Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.
In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi. Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi. The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken. The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south. Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened. ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down. One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi. Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question. What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq? That is a question that as of yet has no answer.
The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah. Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets. The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a. But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel. The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters. Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar. But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win. With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force. Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much. The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria. The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS. This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves. An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development. For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.
Showing posts with label Sunni. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sunni. Show all posts
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Sunday, August 23, 2015
Kurdish politics, and other confusing headaches.
Links: A. Kurdish political parties trying to resolve presidential debate.
B. Wikipedia entry for Peshmerga.
C. Wikipedia entry for PKK.
During my career, I was fortunate enough to work closely with representatives of both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 2003 and 2004, the opposing Kurdish political parties had set aside much of their differences, at least in Baghdad, for the best interests of the greater Iraqi Kurdish community. Both groups were represented by well-educated, deferential, hard-working people, who were tremendously supportive of the United States and our military forces in particular. I remember that the PUK had taken possession of two large, adjoining compounds in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, which they utilized for a variety of purposes, including regular meetings with representatives of U.S. government agencies. Jalal Talabani, founder and leader of the PUK, maintained a much more elaborate residence in Baghdad, closer to the Karada neighborhood. My initial visit to the PUK compound brought me into contact with Peshmerga (Kurdish for "one who confronts death") for the first, but certainly not the last time. The Peshmerga are the military forces for the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; they attempt to maintain a non-aligned posture with regards to the PUK and KDP, who have, at times, really had a go at each other. Although I've never seen a female Peshmerga, I've been told that they exist. This group represents the type of self-reliant, hardy, low-maintenance soldier that we don't see much anymore. They are brave, well-trained, and move together flawlessly when operational. That being said, I wouldn't invite them to a candlelight dinner party. From my experience (forgive the stereotyping), they stink, and although not rude, normally haven't picked up much in the way of manners. I wrote in my book about a meeting I had once at the PUK house, where we discovered two Peshmerga asleep under the table because of the volume and frequency of their farts. Aside from the U.S. Armed Forces, I can't think of any group that I would want fighting by my side more than the Peshmerga.
I have at times been accused of being biased towards the Kurds. I am guilty as charged. I have no qualms about admitting that I support the Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland. As a people, they are kind, generous, welcoming, hard-working and very family-oriented. They can also hold a grudge for a very long, long time. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but the manner of worship in the Kurdish community, regardless of affiliation, is much different than what is normally observed in the Arab world. Kurds are private about their religious observations, although most Kurds are very observant of Islamic obligations. They go about their business in such a way as to not draw attention to themselves. This is a true example of a community that values the private nature of its religious identity. Sure, the majority are Sunni Muslim, but they don't advocate the use of shura to settle every issue, nor do they feel this automatic disconnect with Christians and Jews. I understand the reasoning behind keeping Iraq united. If the Kurds were granted a homeland in northern Iraq, the rest of the country would be in danger of disintegration. Maybe its time for that disintegration to take place, given that the area that was once known as Babylon, then Mesopotamia, and now Iraq, has not made a great success of ethnic integration. It might happen with or without the Kurds, especially if the majority Shi'a continue to assert themselves and the Sunni start to consider life inside the Islamic Republic of Iraq.
Turkey's recent decision to end the de-facto cease fire with the quasi-military organization the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), has been a reminder that the ISIS crisis is one of a number of unresolved conflicts in this part of the world, that sit just under the skin, waiting to erupt again. Northern Syria is home to a substantial number of ethnic Kurds, and the anti-ISIS coalition has benefitted tremendously from their willingness to stand up and defend their own communities. Even the Turks have benefitted, as Ankara is not keen about having ISIS as a direct neighbor. But the Turks are experts at separating one group of Kurds from another. According to Ankara, the Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS tooth-and-nail are not connected to the "terrorist" PKK. Turkey's decision to conduct bombing sorties against suspected PKK locations was a naked political move on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to energize anti-Kurd elements in Turkey before pivotal fall elections. Not surprisingly, many in the Turkish electorate will scream for vengeance regarding three Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack, and not think twice about the Kurds whose murder precipitated the retaliatory ambush. All the while, the Kurdistan Parliament, which sits in Arbil, is struggling with the never-ending debate over the office of President. The current office-holder, President Masoud Barzani, is the head of the KDP. In 2009, Barzani was elected with 69.9 % of the vote, and in 2013, the parliament decided to extend his term until 2015. The five major Kurdish political parties were attempting to resolve the issue of succession, but failed before Barzani's term expired on August 20. Believe me, Kurdish politics can get very complicated. Its imperative that Kurdistan present a united front, given the renewed trouble with Turkey and the continuing war against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. The PDK will argue for another extension for Barzani, which, for political expediency, will be supported by the PUK. The remaining parties do not represent enough votes to budge a joint KDP/PUK effort. Expect the Kurdistan Parliament to extend Barzani's term to 2017, when it meets to debate the issue on August 23.
B. Wikipedia entry for Peshmerga.
C. Wikipedia entry for PKK.
During my career, I was fortunate enough to work closely with representatives of both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 2003 and 2004, the opposing Kurdish political parties had set aside much of their differences, at least in Baghdad, for the best interests of the greater Iraqi Kurdish community. Both groups were represented by well-educated, deferential, hard-working people, who were tremendously supportive of the United States and our military forces in particular. I remember that the PUK had taken possession of two large, adjoining compounds in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, which they utilized for a variety of purposes, including regular meetings with representatives of U.S. government agencies. Jalal Talabani, founder and leader of the PUK, maintained a much more elaborate residence in Baghdad, closer to the Karada neighborhood. My initial visit to the PUK compound brought me into contact with Peshmerga (Kurdish for "one who confronts death") for the first, but certainly not the last time. The Peshmerga are the military forces for the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; they attempt to maintain a non-aligned posture with regards to the PUK and KDP, who have, at times, really had a go at each other. Although I've never seen a female Peshmerga, I've been told that they exist. This group represents the type of self-reliant, hardy, low-maintenance soldier that we don't see much anymore. They are brave, well-trained, and move together flawlessly when operational. That being said, I wouldn't invite them to a candlelight dinner party. From my experience (forgive the stereotyping), they stink, and although not rude, normally haven't picked up much in the way of manners. I wrote in my book about a meeting I had once at the PUK house, where we discovered two Peshmerga asleep under the table because of the volume and frequency of their farts. Aside from the U.S. Armed Forces, I can't think of any group that I would want fighting by my side more than the Peshmerga.
I have at times been accused of being biased towards the Kurds. I am guilty as charged. I have no qualms about admitting that I support the Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland. As a people, they are kind, generous, welcoming, hard-working and very family-oriented. They can also hold a grudge for a very long, long time. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but the manner of worship in the Kurdish community, regardless of affiliation, is much different than what is normally observed in the Arab world. Kurds are private about their religious observations, although most Kurds are very observant of Islamic obligations. They go about their business in such a way as to not draw attention to themselves. This is a true example of a community that values the private nature of its religious identity. Sure, the majority are Sunni Muslim, but they don't advocate the use of shura to settle every issue, nor do they feel this automatic disconnect with Christians and Jews. I understand the reasoning behind keeping Iraq united. If the Kurds were granted a homeland in northern Iraq, the rest of the country would be in danger of disintegration. Maybe its time for that disintegration to take place, given that the area that was once known as Babylon, then Mesopotamia, and now Iraq, has not made a great success of ethnic integration. It might happen with or without the Kurds, especially if the majority Shi'a continue to assert themselves and the Sunni start to consider life inside the Islamic Republic of Iraq.
Turkey's recent decision to end the de-facto cease fire with the quasi-military organization the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), has been a reminder that the ISIS crisis is one of a number of unresolved conflicts in this part of the world, that sit just under the skin, waiting to erupt again. Northern Syria is home to a substantial number of ethnic Kurds, and the anti-ISIS coalition has benefitted tremendously from their willingness to stand up and defend their own communities. Even the Turks have benefitted, as Ankara is not keen about having ISIS as a direct neighbor. But the Turks are experts at separating one group of Kurds from another. According to Ankara, the Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS tooth-and-nail are not connected to the "terrorist" PKK. Turkey's decision to conduct bombing sorties against suspected PKK locations was a naked political move on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to energize anti-Kurd elements in Turkey before pivotal fall elections. Not surprisingly, many in the Turkish electorate will scream for vengeance regarding three Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack, and not think twice about the Kurds whose murder precipitated the retaliatory ambush. All the while, the Kurdistan Parliament, which sits in Arbil, is struggling with the never-ending debate over the office of President. The current office-holder, President Masoud Barzani, is the head of the KDP. In 2009, Barzani was elected with 69.9 % of the vote, and in 2013, the parliament decided to extend his term until 2015. The five major Kurdish political parties were attempting to resolve the issue of succession, but failed before Barzani's term expired on August 20. Believe me, Kurdish politics can get very complicated. Its imperative that Kurdistan present a united front, given the renewed trouble with Turkey and the continuing war against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. The PDK will argue for another extension for Barzani, which, for political expediency, will be supported by the PUK. The remaining parties do not represent enough votes to budge a joint KDP/PUK effort. Expect the Kurdistan Parliament to extend Barzani's term to 2017, when it meets to debate the issue on August 23.
Monday, July 20, 2015
Obama's treaty with Iran surpasses Neville Chamberlain in sacrificing international security in search of a political legacy.
Links: A. ISIS a beneficiary of the Obama/Iran nuclear treaty.
B. Putin assisted with Obama/Iran nuclear treaty.
So, Vladimir Putin heartily approves of the treaty agreed to by the Obama Administration and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, President Obama is quick to praise Putin for being helpful during the negotiations. How quickly we forget who we are dealing with. Have we forgotten the 298 dead civilians from Malaysian Airlines flight 17, whose lives were lost because Putin agreed to use advanced Russian military hardware in the Ukrainian conflict. Unfortunately, he didn't lend the experts who know how to use the equipment, and the result was a civilian airline being mistaken for a military flight. The world understands and excepts this reality, along with many others that show Putin to be a megalomaniacal dictator, intent on returning Russia to the military prominence of the Cold War. Every effort made by the United States on behalf of de-escalation of violence and the end of nuclear proliferation, up to now has been met with cold, hard opposition by Putin in Russia. The Russians never sided with the United Nations in its efforts to force Iran to steer away from militarizing its nuclear research. But now, because Putin approves of this treaty, he's become "a friend". And those of us in this country, including many who have served in uniform and sacrificed limbs for national security, are called "overheated and dishonest" by Obama. And now we are told that the Administration has been working on a "rapprochement" with Russia, and has started putting pressure on the Ukrainian government to be more conciliatory to the Russian-backed terrorists, I mean separatists, who are trying to detach entire pieces of Ukraine for annexation by Russia.
I have no doubt that this Administration did not spend one second considering the consequences of this treaty on the current unstable situation in the Persian Gulf and the Levant. All that mattered was to keep the goal in sight, and the goal in this instance was a treaty of some sort to allow Obama to leave office claiming credit for some foreign policy initiative. I don't understand why he just didn't focus on one of his other, previous foreign policy initiatives; he's had six years so there must be something, right? Fat chance. Our foreign policy over the past six years has been as knee-jerk as a reflex in a doctor's office. Under President's Reagan, Bush, and even Clinton, our government continued the tradition of initiating positive change in the world. The last six years have been singularly about responses, not initiatives. Now for a bit of simple, common-sense. ISIS is a religiously Sunni-affiliated organization, as is Al-Qaida. Iran, with the lifting a sanctions, which conservatively will release as much as one hundred billion dollars to the Iranian treasury, will rapidly become a dominant force in the Persian Gulf. The ballsy involvement with the Houthis in Yemen has already demonstrated this Iranian Administration's determination to expand its international influence. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, who are already suspected of having some funding connections to Sunni extremism, will look upon recent developments as a return to the Battlefield of Karbala. Even if the Iranians were to fulfill their obligations according to this treaty, in five years they would again be free to pursue whatever type of nuclear research they desire. There are a number of questionable facilities that are part of the Iranian nuclear research program, which can have no purpose other than the construction of a nuclear weapon. It would have been nice if our negotiating team had at least requested that the Iranians shut these facilities. But as far as I know, nothing was requested of the Iranians whatsoever, except the need for unannounced inspections. Well, we saw how far that demand went.
Lets welcome Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to the nuclear arms race. Lets also congratulate Sunni extremists everywhere, who will now be able to use the growing power of Shi'a Iran as a recruiting and fundraising tool. This treaty is so flawed that I think its time I took a sabbatical from reviewing its contents. Instead, I will pick up another debate which is near and dear to my heart. In 1993, President Clinton signed a law making it illegal for active duty military personnel to be armed on base. I can't recall if this law was preceded by some incident involving firearms and active duty personnel, but I can tell you that the United States is not the same country as it was twenty-one years ago. Our Federal Law Enforcement and Intelligence experts stress the likelihood that Islamic extremists are living within our communities, waiting for the order or the opportunity to strike. On a number of occasions, we have already seen that military installations are prime targets. This is the world we live in today, 2015. Our young men and women who volunteer to put their lives in jeopardy for national security, should not be deprived of the ability to defend themselves. Are we supposed to tell these soldiers that we can trust them enough to die for their country, but they can't be trusted enough to carry a weapon on base? What an absurd law. I'm not afraid to state the obvious, and point directly to former President Bill Clinton: if that law had not passed in 1993, its probable that at least some of the victims of Thursday's attack would have been armed. I will leave the rest of that assumption up to the reader.....
B. Putin assisted with Obama/Iran nuclear treaty.
So, Vladimir Putin heartily approves of the treaty agreed to by the Obama Administration and the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, President Obama is quick to praise Putin for being helpful during the negotiations. How quickly we forget who we are dealing with. Have we forgotten the 298 dead civilians from Malaysian Airlines flight 17, whose lives were lost because Putin agreed to use advanced Russian military hardware in the Ukrainian conflict. Unfortunately, he didn't lend the experts who know how to use the equipment, and the result was a civilian airline being mistaken for a military flight. The world understands and excepts this reality, along with many others that show Putin to be a megalomaniacal dictator, intent on returning Russia to the military prominence of the Cold War. Every effort made by the United States on behalf of de-escalation of violence and the end of nuclear proliferation, up to now has been met with cold, hard opposition by Putin in Russia. The Russians never sided with the United Nations in its efforts to force Iran to steer away from militarizing its nuclear research. But now, because Putin approves of this treaty, he's become "a friend". And those of us in this country, including many who have served in uniform and sacrificed limbs for national security, are called "overheated and dishonest" by Obama. And now we are told that the Administration has been working on a "rapprochement" with Russia, and has started putting pressure on the Ukrainian government to be more conciliatory to the Russian-backed terrorists, I mean separatists, who are trying to detach entire pieces of Ukraine for annexation by Russia.
I have no doubt that this Administration did not spend one second considering the consequences of this treaty on the current unstable situation in the Persian Gulf and the Levant. All that mattered was to keep the goal in sight, and the goal in this instance was a treaty of some sort to allow Obama to leave office claiming credit for some foreign policy initiative. I don't understand why he just didn't focus on one of his other, previous foreign policy initiatives; he's had six years so there must be something, right? Fat chance. Our foreign policy over the past six years has been as knee-jerk as a reflex in a doctor's office. Under President's Reagan, Bush, and even Clinton, our government continued the tradition of initiating positive change in the world. The last six years have been singularly about responses, not initiatives. Now for a bit of simple, common-sense. ISIS is a religiously Sunni-affiliated organization, as is Al-Qaida. Iran, with the lifting a sanctions, which conservatively will release as much as one hundred billion dollars to the Iranian treasury, will rapidly become a dominant force in the Persian Gulf. The ballsy involvement with the Houthis in Yemen has already demonstrated this Iranian Administration's determination to expand its international influence. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, who are already suspected of having some funding connections to Sunni extremism, will look upon recent developments as a return to the Battlefield of Karbala. Even if the Iranians were to fulfill their obligations according to this treaty, in five years they would again be free to pursue whatever type of nuclear research they desire. There are a number of questionable facilities that are part of the Iranian nuclear research program, which can have no purpose other than the construction of a nuclear weapon. It would have been nice if our negotiating team had at least requested that the Iranians shut these facilities. But as far as I know, nothing was requested of the Iranians whatsoever, except the need for unannounced inspections. Well, we saw how far that demand went.
Lets welcome Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. to the nuclear arms race. Lets also congratulate Sunni extremists everywhere, who will now be able to use the growing power of Shi'a Iran as a recruiting and fundraising tool. This treaty is so flawed that I think its time I took a sabbatical from reviewing its contents. Instead, I will pick up another debate which is near and dear to my heart. In 1993, President Clinton signed a law making it illegal for active duty military personnel to be armed on base. I can't recall if this law was preceded by some incident involving firearms and active duty personnel, but I can tell you that the United States is not the same country as it was twenty-one years ago. Our Federal Law Enforcement and Intelligence experts stress the likelihood that Islamic extremists are living within our communities, waiting for the order or the opportunity to strike. On a number of occasions, we have already seen that military installations are prime targets. This is the world we live in today, 2015. Our young men and women who volunteer to put their lives in jeopardy for national security, should not be deprived of the ability to defend themselves. Are we supposed to tell these soldiers that we can trust them enough to die for their country, but they can't be trusted enough to carry a weapon on base? What an absurd law. I'm not afraid to state the obvious, and point directly to former President Bill Clinton: if that law had not passed in 1993, its probable that at least some of the victims of Thursday's attack would have been armed. I will leave the rest of that assumption up to the reader.....
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.
Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
Friday, July 10, 2015
Hezbollah keeping Assad regime from rapid contraction.
Link: Hezbollah assists regime forces to retake Syrian border city.
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
Wednesday, July 1, 2015
Jabhat al-Nusra: the evolution of Al-Qaeda and the need for conventional warfare.
Link: Tension between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria.
We have always expressed the opinion that Al-Qaeda and its representative groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), were really not that far removed from motivations and intentions of the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS). In fact, we have always been surprised and a bit frustrated at the mainstream media's obsession with separating each and every Sunni-based Jihadi group. No doubt Al-Qaeda and ISIS have done everything they can to perpetuate this idea that these groups work exclusively of each other. This impression encourages the idea that Sunni-based jihadism is much more entrenched in the Sunni community than it really is. We have argued that because of their mutual goals, orientation and teachings, that it was virtually impossible for ISIS and JN to be working against each other. In the last six months, both ISIS and JN have enjoyed tremendous success on the battlefields of Syria, as the regime forces have to defend from almost daily attacks, sometimes from different directions. Although we have gone to some lengths to illustrate the common ideology and genesis of ISIS and Al-Qaeda/JN, we have never discounted the probability that the groups would have disagreements that might lead to actual violence. But we continue to strongly believe that any such conflicts would be temporary (and have actually proven to be so).
An interesting trend that we have noted previously is becoming more visible on the battlefields of Syria. We have discussed in some depth the efforts of ISIS to create an effective conventional military, complete with departments, promotions and letters from home. We opined that the numerous former Ba'ath Party members who had found a home in ISIS, were useful to the group because of the organizational and planning experience and skills that they possessed. For a short time it was popular to consider the idea that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had some level of influence within ISIS, when actually the opposite is true. These former bureaucrats and armchair Generals of the Saddam regime are survivors, and ISIS just happened to be in the hiring business. Believe me, it has nothing to do with ideology.
But the need for ISIS to recruit individuals with certain skills outside of bomb-making and decapitation is obvious. ISIS has created the first conventional terrorist army, and to keep that army supplied and effective, a support mechanism must exist. Their effort is evolving, and they have met with some difficulties, but their success can't be denied. We have previously explained the justification for the Islamic extremist cause to pursue a conventional army. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United State Armed Forces proved time and again, that small groups if ill-prepared and inconsistently equipped tribesmen can't defeat a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force (Vietnam was a diplomatic failure but a military success; the American people lost the stomach for daily casualties highlighted by politically-driven new coverage). In 2009, with the apparent successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the decision was made to support the creation of a conventional fighting force loyal to Al-Qaeda, and Syria provided the ideal nursery. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had relocated from Iraq to Syria (or should I say they had been "booted out"), so the platform was in place. Fighters were recruited, many from Africa and the West, and equipment was either purchased or purloined from the Syrians. The group changed its name, probably as a purposeful effort to separate itself from Al-Qaeda and strengthen the suggestion that the region was full of Sunni-based extremist military groups. The head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, did move the group away from Al-Qaeda to a certain extent, a move which no doubt infuriated Ayman al-Zawahiri, hold up back in Pakistan somewhere (probably at the Pakistani Intel Service main headquarters), and the link indicates that the two groups are not necessarily coordinating their operations or sharing their battle plans. This mild declaration of independence by ISIS, forgive the phrase, is the reason JN has become so successful on the battlefield.
Al-Qaeda was the original genesis of the idea to create a conventional military capability to pursue the goals of international Sunni Jihad. When ISIS began showing bit of free will, JN, which was in direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership and much more representative of the group's most recent persona, began to follow the same plan which proved so successful to ISIS. JN, although on a much smaller scale, started to morph into a conventional military force. In the past, Al-Qaeda has relied on its small size to stay mobile, hidden, and able to strike targets and disappear. JN created a supply mechanism, mostly utilizing its popularity with the local population, that kept its fighters fed and well-equipped. Personnel were selected for various jobs according to background and training, and formalized planning became an integral part of every operation. Communications were strengthened, liaison to the local community were chosen by ethnic background and language skills, and as more fighter arrived on the scene, the variety of military hardware increased. Is it no surprise that JN has been just as successful on the Syrian battlefield lately, if not more, than ISIS. The one life-line that both ISIS and JN rely on seems to be flowing stronger than ever: the financial support from the gulf states. This support is not necessarily directly from the coffers of the various Emirates and Sheikdoms (some is), but it is coming from millionaire and billionaire families with loyalties to the extremist cause. The financial support has increased as of late as Iran and the despised Shi'a stretch their legs in Yemen and Iraq. No doubt some of these fanatics are expecting to re-fight the Battle of Karbala.
As things stand now, ISIS is a much more entrenched and evolved military machine. In size and in capabilities, JN can't hold a candle to the Islamic State forces. But everyday JN grows stronger, and JN has proven to be much more popular with the local communities than ISIS (probably has something to do with the burning of that young Jordanian pilot; families from the Hashemites in Jordan and the rural communities of Syria have a history of good relations). With JN and ISIS both trying to outdo each other in capturing former regime towns, and the Sunni and Shi'a threatening to start an Islamic Civil War in Yemen and Iraq, the West has a bit of breathing room. But once JN and ISIS merge, and they will, and the Iranians pull back behind the walls of secrecy they value so much, we will be faced with a tremendous foe.
We have always expressed the opinion that Al-Qaeda and its representative groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), were really not that far removed from motivations and intentions of the Islamic State terrorist group (ISIS). In fact, we have always been surprised and a bit frustrated at the mainstream media's obsession with separating each and every Sunni-based Jihadi group. No doubt Al-Qaeda and ISIS have done everything they can to perpetuate this idea that these groups work exclusively of each other. This impression encourages the idea that Sunni-based jihadism is much more entrenched in the Sunni community than it really is. We have argued that because of their mutual goals, orientation and teachings, that it was virtually impossible for ISIS and JN to be working against each other. In the last six months, both ISIS and JN have enjoyed tremendous success on the battlefields of Syria, as the regime forces have to defend from almost daily attacks, sometimes from different directions. Although we have gone to some lengths to illustrate the common ideology and genesis of ISIS and Al-Qaeda/JN, we have never discounted the probability that the groups would have disagreements that might lead to actual violence. But we continue to strongly believe that any such conflicts would be temporary (and have actually proven to be so).
An interesting trend that we have noted previously is becoming more visible on the battlefields of Syria. We have discussed in some depth the efforts of ISIS to create an effective conventional military, complete with departments, promotions and letters from home. We opined that the numerous former Ba'ath Party members who had found a home in ISIS, were useful to the group because of the organizational and planning experience and skills that they possessed. For a short time it was popular to consider the idea that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party had some level of influence within ISIS, when actually the opposite is true. These former bureaucrats and armchair Generals of the Saddam regime are survivors, and ISIS just happened to be in the hiring business. Believe me, it has nothing to do with ideology.
But the need for ISIS to recruit individuals with certain skills outside of bomb-making and decapitation is obvious. ISIS has created the first conventional terrorist army, and to keep that army supplied and effective, a support mechanism must exist. Their effort is evolving, and they have met with some difficulties, but their success can't be denied. We have previously explained the justification for the Islamic extremist cause to pursue a conventional army. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the United State Armed Forces proved time and again, that small groups if ill-prepared and inconsistently equipped tribesmen can't defeat a well-trained and well-equipped army and air force (Vietnam was a diplomatic failure but a military success; the American people lost the stomach for daily casualties highlighted by politically-driven new coverage). In 2009, with the apparent successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the decision was made to support the creation of a conventional fighting force loyal to Al-Qaeda, and Syria provided the ideal nursery. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had relocated from Iraq to Syria (or should I say they had been "booted out"), so the platform was in place. Fighters were recruited, many from Africa and the West, and equipment was either purchased or purloined from the Syrians. The group changed its name, probably as a purposeful effort to separate itself from Al-Qaeda and strengthen the suggestion that the region was full of Sunni-based extremist military groups. The head of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, did move the group away from Al-Qaeda to a certain extent, a move which no doubt infuriated Ayman al-Zawahiri, hold up back in Pakistan somewhere (probably at the Pakistani Intel Service main headquarters), and the link indicates that the two groups are not necessarily coordinating their operations or sharing their battle plans. This mild declaration of independence by ISIS, forgive the phrase, is the reason JN has become so successful on the battlefield.
Al-Qaeda was the original genesis of the idea to create a conventional military capability to pursue the goals of international Sunni Jihad. When ISIS began showing bit of free will, JN, which was in direct contact with the Al-Qaeda leadership and much more representative of the group's most recent persona, began to follow the same plan which proved so successful to ISIS. JN, although on a much smaller scale, started to morph into a conventional military force. In the past, Al-Qaeda has relied on its small size to stay mobile, hidden, and able to strike targets and disappear. JN created a supply mechanism, mostly utilizing its popularity with the local population, that kept its fighters fed and well-equipped. Personnel were selected for various jobs according to background and training, and formalized planning became an integral part of every operation. Communications were strengthened, liaison to the local community were chosen by ethnic background and language skills, and as more fighter arrived on the scene, the variety of military hardware increased. Is it no surprise that JN has been just as successful on the Syrian battlefield lately, if not more, than ISIS. The one life-line that both ISIS and JN rely on seems to be flowing stronger than ever: the financial support from the gulf states. This support is not necessarily directly from the coffers of the various Emirates and Sheikdoms (some is), but it is coming from millionaire and billionaire families with loyalties to the extremist cause. The financial support has increased as of late as Iran and the despised Shi'a stretch their legs in Yemen and Iraq. No doubt some of these fanatics are expecting to re-fight the Battle of Karbala.
As things stand now, ISIS is a much more entrenched and evolved military machine. In size and in capabilities, JN can't hold a candle to the Islamic State forces. But everyday JN grows stronger, and JN has proven to be much more popular with the local communities than ISIS (probably has something to do with the burning of that young Jordanian pilot; families from the Hashemites in Jordan and the rural communities of Syria have a history of good relations). With JN and ISIS both trying to outdo each other in capturing former regime towns, and the Sunni and Shi'a threatening to start an Islamic Civil War in Yemen and Iraq, the West has a bit of breathing room. But once JN and ISIS merge, and they will, and the Iranians pull back behind the walls of secrecy they value so much, we will be faced with a tremendous foe.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Should Iraq be partitioned?
Links: A. Considerations on partitioning Iraq.
B. The U.S. contemplates partitioning Iraq.
In 2006, then-Senator Joe Biden suggested that consideration be given to the partition of Iraq. I believe at the time, that the idea was to allow the Kurds a homeland in the north, the Sunni would stay put in the central belt region, and the Shi'a would have an independent state in the south. For some reason, I couldn't buy into this argument, although for the life of me I can't recall why. I know that Turkey would have had a proverbial herd of cows if the Kurds had been given a homeland, and the Sunni, who as a minority have always ruled Iraq, would've been forced to accept a smaller and less-wealthy nation, but something else kept me from joining the "pro-partition" partisans. I think it was probably just an example of the traditionalist in me not wanted to change the maps again. But we've reached that point again, when folks in position of authority are whispering about partitioning Iraq. It does piss me off a bit, because this discussion wasn't really necessary. We could have avoided this position if we hadn't been in such a hurry to get out of Iraq.
Our rapid departure from Iraq was not necessary. The Iraqis were not requesting it, and our military leaders were strongly advising otherwise. Everyone seemed to be in agreement that the Iraqi military needed to be responsible for Iraq's external security, but only after sufficient training had taken place. Its my understanding that the training program that had been approved by the administration hadn't even started before Obama changed his mind and pulled the rug out from under everyone. So we left Iraq in the hands of an untrained, unprofessional army, with a huge invitation to ISIS to "come on in, folks!" And they didn't need to be asked twice. The real tragedy is that Iraq was beginning to settle into existence as a unitary state, with an economy that connected all the various regions and ethnicities. As its traditional boundaries are drawn, Iraq is fortunate to have natural resources distributed in all parts of the nation. This fact contributed to the successful re-establishment of an internationally-focused economy. The presence of the U.S. military allowed for consecutive years of peace, something foreign to many Iraqis. Markets were open and full of produce, schools were full, traffic lights worked, the electoral process was improving with each election, Iraq's airports were using the designation "international" again, the national soccer team was winning (occasionally), and an Olympic team existed to represent all Iraqis. Compare those few facts with the situation in Iraq today. You can lay all of this at the feet of Barrack Obama. He felt the political pressure from his base to follow through on his irresponsible pledge to rid Iraq of U.S. military forces at the earliest possible opportunity. And lets face it: the ultimate sacrifice of all those American young men and women....does it mean nothing to Obama? Peace was achieved and prosperity was at hand, and for politics' sake, he turned success into failure. His actions did everything possible to encourage sectarian movement amongst the various ethnicities of Iraq. Without the U.S. Army, the only security is with your own kind. That is the perspective of the various groups trying to survive in Iraq today.
Back to the idea of partitioning Iraq. First and foremost, its really absurd of the United States to be considering the limits of the national boundaries of a sovereign nation which is diplomatically accredited in the United States and a member in good standing of the United Nations (what the hell is that, anyway?). Be that as it may, I have always supported the Kurdish independence movement. The Kurds have played the game so long, and been such good team players, that they deserve the opportunity to govern themselves. The truth is, Kurdistan would probably exist today as a separate and legitimate nation-state if it weren't for issues regarding oil. How much oil are the Kurds sitting on, and should it belong to all the people of Iraq, and not just the Kurds? A specious argument, considering that the Kurds have never benefitted from any of the other oil deposits in Iraq. Most Iraqis don't consider the Kurds to be Iraqi, even though most Kurds are Muslim. If Iraq were at peace, it might not be a bad idea to consider three separate nations, one for each ethnicity. But given the current conflict raging against the Islamic State, its really a moot point. The good guys are hoping to find a way to keep Iraq from becoming one united nation under the Islamic State, and don't have much time to sit around discussing the viability of a Kurdish, Sunni and Shia separation.
A quick review of the excellent links that I've provided will remind everyone that efforts to create multiple nations based on ethnicity, from the remains of a failed, much larger state (Yugoslavia, for example), have usually not been successful. I don't know if those examples are applicable in this instance, though. If Iraq were divided into three nations, the two voices that would be screeching the loudest would be Turkey and the Iraqi Sunnis. The Turks are paranoid that the establishment of a Kurdish state will eventually lead to an attempt to annex parts of eastern Asia Minor (Turkey), where the Turks constitute a majority of the population. As long as Erdogan is in office, I'm all for anything that will piss off the Turks, so no problem there. The Iraqi Sunnis will also threaten to hold their breath until they turn blue and pass out, because they've always been the chosen ones. The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Shi'a, the Jews, have always had to sit way in the back of the Iraqi bus, so to speak. Even though Saddam rarely spent money on infrastructure or social projects, when he did, it was for the benefit of a Sunni community. That explains the abject poverty that exists in the Iraqi Shi'a communities located in the south-central and southern parts of Iraq. The Kurds, God love 'em, didn't wait around for a handout from Saddam's Baghdad; they created their own economy, and also benefitted greatly from the Kurdish diaspora. For all practical purposes, Kurdistan has been a self-sufficient nation-state for some time now. Its just not recognized outside of Sulimaniyah. The Kurds even have their own military, and as I've commented before, you don't want to pick a fit with the Pesh Merga. As for the Iraqi Sunni, I don't think they will have much luck finding a sympathetic ear anytime soon.
Under ideal circumstances, It might just be time for serious consideration to be given to the partition of Iraq. But given the current state of affairs, it just doesn't make sense. We might be re-writing the boundaries of a nation that won't exist in 2016. Lets focus on winning this war first.
B. The U.S. contemplates partitioning Iraq.
In 2006, then-Senator Joe Biden suggested that consideration be given to the partition of Iraq. I believe at the time, that the idea was to allow the Kurds a homeland in the north, the Sunni would stay put in the central belt region, and the Shi'a would have an independent state in the south. For some reason, I couldn't buy into this argument, although for the life of me I can't recall why. I know that Turkey would have had a proverbial herd of cows if the Kurds had been given a homeland, and the Sunni, who as a minority have always ruled Iraq, would've been forced to accept a smaller and less-wealthy nation, but something else kept me from joining the "pro-partition" partisans. I think it was probably just an example of the traditionalist in me not wanted to change the maps again. But we've reached that point again, when folks in position of authority are whispering about partitioning Iraq. It does piss me off a bit, because this discussion wasn't really necessary. We could have avoided this position if we hadn't been in such a hurry to get out of Iraq.
Our rapid departure from Iraq was not necessary. The Iraqis were not requesting it, and our military leaders were strongly advising otherwise. Everyone seemed to be in agreement that the Iraqi military needed to be responsible for Iraq's external security, but only after sufficient training had taken place. Its my understanding that the training program that had been approved by the administration hadn't even started before Obama changed his mind and pulled the rug out from under everyone. So we left Iraq in the hands of an untrained, unprofessional army, with a huge invitation to ISIS to "come on in, folks!" And they didn't need to be asked twice. The real tragedy is that Iraq was beginning to settle into existence as a unitary state, with an economy that connected all the various regions and ethnicities. As its traditional boundaries are drawn, Iraq is fortunate to have natural resources distributed in all parts of the nation. This fact contributed to the successful re-establishment of an internationally-focused economy. The presence of the U.S. military allowed for consecutive years of peace, something foreign to many Iraqis. Markets were open and full of produce, schools were full, traffic lights worked, the electoral process was improving with each election, Iraq's airports were using the designation "international" again, the national soccer team was winning (occasionally), and an Olympic team existed to represent all Iraqis. Compare those few facts with the situation in Iraq today. You can lay all of this at the feet of Barrack Obama. He felt the political pressure from his base to follow through on his irresponsible pledge to rid Iraq of U.S. military forces at the earliest possible opportunity. And lets face it: the ultimate sacrifice of all those American young men and women....does it mean nothing to Obama? Peace was achieved and prosperity was at hand, and for politics' sake, he turned success into failure. His actions did everything possible to encourage sectarian movement amongst the various ethnicities of Iraq. Without the U.S. Army, the only security is with your own kind. That is the perspective of the various groups trying to survive in Iraq today.
Back to the idea of partitioning Iraq. First and foremost, its really absurd of the United States to be considering the limits of the national boundaries of a sovereign nation which is diplomatically accredited in the United States and a member in good standing of the United Nations (what the hell is that, anyway?). Be that as it may, I have always supported the Kurdish independence movement. The Kurds have played the game so long, and been such good team players, that they deserve the opportunity to govern themselves. The truth is, Kurdistan would probably exist today as a separate and legitimate nation-state if it weren't for issues regarding oil. How much oil are the Kurds sitting on, and should it belong to all the people of Iraq, and not just the Kurds? A specious argument, considering that the Kurds have never benefitted from any of the other oil deposits in Iraq. Most Iraqis don't consider the Kurds to be Iraqi, even though most Kurds are Muslim. If Iraq were at peace, it might not be a bad idea to consider three separate nations, one for each ethnicity. But given the current conflict raging against the Islamic State, its really a moot point. The good guys are hoping to find a way to keep Iraq from becoming one united nation under the Islamic State, and don't have much time to sit around discussing the viability of a Kurdish, Sunni and Shia separation.
A quick review of the excellent links that I've provided will remind everyone that efforts to create multiple nations based on ethnicity, from the remains of a failed, much larger state (Yugoslavia, for example), have usually not been successful. I don't know if those examples are applicable in this instance, though. If Iraq were divided into three nations, the two voices that would be screeching the loudest would be Turkey and the Iraqi Sunnis. The Turks are paranoid that the establishment of a Kurdish state will eventually lead to an attempt to annex parts of eastern Asia Minor (Turkey), where the Turks constitute a majority of the population. As long as Erdogan is in office, I'm all for anything that will piss off the Turks, so no problem there. The Iraqi Sunnis will also threaten to hold their breath until they turn blue and pass out, because they've always been the chosen ones. The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Shi'a, the Jews, have always had to sit way in the back of the Iraqi bus, so to speak. Even though Saddam rarely spent money on infrastructure or social projects, when he did, it was for the benefit of a Sunni community. That explains the abject poverty that exists in the Iraqi Shi'a communities located in the south-central and southern parts of Iraq. The Kurds, God love 'em, didn't wait around for a handout from Saddam's Baghdad; they created their own economy, and also benefitted greatly from the Kurdish diaspora. For all practical purposes, Kurdistan has been a self-sufficient nation-state for some time now. Its just not recognized outside of Sulimaniyah. The Kurds even have their own military, and as I've commented before, you don't want to pick a fit with the Pesh Merga. As for the Iraqi Sunni, I don't think they will have much luck finding a sympathetic ear anytime soon.
Under ideal circumstances, It might just be time for serious consideration to be given to the partition of Iraq. But given the current state of affairs, it just doesn't make sense. We might be re-writing the boundaries of a nation that won't exist in 2016. Lets focus on winning this war first.
Thursday, June 11, 2015
Back to the Sunni versus Shi'a, a bit of historical perspective.
Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Sunni Islam.
B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.
When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim. I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times. But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you. Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially. The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite. I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave. Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991. As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good. For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort. The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion. It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.
But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences. Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a. This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network. In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual. Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular. This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I. The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness. If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.
We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries. The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government. For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military. This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority). The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed. On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq. Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran. In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a. Iraq is a prime example. The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense). The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.
For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement. As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over. What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever. In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback. With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.
B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.
When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim. I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times. But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you. Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially. The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite. I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave. Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991. As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good. For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort. The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion. It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.
But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences. Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a. This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network. In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual. Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular. This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I. The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness. If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.
We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries. The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government. For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military. This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority). The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed. On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq. Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran. In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a. Iraq is a prime example. The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense). The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.
For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement. As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over. What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever. In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback. With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.
Friday, June 5, 2015
The Sunnis of Iraq..what does the future hold? (Part II)
In 2009 and 2010, the future was really looking brighter for the people of Iraq. The country now boasted of three international airports at Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, and the ex-pat community which was spread out all over the globe, began to make its way back home, with an eye to investing in the new Iraq. Schools were overflowing and Iraq was refining oil again. The Iraqi people, Shi'a Kurd and Sunni, celebrated the success of Iraq's international sports teams, and that all-necessary middle class began to make an appearance. No doubt, a smoother political transition would have been welcome, but it seemed par for the course in this part of the world. The Shi'a/Sunni political split should have been seen as a hugely negative but predictable development. In hindsight, the CIA should have created and financially supported a political party that included both well-known and respected Shi'a and Sunni. But no one was really complaining because Iraq was on the move in the right direction. So what happened? Its 2015, and the country is under siege, and the nascent economy that had begun to grow is now in tatters. The oil refining capability of Iraq, which is its lifeline, is in shambles. And all this happened because of our rapid withdrawal from Iraq. Is it unfair for me to lay all the blame at the feet of the Administration? Lets take a look at the evidence:
How can I blame the Administration for ISIS, a terrorist group that originated in Syria? Wrong - ISIS originated in Iraq. After the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the "Great Awakening" (the Sunni movement to oppose Zarqawi and the insurgency), his organization went into hibernation. It eventually found its way into Syria, and took advantage of that conflict to rebuild and rebrand. This was the creation of ISIS. No doubt that there aren't many left over from the Zarqawi days, but can it be only a coincidence that the leader of ISIS is Abu Bakr al-BAGHDADI? Regardless, ISIS found the perfect environment for reconstituting itself and created a new, sexier manifesto. Since the bad guy in Syria wasn't the United States, a more flexible statement of motivation was necessary. ISIS identified itself with an effort to unite various nations in the Levant under the flag of a Sunni extremist Caliphate (with Baghdadi as the first Caliph, I assume). This declaration allowed ISIS to claim all sorts of enemies (the U.S., Europe, Israel, moderate Arab States, etc.), and at the same time, all sorts of support, including money and volunteers. By the time the United States had just about completed its military departure from Iraq, ISIS was healthy and in a prime position to extend its operations outside of Syria. Iraq, with all of its internal squabbles and still trying to train and equip a legitimate national army, was a juicy target. And I'm sure the irony was not lost in the minds of Baghdadi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, post-Bin Laden leader of Al-Qaeda. The American people can provide Iraq with freedom at the cost of thousands of young U.S. soldiers lives, and everything can be turned to shit with one selfish, stupid, political decision. We understand that a promise was made during the election to remove U.S. military from Iraq, but why didn't the Administration follow the recommended plan put forth by the Pentagon? The greatest flaw of this Administration has been its determination to fill every high-level USG job with a political appointee, regardless of experience or qualification. When you choose this course of action, then it should be no surprise that people with the wrong background are making bad military decisions. What sense does it make to put Bill Clinton's former Chief of State and a career numbers guy, in charge of the CIA? Wouldn't you think that the person chosen would have at least a smidgeon of experience with the intelligence community? Not according to President Obama. This problem, which will take years to correct, has manifested itself everywhere, especially at the State Department, where under first Hillary Clinton and now John Kerry, Foggy Bottom has now become reactive to world events as opposed to proactive. We seem to always be about five minutes behind. It sucks when you arrive on the scene even after Portugal, for goodness sake.
My biggest concern regarding the Sunni of Iraq, is the continued presence of the Shi'a militias and their Iranian advisors. The Sunni no longer see the U.S. military, unless they just happen to have some business at al-Asad Air Base out in the middle of nowhere, Anbar Province. Its true that a number of U.S. non-military personnel continue to function in Iraq in support of the central government (and the U.S. government as well, of course), but to the Sunni in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, this means nothing. Those Sunni tribal leaders who were so instrumental in 2007 and 2008, well, they are still around, and they are keeping a close eye which way the wind is blowing. Fortunately, His Eminence Grand Ayatollah Ali-al-Sistani is still alive, and seems as determined as ever to thwart any Iranian attempt to use the Iraqi Shi'a to deliver their own country into the hands of Tehran. The Shi'a of Iraq listen to Sistani, as do the Sunni; as long as he continues to preach a moderate message of peace and unity, I believe that the Sunni will stay loyal to the government in Baghdad. But once Sistani dies, and reactionary Shi'a cleric Muqtadah al-Sadr becomes the titular head of Iraq's Shi'a, then all bets are off. Sadr is poised to take over after Sistani (there really is no one else), and he has been cultivating the poor, young and angry Shi'a for years. Most importantly, Sadr is in the front AND back pocket of the Iranian Ayatollahs in Qom, and this fact is no secret. If Sistani were to expire, we would have to seriously consider the possibility that the Sunni tribal leaders abandon the Shi'a dominated Iraqi government in Baghdad and throw in with ISIS. For them, it may be a matter of survival.
Wednesday, June 3, 2015
The Sunnis of Iraq..what does the future hold? (Part I)
Link: The Sunni of Iraq - caught in the middle again.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Sunday, April 12, 2015
Is Yemen, 2015, a renewal of the Battle of Karbala, 680 AD?
Links: A. Saudi military on Yemeni border.
B. Is conflict in Yemen a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
No need to get out your history books or almanacs, unless you really want to. The Battle of Karbala was fought in central Iraq in 680 AD, with most religious scholars agreeing that the
violent clash went a long way to settling the question of The Prophet Mohammed's succession. This is important because the two opponents came to represent the Sunni and Shia elements within Islam. Until recently, the two groups seemed to co-exist within an awkward kind of avoidance, although on a few occasions, the international community has been given a glimpse of the emotions involved in the Sunni-Shia schism. Following the first Gulf War, once it became apparent that President George H. Bush was not going to force Saddam Hussein from power, Saddam fired-up what was left of his war machine and butchered thousands of Shia in areas south of Iraq. Saddam was legitimately concerned that the "Marsh Arabs", as these particular Shia were called, were rising up to possibly threaten his hold on power. This was the moment in life that I went over to an Encyclopedia and educated myself on the Sunni and the Shia. Having spent time in Iraq within the last decade, I became familiar with the two groups and the antagonism that basically defines their relationship. Simply put, since Karbala in 680 AD, the Shia have been looking for a little respect. For the most part, the Sunni are considered better educated, more intelligent, and wealthier. The Shia are more the "manual laborers and farmers" of Islam, and they have a tendency to carry a chip on their shoulder as big as Manhattan.
In the last fifty years, the Shia, who are the majority in only two countries (Lebanon being a plurality, folks), have fought fiercely for causes that they support. Following the revolution in Iran in 1979-1980, which deposed the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shia-led government of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw everything but the kitchen sink at Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Since then, the Shia seem to be more comfortable standing up for their interests. In Iraq in 2005, the Shia were quick to create militias to defend Shia communities and Holy Sites, when it became apparent that certain anti-U.S. groups were going to incite various causes to violence. The Iranians were more than happy to provide training and equipment to these militias, who are even more powerful and active today than they were during the insurgency. The Iranian government, and the Guardian Council in Qom, must be pleased by the expression of free will exhibited by the Shia Houthis of Yemen. The Houthis have been around for sometime, and to their credit, they tried a number of non-violent approaches to the former government over the years, in an attempt to end discrimination against the Houthi community. Eventually they were compelled to resort to violence, and the Yemeni government, already under siege from Al-Qaeda, was a bit of an easy target. Today, as April passes us by, The Houthis are in control of the capital city of Sana, and are strategically positioned to move against Yemen's second city (and port/economic lifeline), Aden. Interestingly enough, just to the east of Aden lies a reasonably large area which is controlled by (Sunni) Al-Qaeda. And just when things couldn't get any more confusing, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force, which continues to recognize the legitimacy of the recently removed Yemeni government, has started bombing Houthi forces.
Why do the Saudis care if the Houthis run the table in Yemen? Who knows, they may do a better job than the last few thugs that sat in Sana. Actually, the answer is simple: the Saudis cannot continence a Shia government on the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain is an island, so it doesn't count), and certainly not with a common border. Publicly, the Saudis claim that they are only trying to restore peace and the democratically elected Yemeni government. The truth is, the Saudis and the Iranians can't stand each other, and the Houthis have been heavily supported by Iran since the beginning. Mark my word, the Saudis will do whatever is necessarily to guarantee that the Iranians do not have a presence on the Arabian Peninsula. Just as I was starting this post, I noticed a news report come across the wire (yes, folks...I'm so cool and important that I have one of those "news wires") that Iranian warships were headed for Yemen. Now that would be an
escalation along the lines of Kennedy and Khrushchev back in 1962. Then, as I was looking for an additional article, I came across The Times Of Israel piece titled, "Iran sends battleships to Yemen amid standoff with Saudis". I had to take a break, I was laughing so hard. A journalist actually WROTE that header, and then added a photo of a warship the size of a shrimp boat flying the Iranian flag! I guess "battleships" ain't what they used to be. Regardless of my welcome moment of humor, be assured that the Iranian navy only has a handful of ships that are capable of sailing as far as Yemen. The people of Aden need not lose any sleep; I can categorically guarantee that tomorrow morning when they wake up and look in the direction of the Indian Ocean, they will not see Iranian battleships on the horizon.
Which brings me to my next point of interest. This is something my friend Jennifer and I have been discussing for a few weeks now. Occasionally the media will release a story that mentions "Saudi ground forces", or "Saudi armor being moved to the Yemeni border". For the moment, this is the most important issue that comes to my mind. The Saudis have committed themselves to some level of conflict by conducting air operations against Houthi targets in Sana and other strategic locations. If the Houthis were to go head-to-head against the Saudi military, the result would be beyond ugly. It would be a monumental mismatch. As far as I know, what was the Yemeni Army is still making noise in and around Aden (Houthis on one side, Al-Qaeda on the other....one hell of a spot to be in). If so, then in all likelihood the Houthis have not taken possession of the most modern and useful military vehicles and equipment. So we are talking about Abrams tanks, state-of-the-art Artillery (trained in the Iraq war), fully-equipped infantry and special forces, support from helicopter gunships and guided missiles, etc., on one side, and the Houthis on the other. A few months back I commented that I had seen a video of the Houthis storming some government building in Sana, and actually saw a guy on a camel, with a musket. Holy Lawrence of Arabia, folks. Well, at least, historically, we are on the right continent.
The Saudis should make short work of the Houthis, and then what? Clean out Al-Qaeda from eastern Yemen? Now here is the potential complication that I have been discussing with Jennifer. Everyone keeps talking about a Saudi ground invasion as if its a simple operation. No way. The Saudi armor is normally home-based in the north of the country and around Riyadh (I'm sure some units are also deployed in the Mecca/Medina/Jeddah triangle). Would the Saudis transport their armor and artillery down west, to the coast, then down the coast road to Yemen? Or is there another route that skirts the Rub al-Khali? Whatever the case, for Saudi Arabia to relocate a military force large enough to finish the job at hand (the destruction of the Houthis), it would involve the mobilization of multiple divisions. All of this activity should be visible for the world to watch on satellite. I have yet to hear any media announce that a full-scale Saudi military build-up is taking place near Najran or Abu Arish. So if it hasn't been noted, then how can it be taking place? Now I'm taking a big chance with this post, because I'm writing it four days before it will see the light of day. Many things can happen since then which would resolve the issues I have pointed out. But as things stand today, from the perspective of this armchair general, I do not believe Saudi Arabia is preparing a full-out ground invasion of Yemen.
B. Is conflict in Yemen a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
No need to get out your history books or almanacs, unless you really want to. The Battle of Karbala was fought in central Iraq in 680 AD, with most religious scholars agreeing that the
In the last fifty years, the Shia, who are the majority in only two countries (Lebanon being a plurality, folks), have fought fiercely for causes that they support. Following the revolution in Iran in 1979-1980, which deposed the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shia-led government of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw everything but the kitchen sink at Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Since then, the Shia seem to be more comfortable standing up for their interests. In Iraq in 2005, the Shia were quick to create militias to defend Shia communities and Holy Sites, when it became apparent that certain anti-U.S. groups were going to incite various causes to violence. The Iranians were more than happy to provide training and equipment to these militias, who are even more powerful and active today than they were during the insurgency. The Iranian government, and the Guardian Council in Qom, must be pleased by the expression of free will exhibited by the Shia Houthis of Yemen. The Houthis have been around for sometime, and to their credit, they tried a number of non-violent approaches to the former government over the years, in an attempt to end discrimination against the Houthi community. Eventually they were compelled to resort to violence, and the Yemeni government, already under siege from Al-Qaeda, was a bit of an easy target. Today, as April passes us by, The Houthis are in control of the capital city of Sana, and are strategically positioned to move against Yemen's second city (and port/economic lifeline), Aden. Interestingly enough, just to the east of Aden lies a reasonably large area which is controlled by (Sunni) Al-Qaeda. And just when things couldn't get any more confusing, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force, which continues to recognize the legitimacy of the recently removed Yemeni government, has started bombing Houthi forces.
Why do the Saudis care if the Houthis run the table in Yemen? Who knows, they may do a better job than the last few thugs that sat in Sana. Actually, the answer is simple: the Saudis cannot continence a Shia government on the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain is an island, so it doesn't count), and certainly not with a common border. Publicly, the Saudis claim that they are only trying to restore peace and the democratically elected Yemeni government. The truth is, the Saudis and the Iranians can't stand each other, and the Houthis have been heavily supported by Iran since the beginning. Mark my word, the Saudis will do whatever is necessarily to guarantee that the Iranians do not have a presence on the Arabian Peninsula. Just as I was starting this post, I noticed a news report come across the wire (yes, folks...I'm so cool and important that I have one of those "news wires") that Iranian warships were headed for Yemen. Now that would be an
 |
| Yemen |
Which brings me to my next point of interest. This is something my friend Jennifer and I have been discussing for a few weeks now. Occasionally the media will release a story that mentions "Saudi ground forces", or "Saudi armor being moved to the Yemeni border". For the moment, this is the most important issue that comes to my mind. The Saudis have committed themselves to some level of conflict by conducting air operations against Houthi targets in Sana and other strategic locations. If the Houthis were to go head-to-head against the Saudi military, the result would be beyond ugly. It would be a monumental mismatch. As far as I know, what was the Yemeni Army is still making noise in and around Aden (Houthis on one side, Al-Qaeda on the other....one hell of a spot to be in). If so, then in all likelihood the Houthis have not taken possession of the most modern and useful military vehicles and equipment. So we are talking about Abrams tanks, state-of-the-art Artillery (trained in the Iraq war), fully-equipped infantry and special forces, support from helicopter gunships and guided missiles, etc., on one side, and the Houthis on the other. A few months back I commented that I had seen a video of the Houthis storming some government building in Sana, and actually saw a guy on a camel, with a musket. Holy Lawrence of Arabia, folks. Well, at least, historically, we are on the right continent.
The Saudis should make short work of the Houthis, and then what? Clean out Al-Qaeda from eastern Yemen? Now here is the potential complication that I have been discussing with Jennifer. Everyone keeps talking about a Saudi ground invasion as if its a simple operation. No way. The Saudi armor is normally home-based in the north of the country and around Riyadh (I'm sure some units are also deployed in the Mecca/Medina/Jeddah triangle). Would the Saudis transport their armor and artillery down west, to the coast, then down the coast road to Yemen? Or is there another route that skirts the Rub al-Khali? Whatever the case, for Saudi Arabia to relocate a military force large enough to finish the job at hand (the destruction of the Houthis), it would involve the mobilization of multiple divisions. All of this activity should be visible for the world to watch on satellite. I have yet to hear any media announce that a full-scale Saudi military build-up is taking place near Najran or Abu Arish. So if it hasn't been noted, then how can it be taking place? Now I'm taking a big chance with this post, because I'm writing it four days before it will see the light of day. Many things can happen since then which would resolve the issues I have pointed out. But as things stand today, from the perspective of this armchair general, I do not believe Saudi Arabia is preparing a full-out ground invasion of Yemen.
Thursday, April 2, 2015
Western Christianity More Determined Than Ever to Self-Destruct
Link: Christians Attacking Christians
"But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another."
Galatians 5:15
I'm sure it happens all year long, but for some reason, I seem to notice it more during Lent. And there is no doubt I experience it more in the United States than anywhere else. I'm referring to the obsession Christians have with bashing each other. Up front, let me say that I have no intention of "being fair". I promise to be as honest as my life experience's allow. I will call it as I've seen it. But first, let's have a look at the Islamic community at war with itself. At present, the Christian world is being given a front-row seat into the eternal conflict between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. Internationally, the Sunni greatly outnumber the Shi'a, and consider themselves to be more enlightened, more educated and more refined. The Shi'a have endured a type of prejudice within the Muslim community which assumes them to be less-educated and backward. In the last few decades, the Shi'a have become much more vocal and aggressive, especially in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The Shi'a Houthi group in Yemen has recently removed the Sunni government from power, and is threatening to draw Saudi Arabia into a conventional conflict in the streets of Sana'a. All the while, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have risen like a phoenix from the ashes, and inflicted repeated strategic defeats on the Islamic State forces in and around Tikrit. Why is this worth mentioning? Because for months, the ISF has been equipped and trained by the United States, and the U.S.-led air coalition has been attempting to provide air cover for operations against the IS; unfortunately for the U.S., during these months, the ISF had its ass handed to them. It was only after Iran provided military advisors and the Shi'a militia became more effective that the tide of battle changed.
Not surprisingly, Iran has received the credit for this change in fortune. An "Intro to Islamic Studies" course will teach even the most rudimentary student that Iran is a majority Shi'a nation, and the flag-bearer internationally and diplomatically for the Shi'a community. The Iranians freely admit to providing support to the Houthis, who were locked in a battle with both the Sunni-Yemeni government and Sunni-based Al-Qaeda, who controls a good part of southern Yemen, along the coast and right up to Aden. I have recently become convinced that Sunni Islamic extremist groups send new recruits to Yemen to receive training for the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. At present, the experience to be gained in Yemen is much more similar to Syria than the experience of fighting in Afghanistan. The established Sunni governments of the Middle East, especially the monarchies, are very disturbed by the spread of Iranian (read: Shi'a) influence and authority, and the timing couldn't be worse. Any day now, the Obama Administration will announce the successful negotiation of a Treaty with Iran, that allows the Iranians to peacefully pursue Nuclear research. No doubt the treaty will call for inspections, but something tells me that the Iranians will be inspecting themselves. So Iran seems to be hitting the crest of a wave, and now the world waits to see if they can successfully surf it on home.
In one form or another, I believe the organized religions of the world are going to have a confrontation. I am hoping it will be a diplomatic engagement that results in greater understanding and peace in our lifetime. If we look at the glass as half-empty, then we must consider a major military confrontation with forces that are attempting to forcibly convert the world to (Sunni) Islam. For practical purposes, the Muslims need to resolve their own issue between Sunni and Shi'a. But lets take look at the other side of the coin, the Christian West. Even though the hearts of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are in Europe, I can't speak for the European Christian community. I realize that pockets of devout believers exist in Eastern Europe, but let's face it, the European Christian actually seems ashamed of their beliefs. If Christianity is going to regenerate itself, in light of the potential threat of an organization like the Islamic State, it will have to take place in the United States. And this is where the real tragedy takes shape. In Europe, you can't find a full congregation anywhere in France, Spain, England or Sweden. Young people no longer get married, and the secular aspect of once-Christian holidays now dominate. Christmas is about Santa Claus and Rudolph, not the Christ-child. Further west, the Obama Administration appears to be hostile to the American Christian community, but they have been careful in their actions. The African-American community, which supports this Administration with over ninety-five percent of its vote, considers religion to be an important part of the family and daily life. So the attacks on Christianity have been subtle and infrequent, except, of course, for the ongoing "Gay Marriage" debate. But when I take a good look at what is taking shape in Syria, in Libya, In Nigeria, in Yemen, in Pakistan, in Egypt, and in Somalia, I shudder for the future of my faith. Regardless of what the left and the ACLU tell you, the United States was founded on Christian values. That is the reason you find God mentioned in the Constitution, and most other legal documents of the time. The founding fathers were not opposed to religion, they were opposed to a "STATE RELIGION". But in the last three to four decades, we have allowed this tiny minority of uber-left Christophobes to remove any mention of Christian values from our schools and from any building that has U.S. government affiliation. The Constitution speaks clearly about a separation of Church and State, which in my mind simply means we cannot have a state religion. The beginning of the war against Christianity in the United States really picked up steam with the campaign against prayer in school. The slippery slope has come into play in force, as now we can't pray for no injuries in H.S. sporting events, or allow religious based groups to make use of school facilities (library for meetings for the Fellowship of Christian Athletes) after school hours. Prepare to spend the night in jail of you attempt to put a Nativity Scene in front of a public school in December.
There is great strength in unity; I know this, and I'm no rocket scientist. The various Christian denominations in the U.S. are perfectly suited to rising together in opposition to the long-term plans of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and setting the needed example. Where religion is concerned, the American people give generously of their time and money. We should be able to expect Roman Catholics, Baptists (Southern, et al), Protestants (Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, Unitarians, Anglicans), Mormons, Church of Christ, Pentecostal, Evangelicals of all shapes and sizes, Seventh Day Adventists, and whoever I've left out, to come together and meet this threat, united in our faith that Jesus Christ is the son of God, and that he died on the cross for our sins. I guarantee you, ALREADY someone has a problem with what I've just written. Argh. Recently, I attended a Sunday service of a denomination that is a bit of a mystery to me. They spend most of their Sundays in worship, which is great, and they constitute one of the larger Christian denominations in the United States. And as I listened to the sermon, I heard many things that were familiar to me. In fact, nothing seemed to conflict with what I had been taught as a Catholic. But then it happened. The commentary from the pulpit began to include negative observations about another Christian denomination. Things got back on track, but then it happened again. During the day, in between sermons and during, I noticed a certain amount of comfort in openly criticizing the beliefs/traditions/practices of other Christian denominations (heck, they probably don't even consider these other groups to be true Christians). Now I can tell you in complete honesty that in my entire life as a Church-going Catholic, I can't remember the Priest EVER mentioning another denomination. In fact, in times like these, I think its about time we started discussing Islamic extremism during Catholic services. But what I heard that Sunday, I've never heard in a Catholic Church, although I'm sure it happens. There is no doubt that every Christian denomination in the United States, will occasionally point out what the other "Christians" are doing wrong, "according to scripture". Now if we the opposing side were allowed to defend themselves, no doubt they would interpret that same bit of scripture differently. Its no big surprise that different people interpret religious text differently. No one wants to consider the possibility that all along, they've been thinking the wrong thing. The real nightmare begins when people start arguing about the multiple translations, and should be only translate Aramaic, or also Greek? Now is the time that I stand up in the middle of everyone, and just scream at the top of my lungs, to get everyone to shut up and listen to me.
When did we, as Christians, turn away from the many things that united us, and start focusing exclusively on the few things on which we don't agree? All of the groups I mentioned in the paragraph above (well, almost all) agree on the most important basic tenets of our faith. We believe that Jesus is Lord, and that he is the son of God and that he suffered and died for us on the cross. We believe in the resurrection; that he will return. Jesus is God, God is Jesus, and God is Love. Its wrong to lie, and to steal from your neighbor. Can we agree on that? Murder is arguably the worst crime that a person can commit, although rape and sexual assault is right up there. Are we still on the same page? The age of adulthood, for legal purposes, is eighteen, and we have a Constitution that we use to guide and protect us in our everyday social interaction with each other. We abhor discrimination of any kind, and believe a family is the best place in which to raise a child. See how easy this is? Am I on the right track? Our common beliefs are the glue that hold us together, and one day we very well may have that bond tested by the evil we are watching in Syria and Iraq today. There is no doubt in my mind that both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization are evil. As such, they will use our own bad habits against us, which include our own intolerance of each other. "I don't like Baptists, they don't dance." "Catholics worship false idols". "Pentecostals speak in tongues and don't translate it properly". The list goes on, and on, and on. We have managed to live with each other, to marry one another, and to build families together, all these differences notwithstanding. And we built this country together. We are the only ones that can allow for this destructive process to be reversed. What we are required to do, for the love of our faith, our families and our country, is to search out our commonalities, our special bonds, and when the time comes, we must bring each other close together, so that, united, Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State, or whoever, will find no quarter here, not as long as they seek to divide.
"But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another."
Galatians 5:15
I'm sure it happens all year long, but for some reason, I seem to notice it more during Lent. And there is no doubt I experience it more in the United States than anywhere else. I'm referring to the obsession Christians have with bashing each other. Up front, let me say that I have no intention of "being fair". I promise to be as honest as my life experience's allow. I will call it as I've seen it. But first, let's have a look at the Islamic community at war with itself. At present, the Christian world is being given a front-row seat into the eternal conflict between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims. Internationally, the Sunni greatly outnumber the Shi'a, and consider themselves to be more enlightened, more educated and more refined. The Shi'a have endured a type of prejudice within the Muslim community which assumes them to be less-educated and backward. In the last few decades, the Shi'a have become much more vocal and aggressive, especially in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The Shi'a Houthi group in Yemen has recently removed the Sunni government from power, and is threatening to draw Saudi Arabia into a conventional conflict in the streets of Sana'a. All the while, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have risen like a phoenix from the ashes, and inflicted repeated strategic defeats on the Islamic State forces in and around Tikrit. Why is this worth mentioning? Because for months, the ISF has been equipped and trained by the United States, and the U.S.-led air coalition has been attempting to provide air cover for operations against the IS; unfortunately for the U.S., during these months, the ISF had its ass handed to them. It was only after Iran provided military advisors and the Shi'a militia became more effective that the tide of battle changed.
Not surprisingly, Iran has received the credit for this change in fortune. An "Intro to Islamic Studies" course will teach even the most rudimentary student that Iran is a majority Shi'a nation, and the flag-bearer internationally and diplomatically for the Shi'a community. The Iranians freely admit to providing support to the Houthis, who were locked in a battle with both the Sunni-Yemeni government and Sunni-based Al-Qaeda, who controls a good part of southern Yemen, along the coast and right up to Aden. I have recently become convinced that Sunni Islamic extremist groups send new recruits to Yemen to receive training for the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. At present, the experience to be gained in Yemen is much more similar to Syria than the experience of fighting in Afghanistan. The established Sunni governments of the Middle East, especially the monarchies, are very disturbed by the spread of Iranian (read: Shi'a) influence and authority, and the timing couldn't be worse. Any day now, the Obama Administration will announce the successful negotiation of a Treaty with Iran, that allows the Iranians to peacefully pursue Nuclear research. No doubt the treaty will call for inspections, but something tells me that the Iranians will be inspecting themselves. So Iran seems to be hitting the crest of a wave, and now the world waits to see if they can successfully surf it on home.
In one form or another, I believe the organized religions of the world are going to have a confrontation. I am hoping it will be a diplomatic engagement that results in greater understanding and peace in our lifetime. If we look at the glass as half-empty, then we must consider a major military confrontation with forces that are attempting to forcibly convert the world to (Sunni) Islam. For practical purposes, the Muslims need to resolve their own issue between Sunni and Shi'a. But lets take look at the other side of the coin, the Christian West. Even though the hearts of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are in Europe, I can't speak for the European Christian community. I realize that pockets of devout believers exist in Eastern Europe, but let's face it, the European Christian actually seems ashamed of their beliefs. If Christianity is going to regenerate itself, in light of the potential threat of an organization like the Islamic State, it will have to take place in the United States. And this is where the real tragedy takes shape. In Europe, you can't find a full congregation anywhere in France, Spain, England or Sweden. Young people no longer get married, and the secular aspect of once-Christian holidays now dominate. Christmas is about Santa Claus and Rudolph, not the Christ-child. Further west, the Obama Administration appears to be hostile to the American Christian community, but they have been careful in their actions. The African-American community, which supports this Administration with over ninety-five percent of its vote, considers religion to be an important part of the family and daily life. So the attacks on Christianity have been subtle and infrequent, except, of course, for the ongoing "Gay Marriage" debate. But when I take a good look at what is taking shape in Syria, in Libya, In Nigeria, in Yemen, in Pakistan, in Egypt, and in Somalia, I shudder for the future of my faith. Regardless of what the left and the ACLU tell you, the United States was founded on Christian values. That is the reason you find God mentioned in the Constitution, and most other legal documents of the time. The founding fathers were not opposed to religion, they were opposed to a "STATE RELIGION". But in the last three to four decades, we have allowed this tiny minority of uber-left Christophobes to remove any mention of Christian values from our schools and from any building that has U.S. government affiliation. The Constitution speaks clearly about a separation of Church and State, which in my mind simply means we cannot have a state religion. The beginning of the war against Christianity in the United States really picked up steam with the campaign against prayer in school. The slippery slope has come into play in force, as now we can't pray for no injuries in H.S. sporting events, or allow religious based groups to make use of school facilities (library for meetings for the Fellowship of Christian Athletes) after school hours. Prepare to spend the night in jail of you attempt to put a Nativity Scene in front of a public school in December.
There is great strength in unity; I know this, and I'm no rocket scientist. The various Christian denominations in the U.S. are perfectly suited to rising together in opposition to the long-term plans of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and setting the needed example. Where religion is concerned, the American people give generously of their time and money. We should be able to expect Roman Catholics, Baptists (Southern, et al), Protestants (Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Lutherans, Unitarians, Anglicans), Mormons, Church of Christ, Pentecostal, Evangelicals of all shapes and sizes, Seventh Day Adventists, and whoever I've left out, to come together and meet this threat, united in our faith that Jesus Christ is the son of God, and that he died on the cross for our sins. I guarantee you, ALREADY someone has a problem with what I've just written. Argh. Recently, I attended a Sunday service of a denomination that is a bit of a mystery to me. They spend most of their Sundays in worship, which is great, and they constitute one of the larger Christian denominations in the United States. And as I listened to the sermon, I heard many things that were familiar to me. In fact, nothing seemed to conflict with what I had been taught as a Catholic. But then it happened. The commentary from the pulpit began to include negative observations about another Christian denomination. Things got back on track, but then it happened again. During the day, in between sermons and during, I noticed a certain amount of comfort in openly criticizing the beliefs/traditions/practices of other Christian denominations (heck, they probably don't even consider these other groups to be true Christians). Now I can tell you in complete honesty that in my entire life as a Church-going Catholic, I can't remember the Priest EVER mentioning another denomination. In fact, in times like these, I think its about time we started discussing Islamic extremism during Catholic services. But what I heard that Sunday, I've never heard in a Catholic Church, although I'm sure it happens. There is no doubt that every Christian denomination in the United States, will occasionally point out what the other "Christians" are doing wrong, "according to scripture". Now if we the opposing side were allowed to defend themselves, no doubt they would interpret that same bit of scripture differently. Its no big surprise that different people interpret religious text differently. No one wants to consider the possibility that all along, they've been thinking the wrong thing. The real nightmare begins when people start arguing about the multiple translations, and should be only translate Aramaic, or also Greek? Now is the time that I stand up in the middle of everyone, and just scream at the top of my lungs, to get everyone to shut up and listen to me.
When did we, as Christians, turn away from the many things that united us, and start focusing exclusively on the few things on which we don't agree? All of the groups I mentioned in the paragraph above (well, almost all) agree on the most important basic tenets of our faith. We believe that Jesus is Lord, and that he is the son of God and that he suffered and died for us on the cross. We believe in the resurrection; that he will return. Jesus is God, God is Jesus, and God is Love. Its wrong to lie, and to steal from your neighbor. Can we agree on that? Murder is arguably the worst crime that a person can commit, although rape and sexual assault is right up there. Are we still on the same page? The age of adulthood, for legal purposes, is eighteen, and we have a Constitution that we use to guide and protect us in our everyday social interaction with each other. We abhor discrimination of any kind, and believe a family is the best place in which to raise a child. See how easy this is? Am I on the right track? Our common beliefs are the glue that hold us together, and one day we very well may have that bond tested by the evil we are watching in Syria and Iraq today. There is no doubt in my mind that both Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State organization are evil. As such, they will use our own bad habits against us, which include our own intolerance of each other. "I don't like Baptists, they don't dance." "Catholics worship false idols". "Pentecostals speak in tongues and don't translate it properly". The list goes on, and on, and on. We have managed to live with each other, to marry one another, and to build families together, all these differences notwithstanding. And we built this country together. We are the only ones that can allow for this destructive process to be reversed. What we are required to do, for the love of our faith, our families and our country, is to search out our commonalities, our special bonds, and when the time comes, we must bring each other close together, so that, united, Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State, or whoever, will find no quarter here, not as long as they seek to divide.
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?
Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq
We all have our routines. In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news. I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media. For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq. Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically. As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth. When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy. Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network. Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail. The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces". Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria. Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army". The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only. About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush. An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.
For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope. In other words, its a mess. Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered. I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three. Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive. In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area. I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am. As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran. No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat. This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well. The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad. Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.
I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army. I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin. Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus. I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad. Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria. I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad. But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon. This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.
Back to my simple list of questions:
B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq
We all have our routines. In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news. I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media. For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq. Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically. As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth. When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy. Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network. Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail. The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces". Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria. Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army". The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only. About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush. An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.
For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope. In other words, its a mess. Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered. I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three. Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive. In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area. I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am. As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran. No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat. This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well. The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad. Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.
I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army. I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin. Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus. I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad. Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria. I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad. But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon. This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.
Back to my simple list of questions:
- What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?
- Has the FSA been stood up?
- Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?
- What is the status of the air campaign?
- What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?
- If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?
- If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved?
Saturday, November 8, 2014
Its Time To Get To Know Jabhat al-Nusrah
Links: A. Al-Nusrah Claims That U.S. Has Bombed Its Territory
B. Al-Nusrah Front, Jun al-Aqsa Terrorist Groups In Idlib
C. Al-Nusrah Forces U.S.-Backed Group From Idlib
We've managed to dissect just about every player in Syria except Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front), the regular Syrian Army, and the Free Syrian Army.
support, the army had lost its eyes and was finding itself caught in one ambush after another. But the regular Syrian Army has been given the opportunity to retreat behind the front lines and lick its wounds, while the Kurds struggle against the IS in Kobani and forces supported by the U.S.(?) are driven out of Idlib (were the elements that were routed in Idlib connected to the Free Syrian Army?). Make no mistake, when the time is most advantageous to Assad, his military will return to the battlefield, and don't be surprised if Putin has assisted in rebuilding the Syrian Air Force.
Back to Jabhat al-Nusrah. This group announced its formation in Syria in January 2012, and states that its end goal is the creation of a Pan-Islamic State under Sharia Law and ruled by a Caliph. If we switched out "Jabhat al-Nusrah" with "Islamic State of the Levant", who would know the difference? And yet, according to Twitter, the international media, and the Pentagon, the two groups are at each other's throats. It is believed that many of the original members of Al-Nusrah are Syrians who were fighting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) group during Operation Enduring Freedom. The members of Al-Nusrah are believed to be the best trained and the best equipped of all the Sunni Extremist groups in the Syria/Iraq theater. Al-Nusrah is known for conducting suicide attacks. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the head of Al-Nusrah, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, appear to have had numerous discussions about the merging of the two groups. According to Al-Jazeera, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the only remaining leader of Al-Qaeda without two bullet holes in his forehead (so far), instructed the two groups not to merge. Al-Baghdadi ignored this instruction and continued to publicly declare a merger between the two. Since they appear to be separate today, I'm assuming al-Julani won that argument. But lets be honest; who really gives a shit about any of the back-and-forth that I just repeated (direct from Wikipedia)? Al-Nusrah is on the battlefield in Syria, its fighters are well-trained, disciplined, and like to blow themselves up for Allah. Much of the same can be said for the Islamic State, so as far as I see it, we are looking at two peas in a pod. When the bullets start to fly, I guarantee that these two groups (and any other Sunni-affiliated armed extremist groups) will join ranks. To be honest, the war in Syria means very little to me. The Russians will find a way to protect their interests in the end, so I am forced to accept that Assad isn't going anywhere. My interest is in Iraq, where we have easily identified allies in the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga/Kurdish regular forces. Actually, it becomes more apparent everyday that Iranian military units have been participating in the war against IS. From Assad in Syria to the Iranians in Iraq, we keep ending up with the strangest of bedfellows! I recognize that the Iraqi Army has been strengthened by groups of both Shia militia and Sunni tribal fighters. I see a real opportunity in Iraq to defeat Al-Qaeda/IS, solidify the Kurdish homeland, and greatly improve Sunni/Shia relations. Insha'Allah!
B. Al-Nusrah Front, Jun al-Aqsa Terrorist Groups In Idlib
C. Al-Nusrah Forces U.S.-Backed Group From Idlib
We've managed to dissect just about every player in Syria except Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front), the regular Syrian Army, and the Free Syrian Army.
The Regular Syrian Army
The regular Syrian Army consists of whatever Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has been able to patch together from the pre-war Syrian Army. The Syrian Air Force has been decimated and will have to be rebuilt from scratch (which isn't necessarily that difficult if you have the cash to buy new jets from Russia), but the Army, which has basically been inactive over the past few months, really only needs reorganizing and a strong leader who can inspire men to fight. Syria continues to have an absurd advantage in armor over all the players in this drama, and I imagine a great deal has been done to repair vehicles/tanks and train new soldiers. For Assad, the allied air intervention was like water to the man in the desert dying of thirst. He has been given a reprieve, and I have no doubt that he has been making the most of this down-time. We can't forget that Russia continues to support the Syrian government in Damascus. Vlad Putin is also grateful of the allied air campaign because the situation in Syria was becoming dire for Assad and his Ba'athist buddies. The IS was making preparations for an assault on Aleppo, which would have only been the precursor to an attack on Damascus itself. The Syrian Air Force, with most of its Air Bases overrun by the IS and other Islamic terrorist groups, had basically collapsed (with the exception of a few helicopter gunships, which Assad loves to call into action). Without airThe Free Syrian Army
What about the Free Syrian Army (forgive me; for some time I was referring to this group as the "New Syrian Army")? We digested news reports last week from Idlib (see link C) that detailed the rout of U.S.-backed fighters. Were these fighters part of the Free Syrian Army that we are supposed to be training and wasn't supposed to be operational for at least another month? And what about the statement from the Pentagon that the Free Syrian Army would be deployed in a defensive capacity only. Were "our" fighters in Idlib in a defensive posture before they were run out of town? Maybe this is a different group, and this is an indication that we are training other military elements that will have a more "offensive" plan of action. I find this hypothesis to be the most hard to believe, because until now the Obama Administration has been very generous sharing every last detail of its intentions. I see no reason to believe that the leopard has changed his spots; why train others as offensive pieces on the board, but leave the main body of your forces, the Free Syrian Army, in a purely defensive posture? I am surprised that we don't have more information regarding the Free Syrian Army, especially regarding its timetable. I can't help but wonder if this Free Syrian Army, in its effort to be "defensive", is going to get caught between the various Islamic groups in the east, and a reconstituted regular Syrian military in the west.Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front)
The first two links I chose to share provide important details regarding Jabhat al-Nusrah, or the Nusrah Front. The press, in its daily effort to retweet all the propaganda fed to it by the terrorist groups via social media, continues to remind us that al-Nusrah is the Al-Qaeda representative in Syria and that they are not friends with the IS whatsoever. Common sense, and a career of working against Islamic terror groups, leads me to suspect that someone is falling hook, line and sinker for the most obvious of disinformation campaigns. Khorasan hates al-Nusrah and al-Nusrah hates the Islamic State and since al-Nusrah is the representative of Al-Qaeda in Syria (?), then Al-Qaeda must also hate the Islamic State. Please, folks....listen carefully and try to see the truth in all its simplicity. All of these groups are Sunni affiliated and all have historic Al-Qaeda connections of one type or another. The Islamic State of the Levant was called Al-Qaeda in Iraq not to long ago, for goodness sake. I think the decision by the Qatari Air Force to only bomb targets selectively (no Al-Nusrah targets, please) was part of the effort to convince us that there is freedom of thought and movement in its each individual group. I don't accept this; as far as I'm concerned they are all Sunni terrorist groups who prey upon the weak and helpless. In fact, our military would be best served by keeping all these groups under one header: "THE ENEMY", and let the CTC analysts at Langley worry about the personalities within.Back to Jabhat al-Nusrah. This group announced its formation in Syria in January 2012, and states that its end goal is the creation of a Pan-Islamic State under Sharia Law and ruled by a Caliph. If we switched out "Jabhat al-Nusrah" with "Islamic State of the Levant", who would know the difference? And yet, according to Twitter, the international media, and the Pentagon, the two groups are at each other's throats. It is believed that many of the original members of Al-Nusrah are Syrians who were fighting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) group during Operation Enduring Freedom. The members of Al-Nusrah are believed to be the best trained and the best equipped of all the Sunni Extremist groups in the Syria/Iraq theater. Al-Nusrah is known for conducting suicide attacks. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the head of Al-Nusrah, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, appear to have had numerous discussions about the merging of the two groups. According to Al-Jazeera, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the only remaining leader of Al-Qaeda without two bullet holes in his forehead (so far), instructed the two groups not to merge. Al-Baghdadi ignored this instruction and continued to publicly declare a merger between the two. Since they appear to be separate today, I'm assuming al-Julani won that argument. But lets be honest; who really gives a shit about any of the back-and-forth that I just repeated (direct from Wikipedia)? Al-Nusrah is on the battlefield in Syria, its fighters are well-trained, disciplined, and like to blow themselves up for Allah. Much of the same can be said for the Islamic State, so as far as I see it, we are looking at two peas in a pod. When the bullets start to fly, I guarantee that these two groups (and any other Sunni-affiliated armed extremist groups) will join ranks. To be honest, the war in Syria means very little to me. The Russians will find a way to protect their interests in the end, so I am forced to accept that Assad isn't going anywhere. My interest is in Iraq, where we have easily identified allies in the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga/Kurdish regular forces. Actually, it becomes more apparent everyday that Iranian military units have been participating in the war against IS. From Assad in Syria to the Iranians in Iraq, we keep ending up with the strangest of bedfellows! I recognize that the Iraqi Army has been strengthened by groups of both Shia militia and Sunni tribal fighters. I see a real opportunity in Iraq to defeat Al-Qaeda/IS, solidify the Kurdish homeland, and greatly improve Sunni/Shia relations. Insha'Allah!
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