Part II
At the time, the only real conflict in the region was taking place in Syria, but the revolution to overthrow Bashar al-Assad had nothing to do with the new Iraq, so there probably was not a rush to fully complete the training program. In 2010, when the training program was still basically in the beginning stages, President Barack Obama ordered the U.S. military to depart Iraq according to a particular timeline. At the end of the day, I believe the timeline called for the removal of all but the most essential military personnel with one year. Allegedly, the Obama Administration was warned by the Pentagon that the Iraqi military was in no shape to take over the security of the nation, but it made no difference. You see, mid-term elections were coming up stateside, and the Administration's political base was not happy that President Obama hadn't fulfilled his campaign pledge to bring U.S. troops home. Because this post has already stretched into two, I will mercifully bring things to a close. We left Iraq with an untrained army, holding a billion dollars worth of the world's most modern weaponry.
Across the border in Syria, ISIS, which had started to draw attention to itself through its regular use of butchery and stark brutality, saw an incredible opportunity. They took an eraser to their previous maps of "the Caliphate" and added Iraq. Then ISIS put together a military campaign that relied heavily on its ability to be mobile and move quickly, and invaded Iraq. The only real opposition facing ISIS were the Kurds and the Peshmerga, as first Mosul fell, and then to the south, Baiji and Tikrit, which was the real catastrophe. The young, untrained Iraqi Army recruits deserted their positions en masse, living in the sand rifles, GPS devices, mortars, electronic warfare equipment, targeting devices, artillery, and even vehicles. ISIS is known for its ability to adapt, and that equipment and ammunition not doubt, has been essential in subsequent operations. As for Iraq, the schools are now only half-open, many of the new highways are destroyed by artillery fire, and the Baiji refinery itself as been one of the most contested battlefields of the conflict. From 2009 to 2016....Iraq is an example of what happens when people who don't respect or understand the military, make decisions that direct impact the battlefield. In this instance, the decision created one.
Showing posts with label Tikrit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Tikrit. Show all posts
Friday, January 22, 2016
Wednesday, June 3, 2015
The Sunnis of Iraq..what does the future hold? (Part I)
Link: The Sunni of Iraq - caught in the middle again.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Thursday, May 28, 2015
The rise of a terrorist superpower: the Islamic State in 2015.
Most analysts and military strategists in the United States have focused on the activities of Daesh (Islamic State) in Syria and Iraq. After all, our equities appear to be most at risk in those two particular theaters. We have been conducting an Allied Air Campaign in both areas of conflict for roughly a year, and today, for the first time, we have learned exactly how aggressive this Air Campaign has been. The Allied Air Campaign (which includes the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain) is averaging fourteen missions per day against Daesh targets. In comparison, the U.S. Air Force averaged 800 missions per day against Iraqi and insurgency targets in Operation Enduring Freedom. When questioned about the low number of missions, the Pentagon pointed out that the targets are more complicated, and the coalition is determined to avoid hitting civilian targets in error. I will leave that comment to stand on its own. Recently, Daesh has become more visible in its efforts to expand into other countries. Saudi Arabia has started to suffer from internal bombings conducting by Daesh operatives, and the presence of Daesh has been noted in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, and Armenia (this includes countries with Islamic extremist groups who have declared their allegiance to Daesh). Currently, the Islamic State has the momentum in both Iraq and Syria. In fact, with only the remnants of the regime left to oppose their advance, Syria is beginning to look like a done deal, at least as far as Assad is concerned. Last week, Daesh operatives captured the Syrian/Iraqi border town of al-Tanf (al-Waleed in Iraq), which is a major victory for the extremist group. Controlling this entry point will allow Daesh to resupply its forces in Iraq more quickly, and vice versa. It solidifies their communication and transportation network between the two countries, and will undoubtedly bring more pressure on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Anbar Province.
Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies. No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers. Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria. But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies. We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit. But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets. Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target. It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves. The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh. Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters. No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.
From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries. This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale. It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda. These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame. Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities. We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya. There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships. Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation. One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent. But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target. As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms. It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.
Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies. No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers. Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria. But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies. We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit. But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets. Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target. It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves. The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh. Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters. No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.
From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries. This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale. It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda. These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame. Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities. We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya. There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships. Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation. One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent. But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target. As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms. It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.
[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
Sunday, March 15, 2015
Islamic State Weakesses Exposed In Iraq; Netanyahu Struggling To Get Electoral Traction
Links: A. Islamic State Losses Mount In Iraq
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
Friday, March 13, 2015
Tikrit Falls To The ISF
Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
Monday, October 27, 2014
Updates From The Ground War In Iraq
Links: A. Iraqi Troops Retake Three Tents And A Camel Repair Shop
B. Women Warriors Not New To Kurdistan
I woke up late this morning and missed Mass. When I finally got my wits about me I remembered that the Dallas Cowboys game against the Washington Foreskins was on Monday night, so I was a bit grumpy when I turned on the computer and saw the headline, "Iraqi Troops Retake Town". Allegedly the Iraqi Army already controls most of Ramadi, so if the Iraqi Army could dislodge the Islamic State (IS) from Fallujah, it would clearly disrupt the IS efforts to methodically destabilize Baghdad. Unfortunately, the town that was retaken was not Fallujah, but Jurf al-Sakhar, a Sunni town with roughly 80,000 inhabitants.
For most folks, Jurf al-Sakhar is just another hard-to-pronounce Iraqi village in the middle of nothing. As a former CIA Case Officer, I recall Jurf al-Sakhar as being home to Saddam Hussein's most important biological weapons research facility. The town is part of a ribbon of Sunni communities that hug the Euphrates and are buffered to the east and west by Shia villages. It is strategically located, with Karbala to the west and Hillah to the south. I made light of the fact that Jurf al-Sakhar is unfamiliar to most people reading this post, but in reality the retaking of Jurf al-Sakhar disrupts any attempt by the IS to encircle Baghdad. All in all, the deliverance of Jurf al-Sakhar from the IS is good news. What would truly justify a celebration would be the removal of all IS operatives from Ramadi, and the retaking of Fallujah. If the Iraqi Army could accomplish these two goals, then my readers would get a respite from daily postings about Baghdad.
I do not purposely neglect discussing the Iraqi northern front. The truth is, I have some trouble locating dependable reporting from this area. The Iraqi Army is active not only in and around Tikrit, but also in Baiji, Baqubah, and Kirkuk.
It can be difficult determining exactly where the Iraqi Army leaves off the front line and the Kurdish forces pick it up. The Iraqi Army and the various Kurdish military elements recognize the need to work together against a common enemy, in this case the IS. Interestingly enough, I haven't seen much information online regarding the actual authority that Kurdish leaders bequeath to the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga is the largest, best equipped, best trained, and most respected of all the various military forces that have represented Kurdish interests. I spent some time with the Peshmerga in 2003, and as I see it, they are the true representative Army of the Kurdish people. No doubt other groups representing particular political interests will make themselves useful in the war against the IS (these include PUK, PDK, etc. who will always have their own large cadre of bodyguards). But at the end of the day, there is only one Peshmerga. If it were possible to triple the number of Peshmerga fighters, the IS would be swept away in a month or so. I have tremendous confidence in these Kurdish soldiers because I have watched them in action both nearby and from afar. The Peshmerga has never been accused of "too much discipline" during down-time, and the subject of hygiene seems to escape Peshmerga training programs, but these guys and gals know how to fight. When the bullets start to fly, the Peshmerga seems to maneuver as one unit with one mind. They are just as effective in small units as they are in groups of twenty or fifty, and they can transport an amazing amount of heavy weaponry over great distances in no time at all. In reality, I believe that the IS has stolen its tactics from the Peshmerga. When I worked with the Peshmerga, there was no consistency to the weaponry. Some preferred to carry the M16, and others (most) were comfortable with the ubiquitous AK-47. Any more commentary regarding the Peshmerga will require me to share parts of my book. Suffice to say that I have great faith in the Peshmerga and only wish we had more. The many times that I observed Peshmerga during down time made me realize that the cohesiveness that is so apparent during battle, seems to melt away during personal time. Each Peshmerga is responsible for their own personal issues such as health, hygiene, entertainment, and comfort. In fact, the only time I saw an administrative angle was during meals (not always) and during issues related to ammunition and supply.
Link B is an important article for anyone who requires an accurate vision of the ground war in Syria and Iraq. Women have always been militarily active in Kurdish history. The only militaries that use women as effectively as the Peshmerga are the Israelis and the United States, of course. Kurdish women fighters carry their own equipment and show the same level of personal independence that is such a big part of the Peshmerga way. The Iraqi Army has a respectable number of female troops, and it is my understanding that they have shown promise on the battlefield. Any current female troops in the Iraqi Army are part of the new structure implemented after the fall of Saddam Hussein. This structure is very focused on military instruction and weapons training, so it shouldn't be surprising that so many female troops have achieved success early in their careers. But at the end of the day, all soldiers must fight and fight well to be successful. In warfare, the soldier who is unsuccessful at his or her job, never leaves the battlefield. The IS has made a bit of a public show over the number of female recruits that have arrived from the United States and Europe. Its one thing to display photos and videos on social media of American and European females sporting the latest in Burkha-wear and waving little Islamic State flags for the camera. Here in Mookie World we are all about the truth, and I want to hear from these same young ladies a month after their arrival in camp. I understand that the IS has a few (formerly English) female fighters who have taken to the life of being an Islamic Warrior. My question is, what would The Prophet say? Isn't "soldiering" an occupation reserved for men in the world of the "Caliphate"?
B. Women Warriors Not New To Kurdistan
I woke up late this morning and missed Mass. When I finally got my wits about me I remembered that the Dallas Cowboys game against the Washington Foreskins was on Monday night, so I was a bit grumpy when I turned on the computer and saw the headline, "Iraqi Troops Retake Town". Allegedly the Iraqi Army already controls most of Ramadi, so if the Iraqi Army could dislodge the Islamic State (IS) from Fallujah, it would clearly disrupt the IS efforts to methodically destabilize Baghdad. Unfortunately, the town that was retaken was not Fallujah, but Jurf al-Sakhar, a Sunni town with roughly 80,000 inhabitants.
I do not purposely neglect discussing the Iraqi northern front. The truth is, I have some trouble locating dependable reporting from this area. The Iraqi Army is active not only in and around Tikrit, but also in Baiji, Baqubah, and Kirkuk.
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