Washington Post lest-than thoughtful editorial on Russia's interest in Syria.

Link: Washington Post article on Russian involvement in Syria.

I haven't read the New York times in years.  I'm not alone in my disdain for politically motivated interpretation of national and international events; the Gray Lady ain't what she used to be.  But I do still take a look at the Washington Post on occasion.  Today's editorial by Samuel Ramani isn't terrible, but it is selectively dismissive of certain facts that really shouldn't be left out of this discussion.  As his first point of conversation, Ramani introduces the issue of Putin's motivation for military involvement in Syria.  Basically, he gets this one right.  Putin has a handful of reasons to be interested in the Syrian conflict.  As we've discussed on this blog previously, Putin really wants that Mediterranean Sea Naval Base at Tartus.  Historically, Russia has always craved access to the Mediterranean.  Moscow's interest in the Mediterranean caused the Ottoman Empire centuries of concern.  Presently, the U.S. has naval facilities in the Mediterranean, and also in the Far East and in the Persian Gulf.  Putin must frequently ask himself why Russia, as an "equal" superpower, doesn't have the same access.  If Assad stays in power in Syria, and ISIS is defeated, you can bet that Russia will get that Naval Base at Tartus.  I'm not sure about Putin interest in billion-dollar arms deals.  I have no idea how Assad is accessing money these days, but I would be very surprised to learn that he's paying for all of the recent Russian largesse regarding military equipment and supplies.  Ramani is right-on about the importance of Syria as an opportunity for Putin to demonstrate his abilities as the supreme leader of a world's superpower.

Ramani makes great import of Russia's interest in "the legitimacy of the Assad regime" as the government and authority in Damascus.  I don't believe that Russia give's a rat's ass about the legitimacy of any government.  Its all about Russia's interests, not Assad's legitimacy.  The opposition that Putin's jets are currently blasting to bits in northeast Syria are arguably more legitimate than Assad ever was.  Don't you think that if Assad could have won a free and fair election, he would have called for one before we reached this stage?  Before Putin's arrival, Assad and his Ba'ath Party cronies had become so marginalized that they were close to losing the support of even the Alawite community.  If Assad were in any way a legitimate ruler, he wouldn't have been facing a rebellion that almost swept aside the Levant's largest army and air force.  Ramani comments about Putin's fear of the U.S. is trying to reshape the world in its own image.  Right after Obama pulled U.S. troops out of Syria, and laid out a plan to do the same in Afghanistan?  Actually, if we turn the clock back just a bit, we see Russian interference in Georgia, and more recently, the outright invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine.  So who is trying to reshape the world here, Putin or the United States?  Putin may publicly accuse the United States of imperialist intentions, but its nothing more than typical Russian obfuscation.  In the last seven years, the United States has been about as expansionist as Botswana.

I agree with Ramani that Putin is determined to spread the message loud and clear that Russia will not be ignored.  But Russia's intervention in Syria, with its proxy Iran alongside, is really about regional power and damaging U.S. influence in the Middle East.  Putin is a megalomaniac and he does want to be acknowledged as the world leader who vanquished ISIS.  I do not envision a Russian "bloc of allies" in the Middle East, the likes of which we saw in the days of Gamal Abdel Nassar and Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez.  Putin is definitely living in the moment, and recognizes that the leadership vacuum that currently exists vis-à-vis the international community and ISIS, may not last past 2016 and the next U.S. presidential election.  Also, Russia's closest ally in the region is Iran, who leaders have a habit of spitting in every direction, and Tehran may not always agree with Russian strategy.  Iran has serious ideas about its own regional position, and Iraq may end up causing disagreements between the two "new friends".  Putin is aware that he has limited time to accomplish his goals.  Expect to see more aggressive action by Russia against ISIS.

Update: Russian plans for an offensive in Syria using Iranian and militia troops and Russian air support.

Link: Russian airstrikes in Syria continue to target anti-Assad forces, not ISIS.

Everyday we get a better idea exactly what Vladimir Putin intends to do in Syria.  Normally, the Russians would attempt to be a bit discreet, but Putin realizes that he is experiencing a rare moment of complete freedom to do as he pleases.  The Russians are moving quickly, before someone in the international community decides to object and attempt to slow things down.  One would have thought that Putin would have been a bit more subtle with his intention to destroy the anti-Assad indigenous movement first, but he has decided it is more prudent to act quickly, before any real opposition can manifest itself.  During three days of bombing sorties, the Russians exclusively targeted anti-Assad forces, as the disinformation campaign went into gear, identifying the locations bombed as the "ISIS command center at Raqqah City".  Satellite imagery identifies the town of Al Latamneh in Hama Province as being the actual target.  The Russians will continue to spin a web of disinformation at every opportunity, as they have learned from the Ukraine crisis that disseminating false information is effective.  The worst tragedy is that it appears the majority of the casualties in three days of Russian airstrikes haven't even been anti-Assad combatants, but civilians.  Not that the Russians mind.  Killing civilians is a very useful motivational tool.  And to think just a few weeks ago, Europe and the United States were up in arms over the photograph of one drowned Syrian child.

For years, we have wondered what location on the relatively meager Syrian coastline would the Russians chose for their Mediterranean Naval Base.  I thought that Putin would want to build a shiny, new base in Latakia, but it appears from construction that has already started, that the base will be at Tartus instead.  Tartus, which is south of Latakia and a few kilometers north of the Lebanese border, has some existing port facilities, which are proving useful to the Russians, who are conducting naval and amphibious exercises just offshore.  It is believed that Putin will soon grant "combatant status" to the Russian troops already in Syria, and evidence strongly suggests that Russia is preparing for a broader military intervention than repeatedly claimed by Moscow.  With the announcement of the Iran/Iraq/Russia joint combat coordination center in Baghdad, we considered the possibility that the Iranian government would order full military intervention in Iraq, on the grounds of self defense, as ISIS attacks in Diyala Province are having an impact on neighboring Iran.  The persistent presence of ISIS in Diyala gives the Iranians the justification for greater involvement.  It seemed the ideal scenario for Iran, fighting alongside the militias and the Iraqi Security Forces, to pressure ISIS from the east, while Russian forces attacked from the west in Syria.  At this point, Putin no longer sees the battlefield as being separated by national boundaries, and he is prudent in his assessment.  ISIS must be dealt with on all available fronts, with as much pressure as can be applied.  Since Iranian troops, along with some militia units, have arrived in Syria, the fear that Iran will directly intervene in Iraq, although still a likely possibility, has lessened somewhat.

At the moment, the goal for Russia is to successfully re-introduce Bashar al-Assad to the international community as the legitimate president of Syria.  It is believed that the Russians are planning an operation to retake the ancient city of Palmyra, which will provide Assad with a tremendous publicity opportunity.  Ideally, the recapture of Palmyra (by Syrian regime forces, no doubt) will remind the Syrian people that Assad is a great warrior who will eventually outlast his enemies.  Why Putin insists on propping up Assad is still a bit of a mystery.  He could remove Assad, which would please the Turks and the Gulf Arabs immensely, and install another pro-Russian government.  But for the moment, Assad is experiencing a rejuvenation, as his forces are re-equipped and greatly assisted by the Russian air campaign.  The West must be very careful, that the anti-Assad groups that we have been supporting, don't turn to Al-Qaeda surrogate Jabhat al-Nusra for assistance.  Its a real possibility, as all they have seen since Russia's arrival on the scene, is typical diplomatic hyperbole.  U.S. Secretary of State has threatened that the U.S.-led air coalition might very well increase its anti-ISIS bombing sorties in Syria, as opposed to ending them altogether, as Russia has demanded.  If it is possible to increase the bombing sorties against ISIS, why weren't we doing so before the Russians arrived?

Forget Crimea And The Black Sea...What About Russian Naval Bases In The Mediterranean?

Link: A. Russian Naval Plans In The Mediterranean
          B. Yes Virginia, There Is A Syrian Navy

I spend so much time reading and thinking about the conflict in Syria, I have allowed myself to fall into a two-dimensional trap.  The United States and allies are conducting an air campaign in Syria in an attempt to diminish the fighting capacity of certain Islamic terrorist groups.  Concurrently, efforts are underway to train and equip the "Free Syrian Army", which will serve as the closest thing to a ground element that the United States and her allies have.  I have heard rumors that we've already trained non-U.S. ground units who are now already in combat.  This would make sense, given that the Free Syrian Army has orders to only engage the enemy from a defensive posture.  Another rumor is making the rounds of various U.S. military bases and facilities around the world, and this one dwarfs anything we have heard to date (no, they are not bringing back Little House On the Prairie).  Allegedly, the Administration has accepted the need for U.S. ground forces in Iraq in order to prevent the Islamic State of the Levant (ISIL or IS) from eventually occupying

both Baghdad and the vital oil refinery at Baiji.  I have been hearing this rumor for some time, and it is evolving into a whispered roar.  As far as I am concerned, there is not a shred of truth to the rumor.  However, the small person I had hired to hide up Biden's ass and take discreet notes during Cabinet meetings, was discovered and promoted to the new Ebola Czar.  So your guess is as good as mine.  To be honest, I can't imagine the Administration engaging in such an obvious about-face.  But hey, politics is bizarre.  President Obama may get kudos for allowing his policy to evolve.  With regard to the Syrian campaign, I believed that the conflict was permanently limited to a ground and air conflict.  I realize Syria has a small coast (193 kilometers) which includes two decent sized cities, Tartus and Latakia.  It's my

understanding that the area around Tartus and Latakia is littered with ruins from the days of ancient Sparta, Athens and Troy.  Soon the tourists may hear a new language be spoken among the sightseers: Russian.



Let me clarify an important point: I do not expect the Syrian conflict to become a three-dimensional with an attack on Tartus by the three pedalos that make up the IS Navy.

But I needed a smooth avenue on which to introduce the subject of Russian interest in Mediterranean ports.  We have spent some time commenting on the Russian desire to turn the Black Sea into Lake Putin, but the specter of Russian warships with a home on the Mediterranean is much closer to reality.    In fact, the Russians have already started to use the reasonably modern facilities at Tartus.  I have opined that one of the handful of reasons why Putin will not allow Bashir al-Assad to fall from power is the Russian's need for an ally with a port large enough for expansion.  Tartus certainly fits the bill, although other locations have been mentioned as well.  Occasionally someone will mention the possibility of a Russian naval facility in Libya, but who knows when the camel traders, with AK-47s under one arm and Qurans under the other, will grow tired of creating martyrs.  Alexandria, in Egypt, was looking like a promising destination before Mohamed Morsi was whisked away to jail.  For many years I waited, expecting the Algerian military (Algeria's true boss) to fall totally into the lap of Russia (the Algerians have traditionally purchased Russian-made military equipment).  I was being very naïve.  The Algerian government has contracts with half the oil companies in Europe and the United States, and lately has actually started purchasing more U.S. military equipment.  Malta might as well be a Channel Island, alongside Jersey and the Isle of Man, and the rest are non-starters: Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, France, Italy, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia & Hercegovina, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon and Israel.  Most of the countries on the preceding

list have very little love for Russia, and the others do not have the right harbor for what the Russian Navy requires.  Cyprus though, is a bit of a mystery.  Until recently Cypriot banks were awash with laundered Russian cash, and the Russians really seem to enjoy the little island full of Greeks and Turks who really, REALLY hate each other.  Cyprus has a number of locations that would suit the Russian navy to a tee, but it is unlikely that the UK, who for some reason continues to act as stepfather to the Cypriots, would allow Russian submarines in Larnaka.

I never second-guess Putin's ingenuity (or his ability to blackmail and bribe), and he very well might negotiate himself into a naval port facility in one of the above-named locations.  But for the moment, it isn't necessary.  Assad has given the Russians the keys to the port of Tartus.  The modest, but well-maintained, Syrian Navy keeps its few Russian-made frigates, missile craft and patrol boats at Tartus, which provide an invaluable opportunity for the Syrian naval personnel to work together with the Russians (watch out, Syrian naval commanders: the last time the Russians showed up wearing smiles, the entire Ukrainian navy was swallowed up overnight).  If Assad manages to keep his job (or another Ba'athist butthole takes it), the Russian Navy should have a free hand to construct a modern naval port facility at Tartus, complete with both Marines and a land-based naval air detachment.  Although the Russians have had friends all over the middle east for more than the past half-century, this is the first time that I can recall the Russians openly stating their intention to make full naval use of Tartus.  The presence of all those Russian nuclear submarines does not sit well with me, and you can only imagine the hissy fit being thrown by the Green Party political representatives throughout EU countries.  However, a full-blown Russian fleet in the Levant will accomplish something positive for us over here in the West:  Whoever takes the White House in 2016 won't be able to ignore the reconstituting of the Russian war machine.