Al-Shabab Makes A Statement.

Link: Al-Shabab Attacks University in Eastern Kenya.


On Thursday of last week, Somalian-based terror group Al-Shabab orchestrated an attack against unarmed, innocent students and teachers at Garissa University (College) in Garissa, Kenya.  To date, authorities state that 148 persons died in the attack, along with many if not all of the gunmen.  Since the attack included the taking of hostages (with Muslims and non-Muslims being separated), and some students are still listed as missing, Kenyan officials are hesitant to provide an exact number of gunmen.  I have received a bit of flack from visitors to my blog, because of the amount of attention I give to Africa.  I don't deny that I'm an Africaphile, but my focus on the continent as far as the blog is concerned, is solely related to the issue of terrorism.  To be more precise, I am concerned about the spread of the Islamic extremist message, and also the potential for recruitment of operatives.  It doesn't take a Rhodes Scholar to recognize that young men who have no jobs and very little hope for the future, are prime candidates for recruitment by these groups.  And young men looking for work is something that Africa, unfortunately, has way too many of.

The blog has addressed the increased presence of Al-Shabab in Kenya in numerous postings during the previous three months.  The International Media noted that Al-Shabab had taken a huge hit in their home country of Somalia, and an attitude seemed to creep in that maybe, just maybe, Al-Shabab was finished.  You can separate terrorist groups into countless sub-categories, but for the sake of this post, lets point out that there are two types of terror organizations: the ones who fight solely for the cause; and the ones that use their actions to also make a living.  Al-Shabab was never going to disappear, because they fit into the second category.  Too many members of Al-Shabab had found a way to feed themselves and their families, at a time and place where food is scarce.  Besides, Al-Shabab has too many operatives and too much equipment and too many friends to no longer be considered useful by Al-Qaeda.  Hence to move away from Somalia and into Kenya.  Analysts have been expecting a minor explosion in terrorist activity in Kenya for some time, probably because of its proximity to Somalia combined with the permanent state of economic stagnation.  I have been more concerned with the probability of recruitment in the vast townships outside Nairobi.  Whatever the vehicle, it is imperative that the Kenyan authorities realize that Al-Shabab is in the midst of relocating from Somalia to Kenya.

Many folks in Europe and the United States will automatically assume that by attacking shopping malls and college campuses, Al-Shabab is crippling its image among all the people of Kenya.  Unfortunately, that's not the case.  Forgive me if my comment appears to be ethnocentric (I don't believe it is), but sub-Saharan Africans don't automatically adopt the same perspective as westerners.  In many cases, they approach issues very differently.  By conducting the operation in Garissa, Al-Shabab was providing an example of its strength and power.  Likewise for the attack at the shopping center in Nairobi.  Where was the government?  Where were the police and the military?  Authorities in Nigeria have had a real problem dealing with the same predicament.  Some northerners (Muslims, to be sure) were beginning to support Boko Haram, because they certainly were looking like a winner.  Al-Shabab can provide a hungry, disillusioned young man with three essential things: food, a weapon, and a cause.

An important factor that should never be far from any discussion of Al-Shabab, is Al-Qaeda.  Just how close are these two groups?  I guarantee you that the analysts in Langley know.  If we take a quick look at Al-Qaeda's modus operandi regarding relations with other organizations, it would appear to be always be a one-sided relationship.  I think we will soon discover, though, that the "new" Al-Qaeda, under Ayman al-Zawahiri, is a bit more willing to be interactive with like-minded groups.  In the last few years of Osama bin-Ladin's life, the organization became very isolated and secretive, and for good reason.  I believe that Zawahiri believes in the philosophy of the struggle, just as much as he does the actions being taken.  I think we will see more instances of Al-Qaeda communicating with the Boko Harams and the Al-Shababs, and trying to lay the groundwork for a uniting message.  I believe a great deal has already been accomplished along this path, and the various groups on the ground in Syria are not nearly as separate from each other as they would lead the western media to believe.  Nothing lives forever.  Even Al-Qaeda will eventually disappear.  The key is the message.  It must resonate and be strong enough to live forever.  The message can survive long journeys across mountain ranges and oceans, when men cannot.  The message can survive the battles when all the combatants lie dead on the field.  Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda will depend upon the Boko Harams, and the Al-Qaeda in Magrebs, and the Al-Shababs, to be the caretaker and delivery system for that message.  And the message never changes.  it continues to be about domination, intolerance, hatred and bigotry.  It would behoove us to take down the caretakers before they really get a handle on the message.

Kenya And Its Al-Shabab Problem

Link: Al-Shabaab Killing Kenyan Civilians

We don't hear much in the news about Somalia anymore.  It only makes sense that when U.S. soldiers were involved in Somalia that the American media would be much more focused on the Horn of Africa.  I have no specifics, but I'm sure our military and clandestine folks occasionally have business in Somalia.  It very difficult to gauge the level of progress in attempts to bring peace and stability to the Somali people.  In early October 2014, soldiers of the internationally recognized government retook Barawe, which had been an important base of operations for Al-Shabaab.  With Moqdishu under total government control, and the African Union (AU) continuing its anti-Al-Shabaab campaign in Somalia, I started to consider the possibility of a war-free east Africa.  The events of the last week, which are highlighted in the link, brought me back to reality quickly.

On a personal level, I have greater interest in Kenya than I do Somalia.  I have lived in Kenya and have numerous Kenyan friends.  I'm certainly not disinterested in Somalia; its just never been on my list of "places to visit before I flatline".  But as circumstances would have it, a porous border and "easy targets of opportunity" have obliged me to refresh myself on the current state of affairs in Somalia.  Somali troubles have been easily exported into Kenya, and the Kenyan national defense options appear to be limited.  Al-Shabaab (AS) is crossing the Kenya/Somali border at will and conducting acts of violence against Kenyan civilians.  Its true that the Kenyan military is participating in the African Union initiatives in Kenya, and AS is using this as an excuse to execute innocent Kenyans.  The ability of AS to conduct operations in all corners of Kenya is quite surprising and alarming (please see map in link).  When AS was part of the Islamic conservative movement that attempted to govern Moqdishu at one time, they occasionally appeared to be interested in reform.  Any sense of objectivity and progressive thinking has since disappeared, as AS has embraced the habit of executing non-Muslims out-of-hand.  Over the past few decades, the Kenyan people have busied themselves with working towards a democratic and corruption-free electoral process.  Kenyans have also been very focused on developing an economy that creates jobs and opportunity for all.  The specter of terrorism reared its ugly head in 1998 with the Al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, but until the last five years or so, Kenyans had no real concern that a shopping mall would get shot up, or that a taxi would be hikacked and all its occupants murdered.  Al-Shabaab has brought that fear home to roost in Kenya, with attacks and fatalities in Mombasa, Nairobi, Wajir, Hindi, and Diani.

Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta, who has been much more effective and detail-oriented than I expected, has promised that AS attacks in Kenya will only encourage the Kenyan military to be more determined with their activities in Somalia.  Kenyatta seems to be sincerely pissed off regarding the apparent ease with which AS is slipping across the border.  I'm not so surprised with AS' ability to cross the border at will.  But I am perplexed at the complexity of the AS network in Kenya.  How else would they be able to support attacks in Diani (in the southeast), Wajir up north in the rocky desert, and also in Eastleigh, just outside of Nairobi?  In an otherwise accurate and valuable article, one point in the link causes a bit of heartburn.  I don't think its fair to label the Kenyan security forces as "ill-equipped".  Its fair to question the training and ability of the soldier assigned to whatever equipment, but I believe that the Kenyan military and security forces have recently upgraded some of its more important equipment.  As is apparent to anyone who watches the international news or reads the newspaper, Kenya is a very close ally of the United States.  It is also the second home (at least by heritage) of President Barrack Obama.  No one can convince me that our military, et al, would allow the Kenyans to take on experienced, sociopathic terrorists with outdated or broken equipment.  Its possible that I'm wrong, but I wouldn't bet on it.

So Kenya has a real problem.  Even as AS gets pushed to the edge in Somalia, it appears to be very mobile and effective in Kenya.  Might AS move its operations from Somalia to Kenya?  No doubt there are many jobless, hungry young people in the townships outside of Nairobi and Mombasa who are waiting for a message of deliverance.  In order to be effective in that type of outreach operation, terrorist groups must have access to cash.  Part of the seduction of the young population is the sharing of wealth.  In this instance, AS will probably be limited to using the "change for the better" argument by itself, but it is possible that AS has stepped up its activities in Kenya as a prelude to relocation.  To resolve this problem, Kenyatta has the option of basically putting the fight into the hands of the Americans.  I'm sure it wouldn't be the first time that an African leader made that kind of decision.  Alongside asking for planning and strategy support, Kenyatta must also ask for assistance with resources.  If he effectively demonstrates that he is one hundred percent dedicated to the complete destruction of AS, he will find to better ally than the United States of America.   

Somalian-based Terrorist Group Al-Shabaab Threat to U.S. Interests in Uganda

Link: Uganda Foils Imminent Al-Shabaab terror Plot


To understand the particular brand of compost that makes up the Somalian terrorist group Al-Shabaab (The Younger), Mookie Baby will have to take a quick trip through history.  Somalia, which occupies the eastern Horn of Africa, was an Italian colony until the end of World War II.  At one time it was home to a sizable Italian population, and would have made a strategic port for the Italian Navy. (Why does the new Italian Navy have glass bottom boats?  So they can look at the old Italian Navy.)  After the war it was administered as a protectorate by the Brits until Independence in 1960.  In 1991 Somalia descended into the nastiest kind of civil war.  In the ten years leading up the civil war, the economy had broken down, the capital Moqdishu was often without power, and the government had become more unpopular and repressive.  When the government finally fell, Somalia collapsed into many separate areas of authority.  A group of Islamic Courts was created to help the people work through conflicts (using Sharia Law, of course).  These Courts eventually started providing aid and healthcare and adopted the name "Islamic Courts Union" (ICU).  The ICU swallowed up weaker authorities and expanded quickly. 

In 1999 the Courts and various affiliated groups merged to create a militia, the ICUP.  At its greatest strength, ICU was in control of Moqdishu and all of south Somalia.  Interestingly enough, a government run by judges is called a "Krytocracy" (thank you, Wikipedia).  From 1999 to 2006, the ICU fought against a variety of different home-grown groups including a number of "Transitional Governments" supported by the Arab League and African Union.  In 2006, with the ICU apparently in control of all of Moqdishu and large parts of Somalia, Ethiopia invaded.  The Ethiopians had no trouble defeating the various militias aligned with the ICU.  A Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by Ethiopia, the African Union, and apparently the UN, forced the remaining elements of ICU into the rural areas (although certain sectors of Moqdishu remained in Al-Shabaab control until 2011).  The ICU splintered into a number of groups, including Al-Shabaab, which describes itself as carrying out a jihad against the enemies of Islam, the TRG, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  Al-Shabaab is known to butcher herds of elephants to raise money from their Ivory, and also collects ransoms from kidnappings.  Internationally, Eritrea (Eritrea's Intelligence Service in particular), has been accused of providing support to Al-Shabaab (Eritrea hates Ethiopia, Ethiopia is at war with Al-Shabaab, therefore Eritrea supports Al-Shabaab; just another verse in the famous tune "the enemy of my enemy is my friend").

After 2006, Al-Shabaab began to resemble a smaller, more tactile terrorist group.  Attacks were conducted against targets in Kenya, especially areas frequented by western tourists.  Starting in 2011, Al-Shabaab began conducting small scale attacks against defenseless targets in Nairobi and also in areas of northeast Kenya.  Hundreds of people were killed.  In December 2013, Al-Shabaab attacked an upscale shopping market in Nairobi (frequented by ex-pats, diplomats, and wealthy Kenyans) and thirty-nine people were killed.  In September 2014, a Drone strike killed Al-Shabaab leader Moktar Ali Zubayr.  Operations by Kenyan police and Special Forces, with assistance from western allies, conducted many successful raids against Al-Shabaab in 2013 and 2014.  It was believed by many that the death of Zubayr spelled the beginning of the end for Al-Shabaab.  It might have been wishful thinking, as the link provided above details Ugandan authorities working against a suspected Al-Shabaab operation in Entebbe, Uganda.  In 2012 Al-Shabaab announced a merger with a Somali-based Al-Qaeda group.  Intelligence has also confirmed that Al-Shabaab is in contact with Al-Qaeda In the Maghreb (AQIM) and Nigerian Islamic fundamentalist group Boko Haram (see previous post on Boko Haram).

It would be unwise to consider Al-Shabaab irrelevant.  In many instances, terrorist groups become more of a threat as they become smaller.  They are able to travel easier and don't require much in the way of resources (although everyone needs an AK-47, a beheading knife, and a bomb or two).  I can imagine the poor folks at CTC in Langley trying to make sense of all these various groups.  One of the reasons they splinter in this manner is to make it difficult for the good guys to stay on top of their game.  It would be much easier to follow and destroy three large terrorist networks, as opposed to the difficulty (and resources needed) to combat over one hundred different groups.  The key is not to get bogged down in the different names and titles.  These people all have the same basic goal, creating chaos and fear through murder and destruction.  They are best confronted as one monster: International Terrorism.