Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.
In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi. Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi. The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken. The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south. Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened. ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down. One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi. Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question. What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq? That is a question that as of yet has no answer.
The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah. Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets. The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a. But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel. The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters. Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar. But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win. With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force. Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much. The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria. The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS. This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves. An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development. For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.
Showing posts with label Prime Minister al-Abadi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prime Minister al-Abadi. Show all posts
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Wednesday, August 26, 2015
Abadi encouraging continued anti-corruption, pro-reform demonstrations.
Link: Abadi serious about reforming Iraqi government.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has made it obvious that his attempts at reforming the Iraqi government aren't limited to sacking a few corrupt ministers and eliminating a redundant post or two. Abadi is determined to reshape the government, and in doing so, will no doubt strengthen his own political base. At the moment, Abadi is controlling the conversation, and has yet to meet with any focused opposition. On 21-22 August, the Babil Provincial Government imposed a curfew to frustrate the efforts of demonstrators. Abadi promptly ordered the Babil Operations Command to cancel the curfew, and ordered the Iraqi Army to provide security for the crowd. Abadi has carefully maneuvered around a number of political minefields, as he plays the demonstrators off against his political rivals. But Abadi has to be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security. As of today, popular and sometimes reactionary Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his followers (practically the entire population of the huge Shi'a slum to the northeast of Baghdad known as "Sadr City") to participate in Friday's anti-corruption demonstration in central Baghdad. But Sadr has always been a wildcard, at times proving difficult even for his Iranian handlers to control. Most political analysts are supportive of the Abadi reforms; the Iraqi government that evolved out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was often ineffectual, redundant and practically encouraged corruption. So far, every step taken by Abadi will simplify the governing process, increase accountability, and safe money. But when a government makes changes that result in financial savings, then someone isn't getting their "take". The functionaries, civil servants and politicians who have made a living sucking on the teat of Iraqi corruption, will no doubt attempt to thwart Abadi, and opportunities to cause problems are plentiful.
The planned demonstration in central Baghdad on Friday, 28 August, will be the largest demonstration yet. Not only will the Iraqi Police and related security forces have their hands full keeping ISIS SVBIEDs from crashing this party, but the potential for conflict between political groups is also a serious concern. Sadr's people and the folks from Ahl-al Haq (League of the Righteous) may be protesting corruption together, but neither side will pass up a chance to make trouble for the other, and a huge public demonstration will provide ample opportunity. Also, Maliki's supporters in Dawa and SLA (State of Law Alliance) can cause the Abadi Administration great embarrassment if the security arrangements go south. Lets face it, Abadi has signed off on this demonstration, and he needs it to come off without too much drama. Eventually, opposition to Abadi will coalesce, probably around Maliki; but by then, he may be too strong to defeat.
ISIS fighters continue to make the ISF pay a high price for every bit of ground gained in the neighborhoods of Ramadi. The ISF has yet to puncture ISIS' main defensive perimeter around Ramadi, choosing to roll-up neighborhoods block-by-block, street-by-street. True to their modus operandi, ISIS fights tooth-and-nail for territory, and then before retreating, they wire and booby-trap everything including stray dogs and urinals. The Iraqi government is determined that when the actual residents of Ramadi return, they may find nothing but piles of rubble, but at least their won't be an IED hidden amongst the rubble. While the attention of the world seems to be focused on Ramadi, ISIS continues to cause headaches in Baiji and probe Iraqi defenses in Haditha and Samarra. ISIS has proven time and again, that it can conduct operations on numerous fronts simultaneously. In the past, one of the reasons why ISIS has been able to survive high-profile defeats is because they are able to mount offensive operations simultaneously in other areas. This type of strategic distraction has a habit of making the enemy take their eye of the ball, so to speak. In the last few weeks, as the clashes around Ramadi and Fallujah have intensified, ISIS has been able to launch spectacular VBIED attacks in both Diyala Province and Baghdad. The key for the Iraqi government, the military High Command, and the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), is to step up the pressure when ISIS conducts an operation aimed at distraction. ISIS has been astonishingly effective at predicting the actions of the enemy, in both Syria and Iraq. The goal of the offensive in Anbar which commenced in July, was the liberation of both Fallujah and Ramadi, followed by the breaking of the siege of Haditha. Once the ISF and its allies reach this point, then they can turn north to Salad-ad-Din Province and Baiji, and roll-up isolated ISIS units along the way.
*(One more than a few occasions, we have been critical of the allied air campaign that President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2014. For an extended period of time, it appeared as if this united effort, which included the Air Forces of the United States, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, was severely handicapped by the political sensitivities of some of the Arab members. One country would expressly forbid its jets to participate in the bombing a particular group, and another nation would forbid its planes to target some other group. This development received a good deal of airtime in the western press; probably more than it actually deserved. Be that as it may, there also seemed to be an ongoing problem getting real-time reporting on the actions of the allied air units. But in the last two months, these issues seem to have been addressed, as the air campaign has really started to inflict serious casualties on ISIS, and successfully disrupt its attempts at movement and resupply. The arrival of Iraqi Air Force F-16s has invigorated the Iraqis, and together these military air resources have become an invaluable part of the effort to push ISIS out of Anbar, and out of Iraq altogether.)
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has made it obvious that his attempts at reforming the Iraqi government aren't limited to sacking a few corrupt ministers and eliminating a redundant post or two. Abadi is determined to reshape the government, and in doing so, will no doubt strengthen his own political base. At the moment, Abadi is controlling the conversation, and has yet to meet with any focused opposition. On 21-22 August, the Babil Provincial Government imposed a curfew to frustrate the efforts of demonstrators. Abadi promptly ordered the Babil Operations Command to cancel the curfew, and ordered the Iraqi Army to provide security for the crowd. Abadi has carefully maneuvered around a number of political minefields, as he plays the demonstrators off against his political rivals. But Abadi has to be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security. As of today, popular and sometimes reactionary Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his followers (practically the entire population of the huge Shi'a slum to the northeast of Baghdad known as "Sadr City") to participate in Friday's anti-corruption demonstration in central Baghdad. But Sadr has always been a wildcard, at times proving difficult even for his Iranian handlers to control. Most political analysts are supportive of the Abadi reforms; the Iraqi government that evolved out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was often ineffectual, redundant and practically encouraged corruption. So far, every step taken by Abadi will simplify the governing process, increase accountability, and safe money. But when a government makes changes that result in financial savings, then someone isn't getting their "take". The functionaries, civil servants and politicians who have made a living sucking on the teat of Iraqi corruption, will no doubt attempt to thwart Abadi, and opportunities to cause problems are plentiful.
The planned demonstration in central Baghdad on Friday, 28 August, will be the largest demonstration yet. Not only will the Iraqi Police and related security forces have their hands full keeping ISIS SVBIEDs from crashing this party, but the potential for conflict between political groups is also a serious concern. Sadr's people and the folks from Ahl-al Haq (League of the Righteous) may be protesting corruption together, but neither side will pass up a chance to make trouble for the other, and a huge public demonstration will provide ample opportunity. Also, Maliki's supporters in Dawa and SLA (State of Law Alliance) can cause the Abadi Administration great embarrassment if the security arrangements go south. Lets face it, Abadi has signed off on this demonstration, and he needs it to come off without too much drama. Eventually, opposition to Abadi will coalesce, probably around Maliki; but by then, he may be too strong to defeat.
ISIS fighters continue to make the ISF pay a high price for every bit of ground gained in the neighborhoods of Ramadi. The ISF has yet to puncture ISIS' main defensive perimeter around Ramadi, choosing to roll-up neighborhoods block-by-block, street-by-street. True to their modus operandi, ISIS fights tooth-and-nail for territory, and then before retreating, they wire and booby-trap everything including stray dogs and urinals. The Iraqi government is determined that when the actual residents of Ramadi return, they may find nothing but piles of rubble, but at least their won't be an IED hidden amongst the rubble. While the attention of the world seems to be focused on Ramadi, ISIS continues to cause headaches in Baiji and probe Iraqi defenses in Haditha and Samarra. ISIS has proven time and again, that it can conduct operations on numerous fronts simultaneously. In the past, one of the reasons why ISIS has been able to survive high-profile defeats is because they are able to mount offensive operations simultaneously in other areas. This type of strategic distraction has a habit of making the enemy take their eye of the ball, so to speak. In the last few weeks, as the clashes around Ramadi and Fallujah have intensified, ISIS has been able to launch spectacular VBIED attacks in both Diyala Province and Baghdad. The key for the Iraqi government, the military High Command, and the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), is to step up the pressure when ISIS conducts an operation aimed at distraction. ISIS has been astonishingly effective at predicting the actions of the enemy, in both Syria and Iraq. The goal of the offensive in Anbar which commenced in July, was the liberation of both Fallujah and Ramadi, followed by the breaking of the siege of Haditha. Once the ISF and its allies reach this point, then they can turn north to Salad-ad-Din Province and Baiji, and roll-up isolated ISIS units along the way.
*(One more than a few occasions, we have been critical of the allied air campaign that President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2014. For an extended period of time, it appeared as if this united effort, which included the Air Forces of the United States, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, was severely handicapped by the political sensitivities of some of the Arab members. One country would expressly forbid its jets to participate in the bombing a particular group, and another nation would forbid its planes to target some other group. This development received a good deal of airtime in the western press; probably more than it actually deserved. Be that as it may, there also seemed to be an ongoing problem getting real-time reporting on the actions of the allied air units. But in the last two months, these issues seem to have been addressed, as the air campaign has really started to inflict serious casualties on ISIS, and successfully disrupt its attempts at movement and resupply. The arrival of Iraqi Air Force F-16s has invigorated the Iraqis, and together these military air resources have become an invaluable part of the effort to push ISIS out of Anbar, and out of Iraq altogether.)
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.
Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.
It was too good to be true. The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs. For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet. In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki. The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all. Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar. If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk. Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has? Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other? Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.
Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
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