Russia steps up air campaign in Syria, increasing sorties against ISIS, but continues to target anti-Assad forces.

Link: Russian forces on-the-ground in Syria increase to over 4000.

In response to ISIS advances in the vicinity of Aleppo City, Russian bombing raids against Islamic State targets have increased.  On November 2 and 3, Russian warplanes attacked ISIS positions near Palmyra and Qaraytan in eastern Homs, as well as in ar-Raqqah City.  Russia claims to be working with Syrian opposition in its targeting of ISIS units.  In reality, Russia has coordinated some of its bombing sorties with Syrian opposition that is the least "at odds" with the Assad regime.  Russia claimed to have coordinated with Syrian opposition when utilizing precision weapons to attack ISIS targets near Palmyra and Deir ez-Zour, in an effort to pressure the United States to recognize and support the more "moderate" Syrian opposition.  As Russia negotiates with Jordan and Israel regarding the make-up of a post-ISIS Syrian government, Putin wants to isolate the more determined and uncompromising of the Syrian opposition groups.  A number of the organizations that Russia considers more moderate have only evolved in the more recent stages of the conflict, which will provide a problem for some of the groups who were present in the beginning of the movement to topple Bashar al-Assad.  Its easy for some to forget that this conflict began as an offshoot of the Arab Spring, and was a ground-roots, indigenous effort to remove Assad.  ISIS took advantage of the breakdown in authority and civil control to expand its base and create a three-dimensional battleground in Syria.  In reality, the foreign elements involved in Syria should be exclusively focused on the defeat of ISIS, which is in itself, foreign to Syria.  When attempting to create an anti-ISIS ground force in Syria utilizing mostly former Assad regime officers, great efforts were made to avoid contact with regime forces.  Russia does not accept the obligation to avoid internal Syrian problems.  In fact, Russia has used the excuse of opposing ISIS as a shield to conduct one bombing raid after another against Syrian opposition.  Recent Russian focus on ISIS targets have been in response to ISIS advances near Aleppo City and international criticism of its up-to-now almost exclusive targeting of Assad's Syrian opposition, vice ISIS positions.

The United States and Russia have made some progress in deconflicting military operations in Syria;  a successful short-range communications test with a U.S. fighter was conducted on November 3.  But Russia seems determined to continue with its strategy to build Iran into a dominant regional power, and to counter U.S. efforts at strengthening its military cooperation with its eastern European allies.  This week Russia deconflicted a contract with Iran for S-300 anti-aircraft systems.  This agreement had been stalled for some time as Iran focused on developments in Iraq and nuclear treaty negotiations with Europe and the United States.  In a typically heavy-handed attempt at intimidation, Russia launched one of its largest missile tests of the year on the day of the meeting in Vienna to discuss the Syrian conflict.  Russia is also suspected of supporting the action taken by the Moldovan Parliament on October 29 to remove the current government.  As NATO stepped up efforts to strengthen its ties in eastern Europe, Russia launched a snap aviation drill in Kaliningrad.  Russia has a habit of occupying its opponents with diplomacy and other distractions, while continuing whatever action has caused disagreement.  Expect Russia to continue its efforts to prop up Assad and to build Iran into an international player.  Iran has a very important role to play in Vladimir Putin's larger plan to propel Russia into the role of sole world superpower.    

Update: Russian plans for an offensive in Syria using Iranian and militia troops and Russian air support.

Link: Russian airstrikes in Syria continue to target anti-Assad forces, not ISIS.

Everyday we get a better idea exactly what Vladimir Putin intends to do in Syria.  Normally, the Russians would attempt to be a bit discreet, but Putin realizes that he is experiencing a rare moment of complete freedom to do as he pleases.  The Russians are moving quickly, before someone in the international community decides to object and attempt to slow things down.  One would have thought that Putin would have been a bit more subtle with his intention to destroy the anti-Assad indigenous movement first, but he has decided it is more prudent to act quickly, before any real opposition can manifest itself.  During three days of bombing sorties, the Russians exclusively targeted anti-Assad forces, as the disinformation campaign went into gear, identifying the locations bombed as the "ISIS command center at Raqqah City".  Satellite imagery identifies the town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province as being the actual target.  The Russians will continue to spin a web of disinformation at every opportunity, as they have learned from the Ukraine crisis that disseminating false information is effective.  The worst tragedy is that it appears the majority of the casualties in three days of Russian airstrikes haven't even been anti-Assad combatants, but civilians.  Not that the Russians mind.  Killing civilians is a very useful motivational tool.  And to think just a few weeks ago, Europe and the United States were up in arms over the photograph of one drowned Syrian child.

For years, we have wondered what location on the relatively meager Syrian coastline would the Russians chose for their Mediterranean Naval Base.  I thought that Putin would want to build a shiny, new base in Latakia, but it appears from construction that has already started, that the base will be at Tartus instead.  Tartus, which is south of Latakia and a few kilometers north of the Lebanese border, has some existing port facilities, which are proving useful to the Russians, who are conducting naval and amphibious exercises just offshore.  It is believed that Putin will soon grant "combatant status" to the Russian troops already in Syria, and evidence strongly suggests that Russia is preparing for a broader military intervention than repeatedly claimed by Moscow.  With the announcement of the Iran/Iraq/Russia joint combat coordination center in Baghdad, we considered the possibility that the Iranian government would order full military intervention in Iraq, on the grounds of self defense, as ISIS attacks in Diyala Province are having an impact on neighboring Iran.  The persistent presence of ISIS in Diyala gives the Iranians the justification for greater involvement.  It seemed the ideal scenario for Iran, fighting alongside the militias and the Iraqi Security Forces, to pressure ISIS from the east, while Russian forces attacked from the west in Syria.  At this point, Putin no longer sees the battlefield as being separated by national boundaries, and he is prudent in his assessment.  ISIS must be dealt with on all available fronts, with as much pressure as can be applied.  Since Iranian troops, along with some militia units, have arrived in Syria, the fear that Iran will directly intervene in Iraq, although still a likely possibility, has lessened somewhat.

At the moment, the goal for Russia is to successfully re-introduce Bashar al-Assad to the international community as the legitimate president of Syria.  It is believed that the Russians are planning an operation to retake the ancient city of Palmyra, which will provide Assad with a tremendous publicity opportunity.  Ideally, the recapture of Palmyra (by Syrian regime forces, no doubt) will remind the Syrian people that Assad is a great warrior who will eventually outlast his enemies.  Why Putin insists on propping up Assad is still a bit of a mystery.  He could remove Assad, which would please the Turks and the Gulf Arabs immensely, and install another pro-Russian government.  But for the moment, Assad is experiencing a rejuvenation, as his forces are re-equipped and greatly assisted by the Russian air campaign.  The West must be very careful, that the anti-Assad groups that we have been supporting, don't turn to Al-Qaeda surrogate Jabhat al-Nusra for assistance.  Its a real possibility, as all they have seen since Russia's arrival on the scene, is typical diplomatic hyperbole.  U.S. Secretary of State has threatened that the U.S.-led air coalition might very well increase its anti-ISIS bombing sorties in Syria, as opposed to ending them altogether, as Russia has demanded.  If it is possible to increase the bombing sorties against ISIS, why weren't we doing so before the Russians arrived?

Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.

[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.


A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed.  The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government.  They would be absolutely correct in their assessment.  They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through.  Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow.  Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition.  The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone.  All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar.  The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar.  The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit.  If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit.  As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit.  Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.

Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed.  We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block.  Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass.  What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi!  I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them?  We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I.  At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military.  But this time around, I expect some accounting!  Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability?  How about, "once-burned, twice shy"?  I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery,  rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition?  Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS?  From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment. 

Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA).  That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it.  True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines.  The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict.  Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue.  Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself.  I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action.  In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting.  We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target?  Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.

I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA.  I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime.  Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis.  So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point?  All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely.  The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles.  What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS.  Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move.  But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies.  If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.