Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
           B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.

Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache.  I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias".  But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard.  Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A.  In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS).  The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved.  A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army.  For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s.  Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881.  Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt.  Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad).  The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers.  Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject.  Back to the subject at hand...

The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion.  Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented.  In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets.  On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias.  The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran).  The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly.  The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government.  Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group.  Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office.  But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias.  Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields".  This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias.  Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias.  To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise."  Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.

The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians.  Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda.  But what can we expect after the IS is defeated?  And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again.  In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office.  His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him.  Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani.  At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites".  Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds!  On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future.  We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries.  With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq.  And when did all this happen?  While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime.  This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments.  The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us?  As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty.  Quel bordel!

Back to the Sunni versus Shi'a, a bit of historical perspective.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Sunni Islam.
           B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
           C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.

When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim.  I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times.  But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you.  Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially.  The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite.  I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave.  Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991.  As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good.  For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort.  The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion.  It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.

But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences.  Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a.  This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network.  In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual.  Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular.  This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was  the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I.  The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness.  If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.

We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries.  The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government.  For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military.  This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority).  The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed.  On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq.  Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran.  In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a.  Iraq is a prime example.  The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense).  The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.

For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement.  As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over.  What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever.  In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback.  With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.

Iran patiently winning battle of influence in Iraq.

Link: U.S. losing battle of influence in Iraq to Iran.


For some time, analysts, were trying to understand the Iranian strategy regarding the current conflict in Iraq.  The Iranians, with so much to win or lose, appeared content to allow the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) tackle ISIS, with the only assistance from Iran coming in the form of the Badr Corps and a few other Shi'a militias.  For roughly the last decade, the Shi'a militias have existed solely (or so they claim) for the purpose of protecting holy Shi'a sites in Iraq and for the personal safety of His Eminence Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani, who holds a tremendous amount of influence among the Shi's community of Iraq.  In fact, Sistani is an important figure to the United States and Europe as well.  He has always been a pragmatic, moderating presence and manages to keep the popular and dangerous Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in a bit of a box.  Sadr is very dangerous; he is tied to the most anti-U.S. elements in the Qom-based Iranian religious leadership, and appears to be waiting for Sistani to expire, when he will take his place as a real trouble-maker in the region.  During the current conflict, Sadr has been conspicuous in his good behavior, although some could argue that he hasn't done enough to support the Iraqi government and military.  We expected much more involvement from Iran, given the Shi'a make-up of the present government in Baghdad.  From our optic, serious Iranian military intervention would have pushed ISIS out of western Iraq, but its possible that we are overestimating the strength of the Iranian military or even underestimating the staying power of ISIS.  Either way, it now appears that the Iranians made the smart choice by utilizing the militias in both a diplomatic and military manner.  The militias voiced opposition to the U.S.-led air campaign (which was reciprocated), and laid low while ISIS retook Ramadi.  Then, when it became necessary for the ISF to organize a multi-pronged offensive operation, which required the assistance of ground support more than air cover, the militias made themselves available, and have been performing admirably in both Anbar and Salah al- Din provinces.  The current successful military operations have had more to do with the militias than the air coalition, which continues to be hampered by not only weather anomalies, but by political constraints (it is our understanding that all the members of the coalition reserve the right to beg-off any operation after learning its intended target, a circumstance that speaks volumes).

U.S. Secretary of Defense served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under President Clinton from 1993-96, and as Deputy Secretary of Defense from Oct 2011 to Dec 2013 under President Obama.  Carter (no relation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter) studied Physics and Medieval History, and was a research associate in Theoretical Physics at Rockefeller University from 1979-80.  Although he has accumulated an admirable amount of experience working in the Department of Defense over the past three decades, he has never been in uniform and has never held a command.  He has become more visible in the public eye since becoming Secretary of Defense, and appears to be sincerely engaged to fully implement U.S. policy regarding the conflict in Iraq.  The problem is, the United States doesn't seem to have much of a policy.  We have sponsored a hit-and miss air coalition that has proven to be ineffective against ISIS use of complex Suicide Vehicle attacks.  Certainly the recent ISIS offensive in Anbar and Salah al-Din were in no way impacted by air coalition activity.  Carter has been given very little to work with, while the Iranians continue to use the militias like chess pieces on a game board.  The Iranians can easily resupply the militias and continue to supply strategic advisors to assist the militia leadership.  They work closely with the ISF, while the U.S. is limited to a host of intel folks and diplomats in the big cities, and a contingent of instructors sitting out at al-Asad Airbase in central Anbar Province.  The Iraqi people see he Iranians as being much more engaged in the struggle, and the U.S. as sniffing around, waiting for the orders to leave (again).

 

Developments in Iraq, Syria.

Links: A. Iraqi forces confront ISIS in Anbar.
           B. Al-Qaeda celebrates as Assad regime collapses.


In a positive move, the Iraqi military has begun a well-supported effort to recapture the city of Ramadi and roll-up ISIS fighters in eastern Anbar Province. In a surprise development, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are fighting alongside the "Popular Mobilization" (Shi'a militia), and at the same time, enjoying air support from the allied coalition, which continues to wreck havoc with any ISIS attempts to operate during clear weather.  Early indications are that the ISF is having success retaking neighborhood after neighborhood, and that ISIS forces in Ramadi are virtually surrounded.  Since we've been down this road before, the Iraqis know to expect very few if any prisoners, and that the mopping up operation could take weeks.  An important element of the effort to retake Ramadi, is that it is taking place concurrently with operations in Salah ad-Din Province, where the Shi'a militias Asa'aib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the Badr Organization have been successfully retaking territory northeast of Fallujah. In fact, the Popular Mobilization is active throughout Salah ad-Din Province, as Shi'a militias have retaken territory from ISIS south and southwest of Samarrah city.  The key to current operations against ISIS is the joint-activity of the allied air campaign and the Popular Mobilization.  At times, both the air coalition, led by the United States, and the Shi'a militias, backed by Iran, refused to participate in military operations as long as the other was involved.  It was an odd situation, given that at the time, Iran and the United States were conducting negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Be that as it may, the tide appears to be turning in Iraq (again), especially given that ISIS has been unable to gain complete control of the Baiji refinery, a piece of real estate that may appear to be worth more than it actually is.  But it has become a bit of a rallying cry for the ISF, and they are very determined to relieve its defenders and remove the threat of ISIS control of the entire refinery.  Once Ramadi has been relieved, and the ISF and its militia partners are able to consolidate gains in Salah ad-Din province and around Baiji, then ISIS may be obliged to re-evaluate its long-term strategy.  Almost everyday brings more bad news for Bashir al-Assad in Syria, and its not necessarily ISIS that is causing the trouble.  Jabhat al-Nusrah, considered by many analysts to by Al-Qaeda's "representative" in Syria, has been conducting one successful military operation after another.  In reality, all the Islamic extremist groups who envision some form of a Sunni-based caliphate, are representing Al-Qaeda, including ISIS.  That certainly does not imply that Assad is a friend to the west, it only means that the various Islamic Sunni extremist military groups around the world all have the same goal and the same motivation.  At this point, keeping them separate no longer seems to serve a point.

News from northwest Syria is that Idlib Province has, for the most part, fallen to Jabhat al-Nusrah.  Everyday, village by village, town by town, and province by province, the end draws nearer for Bashir Al-Assad; and once it comes, no doubt there will be a serious vengeance visited upon all those who were loyal to the regime.  And as the situation becomes more desperate, the regime continues to make enemies by its use of weaponized chlorine gas attacks, barrel bombs, and indiscriminate air attacks on civilian areas.  Sooner or later, the last handful of troops loyal to Assad will realize that he and his closest comrades will escape Damascus to end their days in luxury, probably in a villa on the Black Sea.  Its no secret that the Assad family has treated the Syrian treasury as its own personal bank account, not to mention all the cash derived from all manner of bribes.  So the Assad clan will be just fine, but what about the troops who have been loyal to the end?    In Libya, the number of loyal troops disintegrated at the end, and I expect the same situation to happen in Syria.  Assad will have a limited amount of time to decide when to leave, and if he misses the deadline by the smallest of margins, we might just see Bashir lit up like a Christmas tree, inside of a cage.

We have been monitoring the media reports regarding Syria, for any indication that the clocks are ticking in Paris, Moscow, Washington, London, etc., on Bashir al-Assad's Syria. The west was taken by surprise at the swift removal of Gaddafi (no doubt he was surprised by the swift removal of his head), and I wonder if the analysts aren't giving Assad a bit more staying power than he actually has.  True, we had him practically written off once before and he bounced back.  But the giant difference between then and now is Russia. We believe that Putin is willing to allow Assad and his flock of butchers and thieves to go into exile in Russia, but that's about it.  He does not appear willing to expend anymore political capital or money on the Syrian Ba'ath movement.  Assad's predicament isn't complicated; its simply a matter of diminishing returns.  Unless the Syrian military is preparing some awe-inspiring major offensive (it would have to be out of Damascus) to turn the tide of battle, then everyday Assad can expect his loyalists to decrease in number.  A few gone over here, and a few more missing over there.  Don't be surprised to see a Syrian pilot asking for asylum soon, although I don't know if any are left that can pretend to have clean hands, i.e. never having targeted civilians.  The truth is, we're getting a little impatient.  We want to know what will happen "apres les deluge", so we are discreetly trying to nudge Assad in the right direction.  "Hey Bashir, I understand that Black Sea caviar is the richest.  Don't take any chances, Bashir; you already have no chin, how will you look with no head?  Be careful, Bashir, I opened the refrigerator this morning only to find a frozen Jabhat al-Nusrah guy inside.  Oh, that was your doing?  Sorry....."  

Just what is Iran's strategy in Syria and Iraq?

Link: What is the Iranian Strategy?

The article which I have linked is so concise, well-written and full of relevant details, that I had no need to added a second link.  You might be assuming that it was written by me, but in this instance, I can't take the credit.  With regard to the ISIS/ISIL conflict playing out in Syria and Iraq, Iran is a major player.  The Iranians support Bashir al-Assad in Damascus, and currently appear to be calling the shots in Baghdad, Yemen, and Lebanon (Iran is also close with Oman's Sultan Qaboos).  The recent military gains near the oil refinery in Baiji have been attributed to support provided to the Iraqi Army by Shia militias directed by Teheran.  While Turkey purposely steps on everyone's toes, the United States fumbles around, searching for a coherent strategy, and ISIL spends every waking moment looking for a woman to rape or a head to chop off, the Iranians have stealthily strengthened their position in every theater.  Don't get me wrong, I'm still very pessimistic regarding the future of Baghdad, but the Iranians are beginning to apply a few more resources to the struggle, which traditionally signals a new, more aggressive policy on the part of Teheran.  Actually, the Iranians almost seem to be in the catbird seat.  ISIL has been stopped, temporarily, from its efforts to control the northern Iraqi oil fields, and the Iranians have yet to deploy one regular army brigade (although the Badr Corps and Kataib Hezbollah are bound to have Iranian military advisors on hand).  Assad, Teheran's man in Syria, has been given a new lease on life due to the allied air campaign against ISIL, al-Nusra Front, Khorasan and the Partridge Family (excuse the sarcasm, I'm still full of myself after the geniuses in the Pentagon discovered that the groups were part of the same network, which I've been declaring for two months).  In fact, by the time the Free Syrian Army has been trained to adequately fight defensively, the regular Syrian Army will be reconstituted to the point of being the strongest military element in Syria.  And once Assad is back on top, I doubt seriously that Putin and Teheran will allow his removal without a legitimate fight.

Where do the Kurds fit into all this?

I worry about the Kurds.  The fortunes of the Kurdish people can change in the blink of an eye.  They fight like madmen, are courageous to a fault, have never really betrayed anyone, and only want to be left alone in their own little piece of nationhood.  However, since that nationhood dream includes access to oil, it is unlikely to become a reality.  This conflict has Syrian Kurds fighting in Kobani, Iraqi Kurds fighting around Mosul and Erbil, and the never-ending shooting contest with the Turkish Army.  I see an opportunity for the Iranians to add Suleymaniyah, Kurdistan to their list of friends:  If the Iranians were to intervene militarily against ISIL in defense of the Kurds and the Yazidi, can you imagine the public relations jackpot Iran will enjoy?  What a development: Iranian ground forces move in to mop up ISIL, when the Americans couldn't be bothered (and we all know that this is the American's mess to begin with).  The Iranian Army fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, removing the ISIL butchers, should push aside any distaste from the influential Sunni Shaykhs and politicians.  It would solidify the pro-Iranian political forces in Baghdad, and stabilize its own northeastern border with Kurdistan.  Assad finishes off ISIL in Syria, and the Iranians become the power broker in the region.  True, a lot would have to fall into place for this scenario to come to pass.  The Kurds and Iranians would have to get past years of distrust to work that closely together.  And the Sunni community in central Iraq would be the most difficult audience of all.  But when I examine the current situation, I can see no one as well-placed as the Iranians.  The Turks had an opportunity to become that same power broker, but Erdogan can't keep his personal prejudices from impacting his decisions.  The Turks should have co-opted the Kurds, gained access to the Kurdish oil fields, and ended centuries of conflict.  Turkey should have done the United States one better and rolled its tanks and F-16s into Syria, blasting both ISIL and Syrian regular forces into smithereens.  Erdogan could have appealed to the sense of destiny that sits in the heart of every Turk.  At the beginning of this conflict was the time for Turkey to reclaim its natural position as savior and leader of the region, and the first step would have been to crush the band of butchers who call themselves ISIL, and then remove the band of butchers that call themselves the Ba'ath Party in Damascus.  And what would have been the worst-case reaction from the United States and Europe?  That they might have gotten so angry that they enacted a sanctions regime to prohibit Turkish leaders from traveling to Miami Beach in the winter?  At the same time, the Iranians would have been too focused on their all-consuming obsession to build nuclear weapons, and Putin was otherwise too engaged in Ukraine to have made a big stink.  Ok, that last point is probably not true: Putin will not let Assad go without a serious fight, because of Putin's desire for a Mediterranean Port for his navy.

So today's post began as an examination of Iran's options in Syria and Iraq, and ended with a review of what Turkey had to gain by being more aggressive and less-impulsive.  But Turkey's opportunity has now passed, especially in light of recent anti-American, anti-European, events in Turkey.  Erdogan is probably happy right now just to sit back and regroup.  This is of course after he has the pleasure of visiting for a few days with Egg-Head of the millennium, Joe Biden.  But Iran is still in the moment, and if the leaders in Teheran showed a bit of innovation and strategic urgency, they could turn this conflict into an Iranian diplomatic coming-out party.