Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.
In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi. Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi. The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken. The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south. Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened. ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down. One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi. Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question. What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq? That is a question that as of yet has no answer.
The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah. Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets. The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a. But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel. The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters. Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar. But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win. With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force. Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much. The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria. The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS. This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves. An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development. For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.
Showing posts with label ISF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ISF. Show all posts
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Wednesday, September 2, 2015
Iraqi government faced with mounting lawlessness in Basra.
Since 2003, when the southern Iraqi city of Basra celebrated the fall of Saddam Hussein, it has always followed a direction uniquely its own. Although the city has a distinct Shi'a majority, and the various militias make their presence apparent, Basra refuses to follow anyone's "party line", so to speak. In 2007, following the departure of British forces, organized crime and the Shi'a militias became entrenched in Basra. Given its strategic location as a entrepot of sorts, a great deal of goods and merchandise transit Basra, especially in the form of imports and exports. This type of traffic lends itself to all sorts of graft, which is how Basra became the organized crime center of Iraq. In 2008, coalition and government forces launched a major operation in Basra, and successfully restored state-control, but since that time, the same players have returned and discreetly picked up right where they left off. The Iraqi authorities have few options, as military operations elsewhere in Iraq have pulled troops normally posted to the Basra Governorate. The police do what they can, but everyone is basically just trying to stay alive. To stir the pot even more, Basra has been the scene of some of the larger anti-corruption demonstrations in the last year, and kidnappings for ransom have become a real problem. To sum it up, there's a lot going on here!
As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration. Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate. Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration. No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra. Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time. But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time. Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized. At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down. But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation. The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies. It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control. However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF.
As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration. Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate. Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration. No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra. Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time. But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time. Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized. At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down. But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation. The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies. It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control. However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.
It was too good to be true. The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs. For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet. In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki. The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all. Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar. If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk. Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has? Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other? Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Friday, July 24, 2015
Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.
Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.
As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran. Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable". The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war. We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.
The Iranians are faced with a number of options. Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups. The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province. If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border. In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero". The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories. On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat. Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create. Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord. The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi. The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.
Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala. The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order. But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years. The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria). The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban. Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations. You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around. One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran. So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?
As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran. Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable". The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war. We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.
The Iranians are faced with a number of options. Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups. The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province. If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border. In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero". The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories. On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat. Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create. Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord. The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi. The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.
Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala. The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order. But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years. The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria). The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban. Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations. You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around. One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran. So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Iraqi forces facing serious challenges from ISIS in Diyala and Babil provinces.
Link: ISIS attack on market leaves 115 dead.
As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province. ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad. Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary. In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.
The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned. According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar. The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there. Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure. Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time. The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.
And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar. What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi. It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture. The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs. How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?
As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province. ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad. Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary. In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.
The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned. According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar. The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there. Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure. Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time. The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.
And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar. What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi. It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture. The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs. How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?
Saturday, July 18, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.
Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.
Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS). Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah. The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force. If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west. After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi. But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death. Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication. In this theater, nothing would surprise me.
The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts. The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design. Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs. Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad. The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority. In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations. While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire. Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.
The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front. Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time. The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing. Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions. Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq. The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack. At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi. The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces. As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties. Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply. Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult. But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements. Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.
Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS). Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah. The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force. If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west. After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi. But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death. Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication. In this theater, nothing would surprise me.
The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts. The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design. Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs. Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad. The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority. In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations. While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire. Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.
The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front. Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time. The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing. Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions. Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq. The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack. At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi. The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces. As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties. Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply. Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult. But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements. Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces launch offensive to retake Ramadi; PMUs tackling Fallujah separately.
Links: A. ISF launches offensive in Anbar.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
Thursday, May 28, 2015
The rise of a terrorist superpower: the Islamic State in 2015.
Most analysts and military strategists in the United States have focused on the activities of Daesh (Islamic State) in Syria and Iraq. After all, our equities appear to be most at risk in those two particular theaters. We have been conducting an Allied Air Campaign in both areas of conflict for roughly a year, and today, for the first time, we have learned exactly how aggressive this Air Campaign has been. The Allied Air Campaign (which includes the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain) is averaging fourteen missions per day against Daesh targets. In comparison, the U.S. Air Force averaged 800 missions per day against Iraqi and insurgency targets in Operation Enduring Freedom. When questioned about the low number of missions, the Pentagon pointed out that the targets are more complicated, and the coalition is determined to avoid hitting civilian targets in error. I will leave that comment to stand on its own. Recently, Daesh has become more visible in its efforts to expand into other countries. Saudi Arabia has started to suffer from internal bombings conducting by Daesh operatives, and the presence of Daesh has been noted in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, and Armenia (this includes countries with Islamic extremist groups who have declared their allegiance to Daesh). Currently, the Islamic State has the momentum in both Iraq and Syria. In fact, with only the remnants of the regime left to oppose their advance, Syria is beginning to look like a done deal, at least as far as Assad is concerned. Last week, Daesh operatives captured the Syrian/Iraqi border town of al-Tanf (al-Waleed in Iraq), which is a major victory for the extremist group. Controlling this entry point will allow Daesh to resupply its forces in Iraq more quickly, and vice versa. It solidifies their communication and transportation network between the two countries, and will undoubtedly bring more pressure on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Anbar Province.
Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies. No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers. Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria. But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies. We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit. But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets. Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target. It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves. The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh. Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters. No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.
From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries. This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale. It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda. These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame. Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities. We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya. There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships. Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation. One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent. But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target. As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms. It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.
Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies. No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers. Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria. But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies. We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit. But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets. Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target. It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves. The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh. Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters. No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.
From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries. This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale. It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda. These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame. Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities. We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya. There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships. Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation. One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent. But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target. As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms. It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.
[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
Sunday, March 15, 2015
Islamic State Weakesses Exposed In Iraq; Netanyahu Struggling To Get Electoral Traction
Links: A. Islamic State Losses Mount In Iraq
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
Friday, March 13, 2015
Tikrit Falls To The ISF
Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
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