Iraqi forces surround Fallujah, continue efforts to push ISIS from Anbar Province.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have surrounded ISIS elements in Fallujah, taking the northern suburbs and clearing ISIS from the Baghdad area.   ISF have also punished ISIS forces further, retaking territory around Hit and giving some relief to hard-pressed Habaniyah.  Over the past few months, Iraqi forces, aided by elements of the Popular Mobilization Units (Iranian supported Shi'a militia) and air support from coalition forces, have broken the back of ISIS in Anbar Province and central Iraq.  In order to put pressure on the Iraqi government and hopefully encourage the recall of Iraqi troops to the capital, ISIS stepped up suicide bomb attacks against Shi'a targets, inflicting large number of fatalities and injuries.  Shi'a leaders did put pressure on the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, but Abadi has managed to keep control of the government and focus on the efforts to remove ISIS from Iraq altogether.  If the military situation doesn't improve for ISIS, the terrorist organization will have to reconsider its intentions in Iraq.  No doubt Fallujah will fall, and as the ISF continues to retake territory once occupied by ISIS, it will become impossible for ISIS to not only continue suicide and vehicular explosive attacks, but to keep its units supplied and reinforced.

With the encouraging advances the ISF has made in Samarra and Baiji, and the advances made by the Kurds in the north, ISIS will be hard-pressed to regain the initiative on any of the Iraqi fronts.  Mosul is also in the sights of the ISF, with word that except for a small contingent of die-hard operatives, ISIS has basically already abandoned the city.  That remains to be seen, but there can ge no doubt that the ISF appears to be in the last stages of defeating ISIS in Iraq.  This development has already started to impact the political environment in Baghdad.  For some time, Shi'a politicians and religious leaders have been engaging in efforts to discredit and destabilize the Ababi Administration.  No doubt Iran, who continues to interfere in internal Iraqi affairs, has been behind the effort to see Abadi replaced.  The dynamics of this situation can be very confusing to anyone who has not been following Iraqi politics. losels.  When Abadi took office as Iraq's second Shi'a Prime Minister, the Sunni community was convinced that we would act in Iran's interest foremost, and the Sunni community would suffer.  In fact, Abadi has not taken one side over the other.  He has proven to be a true statesman and leader, and he truly deserves tremendous credit for the optimistic military situation.

Iraqi Armed Forces, alongside Shi'a militia, making progress in retaking territory from ISIS.

Since the recovery of Ramadi, the Iraqi Armed Forces have continued to put pressure on ISIS elements by clearing ISIS from the Hit District, and moving to isolate ISIS forces in Fallujah.  The Shi'a militias, still fighting under the banner of "Popular Mobilization Units", have also been successful, as ISIS seems to be unable to conduct the daily terror attacks and suicide bombings that were conducted last summer with such frequency.  In particular, Baghdad and Diyala Province are no longer suffering from the terrorist attacks that had become so familiar.  The Iraqi military is determined to consolidate its position in Baiji and to end ISIS operations against Hadithah, but efforts to retake Mosul remain a priority.  ISIS has had the opportunity to consolidate its hold on Mosul and to fortify the city in typical ISIS fashion, which includes booby traps and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  The Iraqi Army currently in the field is not the Iraqi Army that faced off against ISIS outside of Tikrit in 2014.  The Iraqi military of today has become familiar with the strategy and tactics of ISIS, including the use of human hostages and hidden explosive devices, and has turned the table on ISIS attempts to utilize fear and intimidation as a weapon.  The Iraqi military has benefitted greatly from the training providing by U.S. Special Forces.  ISIS was using the same strategies employed by the Iraqi insurgents in 2006-7, which included targeting civilians and taking hostages; the Iraqi Army is using tactics employed by the U.S. Army against the insurgency, which included using superior manpower, weaponry and air elements to constantly harass the enemy into retreating.  The Iranian-supported and Shi'a led Popular Mobilization Forces have been acting in concert with the Iraqi military, and has succeeded in pushing ISIS out of Sammarah.

It is obvious that ISIS has suffered some serious setbacks in Iraq during the first months of 2016.  ISIS has had difficulty resupplying its forces in Iraq, and continued Russian pressure in Syria is forcing ISIS leaders to make difficult decisions regarding reinforcements.  Although ISIS has not been forced to retreat in Syria as it has been obliged to do in Iraq, the issue of supply has become a priority.  ISIS continues to successfully recruit outside of the Middle East, and funding has not diminished.  But the United States and its European partners have had success intercepting and disrupting some of ISIS' funding mechanisms, which has impacted the organization's ability to pay its operatives.  Also, resupplying has been very difficult, and almost always conducted under the cover of night. The overall situation on the ground in Syria and Iraq and moved decidedly in favor of the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Bashar al-Assad.  With the involvement of Russia in Syria, very attempt to degrade ISIS will be an effort in support of al-Assad and his Syrian Ba'ath party.  This conclusion is unavoidable.  Given the nuclear treaty drafted last year and signed by the U.S., major European nations, and Iran, it appears as if the U.S. is interested in furthering the influence and military presence of Iran.  For the moment, the Iranians appear content to meddle with  Iraqi internal political affairs, and will let the Popular Mobilization Units do its fighting.  It will be interesting to see what policy is adopted by the United States, provided a Republican wins the presidency in 2016.  Obviously, its traditional to oppose the Iranians, but if events continue to favor al-Assad, Russia and Iran, it will prove very difficult to revert to previous policy.    

ISIS continues attacks on provincial targets, as civilain casualties mount.

Link: Rare ISIS VBIED in Basra.

As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to inch closer to the strategic areas of Ramadi, ISIS reminds Baghdad of the breadth of its reach, as Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are detonated in suburban areas of Baghdad, Diyala Province, and south of Basra.  The attack in Zubair, south of Basra was especially concerning as only one previous VBIED has ever been detonated this far south.  The weekend of bloodshed is a clear indication that ISIS will not deter from its overall plan to make the provinces of Iraq more and more difficult to govern.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in Diyala Province, where a VBIED in the town of Khalis casts doubt on the success of recent security measures taken by the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).  With much of the police manpower at the front, supplementing the Armed Forces, the PMUs have taken a more visible role in providing security on the streets of Iraq.  The PMUs have elaborate mechanisms in place to defeat the attempts to successfully detonate a VBIED.  All of the roads are monitored closely, with numerous checkpoints and roadblocks.  Somehow, ISIS continues to get VBIEDs on the roads.  Almost every VBIED has been driven by a single male, usually in his 20's.  Unfortunately, in Iraq, the highways are full of cars whose only passenger is the young man behind the wheel.  The only truly effective way to eliminate the use of vehicles as moving bombs is to force everyone to either walk, bicycle, or use public transportation.  Sadly, this would probably result in the use of buses as mass killing machines.

With recent VBIED attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra and Salah al-Din Provinces, ISIS continues to demonstrate basic freedom of movement.  The ISF has also ben unable to permanently cut the roads between Fallujah and Ramadi.  ISIS is able to move personnel and supplies into Ramadi, although with the Allied Air Campaign in full swing and the ISF artillery getting more and more accurate, I wouldn't chance a trip on that road.  Why haven't all the roads leading into and out of Ramadi and Fallujah been completely destroyed?  Is it out of concern for the number of civilians who still live in these communities and rely on the roads for food, medical care, and as a means of last-minute evacuation?  No one has been able to come up with a reliable figure as to how many civilians remain in Fallujah and Ramadi (it appears that Fallujah is less deserted than Ramadi), but it can't be a pleasant place to be at the moment.  What is most frustrating is that while the government is training its resources to the breaking point in an attempt to recapture Ramadi, ISIS is able to plan and execute daily VBIED attacks in Baghdad and numerous bordering provinces.  The giant pink elephant in everyone's living room at present, though, is Ramadi- what is going on in Ramadi?  Are the special police units and military actually making daily progress in retaking the city, or have we passed the point for reasonable expectation of victory?  In fact, does evidence exist that the ISF has broken off offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah?  Is the government just waiting for the best time to spill the bad news?  Serious fighting continues in and around Baiji and in Salad al-Din Province, and the Kurds in the north regularly find ways to ambush ISIS patrols, so how important is Ramadi?  From a confidence perspective, it means everything.  If the government announces a general retreat from Anbar, then they had better be prepared to invite the Iranian Army across the border, because someone has to stop ISIS before they storm Baghdad.  Actually, a military collapse would provide just the justification for direct Iranian military intervention.  The players would then be in place for Putin's grand scheme.  The Russians destroy Assad's opposition in Syria, then tackle ISIS head-on, while the Iranians engage ISIS in Iraq.  Ideally, in the end, with ISIS vanquished, the Russians and the Iranians would meet up and shake hands, like the Russians and the Americans/British did in April 1945 at the River Elbe in Germany.  Putin would be hailed as a tremendous leader and the man of the hour, and the Iranians would have totally reformed their image, and could for the most part dictate the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.  Lets meet in year, same time, same place, and see how my prognostications played out.

Iraqi Security Forces remain committed to retaking Ramadi.

Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.

In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi.  Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi.  The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken.  The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south.  Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened.  ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down.  One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi.  Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question.  What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq?  That is a question that as of yet has no answer.

The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah.  Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets.  The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a.  But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel.  The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters.  Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar.  But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win.  With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force.  Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much.  The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria.  The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS.  This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves.  An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development.  For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.

Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi continues pushing reforms, as 123 senior government officials are sacked.

Links: A. Abadi dismisses 123 senior government officials.
           B. Iraqi Deputy Justice Minister kidnapped.


Iraqi Prime Minister continues to exhibit a tremendous amount of determination and courage, as his administration has announced the dismissal of 123 senior officials from a number of different ministries.  Abadi has stressed that the reform agenda is not political, and has been careful to evenly distribute the dismissals so that one party does not stand out.  It will be interesting to see if the positions are eliminated altogether, or if there will be attempts to refill them in the future.  Abadi is determined to stick to his agenda, regardless of the saber-rattling on behalf of the various militia groups that have announced their opposition to the reforms.  Last week, eighteen Turkish workers were kidnapped in Baghdad while working on a stadium construction project.  Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) is strongly suspected of being responsible.  On Tuesday of this week, Iraq's Deputy Justice Minister, Fares Abdul-Karim al-Saadi, was kidnapped in broad daylight, the day after he opened an investigation into alleged human right abuses by militia groups.  Again, Kata'ib Hezbollah is suspected of involvement.  Its obvious that the militias are determined to erode the security in Baghdad, in order to discourage the pro-reform demonstrations and put into question the Abadi administration's ability to protect Iraqi citizens.

The purpose of the efforts at destabilization on behalf of the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) is to scuttle Abadi's attempts at reform.  The reforms intended by Abadi will deprive former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of much of his influence, as many of his supporters are finding their high-level government positions eliminated.  The militias finally decided to become involved when Abadi started pushing his National Guard Law, which would have placed the militias and all similar groups directly under the authority of the Iraqi government.  In other words, if Iran wants to send fighters to help in the struggle against ISIS, then great.  But while they are in Iraq, they come under the authority of Baghdad, not Tehran.  Under pressure from the militias, who claimed that the National Guard Law was a conspiracy of "The United States, the Ba'ath Party, ISIS, and certain Arab countries", the Iraqi Parliament's Council of Representatives dropped the Bill.  Although the Iraqi government claims that it has authority over the militias regardless of the failure of the National Guard Law, the activities of Kata'ib Hezbollah in Baghdad and the Badr Group in Basra, highlight its limited control.

Fortunately, Abadi does not get easily discouraged.  He will continue to push through various aspects of the reform agenda, and do his best to counter-balance the efforts of the militias.  The majority of the members of the militias should be on the battlefield, as Fallujah was basically "assigned" to them.  They appear to have had just as much difficulty with their target as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have had with Ramadi.  A major military victory at this moment would be very welcome, to unite the Iraqi people in celebration, and remind both pro and anti reform zealots that the real enemy is ISIS.  Hopefully the retaking of Ramadi is within sight.

Security situation in Baghdad deteriorates as militias and opponents of reform demonstrate their level of control.

Links: A. Washington Post editorial on Iraqi reform crisis.
           B. Gunmen kidnap Turkish workers in Baghdad.

We've been following the evolving reform crisis in Iraq since Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly announced his intention to eliminate the office of Vice President.  At the time, that particular office was held by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and it demonstrated from the very beginning that we were witnessing the opening salvo in a political struggle that will determine if Iraq remains politically independent, or becomes a satellite state of Iran.  Abadi was faced with a very difficult decision.  The lauded Anbar Offensive which began in late May was still bogged down outside of Ramadi, and the Iranian-back militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) were engaging the enemy to the northeast, in Fallujah.  Any action which would upset the militias might lead to a withdrawal of their forces, which would undoubtedly compound whatever problems the ISF was having outside Ramadi.  But Abadi had very little room to maneuver with regards to timing.  A popular groundswell of anger, frustration and determination had swept through the capital, and found its way to many of the other Iraqi cities as well.  People were demonstrating for reform and an end to corruption.  Actually, they were demanding it.  Everyday the crowds grew larger in Basra, Baghdad, Baqubah and al-Kut, and they were protesting the endemic nepotism, bribery and outright theft that they believed existed in the Iraqi government.  This movement was supported by the media, who daily would print articles detailing hard-to-believe examples of kick-backs and "skimming" that was prevalent not only in Baghdad, but in the provincial administrations as well.  Abadi needed to take advantage of this public demand for change, and he bargained that the militias wouldn't walk off the battlefield because by doing so they would walk away from their main source of influence and authority.  Abadi was also helped to a great degree by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose open calls for reform were co-opted by Abadi and the reform movement.  Once Abadi started down the road of abolishing offices, eliminating redundancies, and cashiering thieves, he was determined to finish the job.  Those of us on the outside anxiously waited to see how many friends Maliki could still depend on, and how aggressive would the opposition be.

Any hope that Maliki had lost his influence and that the militias would play nice, ended with the Badr Organization's announcement that they would be enforcing the law in Basra and that illegal gatherings (meaning pro-reform demonstrations) would not be allowed.  The government, with its police fighting alongside the army in Anbar, had few law enforcement resources to counter the move by Badr, which certainly succeeded in shutting down the public cacophony from Basra.  The PMUs sided with Maliki in opposition to the reforms.  Simply put, with reforms, the Iranian government saw the potential for a stronger, independent Iraq.  Tehran is intent on creating a Shi'a client state in Iraq, with the militias forming the basis for an Iraqi Republican Guard Corps.  During his term, Maliki proved to be a dependable yes-man for the Iranians, and the militias, even with the majority of their resources in the field fighting ISIS, still controlled large numbers of armed soldiers in every large Iraqi city.  Once the word came down from Tehran, the militias started acting aggressively in opposition to Abadi's reforms.  By making Baghdad more difficult to govern, the militias damage Abadi's credibility and influence.  With the kidnapping last week of eighteen Turkish workers in Baghdad, Abadi's opponents hope to call into question the Abadi Administration's ability to protect foreign nationals in the nation's capital city.  It is strongly suspected that the kidnappings were carried out by Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the more prominent militias.

The militias have the ability to bring the Abadi government down, but in doing so, they risk benefitting ISIS to a great degree.  The militias, with basically unlimited manpower and a steady flow of money and supplies from Iran, can make Basra, Baghdad, Al-Muqdadiyah, Samarra and Nasiriyah buckle to their authority through the simple use of curfews, and the control of water and electricity.  What could the Iraqi government do in response, given that they invited the militias into Iraq to help fight ISIS?  Certainly the government could pull troops back from the front to retake control away from the militias, but you can be sure that ISIS would take quick advantage of that opportunity to solidify their hold on Ramadi and Fallujah, and complete the occupation of Haditha.  Some heave questions remain: how far will the militias go in opposition to Abadi's reforms?  One of the most important new laws dealing with the National Guard and the entire militia issue altogether, has already been scuttled. Not surprisingly, the militias opposed the law, which would have brought them under the authority of the government in Baghdad.  Another important question: how far will Abadi go, and will he try to mobilize the public to protect his reform movement?  The most unfortunate element to this evolving situation is that the only apparent winner at present appears to be ISIS.    

The Shi'a militias line up in opposition to reforms in Iraq, threaten to disperse demonstrators in Basra with bullets.

Link: Voice Of America considers the impact of reforms in Iraq.

In the last few days, a line in the sand has been drawn in Iraq, between those who support anti-corruption initiatives and government reform, and those who are in opposition.  A number of Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) have come out in opposition to the reforms being introduced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  Former Iraqi Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, who exerts a fair amount of influence with the militias, was schedule to lose his job, as the elimination of the position of Vice President was one of the more prominent features of Abadi's reform package.  The reforms are designed to tackle redundancy in various Iraqi Ministries, which would negatively impact Maliki's political party and his overall position of authority.  Abadi did not invent the issue of reform; in the past few months, the Iraqi people have begun to mobilize and demonstrate in every large city, calling for an end to government corruption and the passage of legitimate, effective reform.  The media in Iraq has had a field day highlighting the countless instances of corruption within the Maliki Administration.  Probably the most prolific and often-discussed example was the creation of a 55,000-strong "ghost army" within the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Maliki's government began paying the salaries of 55,000 soldiers who didn't in fact exist.  The money was graft and was spread around to various military officers in an effort to bolster Maliki's support within the military.  Maliki didn't invent corruption in Iraq; much of the waste and bribery that occurred during his administration was just a repeat of business-as-usual during the days of the Ba'ath Party.  Maliki insisted that anyone who was appointed to a useful position in the government must by loyal to him and his political party.  This rule crippled some Iraqi Ministries, as persons with no experience or knowledge about their particular job, found themselves in charge.

Maliki eventually was replaced by Abadi, who seems determined to succeed in his effort to clean up the government and isolate Maliki altogether.  Abadi appeared to have caught some head-wind, with the support of the Council of Representatives in Parliament, and the backing of the huge crowds of demonstrators that continued to choke the downtown areas of Baghdad and Basra. Both Shi'a and Sunni Iraqis were in approval of his reform efforts.  The Abadi Administration made efforts to explain the importance of proceeding with caution with regards to the Ramadi Offensive, because it was also necessary to locate and destroy all the booby-traps and bombs that ISIS had left to greet the returning civilians.  The people seemed to accept the need for patience, even as ISIS continued his campaign of SVBIEDS and VBIEDS in all the provinces surrounding the capital.  Abadi can even count the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'a population, as an ally.  Maliki seemed to be unstoppable, although behind the scenes, we all were whispering about the level of Maliki's influence with Iran and the militias.  During his administration, the relationship was at times strained, at least with certain groups, including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which had trouble trusting Maliki because of his ties to the United Kingdom and the United States.  In the last few days, though, it has become apparent that the militias have come out united in support of Maliki and opposed to Abadi's reform agenda.  Although the militia movement does not have the opportunity to impact the reform issue at the ballot box, they have no problem intimidating people from the end of a machine gun.

One of Abadi's targets in the reform campaign was the Iraqi judiciary.  Historically rife with bribery and the target of countless complaints, , Abadi saw an opportunity to appease the masses and also push along the reform agenda.  Medhat al-Mahmud, the head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council and the first and current Chief Justice of Iraq, is an ally of Maliki, probably only because he wants to keep Abadi from cleaning out Iraq's Judicial Council, so to speak.  Mahmud has been quite fortunate over the past decade, presiding over the creation of the Iraqi Judiciary, then finding himself as its first Chief Justice.  This position has given him tremendous influence and made him a rich man.  Under Mahmud's watch, the Judiciary was subject to no other authority, although the Constitution calls for oversight by Parliament.  Abadi's reforms have made Medhat al-Mahmud and the Shi'a militias strange bedfellows, as the expression goes.  Interestingly enough, the head of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, met with Iraqi President Fuad Masum on August 25, and asked Masum not to finalize the Iraqi Parliament Council of Representative's decision to eliminate Maliki's Vice Presidential post.  We don't often speak of Fuad Masum because his job is usually ceremonial, but every avenue is being used to thwart the reform movement.  There has been no indication that Masum would give in to the request of Khazali, but the issue has yet to be resolved.

Now that the players are in place, the real struggle over the future of reform will begin.  The anti-reform side does not have numbers in its favor, so it will resort to other means to sabotage the reform agenda.  Already, the militias have announced in Basra that any protests or demonstrations were illegal and would be met with an aggressive response from the militias.  Business as usual for those guys, I assume.  We can expect the militias to use whatever is necessary to intimidate the opposition and scuttle the reform agenda.  This development could impact the military situation, as the militias have been vital to the efforts in Anbar Province.

Block by block, Iraqi forces begin to dislodge ISIS from the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: ISIS kills two Iraqi generals in separate attacks on the same day outside Ramadi.


Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west.  For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense.  In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity.  At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion.  Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield.  Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer.  People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties.  Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine).  All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS.  The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July.  Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din.  As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji.  The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands).  Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.

Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers.  The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches.  This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable.  With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces.  The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out?  Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47?  The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse.  It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause.  Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.

The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late.  The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press.  But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi?  If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time.  You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning.  This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi.  Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies.  But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before.  ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen.  In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap.  ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule.  ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again.  One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units.  ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units.  It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped.  What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq.  At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army.  Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go.  We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks.  At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street.  We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.

The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package.  On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings.  No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias.  The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity.  Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters.  Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.

Abadi encouraging continued anti-corruption, pro-reform demonstrations.

Link: Abadi serious about reforming Iraqi government.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has made it obvious that his attempts at reforming the Iraqi government aren't limited to sacking a few corrupt ministers and eliminating a redundant post or two.  Abadi is determined to reshape the government, and in doing so, will no doubt strengthen his own political base.  At the moment, Abadi is controlling the conversation, and has yet to meet with any focused opposition.  On 21-22 August, the Babil Provincial Government imposed a curfew to frustrate the efforts of demonstrators.  Abadi promptly ordered the Babil Operations Command to cancel the curfew, and ordered the Iraqi Army to provide security for the crowd.  Abadi has carefully maneuvered around a number of political minefields, as he plays the demonstrators off against his political rivals.  But Abadi has to be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security.  As of today, popular and sometimes reactionary Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his followers (practically the entire population of the huge Shi'a slum to the northeast of Baghdad known as "Sadr City") to participate in Friday's anti-corruption demonstration in central Baghdad.  But Sadr has always been a wildcard, at times proving difficult even for his Iranian handlers to control.  Most political analysts are supportive of the Abadi reforms; the Iraqi government that evolved out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was often ineffectual, redundant and practically encouraged corruption.  So far, every step taken by Abadi will simplify the governing process, increase accountability, and safe money.  But when a government makes changes that result in financial savings, then someone isn't getting their "take".  The functionaries, civil servants and politicians who have made a living sucking on the teat of Iraqi corruption, will no doubt attempt to thwart Abadi, and opportunities to cause problems are plentiful.

The planned demonstration in central Baghdad on Friday, 28 August, will be the largest demonstration yet.  Not only will the Iraqi Police and related security forces have their hands full keeping ISIS SVBIEDs from crashing this party, but the potential for conflict between political groups is also a serious concern.  Sadr's people and the folks from Ahl-al Haq (League of the Righteous) may be protesting corruption together, but neither side will pass up a chance to make trouble for the other, and a huge public demonstration will provide ample opportunity.  Also, Maliki's supporters in Dawa and SLA (State of Law Alliance) can cause the Abadi Administration great embarrassment if the security arrangements go south.  Lets face it, Abadi has signed off on this demonstration, and he needs it to come off without too much drama.  Eventually, opposition to Abadi will coalesce, probably around Maliki; but by then, he may be too strong to defeat.

ISIS fighters continue to make the ISF pay a high price for every bit of ground gained in the neighborhoods of Ramadi.  The ISF has yet to puncture ISIS' main defensive perimeter around Ramadi, choosing to roll-up neighborhoods block-by-block, street-by-street.  True to their modus operandi, ISIS fights tooth-and-nail for territory, and then before retreating, they wire and booby-trap everything including stray dogs and urinals.  The Iraqi government is determined that when the actual residents of Ramadi return, they may find nothing but piles of rubble, but at least their won't be an IED hidden amongst the rubble.  While the attention of the world seems to be focused on Ramadi, ISIS continues to cause headaches in Baiji and probe Iraqi defenses in Haditha and Samarra.  ISIS has proven time and again, that it can conduct operations on numerous fronts simultaneously.  In the past, one of the reasons why ISIS has been able to survive high-profile defeats is because they are able to mount offensive operations simultaneously in other areas.  This type of strategic distraction has a habit of making the enemy take their eye of the ball, so to speak.  In the last few weeks, as the clashes around Ramadi and Fallujah have intensified, ISIS has been able to launch spectacular VBIED attacks in both Diyala Province and Baghdad.  The key for the Iraqi government, the military High Command, and the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), is to step up the pressure when ISIS conducts an operation aimed at distraction.  ISIS has been astonishingly effective at predicting the actions of the enemy, in both Syria and Iraq.  The goal of the offensive in Anbar which commenced in July, was the liberation of both Fallujah and Ramadi, followed by the breaking of the siege of Haditha.  Once the ISF and its allies reach this point, then they can turn north to Salad-ad-Din Province and Baiji, and roll-up isolated ISIS units along the way.

*(One more than a few occasions, we have been critical of the allied air campaign that President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2014.  For an extended period of time, it appeared as if this united effort, which included the Air Forces of the United States, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, was severely handicapped by the political sensitivities of some of the Arab members.  One country would expressly forbid its jets to participate in the bombing a particular group, and another nation would forbid its planes to target some other group.  This development received a good deal of airtime in the western press; probably more than it actually deserved.  Be that as it may, there also seemed to be an ongoing problem getting real-time reporting on the actions of the allied air units.  But in the last two months, these issues seem to have been addressed, as the air campaign has really started to inflict serious casualties on ISIS, and successfully disrupt its attempts at movement and resupply.  The arrival of Iraqi Air Force F-16s has invigorated the Iraqis, and together these military air resources have become an invaluable part of the effort to push ISIS out of Anbar, and out of Iraq altogether.)

Iraqi Security Forces prepare for final push to retake Ramadi, as ISIS continues use of suicide bombers.

Links: A. ISIS suicide attacks target ISF forces in eastern Ramadi.
           B. ISF prepares final push to retake Ramadi.

In early July, the Iraqi government announced with a bit of fanfare that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), would begin a military offensive dedicated to liberating Anbar Province from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  Almost simultaneously, ISIS increased random fire and SVBIED attacks in Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, to distract from the ISF operation in Anbar, and to encourage Provincial Administrations to request a return of their troops from the Ramadi front.  The Iraqi government has faced a great deal of pressure because of the time it has taken to liberate both Ramadi and Fallujah.  In reality, the ISF and the PMUs have rationally adhered to the strategic plan originally agreed upon, which requires the removal of all explosives and booby traps, so that the civilian population of Ramadi that has been living in exile in Baghdad, can return in safety.  Also, the ISF, which consists of both special police units and the Iraqi Army, has been very deliberate in its movements, taking care to consolidate all strategic gains and discourage a return by ISIS.  The Iraqi people have been subject before to the occupation by ISIS, liberation, and re-occupation by ISIS, and it is important that the groundwork is laid to make the departure of ISIS permanent.  On Sunday, ISIS launched SVBIED attacks and fired artillery at ISF positions, killing 17 soldiers and 6 Sunni militiamen.  The ISF responded with heavy shelling of ISIS positions, alongside what has become a stepped-up presence by the allied air coalition, which has left ISIS occupied areas of the city in rubble.  Also, as mentioned in Link A, a major commander in the Iraqi Army serving on the Anbar front, was removed from duty by officials in Baghdad.  The announcement from the government would only comment that the general in question was guilty of dereliction of duty.

On Saturday, the Iraqi government has announced the formation of a joint police and Iraqi Army force, 10,000 strong, to renew the offensive to liberate Iraq.  Plans to transfer these troops to Anbar had been underway for some time, and the second wave of the offensive which began in July, was about to commence.  Some neighborhoods in eastern Ramadi have become intense battlegrounds, as city blocks change hands repeatedly.  In particular, ISIS has focused its attention on retaking the Husaibiya District, but so far its efforts have been unsuccessful.  The Iraqi military command is optimistic that the increase in troops will help the ISF to overwhelm ISIS positions in relatively short order, and that within the next few weeks, the ISF will be able to focus its operations on completing the liberation of Fallujah; presently, ISIS positions in Fallujah are under intense pressure from allied air attacks and regular attacks from the PMUs. 

Iraqi civilians in Baghdad are increasing pressure on the government for the relief of Haditha, which is located to the northwest of Ramadi, and has been under siege by ISIS since mid-July.  Up to now, the city has withstood the attempts at occupation by ISIS forces, and any positive developments from eastern Anbar can only increase pressure on ISIS to take Haditha, which they publicly declared as a target in July. 

Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.

It was too good to be true.  The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs.  For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).  But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption.  Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet.  In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki.  The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all.  Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar.  If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk.  Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has?  Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other?  Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.

Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government.  Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war.  Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister.  The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country.  The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran.  During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority.  Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq.  In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations.  Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded.  The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard.  Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided.  The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border.  Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS.  I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced.  The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.

Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki.  There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption.  As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers.  Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative.  The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined.  It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way.  Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics.  The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice.  How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?

How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so.  Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner.  Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias.  I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms.  Am I overestimating Sistani's power?  Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort?  If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens. 

With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond?  They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy.  With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through.  This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield.  The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation.  But the Sunnis have suffered terribly.  I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform.  But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment.  The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.

Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.

Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.

As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran.  Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable".  The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war.  We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.

The Iranians are faced with a number of options.  Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups.  The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province.  If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border.  In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero".  The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories.  On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat.  Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create.  Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord.  The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi.  The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.

Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala.  The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order.  But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years.  The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria).  The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban.  Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations.  You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around.  One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran.  So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?

Iraqi Security Forces launch offensive to retake Ramadi; PMUs tackling Fallujah separately.

Links: A. ISF launches offensive in Anbar.
           B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.

Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province.  The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi.  Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah.  The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend.  It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi?  I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS.  There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad.  In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province.  But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce.  The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province.  This strategy does include a certain level of risk.  What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi.  The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police.  We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade.  On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran.  This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".

In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013.  The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16.  A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition.  Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development.  With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition.  weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars?  Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy.  One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night.  That hasn't been the case.  One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes.  Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple.  But something just doesn't add up.  We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS.  And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria.  In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.

Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity.  And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS.  These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake.  Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria?  I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads.  And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq?  Are we out of bombs?  Have we run out of drones?  One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.

Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
           B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.

Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache.  I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias".  But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard.  Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A.  In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS).  The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved.  A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army.  For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s.  Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881.  Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt.  Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad).  The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers.  Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject.  Back to the subject at hand...

The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion.  Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented.  In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets.  On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias.  The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran).  The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly.  The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government.  Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group.  Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office.  But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias.  Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields".  This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias.  Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias.  To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise."  Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.

The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians.  Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda.  But what can we expect after the IS is defeated?  And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again.  In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office.  His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him.  Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani.  At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites".  Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds!  On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future.  We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries.  With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq.  And when did all this happen?  While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime.  This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments.  The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us?  As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty.  Quel bordel!