Iraqi Security Forces remain committed to retaking Ramadi.

Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.

In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi.  Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi.  The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken.  The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south.  Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened.  ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down.  One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi.  Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question.  What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq?  That is a question that as of yet has no answer.

The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah.  Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets.  The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a.  But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel.  The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters.  Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar.  But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win.  With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force.  Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much.  The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria.  The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS.  This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves.  An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development.  For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.

Abadi encouraging continued anti-corruption, pro-reform demonstrations.

Link: Abadi serious about reforming Iraqi government.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has made it obvious that his attempts at reforming the Iraqi government aren't limited to sacking a few corrupt ministers and eliminating a redundant post or two.  Abadi is determined to reshape the government, and in doing so, will no doubt strengthen his own political base.  At the moment, Abadi is controlling the conversation, and has yet to meet with any focused opposition.  On 21-22 August, the Babil Provincial Government imposed a curfew to frustrate the efforts of demonstrators.  Abadi promptly ordered the Babil Operations Command to cancel the curfew, and ordered the Iraqi Army to provide security for the crowd.  Abadi has carefully maneuvered around a number of political minefields, as he plays the demonstrators off against his political rivals.  But Abadi has to be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security.  As of today, popular and sometimes reactionary Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his followers (practically the entire population of the huge Shi'a slum to the northeast of Baghdad known as "Sadr City") to participate in Friday's anti-corruption demonstration in central Baghdad.  But Sadr has always been a wildcard, at times proving difficult even for his Iranian handlers to control.  Most political analysts are supportive of the Abadi reforms; the Iraqi government that evolved out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was often ineffectual, redundant and practically encouraged corruption.  So far, every step taken by Abadi will simplify the governing process, increase accountability, and safe money.  But when a government makes changes that result in financial savings, then someone isn't getting their "take".  The functionaries, civil servants and politicians who have made a living sucking on the teat of Iraqi corruption, will no doubt attempt to thwart Abadi, and opportunities to cause problems are plentiful.

The planned demonstration in central Baghdad on Friday, 28 August, will be the largest demonstration yet.  Not only will the Iraqi Police and related security forces have their hands full keeping ISIS SVBIEDs from crashing this party, but the potential for conflict between political groups is also a serious concern.  Sadr's people and the folks from Ahl-al Haq (League of the Righteous) may be protesting corruption together, but neither side will pass up a chance to make trouble for the other, and a huge public demonstration will provide ample opportunity.  Also, Maliki's supporters in Dawa and SLA (State of Law Alliance) can cause the Abadi Administration great embarrassment if the security arrangements go south.  Lets face it, Abadi has signed off on this demonstration, and he needs it to come off without too much drama.  Eventually, opposition to Abadi will coalesce, probably around Maliki; but by then, he may be too strong to defeat.

ISIS fighters continue to make the ISF pay a high price for every bit of ground gained in the neighborhoods of Ramadi.  The ISF has yet to puncture ISIS' main defensive perimeter around Ramadi, choosing to roll-up neighborhoods block-by-block, street-by-street.  True to their modus operandi, ISIS fights tooth-and-nail for territory, and then before retreating, they wire and booby-trap everything including stray dogs and urinals.  The Iraqi government is determined that when the actual residents of Ramadi return, they may find nothing but piles of rubble, but at least their won't be an IED hidden amongst the rubble.  While the attention of the world seems to be focused on Ramadi, ISIS continues to cause headaches in Baiji and probe Iraqi defenses in Haditha and Samarra.  ISIS has proven time and again, that it can conduct operations on numerous fronts simultaneously.  In the past, one of the reasons why ISIS has been able to survive high-profile defeats is because they are able to mount offensive operations simultaneously in other areas.  This type of strategic distraction has a habit of making the enemy take their eye of the ball, so to speak.  In the last few weeks, as the clashes around Ramadi and Fallujah have intensified, ISIS has been able to launch spectacular VBIED attacks in both Diyala Province and Baghdad.  The key for the Iraqi government, the military High Command, and the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), is to step up the pressure when ISIS conducts an operation aimed at distraction.  ISIS has been astonishingly effective at predicting the actions of the enemy, in both Syria and Iraq.  The goal of the offensive in Anbar which commenced in July, was the liberation of both Fallujah and Ramadi, followed by the breaking of the siege of Haditha.  Once the ISF and its allies reach this point, then they can turn north to Salad-ad-Din Province and Baiji, and roll-up isolated ISIS units along the way.

*(One more than a few occasions, we have been critical of the allied air campaign that President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2014.  For an extended period of time, it appeared as if this united effort, which included the Air Forces of the United States, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, was severely handicapped by the political sensitivities of some of the Arab members.  One country would expressly forbid its jets to participate in the bombing a particular group, and another nation would forbid its planes to target some other group.  This development received a good deal of airtime in the western press; probably more than it actually deserved.  Be that as it may, there also seemed to be an ongoing problem getting real-time reporting on the actions of the allied air units.  But in the last two months, these issues seem to have been addressed, as the air campaign has really started to inflict serious casualties on ISIS, and successfully disrupt its attempts at movement and resupply.  The arrival of Iraqi Air Force F-16s has invigorated the Iraqis, and together these military air resources have become an invaluable part of the effort to push ISIS out of Anbar, and out of Iraq altogether.)

Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
           B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.

Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache.  I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias".  But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard.  Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A.  In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS).  The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved.  A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army.  For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s.  Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881.  Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt.  Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad).  The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers.  Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject.  Back to the subject at hand...

The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion.  Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented.  In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets.  On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias.  The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran).  The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly.  The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government.  Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group.  Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office.  But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias.  Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields".  This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias.  Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias.  To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise."  Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.

The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians.  Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda.  But what can we expect after the IS is defeated?  And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again.  In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office.  His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him.  Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani.  At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites".  Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds!  On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future.  We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries.  With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq.  And when did all this happen?  While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime.  This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments.  The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us?  As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty.  Quel bordel!