Iraq: U.S. compromises with Iran have not influenced the Iranians to abandon the policy of undermining United States initiatives.

Links: A. Turkey unilaterally invades Iraq to launch attacks against Kurdish PKK militants.
           B.  Iraq claims to have retaken 60% of Ramadi City.

In a move that will no doubt escalate already dangerously high tensions in the area, Turkey deployed military units into northeastern Iraq, just outside of Mosul, in order to more effectively launch attacks against militants from the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).  If Turkish President Erdogan was looking for the quickest way to unite the Kurds, and at the same time, bring the Iraqi government and the Kurdish authorities closer together, they found it.  Turkey's actions are almost inexplicable, unless Erdogan is determine to make things difficult for Barack Obama as he tries to leave office gracefully.  At the same time, the Pentagon is preparing to deploy roughly 200 U.S. Army Special Forces elements into Iraq, to act as a mobile "hit squad" to take out ISIS leaders, if you will.  This policy seems to fly in the face of Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, which prohibits any Agent or Representative of the United States Government from involvement in assassinations.  I may be nit-picking here, especially since we already are aware of this Administration's perception of the Constitution and the laws of this nation.  Either way, the arrival of this American Special Forces Unit has already come under heavy criticism in Baghdad, where Prime Minister Abadi is doing everything he can to keep the ship of state from sinking altogether.  Abadi is under particular pressure from the Shi'a elements in the Council of Representatives, who are angling to bring a vote of no confidence against the Iraqi Prime Minister.  Also, Iranians in Baghdad are as thick as fleas on a mongrel's back, and they are also putting pressure on the government, both to oppose the deployment of more U.S. troops, and to take action against the Turkish incursion northeast of Mosul.  Abadi has been under fire before, but this time his administration may not survive.

One of the most appalling and embarrassing developments in the region has been the continued intransigence from the Iranians with regards to any U.S. diplomatic or military initiatives.  I assume that following the nuclear treaty negotiations, the Obama Administration (the President, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry in particular) expected the Iranian government to lighten the anti-U.S. rhetoric and to be less aggressive in opposing every U.S. action in the region.  I knew better, and you knew better, but for some reason, the three men with the greatest access to intelligence on this planet, didn't see this coming.  Or did they, and it just didn't matter?  At the moment, events in Iraq and Syria need to be stabilized, before the Iraqi's end up at war with Turkey, or the Turks decide that the time is right to "ethnic-cleanse" northern Iraq of Kurds once and for all.  The action ordered by the President and taken by the Pentagon to deploy Special Forces is way too little and way too late, and will cause more harm than good, especially if Abadi falls from power.  It has been suggested (whispered more like) in DC that the Obama Administration is hesitant to take stronger military action against ISIS, because increased U.S. presence in the region will infuriate Iran, and put Obama's "legacy treaty" with Iran in jeopardy.

What we can expect is the Administration attempting to steer the media away from connecting the recent terror attack in San Bernardino to the ongoing conflict in Syria.  Obama is bound and determined to avoid getting drawn into a full-scale war in Syria/Iraq.  I'm not so reactionary that I don't see the ideological motivation; the United States has a tempestuous relationship with most of the governments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and lets not forget that we invaded Iraq twice in the last thirty years.  Our historical tradition of supporting unpopular governments in Egypt and Iran and our long-term, close relationship with Israel, have not endeared the U.S. to the people of the region, that's for sure.  But the clock is ticking (excuse the cliché); ISIL/ISIS/Daesh or whatever you want to call them, have not been really impacted by the Russian intervention in Syria (probably because most of the Russian bombs were dropped on anti-government Syrian groups as opposed to ISIS).  ISIS is increasing its activities in Africa and in the Far East, and I expect we will soon see a more regular pattern to domestic terror events (God forbid).  Still today, on December 9, 2015, the United States is military capable of destroying ISIS on our own.  But a serious effort at building a military coalition, to include our European allies and Russia (who should be told, bluntly, to "get on board or get out of the way"), would a tremendous advantage in eliminating this scourge once and for all.  Why now?  Because if ISIS continues to raise money and recruit, I have no idea how improved their conventional army will become (with modern weapons, tanks, artillery, and possibly and Air element), nor can we accurately gauge how complicated and dangerous the situation will be in the urban and residential areas of Europe and the United States.  Some crusty old General once said, that when you go to war, you must use everything at your disposal, every weapon, no matter how heinous, and you must fight with the utmost aggression and determination.  This is the formula for ending a war quickly, which will save countless lives on both sides, especially when compared to wars that drag on and on and on......

Back to the Sunni versus Shi'a, a bit of historical perspective.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Sunni Islam.
           B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
           C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.

When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim.  I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times.  But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you.  Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially.  The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite.  I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave.  Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991.  As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good.  For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort.  The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion.  It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.

But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences.  Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a.  This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network.  In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual.  Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular.  This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was  the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I.  The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness.  If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.

We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries.  The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government.  For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military.  This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority).  The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed.  On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq.  Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran.  In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a.  Iraq is a prime example.  The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense).  The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.

For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement.  As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over.  What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever.  In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback.  With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.

The rise of a terrorist superpower: the Islamic State in 2015.

Most analysts and military strategists in the United States have focused on the activities of Daesh (Islamic State) in Syria and Iraq.  After all, our equities appear to be most at risk in those two particular theaters.  We have been conducting an Allied Air Campaign  in both areas of conflict for roughly a year, and today, for the first time, we have learned exactly how aggressive this Air Campaign has been.  The Allied Air Campaign (which includes the United States, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Bahrain) is averaging fourteen missions per day against Daesh targets.  In comparison, the U.S. Air Force averaged 800 missions per day against Iraqi and insurgency targets in Operation Enduring Freedom.  When questioned about the low number of missions, the Pentagon pointed out that the targets are more complicated, and the coalition is determined to avoid hitting civilian targets in error.  I will leave that comment to stand on its own.  Recently, Daesh has become more visible in its efforts to expand into other countries.  Saudi Arabia has started to suffer from internal bombings conducting by Daesh operatives, and the presence of Daesh has been noted in Algeria, Mali, Libya, Egypt, Pakistan, Yemen, and Armenia (this includes countries with Islamic extremist groups who have declared their allegiance to Daesh).  Currently, the Islamic State has the momentum in both Iraq and Syria.  In fact, with only the remnants of the regime left to oppose their advance, Syria is beginning to look like a done deal, at least as far as Assad is concerned.  Last week, Daesh operatives captured the Syrian/Iraqi border town of al-Tanf (al-Waleed in Iraq), which is a major victory for the extremist group.  Controlling this entry point will allow Daesh to resupply its forces in Iraq more quickly, and vice versa.  It solidifies their communication and transportation network between the two countries, and will undoubtedly bring more pressure on the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Anbar Province.

Outside of Saudi Arabia and a few isolated incidents in other countries, Daesh has yet to conduct a major operation in a theater other than Syria and Iraq....at least as far as we know. This group continues to impress with its planning and patience, and its ability to transform financial support into military equipment and supplies.  No doubt its recent successes on the battlefield have increased the flow of volunteers.  Last summer, when the United States appeared to be taking this threat seriously, there was hope that the Daesh movement would be limited to Iraq and Syria.  But the organization has executed a much more successful military strategy than the United States and its allies.  We celebrated when the Kurds won a few victories in northern Syria, and we rejoiced when the ISF recaptured Tikrit.  But each minor Daesh setback was followed by a major military operation against weak targets.  Although Ramadi wasn't thought to be a weak target.  It became one when the ISF deserted its positions and equipment/vehicles, and left the people of Ramadi to fend for themselves.  The example that the Iraqi Army continues to set (with the exception of a modest-sized number of well-trained, disciplined troops that get deployed whenever the government in Baghdad needs a headlining-grabbing victory somewhere) is only encouraging scores of Sunni in Anbar and elsewhere to back the winner, which at this stage is Daesh.  Each little step east, closer to Baghdad, allows Daesh to seed Sunni communities with locals who have become supporters.  No doubt, actual Daesh operatives are already in place in the bedroom communities of Baghdad.

From a larger perspective, the EU and the United States had better recognize the danger of Daesh "sightings" in Africa and in other Middle East countries.  This extremist group is nothing like we have seen before, with the exception of the Taliban, on a much smaller scale.  It has brought a conventional military capability to an extremist agenda.  These groups feed off the poverty and misery of the third world to recruit and spread a message of hate and blame.  Sadly, in 2015, they have no shortage of expansion opportunities.  We have been concerned for some time with the activities of Al-Shabaab in East Africa, and the potential for recruitment in the townships of Kenya.  There is no doubt that Al-Shabaab and Daesh are in regular communication, and that Daesh is already considering ways to tap into the mountain of discontent that exists in East African townships.  Another troubling development is the easy manner in which Daesh seems to co-opt existing guerilla movements, sometimes even groups that are not Sunni in affiliation.  One would have though that the mass executions and beheadings would have damaged the brand at least to some extent.  But the reality is, at the end of the day, what really impresses is success, which at the moment, Daesh is enjoying in Spades. Anyone that is able to make the United States appear reactionary and unresolved will always attract a certain element of bad guys, but Daesh has managed to force the United States, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the Emirates, and even the Assad regime, stand behind the same target.  As far as Daesh is concerned, they have one enemy that just happens to speak different languages and wear different uniforms.  It would be in our best interest if we also adopted the same approach, instead of continuing with this obsession of separating the motivations of various extremist groups that all share the same goal: the expansion of Islamic extremism and the destruction of the western way of life.

What is in a Name? IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh

By Jennifer Jennings, Guest Blogger
sistereight@icloud.com    Twitter @Sistereight 

Links: A. “There is no al-Sham”
           B.  Levant and al-Sham are not Synonyms
           C.  France Swtiches to Daesh Acronym

What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
- Act II, Scene II of Romeo and Juliet, William Shakespeare

What is in a name?  Well, when it comes to branding … everything.  And that includes the branding of political groups.  While the truth of what a group represents is defined in large part by their deeds and actions, it is also defined, in part, by what others can be convinced to believe they represent.  And this all starts with nomenclature, known in contemporary terms as “spin”.  Normally I would have expected that a group lacking a clear, unambiguous, and universally recognized name would have difficulty maintaining legitimacy or attention.  Perhaps this is my business background biasing my view.  You usually can't get widespread attention for a product or your brand if everyone is referring to it as something different.  But over the last four months I've seen the militant terrorists in Iraq and Syria get just this kind of attention despite the fact that no one can quite seem to agree on what to call them.  I suppose when you destroy lives and property, take control of and oppress populations, and publicly behead those who disagree . . . well then you are bound to capture attention regardless of what various names are being used to refer to you.  So why then all the disparity in names?  And why the multiple news articles and mentions addressing the disparity?   Wouldn’t it just be easiest to go with the self-given name of the group?  Well, let's start with this then.

الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
This is the self-given name of the militant terrorist group in question.  Not so easy to use in European/western conversation, or oral news reporting, or even for readers to continually recognize in print.  Even the romanization of the Arabic script leaves us with the lengthy: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fīl-ʻIraq wa ash-Shām, which is difficult for western ears, tongues and memories.  So a translation seems the natural course:  Put the name in the native language of the reader/listener.  This will make it easier to refer to, easier to remember, and easier to understand in an instant just what it is that the group is self-proclaiming via their name.  If only translation were so simple a task . . .

• ad-Dawlah translates easy enough as “the State” (which brings its own issues)
• al-Islāmīyah is also an easy translation to “Islamic” (also creating issues)
• fīl-ʻIraq is accepted to translate as “of Iraq”

The first two easily translated words form the “IS” basis of the names IS, ISIS, and ISIL, since there is no dispute that they translate as “the Islamic State”.  And while it’s also readily accepted that the next portion translates as “of Iraq”, it is ambiguity with the final part that leads to the split between the users of ISIS and those of ISIL, and ultimately to those that avoid the dispute entirely by sticking simply with IS.

wa ash-Shām/ ISIS v ISIL

For translators, this is the most complicated portion of the self-given name. It refers to “al-Sham”: a region that is translated either as the Levant or as Syria.  There are some that

claim that al-Sham and the Levant are essentially, or even exactly, the same thing, while others argue that there are cultural differences that indicate the true motivation of the jihadist group we are dealing with.

• The Levant:  The term first appeared in English in 1497 and is borrowed from the French, levant,  meaning “rising”.   It is used to refer to the east Mediterranean, where the sun rises and is accepted to refer to a geographical and cultural region that includes Cyrpus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and part of Southern Turkey. 
• al-Sham:  This term refers to Bilad al-Sham which is sometimes also called “Greater Syria”. It is a province that is roughly incorporated by the same area as the Levant, but was in existence far earlier (630s-940s) as an Islamic Caliphate with Damascus as its capital. 

Some of the dispute between using ISIS versus ISIL seems to stem from two sources:   First, and easiest to dismiss is that the last "S" in ISIS shouldn’t stand for “Syria”, as the modern version of this country doesn’t include all the countries of the historical al-Sham.  Most news sources have recognized that the “Syria” translated here is referring to the Greater Syria of old.  Although, to avoid confusion this is why some have chosen “Levant” rather than “Syria” for use in the acronym and have thus gone with ISIL.  The other dispute comes from those that claim al-Sham and Levant are in fact not synonymous, but that the use of al-Sham has a deeper, older, cultural and religious meaning that indicates a “race to Jeruselem” for the militant Islamic group (link B).  Those with this perspective prefer using “ISIS” over “ISIL” with the final “S” referring to al-Sham, not Syria and certainly not the Levant, as they argue that this is a western geographical distinction that ignores the prior religious significance that al-Sham held to the Muslims.

DAESH
Another major difference in nomenclature for this militant jihadist group comes from the refusal to recognize them as a State, or as representing Islam.  Daesh is a loose

acronym formed from ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fīl-ʻIraq wa ash-Shām and is most frequently used by enemies of the group as it has negative undertones: it sounds similar in Arabic to words  Daes meaning "one who crushes something underfoot" and Dahes meaning "one who sows discord".  This name, Daesh, has been officially adopted by the French government (see link C), but I see it most frequently used by Kurds in Syria that I follow on Twitter.  In fact, on Twitter there was a campaign to make the name even more insulting: the winning hashtag was #daeshbag. However, I do still see the runner up, #daesshole, used almost as frequently.  For the terrorists being targeted with the name Daesh, there is strong evidence that they do in deed take offense to it:  there are reports out of northern Iraq that anyone caught using this name is subject to having their tongue cut out by the militants.  It is worth noting that there are westerners and Europeans who are opposed to calling the terrorists Daesh.  They argue that it ignores and hides the fact that the militants are an Islamic religious group intent on converting the world to submit to Islamic rule and law by forcing non-believers into slavery, and/or to pay tax for not being Muslim, and/or being beheaded.

As a civilized people, we like to label and neatly categorize.  I started off feeling this same way;  I was simply annoyed when one newscast said "ISIS" while the U.S. Government said "ISIL" and my Kurd Tweeps said "Daesh".  Like most people, I am more comfortable if everyone is on the same page.  I have come to accept that everyone is not.  In my personal journey to figure out the “right name” for this group, I can’t say that I’ve come to any definitive conclusions.  I know they’re the bad guys.  But I have come to realize that it is much less important what I personally call "them", those evil militant beheaders in the Middle East, and more important that I keep listening to all the different names they call themselves and are being called by others.  And that then I ask “why”?  What motives and beliefs does each group have that cause it to refuse the name that others use and offer one of its own? Only then can I begin to get a glimmer of understanding into the chaos of this region.