Revisiting the Iraq War.

For all of 2016, I have been without a television.  It wasn't some moral choice on my part to rid my life of time wasting distractions and bad influences, it was more of a case of changing residences and not finding the time to hire a new Cable or Satellite provider.  Once Lent season rolled around, and I still hadn't connected the boob tube, I decided to guilt myself into extending this new lifestyle sans TV.  I gave up television for Lent.  Granted, when Lent commenced I was already without my 46' flat-screen Sony, but I did have the intention of rejoining the grid.  Lent gave me the opportunity to extend this experiment, which no-doubt has been good for me.  The most valued benefit of not having a television is being able to keep Donald Trump out of my life.  Friends assumed I would spend less time at home without a TV, but having my own personal, guaranteed "no Trump zone" tempts me to spend more time in my empty little apartment, catching up on my reading.  But I still function in this society, therefore I am destined to get more than my share of "The Donald".  This character manages to increase my dislike for him every single chance he has.  If I'm at my friend Sue's house, or visiting my Mother, and the TV is on in the background, the media will find a way to include Trump in the programming.  I could be mistaken, but I believe my friend Stacy and I actually saw Trump interjected into a National Geographic Channel program about asexual reproduction in the worm community.....and there's Trump.

I've already explained my hypothesis regarding Trump, the media, and our future next President, Donald Trump.  Today my annoyance is with something I've heard this ignorant bully repeat a number of times.  Donald Trump did not support President George Bush's decision to invade Iraq following 9/11.  Shockingly, Trump normally explains his lack of support for the invasion by connecting the war and its aftermath to Bush's less-than brilliant attempt to justify the invasion by protecting the free world from Iraq's research into Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).  Trump, who seems to enjoy soaking in his own ignorance like a chicken in a pot of stew, seems to believe that Iraq, in fact, did not have any WMD and was not conducting banned weapons research.  In fact, Iraq was (is?) littered with WMD; Saddam Hussein had poison gas storage facilities in a number of locations around Iraq.  Maybe you don't consider Mustard Gas a Weapon of Mass Destruction?  I'm sure the Shi'a women and children that Saddam gassed following the first Gulf War will disagree. But Trump, in all his bluster and braggadocio, can't help himself.  So he goes on television to brag to the American people that he did not support the Iraq War and that he knew that there were no WMDs.  I only wish Trump would have been obliged to spend a bit of time out in the desert as we had to do.  A good gust of wind and sand would turn his hair into a magic carpet.

I no longer discuss the subject of WMD as it relates to the Iraq War, but I welcome the opportunity to discuss the conflict in simple, factual terms.  After observing the damage that had been inflicted on our transportation grid and our sense of safety, no doubt Osama bin-Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri spent the months following the September 11 tragedy, making every effort to plan and implement a similar attack.  The longer we waited to directly respond, the more likely that al-Qaida and their supporters would find the opportunity to hit us again.  As a nation, our defense apparati had to undergo a Sea Change, and make terrorism the greatest threat to our security.  Fighting a war against s terrorist group is nothing like conventional warfare.  They don't want to be forced into prolonged military engagements because they have neither the manpower or the equipment to be successful.  Hence their Modus Operandi of utilizing well-trained, heavily-armed and religiously motivated operators with tremendous religious conviction.  Terrorists can slip into crowds and disappear like a needle in a haystack.  President Bush was faced with a difficult task: how to defeat an enemy that is so far removed from the United States, and relishes the backward, primitive society within which they live.  Bush and his advisors came to the conclusion that to destroy Al-Qaida, the conflict must be taken to bin-Laden and his group of butchers.  We knew that Al-Qaida was being given a form of Sanctuary by Afghanistan's Islamic Extremist Taliban government.  I believe that the Bush Administration chose to deliver the war to Al-Qaida in its own back yard, which ideally would force them into a conventional conflict, and there was no way that Al-Qaida (and the Taliban, for good measure, could hope to triumph over the United States military in a conventional war.  But the Bush Administration had a dilemma: a country was needed that was near enough to Afghanistan to support our military efforts against the Taliban, and also present an opportunity for a long-term military presence, in the form of military bases.  If this plan were successful, Al-Qaida would not have the resources or operatives to continue launching suicide attacks against Europe and the United States.

We all know that Iraq was chosen as the ideal location.  The United Nations had been involved in a protracted struggle with Iraq regarding its attitude towards UN resolutions.  The Bush Administration must have considered Iraq as the ideal location the create this semi-permanent military footprint in the Middle East.  I imagine that Bush expected the UN and it's member states to welcome the willingness of the United States to go into Iraq, remove a bloodthirsty dictator, and rebuild a nation with tremendous oil reserves.  Heck, he probably expected that our troops would be greeted as liberators (at least that's what a number of the Iraqi ex-pats, told Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney.

In the end, the plan proved successful, at least temporarily.  By 2009, much of Iraq had been rebuilt, including its transportation network and refining capacity.  But more important is the fact that following 9-11, Islamic Extremists were unable to repeat their destruction.  The U.S. military, like an avenging giant, transported itself in a matter of weeks into bin-Laden's front AND back yard.  Al-Qaida attempted to combat the U.S. presence, partly by sending Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to Iraq with orders to establish an Iraqi-based military force that would conduct lightening raids and ambushes, and make deadly use of Improvised Explosive Devises.  In the end, our military dropped a 500 lb bomb in Zarqawi's lap, and his group took off for greener pastures (Syria beckoned).  Of course, our foreign policy since 2008 has been at odds with what was accomplished during the Bush Administration.  But let's not let Trump trick himself anymore.  He wants to brag that he would not have invaded Iraq in 2003, then I wonder just how long it would have been before Donald Trump was witnessing another domestic terror incident.  So lay blame as you see fit, Mr. Trump.  I'm convinced that history will give the Bush Administration credit for keeping the pressure on Al-Qaida, and disrupting any other attempts at 9-11 type attacks.

The expansion of ISIS and its intended future targets.

Link: A.  The expansion of The Islamic State.
          B.  Hamas aiding ISIS in Sinai?
      

This blog has regularly taken the opportunity to provide information regarding the recruitment efforts ands expansionist intentions of the extremist group, The Islamic State (ISIS).  From out perspective, the United States and its European and Arab allies have not been nearly proactive enough regarding the ISIS' ability to establish itself rapidly in almost any part of the world.  In fact, the allies haven't been proactive whatsoever.  Until now, that is.  We are beginning to see a bit more attention paid to the activities of ISIS, and more importantly, groups that have aligned themselves with the Islamic State.  June and July were pivotal months regarding the expansion of ISIS from within the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq, to Egypt, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and possibly even the United States itself.  As detailed in our blog posting from July 8 (Link B), ISIS arrived with a bang in Sinai, taking out one Egyptian checkpoint before being dispatched themselves.  Although the international press had published occasional stories regarding certain established terrorist groups pledging allegiance to ISIS, it was the attack in Sinai that sounded the alarm.  From a strictly military perspective, the attack was a disaster.  The ISIS fighters, most of whom were local Palestinian recruits with a few veterans of Syria thrown in for good measure, managed to kill a handful of Egyptian soldiers, but they lost roughly two hundred of their own.  We know from a source on the scene that the Egyptian soldiers, especially the ones attacked at the original checkpoint, exhibited tremendous courage and determination.  No doubt their ability to keep ISIS from quickly moving through the checkpoint and on to larger targets, saved many lives.  In the end, though, the attack achieved its goals.  ISIS wanted to announce to the world that the conflict was no longer limited to Syria and Iraq, and also demonstrate its ability to recruit and utilize dedicated supporters was basically unlimited.

Since the early July events in Gaza, ISIS has not conducted anymore high-profile attacks outside Syria and Iraq, at least not of which we are aware.  In July, an Islamic extremist gunman opened fire on a U.S. military facility in Chattanooga, Tennessee, killing four Marines and a Sailor.  Was this deranged young man connected to ISIS?  Not according to the U.S. government.  He was a frequent visitor to ISIS-friendly websites, message boards and chat rooms, and he recently spent six months in Jordan, which makes the "lone-wolf" declaration by the Obama Administration seem to us to be bizarrely premature and suspiciously political.  We suspect that the shooter probably had some contact with ISIS agents while in Jordan, who ratcheted up the hate and anti-infidel message which was spinning in his head when he returned stateside.  The most difficult question to answer, is what kind of sleeper-cell network has ISIS, and Al-Qaeda beforehand, developed in North America?  From our optic, Al-Qaeda appears to favor the well-planned, highly trained, carefully chosen target, patient approach with regards to its cells, while ISIS seems to have no problem just handing someone a gun or a vehicle full of explosives, and telling them that when the signal comes in, just go out and kill people.  Interestingly enough, Bin Laden, Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda loved a carefully planned, well-resourced operation, and al-Baghdadi and ISIS seem to prefer operations that result in the highest casualty list, regardless of cost.  In the end, though, all three were definite believers in the power of fear.  However the operation comes about, in the end, it must create enough fear in the target communities, to make people consider changing the way they and their families live life.

On a positive note, the new administration in Nigeria seems intent on destroying Boko Haram (BH)once and for all.  The terrorist group has basically been on the run for some weeks, as the joint military efforts of Chad, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroon have left BH very little room to maneuver.  BH achieved a great deal of attention with its announcement of allegiance to ISIS, but ISIS is smart enough to stay out of northern Nigeria, at least for the moment.  The same can't be said for Libya, which seems to become more of a complicated mess everyday.  The fact that Libya hasn't already been united under one Islamic extremist banner is a surprise in itself, because it certainly seems destined to happen.  But for the time being, the United States and Europe continue to utilize some form of diplomacy to effect positive change, while at the same time, ISIS does its business out in the desert, visiting one isolated community after another, and adding them to the cause.  I'm not sure if the current Libyan government sits in Benghazi or Tripoli, or if any government is currently being recognized by the United Nations.  But the U.N. and the United States have been aware of the delicate state of affairs in Libya, since long before the Benghazi incident which killed five Americans.  You could not plan a more advantageous situation for ISIS, as the people are desperate for someone to institute a bit of law and order, and maybe get the water turned back on.  As demonstrated in Iraq, ISIS has learned the art of local government, and is expanding its footprint in Libya by providing communities with some level of organization and relief.

ISIS has also become active in Yemen, but to what degree is still a mystery.  ISIS has also established itself in many of the large, urban township communities in central and southern Africa, which has the potential to be an unlimited source of recruits.  Has ISIS found its way to the townships of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paolo?  When young people see no future, the color of their skin makes no difference.  They will be a captive audience when the ISIS recruiters show up, with stories of glory on the battlefield, the holiness of killing infidels, and the providing of a wife (in this world, and forty additional ones in the next).  But one of the most important thing that ISIS can provide is something that the planners at the U.N. and the Pentagon haven't really started to notice: ISIS provides these young people with DIRECTION, a cause, a reason to get up in the morning.  One can never overestimate the value of "raison d'etre".  If the various governments in Africa are unable to solve endemic problems of unemployment and homelessness, then we should have a good idea from where the next batch of young recruits will originate.  Maybe the next Gaza-like statement will be in Pretoria, or Nakuru.  One thing is certain: the problem of global youth unemployment will only feed the fire of discontent that continues to provide extremists like ISIS with young people who are willing to die for the cause. 

Jabhat al-Nusra: the evolution of Al-Qaeda and the need for conventional warfare.

Link: Tension between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria.

We have always expressed the opinion that Al-Qaeda and its representative groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), were really not that far removed from motivations and intentions of the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS).  In fact, we have always been surprised and a bit frustrated at the mainstream media's obsession with separating each and every Sunni-based Jihadi group.  No doubt Al-Qaeda and ISIS have done everything they can to perpetuate this idea that these groups work exclusively of each other.  This impression encourages the idea that Sunni-based jihadism is much more entrenched in the Sunni community than it really is.  We have argued that because of their mutual goals, orientation and teachings, that it was virtually impossible for ISIS and JN to be working against each other.  In the last six months, both ISIS and JN have enjoyed tremendous success on the battlefields of Syria, as the regime forces have to defend from almost daily attacks, sometimes from different directions.  Although we have gone to some lengths to illustrate the common ideology and genesis of ISIS and Al-Qaeda/JN, we have never discounted the probability that the groups would have disagreements that might lead to actual violence.  But we continue to strongly believe that any such conflicts would be temporary (and have actually proven to be so).

An interesting trend that we have noted previously is becoming more visible on the battlefields of Syria.  We have discussed in some depth the efforts of ISIS to create an effective conventional military, complete with departments, promotions and letters from home.  We opined that the numerous former Ba'ath Party members who had found a home in ISIS, were useful to the group because of the organizational and planning experience and skills that they possessed.  For a short time it was popular to consider the idea that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had some level of influence within ISIS, when actually the opposite is true.  These former bureaucrats and armchair Generals of the Saddam regime are survivors, and ISIS just happened to be in the hiring business.  Believe me, it has nothing to do with ideology.

But the need for ISIS to recruit individuals with certain skills outside of bomb-making and decapitation is obvious.  ISIS has created the first conventional terrorist army, and to keep that army supplied and effective, a support mechanism must exist.  Their effort is evolving, and they have met with some difficulties, but their success can't be denied.  We have previously explained the justification for the Islamic extremist cause to pursue a conventional army.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United State Armed Forces proved time and again, that small groups if ill-prepared and inconsistently equipped tribesmen can't defeat a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force (Vietnam was a diplomatic failure but a military success; the American people lost the stomach for daily casualties highlighted by politically-driven new coverage).  In 2009, with the apparent successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the decision was made to support the creation of a conventional fighting force loyal to Al-Qaeda, and Syria provided the ideal nursery.  Al-Qaeda in Iraq had relocated from Iraq to Syria (or should I say they had been "booted out"), so the platform was in place.  Fighters were recruited, many from Africa and the West, and equipment was either purchased or purloined from the Syrians.  The group changed its name, probably as a purposeful effort to separate itself from Al-Qaeda and strengthen the suggestion that the region was full of Sunni-based extremist military groups.  The head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, did move the group away from Al-Qaeda to a certain extent, a move which no doubt infuriated Ayman al-Zawahiri, hold up back in Pakistan somewhere (probably at the Pakistani Intel Service main headquarters), and the link indicates that the two groups are not necessarily coordinating their operations or sharing their battle plans.  This mild declaration of independence by ISIS, forgive the phrase, is the reason JN has become so successful on the battlefield.

Al-Qaeda was the original genesis of the idea to create a conventional military capability to pursue the goals of international Sunni Jihad.  When ISIS began showing  bit of free will, JN, which was in direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership and much more representative of the group's most recent persona, began to follow the same plan which proved so successful to ISIS.  JN, although on a much smaller scale, started to morph into a conventional military force.  In the past, Al-Qaeda has relied on its small size to stay mobile, hidden, and able to strike targets and disappear.  JN created a supply mechanism, mostly utilizing its popularity with the local population, that kept its fighters fed and well-equipped.  Personnel were selected for various jobs according to background and training, and formalized planning became an integral part of every operation.  Communications were strengthened, liaison to the local community were chosen by ethnic background and language skills, and as more fighter arrived on the scene, the variety of military hardware increased.  Is it no surprise that JN has been just as successful on the Syrian battlefield lately, if not more, than ISIS.  The one life-line that both ISIS and JN rely on seems to be flowing stronger than ever: the financial support from the gulf states.  This support is not necessarily directly from the coffers of the various Emirates and Sheikdoms (some is), but it is coming from millionaire and billionaire families with loyalties to the extremist cause.  The financial support has increased as of late as Iran and the despised Shi'a stretch their legs in Yemen and Iraq.  No doubt some of these fanatics are expecting to re-fight the Battle of Karbala.

As things stand now, ISIS is a much more entrenched and evolved military machine.  In size and in capabilities, JN can't hold a candle to the Islamic State forces.  But everyday JN grows stronger, and JN has proven to be much more popular with the local communities than ISIS (probably has something to do with the burning of that young Jordanian pilot; families from the Hashemites in Jordan and the rural communities of Syria have a history of good relations).  With JN and ISIS both trying to outdo each other in capturing former regime towns, and the Sunni and Shi'a threatening to start an Islamic Civil War in Yemen and Iraq, the West has a bit of breathing room.  But once JN and ISIS merge, and they will, and the Iranians pull back behind the walls of secrecy they value so much, we will be faced with a tremendous foe.    

What can we expect if Bashir al-Assad is forced to abandon Damascus?

Links: A. Assad forces losing more ground in Syria.
           B. Assad's weaknesses being exploited.


Everyday the headlines bring news of more territory lost to pro-government forces, as the hodge-podge of various anti-Assad groups push closer and closer to Damascus. In recent weeks, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a well-organized group that many identify as Al-Qaeda's proxy in the Syrian conflict, has taken the lead, and delivered a string of defeats to the regular Syrian Army near the northwest town of Idlib.  Syria's second-largest city of Aleppo, which is just north of Idlib, presently is not controlled by either side.  Within the last year, regime forces have suffered losses in every corner of the country.  The Iraqi border area is controlled by the Islamic State, while the northeast border with Turkey appears to be under mostly Kurdish control.  The Jordanian border area in the southwest has seen a successful push by Jabhat al-Nusrah as of late, with the regime no longer able to claim control of any of the towns.

Although I have argued on numerous occasions that the IS, JN, and the Khorosan group were basically separate digits connected to the same hand, the hand of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda.  I have always based my opinion on the strong historic links between all the groups and Al-Qaeda, and the usefulness of having the enemy imagine ten separate opponents on the battlefield as opposed to one.  In truth, I'm sure these groups do have certain issues of ideology or ceremony that aren't the same, but at the end of the day, they share they same basic goal: creating an Islamic Extremist state in Syria (and the entire Levant, for that matter).  Interestingly enough, now that the Kurds have solidified their defensive positions in the north eastern border region, all of these groups can focus exclusively on regime military targets.  I would imagine that if they truly were opposed to each other, then we would eventually see some sign of conflict; it's human nature.  Even the nebulous "Free Syrian Army", equipped and trained by the United States, appears to be focused on Syrian military units.  In a nutshell, Its all against one.

If the regime is unable to respond effectively, what can be expected?  Right now, Assad's control basically is limited to everything west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range, which includes the entire Mediterranean coast, and the area around Damascus, although the Yarmouk refugee camp just outside Damascus has apparently been co-opted by the IS.  As difficult as it is to imagine, Assad controls roughly one-eighth of Syria, the enemy is collecting at the gates.  No doubt, when it becomes necessary, Assad and his family will be able to find asylum in Iran, Oman, or some friendly country, and plenty of money has been squirrelled away in various banks to keep him and his henchmen living comfortably for the remainder of their days.  The question is, will Assad recognize the moment, when the time has come to abandon ship?  He has shown a great deal of determination in the past, and he has stayed in Damascus when many others would have left. 

Who picks up the pieces?  Will it be Jabhat al-Nusrah?  Or possibly Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State?  Don't put your hopes on the Free Syrian Army.  As soon as the U.S. money goes away, these guys will disappear into the hills.  I believe that the Islamic State will take charge, and the experts will begin to consider that maybe these groups weren't so far apart after all.  While the IS solidifies its position, maybe Angela Merkel and President Obama and convene a summit to enact sanctions. One thing is certain; whatever military resources that will be made available because of the end of hostilities in Syria, will quickly make their way to the battlefields of Iraq.  

Al-Shabab Makes A Statement.

Link: Al-Shabab Attacks University in Eastern Kenya.


On Thursday of last week, Somalian-based terror group Al-Shabab orchestrated an attack against unarmed, innocent students and teachers at Garissa University (College) in Garissa, Kenya.  To date, authorities state that 148 persons died in the attack, along with many if not all of the gunmen.  Since the attack included the taking of hostages (with Muslims and non-Muslims being separated), and some students are still listed as missing, Kenyan officials are hesitant to provide an exact number of gunmen.  I have received a bit of flack from visitors to my blog, because of the amount of attention I give to Africa.  I don't deny that I'm an Africaphile, but my focus on the continent as far as the blog is concerned, is solely related to the issue of terrorism.  To be more precise, I am concerned about the spread of the Islamic extremist message, and also the potential for recruitment of operatives.  It doesn't take a Rhodes Scholar to recognize that young men who have no jobs and very little hope for the future, are prime candidates for recruitment by these groups.  And young men looking for work is something that Africa, unfortunately, has way too many of.

The blog has addressed the increased presence of Al-Shabab in Kenya in numerous postings during the previous three months.  The International Media noted that Al-Shabab had taken a huge hit in their home country of Somalia, and an attitude seemed to creep in that maybe, just maybe, Al-Shabab was finished.  You can separate terrorist groups into countless sub-categories, but for the sake of this post, lets point out that there are two types of terror organizations: the ones who fight solely for the cause; and the ones that use their actions to also make a living.  Al-Shabab was never going to disappear, because they fit into the second category.  Too many members of Al-Shabab had found a way to feed themselves and their families, at a time and place where food is scarce.  Besides, Al-Shabab has too many operatives and too much equipment and too many friends to no longer be considered useful by Al-Qaeda.  Hence to move away from Somalia and into Kenya.  Analysts have been expecting a minor explosion in terrorist activity in Kenya for some time, probably because of its proximity to Somalia combined with the permanent state of economic stagnation.  I have been more concerned with the probability of recruitment in the vast townships outside Nairobi.  Whatever the vehicle, it is imperative that the Kenyan authorities realize that Al-Shabab is in the midst of relocating from Somalia to Kenya.

Many folks in Europe and the United States will automatically assume that by attacking shopping malls and college campuses, Al-Shabab is crippling its image among all the people of Kenya.  Unfortunately, that's not the case.  Forgive me if my comment appears to be ethnocentric (I don't believe it is), but sub-Saharan Africans don't automatically adopt the same perspective as westerners.  In many cases, they approach issues very differently.  By conducting the operation in Garissa, Al-Shabab was providing an example of its strength and power.  Likewise for the attack at the shopping center in Nairobi.  Where was the government?  Where were the police and the military?  Authorities in Nigeria have had a real problem dealing with the same predicament.  Some northerners (Muslims, to be sure) were beginning to support Boko Haram, because they certainly were looking like a winner.  Al-Shabab can provide a hungry, disillusioned young man with three essential things: food, a weapon, and a cause.

An important factor that should never be far from any discussion of Al-Shabab, is Al-Qaeda.  Just how close are these two groups?  I guarantee you that the analysts in Langley know.  If we take a quick look at Al-Qaeda's modus operandi regarding relations with other organizations, it would appear to be always be a one-sided relationship.  I think we will soon discover, though, that the "new" Al-Qaeda, under Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a bit more willing to be interactive with like-minded groups.  In the last few years of Osama bin-Ladin's life, the organization became very isolated and secretive, and for good reason.  I believe that Zawahiri believes in the philosophy of the struggle, just as much as he does the actions being taken.  I think we will see more instances of Al-Qaeda communicating with the Boko Harams and the Al-Shababs, and trying to lay the groundwork for a uniting message.  I believe a great deal has already been accomplished along this path, and the various groups on the ground in Syria are not nearly as separate from each other as they would lead the western media to believe.  Nothing lives forever.  Even Al-Qaeda will eventually disappear.  The key is the message.  It must resonate and be strong enough to live forever.  The message can survive long journeys across mountain ranges and oceans, when men cannot.  The message can survive the battles when all the combatants lie dead on the field.  Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda will depend upon the Boko Harams, and the Al-Qaeda in Magrebs, and the Al-Shababs, to be the caretaker and delivery system for that message.  And the message never changes.  it continues to be about domination, intolerance, hatred and bigotry.  It would behoove us to take down the caretakers before they really get a handle on the message.

Why should the West be concerned with the intentions of the Islamic State in Africa? (Part II)

Links: A. ISIS supporting Al-Shabaab in Africa?
           B. ISIS eager to recruit South Africans.

In Part II we will focus on the Islamic State (IS) in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The Muslim states of West Africa are vitally important, because they will discreetly provide financial and material support to Islamic extremist groups, while publicly disavowing any involvement or knowledge of these organizations.

Mauritania.  To start, Mauritania is a bit of a mystery.  The government gives the appearance of being deeply observant of all Islamic Laws and traditions.  At the same time, Mauritania has steered a very moderate course diplomatically, snuggling up to France in particular.  In truth, Mauritania is a lightly-populated country that consists almost exclusively of SAND.  Eventually, the engineers and researchers will find oil in Mauritania, mark my word.

Al-Qaeda in the Magreb.   Al-Qaeda remains active in West Africa, in Mali and Niger in particular.  In 2013, Al-Qaeda more-or-less surprised everyone by hopping the coat tails of a Tuareg insurrection in northern Mali.  The Tuaregs, who had made repeated complaints to the government in Bamako, were suffering from private French companies occupying oases and disturbing traditional Tuareg trading patterns.  The Tuaregs felt that they had no choice but to take up arms, at least long enough to attract the European press.  But before you can say, "Camel Fart", Al-Qaeda had hijacked the Tuaregs little rebellion.  The Tuaregs quickly faded away, but Al-Qaeda in the Magreb (AQM) meant business, attacking Malian military and government installations as far south as Timbuktu.  In steps the French, who roll up AQM in record time (not many prisoners taken, from what I understand).  In the Fall of 2014, AQM, taking advantage of a government focused exclusively on combating Ebola, popped back up in northern Mali.  And this time, they were better armed and willing to involve others.  AQM repeatedly crossed the border into Niger and conducted raids against simple villages, along with the usual attacks against government and civilian targets in Mali.  Again, the French military has arrived on the scene, and I expect and even more thorough accounting of AQM.  I can hear you now, asking, "why all this AQM bullshit when the post is supposed to be about the IS"?  The answer is simple; the post is about the IS.  Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are, for all practical purposes, the same organization.  They are both Sunni-based, violent, terrorist groups dedicated to the removal of infidels from their "Holy Land".  They communicate with each other, they assist one another, and they play-up the western media's insistence on separating the two. As always, this is only my opinion.  Come see me in a year and remind me how wrong I was.

Al-Shabaab.  One fact that is not debatable is that the IS was born into the Al-Qaeda family.  In its former life, it was known as "Al-Qaeda in Iraq".  After the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed as the leader of the organization, and a new name, "the Islamic State in the Sham" (ISIS) was chosen.  Folks, I'm leaving out all sorts of important background to the genesis of IS, but this post has to stay within reasonable limits.  Al-Baghdadi really began to make the IS about himself, and let it be known to Al-Qaeda head Ayman Al-Zawahiri, that IS was able to function on its own.  Now this is as close to a complete rift with Al-Qaeda as ever occurred.  Zawahiri didn't have much to bitch about because the IS was kicking ass and taking names all over Iraq and Syria.  More recently, as the organization stretches its legs a bit, relationships have been established with like-minded Sunni extremist groups around the world, including Africa.  Al-Shabaab, that nasty bunch of turds that tried to turn Somalia into an Islamic State ruled by Islamic Courts (sounds wonderful, doesn't it?), have established themselves in the townships of Kenya, which are ripe recruitment areas.  Social Media is the master at bringing people together, and the IS and Al-Shabaab have been expressing support for one another for some time.  These two groups need each other.  Al-Shabaab needs the organizational skills, the discipline, and the funding of the IS, and the IS needs the geographic reach, and the potential recruitment opportunities available to Al-Shabaab.  They are both Sunni based, therefore there will be no trouble finding ideological (read: idiot-logical) common ground.  Al-Shabaab has established a presence as far south as South Africa and as far west as Namibia.

Boko Haram.  Ehen the Nigerian based terrorist organization, "Boko Haram", announced its support for the IS, the news was treated as a truly important development.  During the same week, the combined military forces of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Benin inflicted defeat after defeat on Boko Haram, who was now only in control of four northern communities (from twenty just the week before).  It was no surprise that Boko Haram (BH) wanted to change the headline, and the press obliged.  The poor Nigerian Army; after months of getting raked over the coals by the domestic and international press, they finally have a very successful strong of victories, and they get upstaged by BH's announcement of love for the IS.  The truth is, even though BH has very recently received a black eye and a bloody nose, this organization is built similar to the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda, and it is more than able to retreat into the jungle and reconstitute itself.  I find BH to be the most dangerous terrorist group on the continent, and that includes north Africa.  Anyone engaged against BH needs to be familiar with its history, as BH is very loyal to its founding principles and the accompanying religious ideology.  The organization was originally established in support of providing Islamic education in northern Nigerian schools.  At the time, there was a need for a bit of a "siege mentality", as the Islamic community in Nigeria had many opponents.  Through concentration of resources and discipline, the Islamic community in northern Nigeria was able to effectively establish a network of Islamic schools.  As is often the case, this well-meaning effort got out of hand.  BH quickly morphed into a organization that allowed no disagreement and enforced the strictest of Islamic codes.  Instead of living peacefully with the Christian community, BH made every effort to either drive them off or convert their children.  When it became apparent that the Nigerian authorities were either unwilling or unable to respond, BH began large-scale forced conversions.  Instead of focusing on education, BH became a para-military organization, bent on proselytizing extremist Islam.  At the zenith of its reach, BH was smart enough to reach out to other like-minded organizations, which will provide a lifeline, if the Nigerian military is successful in forcing BH out of Nigeria.  BH is present in Ghana, in Cote d'Ivoire, and in the Cameroon.  Many of his soldiers are "brainwashed" teens, some not much older than ten, eleven years of age.  In many cases, these young fighters are the most dedicated.  I won't mention the fate of the young girls that are randomly kidnapped.  Suffice to say that the lucky ones are forced into sometimes plural marriages with men usually many years older.

Because of the growing population rate in sub-Saharan Africa, the pressure on the various national economies will only increase.  At the moment, even the most optimistic economies like South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia, Botswana, Gabon and Ghana, have unemployment rates for post-high school males as high as forty percent.  This group of unemployed, bored, many times hungry, unable to afford university fees, young men are the perfect targets for the IS.  Since the Islamic faith has done such an outstanding job introducing Islam to poorer African communities, many of these young men are already halfway home.        

Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part II)

Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
           B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?

I believe that Yemen and Iraq, and possibly locations in Pakistan and Africa, are currently being utilized as training locations for the IS foot soldier.  Intelligence services have already located a number of locations in Iraq which are suspected of being training centers of IS, but I believe that Yemen should be added to the list.  Those who disagree with me with point out that AQ already uses Yemen as a "breaking-in" location for its members.  No doubt AQ continues to conduct certain types of training in Yemen, alongside the IS.  In fact, I believe that they are one and the same.  We will know soon enough.  Eventually a few IS prisoners of war from the Iraq and Syria conflict will, during interrogation, mention travel to Yemen for training purposes.  If I'm correct, hopefully this will be the catalyst for the west to stop the damaging and wasteful routine of differentiating between these Sunni Muslim extremist groups.  I do not buy into the narrative that the leader of Khorasan is angry at al-Baghdadi, so the IS and Khorasan can't be friends, or that AQ is embarrassed by the number of young men who were decapitated by IS this week, so AQ can't be tainted by association.  Believe me, at the end of the day, that AK47 will be pointed at you and I and our children, it will not be pointed at another extremist.  I might be a bit more sympathetic to the argument that major rifts exist between various Sunni Muslim extremist groups, if I could be presented with hard evidence.  Social media captures aren't worth a bucket of shit, and neither are rumors that someone from one group shot up a few people from another group.

Islamic extremism is a giant of a beast, but at present, it has only one head, and that is Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Beneath that head, a number of phalanges are jockeying, positioning themselves to move into the void once the sixty-three year old Zawahiri finally floats off to meet his virgins (we might just find him as well).  For anyone who argues that these groups are not fighting together with a unique, singular goal in mind, I would ask them to please have look at the state of affairs in the world today.  I cannot recall a time in my life when terrorism was so rampant and so conventional.  Our military is handicapped by an Administration made up of political appointees and outright amateurs, and every move we make is reactive.  Not surprisingly, the same can be said for our efforts and strategy in the Ukraine.  When IS originally became aggressive in Iraq, our attempt at being an ally resulted in an entire Iraqi Army Corps deserting the field of battle, and people scurrying out of Baghdad as if it were Atlanta before Sherman came to town.  The Iranians step in, and IS appears to be in retreat.  The case is different in Syria, which is almost impossible to evaluate effectively.  The IS (and AQ) are active in Tunisia, Libya, and various other countries in Africa.  Its interesting to note that the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram recently declared its allegiance to the IS.  Well guess what folks; Boko Haram has already declared its loyalty to AQ.  Really, what is the difference?  Both groups are working in the same arena towards the same goal: the destruction of the west and Israel.  You can put all that Caliphate bullshit into the backseat.  No doubt Mr. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi envisions himself as the Caliph in such a manifestation, but Zawahiri sees it for what it is: just another story in a sea of distractions, that keep the infidels from unifying their aim at the singular target.

Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part I)

Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
           B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?

If I get something wrong, I can rely upon my readers to send enough emails to ensure that I am corrected.  I get so little correspondence (the email address is provided below), that I welcome a polite scolding, just for the opportunity to interact with someone who has given consideration to my perspective.  And that, basically, is what the blog means to me.  It provides an opportunity for me to share my perspective with an unlimited number of people around the world.  Now my perspective is biased by definition.  I do my best to present a balanced viewpoint, supported by my personal life experiences.  But I am a citizen of the United States, and I fully believe in the exceptional nature of our Constitution and the American people; let there be no doubt that I would lay down my life for my country.  But I am half-French, and I cherish every part of me that is France.  That being said, I have been a world traveler, and I make a supreme effort to give full consideration to all viewpoints.  One issue that seems to draw sharp dividing lines is the relationship between the two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS).  I have included two links that present opinions which are contrary to my own, in an effort to jump-start a conversation which is truly very important.  The sources for the links I have provided, continually use information obtained from Social Media as evidence of a rift between the two organizations.  We have also heard vague rumors of actual violence between the groups, and also conflict with some of the other players on the ground in Iraq, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group (K).  Both links are well-written and ideally sourced.  I found both commentaries to be full of well-intended, useful information.  But in the end, I disagree with their basic premise.  I believe that AQ and IS are closely linked and work within a loose, coordinated Confederation of sorts.  And the sooner we recognize this fact, the better.

Its no secret that the IS has evolved from the remnants of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  I see many similarities.  The first link above continues to highlight the atrocities committed by IS and its obvious propensity towards violence, as if AQ plays the game differently.  The history of the AQ movement begs to differ.  AQ brought us televised beheadings from Afghanistan when such demonstrations were still good for a bit of shock value.  AQ has ordered the slaughter of entire villages in Afghanistan and whole families in Pakistan.  I assume that I don't have to remind anyone about the amount of blood shed on September 11, 2001, or the desecration of the bodies of three U.S. contractors in Fallujah/Ramadi during Operation Enduring Freedom.  Osama bin-Laden fully understood the power of violence as a tool in both warfare and perception.  Bin-Laden frequently used violence to create fear in his enemies and the public in general, who would in turn acquiesce to his will.  Its not a new approach, nor is it Rocket Science (damn to hell all those clichés!).  I believe the attacks of September 11 carried a different message, a declaration of war against Christianity, Judaism and the west, as represented by the United States.  President George W. Bush recognized the determination in his enemy, and decided upon a course of action that will be debated until the end of time.  Bush decided to force AQ into a conventional conflict, in AQ's own backyard.  He used the issue of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" as a platform (excuse? justification?) from which to force AQ into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He correctly deduced that AQ could not avoid the confrontation with the U.S. Army in the heart of Islam, or risk losing legitimacy with the Muslim community internationally.  He was also correct in assuming that AQ would suffer logistics and funding crises, which would hamper its ability to stay active elsewhere.  I don't believe Bush, Rumsfeld or the Pentagon anticipated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the depth of the Iraqi insurgency, but before leaving office in 2008, he could be satisfied with the status quo in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Bin-Laden and his elderly Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Physician-turned sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri (now that was a mouthful) obviously assessed the situation and realized early on that Bush was attempting to paint them into a corner.  But for the time being, they were obliged to play the game.  But Bin-Laden considered our Democratic habits to be our Achilles tendon, and in this instance he may have been correct.  in 2008, the American people voted for a new direction, and a new direction is what we received.  Although it didn't begin immediately, you might as well circle President Obama's first day in office as the start of the U.S. military's draw-down and eventual departure from Iraq.  Bin-Laden and Zawahiri anticipated this, and focused on rebuilding their movement from the ground-up (I'm frequently including Zawahiri because he now runs the show, and we need to get accustomed to his brand of terrorism.  He is methodical, detail-oriented, brilliant and probably a sociopath, and he is the enemy).  If the west wanted a conventional war, then the movement was happy to oblige.  First and foremost, I believe that sometime in between 2007 and 2009, AQ reviewed and rebuilt its internal security network.  Bin-Laden realized that many parts of his network had been compromised and a simpler, more effective plan was put in place.  The key to this plan was to limit the amount of time members engaged in face to face contact outside of the battlefield, and to severely limit all contact with Bin-Laden and Zawahiri.  Steps were taken to eliminate the need for direct contact.  As long as the brain could communicate with the limbs, everything else was almost superfluous.  Also, a designation must exist between highly-trained, professional operatives and the continued stream of unskilled volunteers that make there way into the organization.  I believe the root of the original AQ, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which trains highly skilled and motivated operatives for complex operations, still functions as it always has.  What has changed is the growth of another type of operative, the foot soldier who will give the movement a resource which was sorely lacking in Afghanistan and Iraq: a conventional offensive capability.

Why Has ISIS/ISIL Been So Successful? (Part II)

(Part II)

Another reason that the IS has been successful is that it Islamic Extremism does not consist of a handful of disparate, arguing, selfish groups that can't ever get on the same page.  I believe that once we get past all the bullshit, we will discover that one command structure exists for Khorasan, Al-Nusra and the IS.  The little identity game they play has already caused problems for the "air campaign" coalition, as certain Gulf States have refused to participate in targeted bombing raids because they weren't comfortable with the target.  The reality is, the IS has grown stronger because the Extremist cause has learned the importance of supporting one another.  AQIM will support Boko Haram, just as the Taliban support Al-Qaeda.  Unfortunately, the bad guys are finally grasping the ancient cliché that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" (from a Muslim prince, by the way).   Recently, the world was focused on Yemen (for about seven minutes).  Al-Qaeda, who control a good part of the southern coast east of Aden and up to the border with Oman, have been utilizing Yemen as a training environment for new recruits.  Once we are in a position to interview (we don't use the word interrogate anymore)some of the IS soldiers who surrender in Syria after a battle, it will be fascinating to determine just how many of them had previous training assignments in Yemen.  Any Islamic Extremist who has trained in Yemen is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, so the discovery of a Syrian battlefield of veterans of the AQ training module in Arabia Felix, will destroy the myth that Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are distinctly separate terrorist groups.

I believe that the willingness and ability of Islamic Extremist groups to modernize and take full advantage of the advances made in telecommunications has been the most important part of their success.  That, and their use of Social Media has positively affected just about everything else they try to accomplish.  I am saving another important factor for last.  The Islamic Extremist cause was forced to adapt in a constantly evolving, modern world.  George Bush recognized this fact, and following September 11, 2001, Bush (and the Pentagon, I assume) realized that to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional war would require all of its resources and would eventually cripple the organization.  And the only way to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional war, was to take the conflict to a Muslim country.  Iraq was the perfect patsy, and even provided justification (let's face it, Saddam had been breaking U.N. prohibitions for years).  The United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and although things did not always go smoothly, (Abu Ghraib, the Sunni Insurgency) The U.S. military left Al-Qaeda crippled and down for the count.  Unfortunately, the American people voted for an Administration with an entirely different perspective regarding U.S. obligation and debt to the Muslim world.  The message that we would be basically inactive for some time (with the exception of finding Bin Laden, which was nothing more than a political tool) was telegraphed to the Gulf States, North Africa and beyond.  Al-Qaeda was allowed to lick its wounds and rebuild.  Bin Laden structured his organization so that his death would not impact the long-term plans of the group.  At this point, something pivotal occurred: Ayman al-Zawahiri became the go-to man.   Why is this so pivotal?  Because Zawahiri is arguably brilliant, and he spent his cave-time as number two, analyzing the history and strategy of the conflict, and creating a map to victory.  First and foremost, the Islamic Extremist cause had to create a conventional military element; and army, for lack of a better term.  AQIM had risen from the dust or far west Iraq and had inserted itself into the Syrian conflict, as "the Islamic State for Iraq and al-Sham", and later to "the Islamic State for the Levant"; but make no mistake - Baghdadi or no Baghdadi, this group looks west to the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to a shrunken, tiny old Egyptian Doctor, for their guidance and leadership.

The decision to adopt a more formal approach to the struggle was not accomplished overnight.  In fact, it would be wise to assume that the Islamic Extremist cause continues to keep a smaller, discreet more typical capability on hand.  But after embracing the move to a more conventional model, the call went out for recruits.  A legitimate army must have soldiers, and Yemen was the location chosen to train the new recruits.  Why else would Al-Qaeda be devoting so many resources to that rocky, barren, stinky, qat-obsessed little dump?  The Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq have provided training-under fire at one time or another.  The options have become a bit more limited as of late, with Yemen and Iraq getting special attention.  Surprisingly (at least to me), the bad guys have taken to the idea of conventional warfare quite quickly.  IS units in the field appear to be well-fed, supplied and rested.  Just last week, the IS launched a mini-offensive in Anbar Province that took the Iraqi military by complete surprise.  This offensive was coordinated with attacks south of Tikrit and Samarah.  The IS is attempting to cut off Iraqi military units and Shi'a militia in place around Baiji, and the manner in which the offensive was conducted (the IS waited until the weather was overcast, to limit the impact of coalition air attacks.  As you read this, the IS is causing some serious headaches in Tehran, which is really such a shame.  Just when the Iranians were preparing to storm our embassy a second time (on this occasion, in the guise of a treaty with the United States regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions), the IS has to start making noise in a province that borders the Islamic Republic Of Iran.  What is truly interesting is that all of the Islamic Extremist groups are beginning to show signs of military discipline and planning.  Certainly Boko Haram and AQIM function in this manner.  After the death of Bin Laden, I believe Zawahiri made the decision to start infusing techniques of modern warfare and the benefits of the twenty-first century into the Islamic Extremist gameplan.  Does the current environment support my theory?  Isolated attacks in Paris, London, Boston, Sydney and Copenhagen, Boko Haram acting with impunity in Central and West Africa, the IS running a bit wild in Iraq and pushing the envelope in Syria, and real concerns about a well-funded, organized (surprised?) IS beginning to stretch its legs in Libya.  I guess they were just waiting for the dust to clear.  Certainly the almost complete disappearance of the United States in the battle against Islamic Extremism has contributed to this high-water mark, but the changing of the guard must have had an impact as well.

Why Has ISIS/ISIL Been So Successful? (Part I)

Links A. Stratfor Assessment Of The Islamic State
          B. IS Tweets Itself To Success
          C. Obama Haunted By Yemen Comments

Please take the time to visit the links I have chosen.  Today in particular, they are very useful in support of our discussion. Is this really a discussion?  Well,.....I hope the post will stimulate conversation between you and your colleagues/family/friends, during which you present my perspective, which inserts me into your discussion.  Ideally, that's the way it works.  To be honest, I wouldn't want to be present during everyone's conversations, because people might yell at me and call me a fascist, which would hurt my feelings.

Next to the debate about Bruce/Belinda Jenner, I think the most pondered question has been, how did the Islamic State become so powerful?  Its a truly fascinating issue, one that involves many factors.  I will approach the subject with the confidence of a blogger with six months of my own attitude and opinion to back me up.  Our society has seen Terrorist Groups come and go.  Some have died away, others have ended up in jail.  A few have re-made themselves into peaceful political participants (the Sandinistas, Hamas, Hezbollah), but the peaceful part seems to be a flexible description, especially in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah.  Our friends with Hezbollah have managed to involve themselves in the conflict against the Islamic State (IS).  You see, Hezbollah has been snuggling with de facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad for some time, and his father before him (gross!).  When Lebanon became a proxy state for Syria, Hezbollah flourished at the discretion of Assad in Damascus.  To their credit, Hezbollah has been on the front lines in Syria, bleeding by the bucketful for Assad.  The IS has given heartburn to just about everyone at one time or another, including the Peshmerga, Syrian Kurds, SAF, IAF, Shi'ite militias, and even the Iranians.  As we've pointed out previously (and was repeated word for word by numerous sites with no attribution......assholes), the Islamic State used to be Al-Qaeda in Iraq, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was still breathing.  So even the United States military has had its run-ins with the IS.  Another point that I continue to make repeatedly but has yet to catch on, is that all of these Sunni-based Islamic Terrorist Groups are connected.  Assigning different names and creating the impression that one group is actually ten or fifteen, increases fear and knee-jerk reactions from the west, which usually leads to mistakes of one kind or another.  The leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, is the top dog as far as I'm concerned.  Since these groups operate with such apparent independence, I don't expect Zawahiri to act as the CEO or CIC of Islamic Extremism.  But they do work together.  Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) is aware what is happening is Syria, and Boko Haram is in regular communication with bad guys in Libya.  Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya follows the company line, and has been doing yeoman's work as of late recruiting in the townships of Nairobi.  I see the military wing of Islamic Extremism to be one entity fighting on many fronts, and the sooner our leaders accept this reality, the better off we will be.

When International Terrorism fist made itself known to the west, it was through the hijacking of airplanes, the kidnapping of bankers and industrialists, and attacks in airports.  Even though I was still in short pants, I remember the 1972 Munich Terrorist Attacks.  But even the horror of Munich did not truly bring the reality home (unless, of course, you were Israeli).  September 11, 2001 made everyone feel vulnerable; this was a group of twenty determined young men, who must have been supported by a much wider network.  Terrorism could no longer be thought of as four men with Uzis and one woman with a floppy hat, sun glasses, and a pistol.  Terrorism has arrived into the twenty-first century with a resounding thud.  They network, the plan, they recon, and they practice.  Advances made in telecommunications have made everything easier.  If an operation planned for Lagos is short one explosives expert, relief is a phone call (or text, or email, or Skype) away.  The bad guys have turned Twitter into a huge propaganda loudspeaker, and the ability of just about every cell phone to take and share videotapes has been invaluable as well. The IS can announce that a hostage was just beheaded, and to expect a video within twenty minutes.  The press gets prepared, and the video shows up, right on schedule.  Islamic Extremists use social media to incite fear; they are thrilled with the idea that their disgusted videos are causing people to no longer feel safe in their homes.  Social Media has also been a boon with regards to recruitment.  Today I learned that supporters of the IS (or bored, sick people) have been tweeting the wives of soldiers, and you can imagine what is being said.  Social Media has made planning, organizing, supply, communication, recruitment, and the spread of propaganda so much easier than before.  This is a big part of their success.

Click here to continue on to Part II of this post 

Why Is Pakistan So Welcoming To Islamic Extremists?

Links: A. Pakistan Wikipedia
           B. Pakistan Bans Terror Groups In Word Only
           C. Al-Qaeda Active And Influential In Pakistan
           D. Pakistani Support For Extremists Persists

(Quick personal comment: I am so grateful to all of you who come to this blog to read my commentaries.  I do my very best to include as much substance and fact as I do opinion, but by the end of the post, I will express my perspective on whatever issue I am discussing.  I welcome opposing viewpoints; most of the opinions I have today are variations of what they once were.  We have to learn to evolve our opinions in the face of presented facts that were previously unknown to us.  It is a sign of maturity and goodwill.  Also, if you do enjoy my posts, please recommend the blog to other persons who you believe might also find it interesting.  An unavoidable reality is that growth is essential in this medium, especially given the number of like-minded commentaries.)

I always find myself battling the need to keep my posts at a reasonable length.  I don't like to split a commentary into "Part I" and "Part II", because the uninterrupted flow of the conversation is essential.  But occasionally I give myself no choice.  Writing about Pakistan is a huge challenge.  As a nation, Pakistan has existed less than sixty years.  But it feels like an old soul, with many grievances to be addressed.  Please forgive me for this unworthy and inadequate review of Pakistani history, but a respectable effort would require a Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV....you get the picture.  What we know as Pakistan today was originally part of India.  When Great Britain decided to grant independence to India, it was decided that the Predominantly Muslim North Western and Eastern Provinces would be partitioned to create the nation of Pakistan.  Oddly enough, the British partition of India created two pieces of Muslim Pakistan separated by a giant India with a huge Hindu majority.  Twenty-four years following the partition, Eastern Pakistan suffered a bloody Civil War, with the opposition openly supported by India. Without the possibility of reinforcements and supplies, the Pakistani forces eventually surrendered, and the nation of Bangladesh is the result.  Given that relations between Pakistan and India were already less-than-friendly, India's interference in what Pakistan considered to be an internal rebellion, caused even more difficulties for the two nations.  Eventually, Islamabad and New Delhi might very well have healed the right, if it weren't for the Province of Punjab.  The far-north, mountainous area is almost equally divided in population between Muslims and Hindus (depending on whose census you believe), and Pakistan has always believed that it should have been included in the original partition.  India is just as adamant that it belongs to India.  This beautiful but almost inaccessible land has been a bone of contention ever since, and has come close to igniting a war between two nuclear powers.

I'm not writing this post to sink myself into the quick-sand of Pakistani-Indian history, so I will move on from the issue of relations with India.  Suffice to say that the two nations have never been friends, although a few times in the last decade, serious diplomatic efforts resulting in face-to-face meetings between the two Prime Ministers, have given rise to optimism.  Frankly speaking I find it hard to believe, and a bit disgusting that both of these nations have nuclear weapons.  In order to reach that level of technology, a huge amount of resources must have been expended, by two countries who still have trouble feeding their people.  That makes no sense to me. The huge defense expenditures allocated by both governments, compared to funds set aside for housing, education and social welfare programs, is astonishing and should be a national embarrassment.  And the real tragedy is that both countries are armed to the teeth because of the threat posed by their neighbor.  The fact the Pakistan has nuclear weapons is more disturbing because of the unstable nature of Pakistani politics.  People get assassinated in Pakistan (also in India) and governments fall.  I am forced to look at Pakistan through red, white and blue glasses.  I can't allow myself to be distracted by the sorry state of affairs with India, and the complete lack of opportunity and hope for the young people of Pakistan.  For one reason and another, this nation has become the world's largest safe house for Al-Qaeda and probably a bunch of other nasty groups as well.  The pillars that constitute the government of Pakistan have been infiltrated for decades by the bad guys, and I'm not referring to the bribes the average Pakistani has to pay to get a license to wipe his ass and water his yard.  The Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI) is rotten to the core with Al-Qaeda sympathizers, as are all branches of the military.  The civilian government is not nearly as corrupted by extremists, but it certainly has its share of thieves.  In fact, the presence of the corruption is what allowed the extremists in to begin with.  The people of Pakistan are only being reasonable.  They voted for the party of capitalism and it failed them.  They elected a bunch of socialists, who also robbed them blind.  So who can blame them for looking towards the traditional, religious answer, especially when it delivers food?

If anyone has any question regarding the depth of extremist influence in the Pakistani military and security service, just remind yourself that Osama Bin-Laden's compound in Abbottabad was located across the street from the Pakistani Military Academy.  That juxtaposition was not accidental, it was meant to discourage any raids like the one that occurred.  Zawahiri is in Pakistan as well.  he is probably closing in on ninety yrs. old, and not many sick, whiny, spoiled Egyptian intellectuals will choose a cave in Afghanistan over a house.  Why do the people of Pakistan provide safe haven to terrorists?  The answer is not as complicated as some people want it to be.  Because of the economic situation in Pakistan ($3,100 per capita income) and the lack of employment opportunities (officially unemployment is 5.1 percent, but in reality its closer to 30 percent), the younger generation, which continues to grow, has little hope or opportunity for the future.  When I was in Pakistan, I was always taken aback by the number of young men walking the streets during the day, every day.  From habit, I said to myself, "shouldn't they be at college or at work?"  These young men are the perfect targets for groups like Al-Qaeda, who will blame the west, and Israel, and India, and their complacent government, for all the ills of Pakistani society.  And when Al-Qaeda hosts a blame party, they do it right.  whoever is on the receiving end isn't just the trouble maker, they are the enemy, THE DEVIL, and they will never allow you to better your condition or improve the lives of your relatives.  The crusade to blame the west and Israel (even more so than India, who is only a seasonal bad guy) has been so successful, that the terrorists and their support network can find sympathizers on every street, on every block, and in every city.  There is an entire segment of Pakistani society that is vehemently opposed to the message of Islamic extremism; they have my support and admiration but I fear that they are fighting a losing battle.

Pakistan continues to give the appearance of a politically moderate Muslim nation.  In the United Nations, it votes with the anti-Israel bloc, but on other issues, Pakistan is known to support the United States, especially regarding Russia.  On the other hand, Pakistan has developed a warm relationship with China, a development which originated with the ignorant decision on the part of the United States to accept payment from Pakistan for some F16s, and then decide not to deliver them.  Its my understanding that diplomatic efforts were made to address and rectify that particular insult, thank goodness.  The Pakistani government has given the U.S. military a surprisingly free hand to deal with the Taliban, especially on the border.  The U.S. military continues to train and equip the Pakistani Army and Air Force (what they don't get from China), and the United States can rely on some internal support, especially from the military High Command.  But the issue isn't limited to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban moving back-and-forth across the border, or with the activities of extremist groups in Waziristan.  The United States must address the alarming fact that Al-Qaeda militants likely have safe-houses in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad.  If this tumor living within Pakistani society becomes a cancer, and extremists take control of the Pakistani government, then we have a real problem.  A nuclear Iran and a nuclear Pakistan, both controlled by Islamic extremists.  I don't believe we have reached that point just yet.  I would like to believe that secular Pakistan will win the day, but the battle is for the hearts and minds of the young, not the middle-aged and old.  Those who love a secular and peaceful Pakistan must find a way to end corruption and provide opportunities for this generation and the one coming up right behind.  Otherwise they won't hesitate to listen to another message.

A Bit More On Khorasan And Al-Qaeda

Link: The Name "Khorasan" A Big Secret?


Here we are talking about the "Khorasan" group again.  Joshua Katz, Managing Partner of "The Enright Group", really rips into the Director of National Intelligence James Klapper, because Klapper revealed the name "Khorasan" Group (see the link).  Like Katz, I also spent a career as an Operations Officer in the CIA and I'm guessing that ninety-nine percent of the time, I agree with Mr. Katz on issues of National Security.  I believe the Obama Administration has politicized the Department of Defense, the CIA, NSA, the Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and every other phalange of the federal government.  The priority seems to be to elect Democrats at all costs, and the ends will justify the means.  I have heard Mr. Katz speak before, and he acquits himself very well on matters of National Security.  Which is why this commentary on Foxnews.com is so confusing.

Why was the release of the name "Khorasan" such a heinous error?  Did Klapper put some asset's life in danger?  As I read the link carefully I kept expecting to find some additional information that would have made Klapper's comments worthwhile.  But those details never showed up.  As far as I see it, Klapper announced the existence of a group called "Khorasan", who were active in Syria and were a threat to the United States (Klapper opined that Khorasan was a "greater threat" to the United States than ISIS).  That definition sounds like Al-Qaeda to me, and I already knew Al-Qaeda was present in Syria.  I'm actually grateful to Klapper.  If he hadn't spoken up, I would not have known that the Administration was trying to cloak Al-Qaeda's activities in Syria.  In truth, its all a game of semantics.  Al Nusra Front, Khorasan, Islamic State in the Levant, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in my Grandma's Drawers, they are all part of the same enemy.  The sooner we recognize that our foe in Syria and Iraq is not new to the battlefield, the better.  Osama bin-Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi may be dead, but the hatred they inspired and cultivated is alive and well. Forget all the various names and splinter groups.  The Administration will put forth the narrative that anti-terrorist actions under Obama have decimated Al-Qaeda and reduced the Islamic extremist cause to a handful of squabbling, separately named and motivated groups.

Identifying this enemy is not difficult.  Any groups associated with Al-Qaeda will be Sunni-affiliated.  Although at times Iran has shown a willingness to assist anti-U.S. operations, the recent Islamic State (IS) actions in Iraq have aggravated existing Sunni-Shia tensions.  I would be very surprised to discover a Shia-dominated terrorist movement with Al-Qaeda connections.  Besides the Sunni angle, any Al-Qaeda group will focus its venom almost exclusively on the United States (and occasionally Europe).  Although its leaders enjoy ranting about "international Jewry", Al-Qaeda has yet to conduct any legitimate operations against Israel (or maybe Mossad has disrupted such operations; its possible).  Not surprisingly, Al-Qaeda was not active in Iraq until the U.S. Army arrived.  Also, Al-Qaeda branches will be well-funded. They always seem to have butt-loads of U.S. dollars to throw around.  Personally, I get suspicious of an Al-Qaeda presence every time I see certain well-known Islamic "Charities".

The most distressing fact regarding Al-Qaeda is its resilience.  These assholes are worse than cockroaches. No doubt the Obama Administration believed that once Bin-Laden's bullet-riddled corpse (I just LOVE that phrase) was disrespectfully dumped from a helicopter into the Indian Ocean, that Al-Qaeda would wilt, dry-up and blow away.  It was never a possibility.  Some will argue that the continued presence of Ayman al-Zawahiri (former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, reportedly a gifted Physician who speaks Arabic, French and English) is the manna which keeps Al-Qaeda alive, but I disagree.  In order to destroy Al-Qaeda, the message of Al-Qaeda must be thoroughly repudiated.  That can only be accomplished by killing (preferred method) or incarcerating every man and woman who were ever part of (or expressed sympathy for) Al-Qaeda.  Its a fight to the death, my friends.  Al-Qaeda can only flourish as long as they can blame the West and the United States for the miserable plight of the Arab people (at times Al-Qaeda will lash out at moderate Arab states, especially the monarchies).  I don't believe the United States or our culture will be disappearing anytime soon, so we are compelled to defend ourselves.  And the best defense is a great offense.  And we are lucky to have heroes like Joshua Katz on our side, to never let us forget.

Questions About Christian Community in Syria

In the past two weeks I have received a number of emails regarding the status of the Syrian Christian community.  Roughly a tenth of the population of Syria is Christian, with the majority being adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church (formerly known as the Melkite Church or Melkites).  During the days of the crusades, the important Christian community of Edessa was located in Syria, as was the Principality of Antioch.  Following the end of the French United Nations Mandate (1946), Syria has suffered through one political crisis after another.  In 1966, the Syrian Ba'ath Party took control of the government, and in 1970 Hafez al-Assad, a former Air Force officer, became President (I'm disrespectfully running rampant over tons of Syrian history and I apologize).  At the time, the Soviet Union exerted tremendous influence over Syrian diplomacy and military affairs, a circumstance that Assad encouraged during his Presidency.  In 2000 Hafez al-Assad died, and his son Bashir won the subsequent presidential election (as the only candidate).  During the six decades since independence Syria has cultivated a reputation of non-repression towards religious minorities.  The Christian community in Damascus in particular has thrived, with allowances being made for Christian observance of the Sabbath and other traditions.  As Syria began its descent into civil war in 2011, many Christian leaders were concerned about the safety of the various communities in Syria.  In fact, organized Syrian Christian groups actually expressed support for the Assad regime and fear of the anti-government rebels.  What does the future hold for the Christians of Syria?

The Obama Administration has declared war on the Islamic State of the Levant, or simply the Islamic State (IS), which currently occupies most of eastern Syria.  The IS is a dedicated Sunni Islam fundamentalist group, which has a nasty habit of executing non-Muslims who do not convert.  The IS butchered many adherents of the Christian Chaldean and Yezidi sects in northern Iraq, and no doubt would do the same to the Assyrian and Greek Orthodox communities in Syria if they win the civil war.  Christians concerned about the welfare of Syrian Christian communities should welcome the Obama Administration's military campaign against the IS.  The real question mark continues to be the New Syrian Army (NSA) that the Administration is equipping and training to conduct the necessary ground campaign against the IS.  If the NSA is successful, will all sides (except the IS, of course) agree to some sort of armistice, to let the diplomats sort out the future of Syria?  No way.  The regular Syrian Army, which keeps a firm grip on Damascus, and President Bashir al-Assad will never agree to negotiations with the NSA.  Assad and the Ba'athists are convinced of their legitimacy, and Vladimir Putin will never agree to a new election monitored by the United Nations.  It astounds me how this argument in the media continues to ignore the Russian element.  Not to worry, because as far as I'm concerned, the NSA, if successful in dispatching the IS, will immediately turn its U.S.-supplied military hardware on Assad and the regular Syrian Army.  Keep in mind, the NSA was organized by disgruntled former elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces officer corps.  Their end goal is not the dismantling of the IS, but the occupation of the Presidential Palace in Damascus and Bashir al-Assad's head on the end of a stick.  They are happy to act as Obama's proxy for the moment, but what happens once the IS is destroyed?

The Christians of Syria have one real concern: the success of the IS.  If the regular Syrian Army and Russian stooge Assad keep power, then its business as usual and the Assyrians and Greek Orthodox Christians can breathe a sigh of relief.  Since the leaders of the NSA are former members of the Syrian military, I am comfortable assuming that if they come to power, they will adopt the same "laissez faire" attitude to the Syrian Christians.  The true enemy of Syrian Christians (and Christians everywhere, to be honest) is the IS, and the Khorasan, and the Al-Nusra Front.  The groups that are motivated by Sunni extremist ideology are the ones most likely to demand forced conversions.  A quick focus of this issue makes it even more apparent that the Sunni extremist groups who fall under different banners, are in fact part of one large, growing mass of hatred.  Al-Qaeda and Ayman al-Zawahiri are at the heart of this evolving mass of evil.  The longer we continue to view the enemy as a handful of separate, distinct Sunni extremists, the more dangerous and powerful it becomes.  I am glad to address the concerns regarding Christians in the battle zone, but I am petrified that sooner rather than later we may discover that the battle zone has come to us.

A Brief Look at al-Nusra and Khorasan

Link: Khorasan a Threat to the West?
          What is Khorasan?

Recently I posted comments relating to the various terror groups currently active in Syria.  I believe that it is best to focus more on the overall threat posed by these groups, than to get lost in the weeds trying to determine what name belongs to which faction.  Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in Magreb, al-Nusra, . . . they all have the same goal: they are determined to destroy our way of life.  The enemy does not separate the French infidels from the Danish infidels, or the Austrian blasphemers from the British infidels.  For those of us who are intelligence freaks, though, breaking down the various terror networks is what we enjoy.  I have stated my preferred strategy for militarily confronting these groups quite clearly in recent posts.  Today I would like to use my experience, training, and intuition to look into some of these groups.

On September 2, I spent an entire post detailing the evolution of the Islamic State (IS).  Not surprisingly, we could create a flow chart that connects all of these groups to Al-Qaeda in one way or another.  In fact, I believe all of the groups we have been reading about lately have an Al-Qaeda angle.  If these groups have an Al-Qaeda genesis and the same motivation, why have they splintered into so many factions?  First and foremost, its human nature.  These young men and women did not join a terrorist group to march on a parade ground and shine medals, they joined to kill in the name of Allah.  Without the discipline of a modern army unit, disagreements become arguments, and groups tend to splinter.  It doesn't mean that they hate you any less, it only means that personality clashes happen everywhere.  Also, smaller groups can be a strategic advantage in certain types of warfare.  Units of five to eight fighters can travel lightly and cover much more ground than two dozen armed men.  And if by chance the various groups come together for battle, they can splinter again just as quickly and disappear into the bush or mountains.  Its much harder to locate and keep track of smaller groups.  Another very important reason why we have so many groups with different monikers is vanity.  Everyone wants their five minutes of fame, so what better way than to create your own movement, name, and flag?

A review of open source media reveals (for the most part), four groups currently operating in Syria in opposition to the regular Syrian Army (loyal to President Bashir al-Assad).  The four names that seem to pop up most frequently are the IS, al-Nusra, Khorasan, and the New Syrian Army (NSA).  No doubt Al-Qaeda in present, advising the leaders of these various groups (NSA excepted, of course).  The NSA is the one anti-Assad group in Syria that appears to also oppose the Islamic extremist element.  The Obama Administration has selected the NSA to be our surrogates against the IS.  We spent time examining the NSA on September 21, so there is no need to revisit them so soon.  Personally, I am most fascinated by this group that calls itself the "al-Nusra Front" (ANF), or just "al-Nusra".  ANF is a direct extension of Al-Qaeda, straight from the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan (its so fascinating how history repeats itself, especially from a military perspective.  The Pakistan/Afghanistan border reminds me of the Vietnam War-era Vietnamese border with Laos and Cambodia).  Khorasan is an extension of al-Nusra.  During the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, the African National Congress (ANC) had a military wing (Umkhonto we sizwe- Spear of the Nation) to carry out attacks against the State.  It appears some of the terrorist groups are operating on similar lines.  Khorasan is known to favor western recruits, especially anyone with explosives training.  I believe Khorasan will attempt to exploit the training of its recruits to not only attack the enemy in Syria, but to also conduct more prolific attacks against western targets.

Khorasan is led by Muhsin Fadhli, a senior Al-Qaeda operative who was probably hiding out in Iran until recently (the Iran angle in this mess is most intriguing, and will be the subject of tomorrow's post).  It is believed that Fadhli was personally tasked by current Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to recruit westerners.  Why are the westerners so important?  Because some are former military and have specialized training, and (ostensibly) all can travel unhindered on western passports.  Examining the flow of recent media reporting on al-Nusra and Khorasan can be confusing.  Is Khorasan designed to be a specialized unit of western recruits with bomb-making experience, who can create explosives to be smuggled onto commercial airplanes?  Or will Khorasan use its skills to create I.E.Ds (Improvised Explosive Devices)?  ANF will be militarily active in Syria regardless of the presence of Khorasan, which leaves me with the impression that Khorasan will be used for specialized operations.

The Syrian conflict seems to become more complicated by the hour.  During a conversation with two colleagues, we couldn't help but laugh at some of the odd bedfellows that have evolved.  Will IS fight alongside ANF and Khorasan?  If events unfold as planned (by the Obama Administration), the New Syrian Army will be fighting both the IS and ANF/Khorasan.  Here is where it gets humorous.  If the situation on the ground develops logically, then the IS and the ANF/Khorasan will be fighting both the NEW Syrian Army and the OLD Syrian Army simultaneously.  And I'm sure before all is said and done, the NAS will settle its conflict with the regular Syrian Army.

One of the greatest books ever written (and I am an expert, just ask anyone) is Seven Pillars of Wisdom by T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia).  Seven Pillars is a poetic,

stylized biographic account of Lawrence during his efforts to organize Arab resistance to the Ottoman Turks during the First World War.  Don't be discouraged by the beginning...its can be a bit "thick".  Once you leave the beginning behind, you won't be able to put it down.  The book is written so beautifully as to provide the mind's eye with the most amazing Arabian landscapes and events.  True, you must wade through a passage or two of Lawrence's "boy-lust", but its not as bad as its made out to be. I strongly recommend Seven Pillars to everyone who will be serving in this part of the world, or who has an interest in Arabia.  I mention Lawrence and Seven Pillars because it provides great detail to the 1916 "Sykes-Picot Agreement" (I imagine if the Ottoman Empire and the Triple Alliance had gone on to win the war, Sykes-Picot would had become cage-liner for some Parakeet).  In a nutshell, Sykes-Picot was an agreement between France and the British, which defined "spheres of influence" (read: occupation) for each nation following the successful resolution of the war.  The Brits would get Palestine and Jordan, and the French would receive Syria and Lebanon.  The Treaty, which made Lawrence appear deceitful, was drafted without Lawrence's knowledge.  Lawrence had been preaching to the Arabs that their participation in defeating the Turks would result in freedom and independence.  Once the details of the treaty became public, the Arabs were incensed.  If you look close enough, you can always find some episode of western idiocy that stains the reputation of Europe and the United States indefinitely (the Chinese are still going on about the 1840s Opium Wars).  The point is, people in this part of the world do not trust westerners.  Every effort to win the "Hearts and Minds" has been unsuccessful.  The Obama Administration, alongside whatever coalition he is able to crochet together, must have a reasonable exit strategy that leaves the Syrian and Iraqi people in control of their own destiny.