Russians wasting no time building up military presence in Syria, and at the same time expanding diplomatic activities in Iraq.

Links: A. Russian military hardware increasingly present on Satellite Imagery.
           B. Russians coordinating militarily in Baghdad with Iranians and militias.

Vladimir Putin has wasted no time in committing Russia militarily to the conflict in Syria.  Northeastern Syria, including Hama Province, the strategically important al-Ghab Valley, and the large port city of Latakia.  In the last year, ISIS made inroads in this part of Syria, which is home to the politically influential Alawite community, and the Assad family home.  These successes came at the expense of regime forces, and increased pressure on Assad to act.  Within the last six months, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the armed militia that is aligned with Al-Qaeda, has complicated the issue by repeatedly defeating ISIS in Hama Province, and occupying towns that were formerly under ISIS control.  As for Assad and the pressure exerted by the Alawite community, regime forces have been increased and air sorties have become much more frequent.  The question is, who are they bombing, JN or ISIS?  I assume at this point it doesn't matter, since both groups are opposed to the Ba'ath Party and Bashar al-Assad.  As if the scenario wasn't crowded enough, the Russians appear to have chosen northeastern Syria as the location for their initial military foothold.  Besides the troops and supplies that have already arrived in Latakia, new satellite imagery identifies a number of Russian jets on the tarmac at Bassel al-Assad Airport/Airbase in Latakia (the Airport was named after the late brother of de facto Syrian President Bashar al-Assad).  Visible on the imagery are a number of SU-30SM (multi-role fighter), SU-24 (all-weather attack/interdictor), SU-25 (close air support), HIND-24 (attack helicopter, and an IL-76 (strategic airlift).  It would appear that the Russians almost have enough air power present in Latakia to kick the shit out of both JN and ISIS, at least in northeast Syria.  But we can expect to see many more air elements before the Russian military takes the offensive.

As an indication that Putin is determined to go after ISIS in Iraq as well, Russian and Iranian military officials have set up a military coordination cell in Baghdad.  This development is the best news to hit the capital in some time, as a Russian military presence almost totally discounts the possibility of Baghdad falling to ISIS.  But this depends on the Russians making a firm military commitment in Iraq as they are doing in Syria.  Working with the Iranian military and Shi'a militias in Baghdad are a clear indication that Putin sees Russia's conflict with ISIS to be international and not limited to Syria.  This makes sense; for Putin to be declared the hero who vanquished ISIS and saved the lives of all the Syrian migrants who would have drowned, it is necessary to defeat ISIS in its entirety.  We have evidence of Putin's determination and long-term strategic thinking, which leads us to believe that Russia will commit itself completely to this campaign.  The media in Moscow is already onboard, with news stories about their international hero-President, again being thrust into the danger zone, to tackle an enemy that has totally emasculated Barack Obama and the west.  In recent weeks, state-sponsored media in Russia has made repeated references to the absolute determination of the United States to avoid American "boots on the ground."  No doubt the brave Russian soldier isn't frightened of ISIS. 

At the end of the day, Putin and Russia are filling a hugely important role.  Every second of every day, the Islamic State (ISIS) becomes stronger, and expands its global footprint.  Billions of dollars in funds continue to fill their coffers, with the identity of the originators always unknown.  Actually, intelligence organizations across the globe have had little difficulty tracing much of the funding for ISIS to Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait, and Bahrain.  Its not politically correct to make any public accusations, but the host governments are aware of the problem.  The dilemma is, exactly how do ancient Arab royal families govern themselves?  How does a multi-millionaire nephew instruct his older, more influential multi-millionaire uncle how to spend his money?  If the Russian military begins to make short-work of ISIS, which is what we expect, the funding will dry up on its own, and ISIS will have to go to ground, mirroring Al-Qaida.

Russia steps up aid to Syria's Assad.

Links: A.  Russia providing military aid to Syrian regime forces.
           B.  Russia delivers military aid to Syria's Assad.


Last Spring, when ISIS started to become a household word in Europe and the United States, the Obama Administration made clear its feelings by announcing the formation of the Allied Air Coalition.  This coalition, which included warplanes from Kuwait, U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Kingdom, allows European nations and the United States the opportunity to militarily strike against ISIS, without risking the lives of one soldier.  Russia chose not to be a coalition member, probably because it would have impacted in some way Russia's close relationship with de facto Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  How did Syria and Russia become so close?  Decades ago, when Israel was being threatened by its neighbors with the Six-Day War, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War, the United States aggressively supported Israel, both diplomatically and with military aid.  At the time, Russia was still the biggest part of the Soviet Union, and played the part of America's foil on the Cold War game board.  When the Arab states would begin to plan attacks on Israel, the Russians were always nearby with T-54/55 and T-62 tanks, Artillery, and Mig warplanes.  I always assumed that the Russians supported the enemies of Israel solely because the United States supported Israel so strongly.  I'm sure the issue is a bit more complicated, but the close relationship between Damascus and Moscow survived the death of the Soviet Union (1991) and of Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez (2000).  In earlier posts we commented on Vladimir Putin's often stated goal of having a port on the Mediterranean Sea for the Russian Navy.  Long before ISIS appeared on the scene, the idea of Russia building a naval port on the Syrian coast near Latakia or Tartus was something considered by NATO intelligence experts and the Pentagon.  Over the years, the Russians certainly built up enough good will.  The issue probably didn't become a serious topic for the Russians until Putin took office.  Given the invasion of Crimea and the support for separatists in Ukraine, he obviously pictures Russia as a nation with expanding national boundaries.  Giving the Russian navy (and submarines in particular) a base from which to repair, refuel, rearm, etc. on the Mediterranean Sea would be a coup for Putin.

Most of the summer, when the media provided the world with daily stories from Syria of regime defeats, Putin seemed to be purposely keeping a low profile.  Granted, the Russian invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine, not to mention the destruction of a civilian airliner by a Russian-made Buk surface-to-air missile, must have kept Putin quite busy.  We began to wonder if maybe Assad's plight had become so precarious that even the Russians had jumped ship.  I was half-expecting to see loads of family members boarding flights to exile in Russia, with their suitcases filled with money and antiquities.  But no such luck.  Assad has shown a willingness to see this thing through.  I think Gadhafi expressed the same willingness, though, and look where it got him.  Basically, Assad's regime forces are limited to defending everything west of the Anti-Lebanon mountain range.  Two-thirds of Syria are presently occupied by either ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and its allies (give a few towns in the north to the Kurds, who as always, have fought with tremendous courage and determination).  Putin may have arrived just in the nick of time, as JN has been expanding its attacks in the northwestern province of Hama, and onto the strategic al-Ghab plain.  The Alawites of northwest Syria, always so loyal to the Assad's, are coming under great pressure from JN, and they are making their feelings known in Damascus. 

Last week saw the arrival of  Russian T-90 tanks to Latakia (the number of tanks is still being debated), and enough living pods for 1,500 persons.  One can assume that the Russians will also be sending in intelligence officers and humanitarian aid personnel, so it can't be assumed that all 1,500 are earmarked for use by soldiers.  Russia has also delivered artillery and loads of smaller arms, ammunition, and military equipment.  Putin obviously believes that Assad can yet win the day.  That cannot be accomplished with the military forces at Assad's disposal today.  For ISIS to be defeated, the Russians either have to join a coalition with Europe and the United States to destroy ISIS for good, or move in enough Russian forces to combine with the remaining regime units, and finish off ISIS on the battlefield.  ISIS is strong, but ISIS cannot defeat the Russian Army.  In fact, ISIS would be hard-pressed to last more than a month against the military of France, the UK, Germany, Israel, China, even Iran.  Putin doesn't scare easily, and he doesn't blink very often either.  We believe he still has intentions for building a Russian Naval Base in Syria, and in order to accomplish this, he must keep his puppet as head of state.  If the Russians lead a military offensive that sends ISIS packing, and Assad is hailed as a hero, how will Erdogan in Turkey take the news?  Many of Syria's neighbors are anxious to see Assad deposed, but not at the risk of creating the ISIS Caliphate.  What would be in the best interest of all, is if a western leader would emerge, who would lead a military coalition including the United States and Europe, and destroy ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  Where can we find such a leader?  Lets hope one shows up soon, because ISIS is only getting stronger.

Blatent militia involvement in kidnapping of Turkish workers in Baghdad exemplifies the struggle for authority.

Link: Militia releases video of kidnapped Turkish workers.

A previously unknown Shi'a militia identifying itself as "Death Squads" has taken responsibility for the kidnapping of eighteen Turkish workers on September 2, and released a video of the captives.  In all likelihood, this new group is a recently concocted cover for Kata'ib al-Hezbollah, the Shi'a militia which was strongly suspected from the beginning of being responsible for the kidnappings. In the video, the kidnappers demand a number of concessions on behalf of Turkey, in order to secure the release of the eighteen construction workers who were in Baghdad to complete the building of a new sports stadium.  The "Death Squad" is demanding that Turkey "seize gunmen" who are transiting through Turkey to Iraq.  Turkey is also required to halt the transfer of "stolen oil" from Iraqi Kurdistan through Turkey.  The Shi'a militias and Iran are opposed to the Iraqi Kurds having access to oil and using it to develop an economy, as this might help legitimize and Kurdish claim to statehood.  The last demand was the most interesting from my perspective.  The kidnappers are demanding that the Turkish government end all support for Jaysh al-Fatah, a Syrian rebel coalition led by Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.  Recently, Jabhat al-Nusra has dealt a number of staggering military defeats on Syrian regime forces.  In fact, in northwest Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra is expected to begin an offensive soon that will sweep down to the strategic al-Ghab Plain and put pressure on the Alawite community and Assad's hometown of Qardaha.  In the past six months, Nusra has become much more effective at combating regime forces than the handful of other anti-regime military groups, which explains why the militias, who are directed from Tehran, would demand that Turkey stop aiding Nusra.  I have yet to see direct proof that Turkey is aiding Jabhat al-Nusra, but it is possible, given Turkish President Erdogan's personal obsession with removing the Assad family from power in Syria.

The government has very little it can do to rescue the kidnapped workers.  Most Special Police Units are fighting outside Ramadi, and the militias present a difficult target.  Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi can take solace in the continued support from Iraqi and Shi'a cleric the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has ordered the kidnappers to release their hostages, making note of the damage being done to the authority of the state, by those who are pledged to protect Iraq.  Little good it did, as the kidnappers  pray to the Ayatollahs sitting in Qom, Iran, not Najaf, Iraq.  But Sistani's continued aggressive support of Abadi provides valuable bona fides to the reform movement in the eyes of the Iraqi Shi'a.  It also puts other Shi'a leaders on the spot.  For instance, Moqtadah al-Sadr, who is the titular head of the Mahdi Army, one of the larger Shi'a militias, has called for the government to immediately take action to free the hostages.  During his public comments on the kidnapping issue, Sadr referred to some of the Shi'a groups as "brazen militias" that should be boycotted by the Popular Mobilization Committee.  Sadr is no friend to Abadi or the reform movement, so he must either be feeling some pressure regarding the kidnapping, or he is using this opportunity to remove Nouri al-Maliki from the scene altogether.  Its quite possible that Sadr, who has definite visions of future power and grandeur, considers Maliki a threat because of Maliki's previous good relationship with the Iranians.

These developments give us an opportunity to examine the animosity between Turkey and Iran, two militarily powerful Muslim nations who share a common border.  Erdogan is aggravated to no end by Iran's use of Hezbollah in Lebanon as a proxy to provide extensive military support to Bashir al-Assad.  The Iranians have always considered the Turks to be tainted through their historic and military ties to the United States, and in the 1990s, when the Turkish Armed Forces started conducting joint military maneuvers with the Israelis, you could just sense the Imams and Ayatollahs in Qom chewing on their turbans and crashing their flying carpets in to the walls.  Now that the Russians have decided, very late in the game, that Assad is worth saving, Iran has an ally on the  battlefields of Syria besides Hezbollah and the regime forces.  The pro-Assad groups are relatively easy to distinguish, but the rest is one big stew of different names, individual ideologies, loyalties, intentions, and complaints.  I'm not sure where Nusra fits in as opposed to the Syrian Kurds.  And what about the free Syrian Army?  And then there exists a handful of smaller groups, operating on their own agenda, including groups of former U.S. servicemen who have volunteered to go back to Mesopotamia to fight ISIS.  Turkey may very well end up playing a large role in how this drama eventually plays itself out.  Outside of Syria and Iraq, they have the most serious security concerns because of the conflict.  If the Turks made the decision to commit themselves totally, they could probably destroy ISIS in Syria in a matter of weeks, although no guarantees about collateral casualties.  Its the one question which troubles me the most: since everyone recognizes ISIS for the real threat to world peace that they hope to become, then why haven't we committed ourselves militarily to their rapid and total destruction?  Heck, the Turks, Iranians, and even the Israelis could join the party.  For now we watch developments in Iraq, to learn if the Abadi regime can survive both an assault by the anti-reform militias, and the possible failure of the Anbar offensive.  

Anti-regime forces target northwest Syria, Alawite community, and Assad's hometown of Qardaha.

Link: A. Anti-regime elements put pressure on Assad stronghold.
         B. Wikipedia definition of Alawite.


For the third time in three years, anti-regime forces are putting pressure on pro-Assad strongholds in northwest Syria, including the port city of Latakia and Assad's ancestral home at the base of the Coastal Mountain Range, Qardaha.  Regime forces, who have heavily fortified local communities and strategic passes and transportation avenues, have seen a marked increase in free-fire and missile attacks from Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Islamic State for Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  The former two groups do not make use of SVBIEDs and similar weapons, at least not to the extent that has been demonstrated by ISIS.  Be that as it may, these groups currently share a common enemy, and have no compunction to piggy-back on one-another's successful military encounters.  On many occasions, regime forces have little identifiable knowledge regarding their adversaries, until after the encounter has concluded.  Both previous operations by anti-regime elements in northwest Syria did not succeed in dislodging Assad's forces, but ISIS units were present long enough to go about their usual agenda, de-populating communities of anyone seen as an infidel or an enemy to the cause.  In some instances, entire towns disappeared.  Northwest Syria is home to a number of Shi'a communities, most prominently the Alawites, who practice a highly controversial vein of Shi'a Islam (see Link B).  No doubt, the Alawites do not fit into the demographic plans of the ISIS Caliphate, which promises to be an extremist singularly Sunni affair.

The Alawites, like the Druze community, have found a relatively safe country in Syria to practice their faith without pogroms, that is until the arrival of ISIS.  Both the Alawites and the Druze support de-facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad, as they supported his father Hafez before him.  The Assad regimes have allowed the two unique communities to more-or-less flourish, without any targeting by the established religious community.  In fact, Syria is also home to numerous Christian communities, especially in and around Damascus.  These groups and their leaders consider Assad to be their protector.  Unfortunately, the Alawites may be forced to re-assess that designation, if this third attempt by anti-regime forces to reach the Mediterranean Sea is successful.  Understandably, the Alawites have been very vocal regarding the need for an increased military presence in the northwest, especially around the strategic al-Ghab plain of Hama Province.  In the past few weeks heavy fighting has moved onto the al-Ghab plain, threatening the command and control node of both the Syrian Arab Army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), located in the town of Joureen.  Obviously Assad and his military commanders recognize the importance of Hama Province and the northwest, especially in light of the overall negative direction of the war to date.  Regime forces have suffered one defeat after another, usually east of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range and in the more isolated communities of Syria.  The loss of Latakia and the al-Ghab plain might bring a split with the Alawite community, and leave Assad with one less dependable ally.