when the time has come to abandon ship?  He has shown a great deal of determination in the past, and he has stayed in Damascus when many others would have left. 

Who picks up the pieces?  Will it be Jabhat al-Nusrah?  Or possibly Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State?  Don't put your hopes on the Free Syrian Army.  As soon as the U.S. money goes away, these guys will disappear into the hills.  I believe that the Islamic State will take charge, and the experts will begin to consider that maybe these groups weren't so far apart after all.  While the IS solidifies its position, maybe Angela Merkel and President Obama and convene a summit to enact sanctions. One thing is certain; whatever military resources that will be made available because of the end of hostilities in Syria, will quickly make their way to the battlefields of Iraq.  

The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?

Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
           B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
           C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq

We all have our routines.  In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news.  I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media.  For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq.  Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically.  As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth.  When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy.  Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network.  Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail.  The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces".  Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria.  Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army".  The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only.  About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush.  An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.

For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope.  In other words, its a mess.  Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered.  I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three.  Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive.  In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area.  I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am.  As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat.  This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well.  The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad.  Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.

I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army.  I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin.  Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus.  I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad.  Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria.  I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad.  But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon.  This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.

Back to my simple list of questions:

• What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?  
• Has the FSA been stood up?  
• Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?  
• What is the status of the air campaign?  
• What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?  
• If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?  
• If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved?