ISIS continues attacks on provincial targets, as civilain casualties mount.

Link: Rare ISIS VBIED in Basra.

As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to inch closer to the strategic areas of Ramadi, ISIS reminds Baghdad of the breadth of its reach, as Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are detonated in suburban areas of Baghdad, Diyala Province, and south of Basra.  The attack in Zubair, south of Basra was especially concerning as only one previous VBIED has ever been detonated this far south.  The weekend of bloodshed is a clear indication that ISIS will not deter from its overall plan to make the provinces of Iraq more and more difficult to govern.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in Diyala Province, where a VBIED in the town of Khalis casts doubt on the success of recent security measures taken by the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).  With much of the police manpower at the front, supplementing the Armed Forces, the PMUs have taken a more visible role in providing security on the streets of Iraq.  The PMUs have elaborate mechanisms in place to defeat the attempts to successfully detonate a VBIED.  All of the roads are monitored closely, with numerous checkpoints and roadblocks.  Somehow, ISIS continues to get VBIEDs on the roads.  Almost every VBIED has been driven by a single male, usually in his 20's.  Unfortunately, in Iraq, the highways are full of cars whose only passenger is the young man behind the wheel.  The only truly effective way to eliminate the use of vehicles as moving bombs is to force everyone to either walk, bicycle, or use public transportation.  Sadly, this would probably result in the use of buses as mass killing machines.

With recent VBIED attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra and Salah al-Din Provinces, ISIS continues to demonstrate basic freedom of movement.  The ISF has also ben unable to permanently cut the roads between Fallujah and Ramadi.  ISIS is able to move personnel and supplies into Ramadi, although with the Allied Air Campaign in full swing and the ISF artillery getting more and more accurate, I wouldn't chance a trip on that road.  Why haven't all the roads leading into and out of Ramadi and Fallujah been completely destroyed?  Is it out of concern for the number of civilians who still live in these communities and rely on the roads for food, medical care, and as a means of last-minute evacuation?  No one has been able to come up with a reliable figure as to how many civilians remain in Fallujah and Ramadi (it appears that Fallujah is less deserted than Ramadi), but it can't be a pleasant place to be at the moment.  What is most frustrating is that while the government is training its resources to the breaking point in an attempt to recapture Ramadi, ISIS is able to plan and execute daily VBIED attacks in Baghdad and numerous bordering provinces.  The giant pink elephant in everyone's living room at present, though, is Ramadi- what is going on in Ramadi?  Are the special police units and military actually making daily progress in retaking the city, or have we passed the point for reasonable expectation of victory?  In fact, does evidence exist that the ISF has broken off offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah?  Is the government just waiting for the best time to spill the bad news?  Serious fighting continues in and around Baiji and in Salad al-Din Province, and the Kurds in the north regularly find ways to ambush ISIS patrols, so how important is Ramadi?  From a confidence perspective, it means everything.  If the government announces a general retreat from Anbar, then they had better be prepared to invite the Iranian Army across the border, because someone has to stop ISIS before they storm Baghdad.  Actually, a military collapse would provide just the justification for direct Iranian military intervention.  The players would then be in place for Putin's grand scheme.  The Russians destroy Assad's opposition in Syria, then tackle ISIS head-on, while the Iranians engage ISIS in Iraq.  Ideally, in the end, with ISIS vanquished, the Russians and the Iranians would meet up and shake hands, like the Russians and the Americans/British did in April 1945 at the River Elbe in Germany.  Putin would be hailed as a tremendous leader and the man of the hour, and the Iranians would have totally reformed their image, and could for the most part dictate the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.  Lets meet in year, same time, same place, and see how my prognostications played out.

Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.

It was too good to be true.  The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs.  For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).  But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption.  Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet.  In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki.  The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all.  Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar.  If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk.  Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has?  Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other?  Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.

Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government.  Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war.  Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister.  The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country.  The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran.  During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority.  Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq.  In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations.  Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded.  The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard.  Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided.  The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border.  Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS.  I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced.  The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.

Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki.  There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption.  As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers.  Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative.  The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined.  It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way.  Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics.  The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice.  How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?

How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so.  Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner.  Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias.  I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms.  Am I overestimating Sistani's power?  Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort?  If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens. 

With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond?  They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy.  With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through.  This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield.  The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation.  But the Sunnis have suffered terribly.  I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform.  But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment.  The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.

Developments in Iraq, Syria.

Links: A. Iraqi forces confront ISIS in Anbar.
           B. Al-Qaeda celebrates as Assad regime collapses.


In a positive move, the Iraqi military has begun a well-supported effort to recapture the city of Ramadi and roll-up ISIS fighters in eastern Anbar Province. In a surprise development, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are fighting alongside the "Popular Mobilization" (Shi'a militia), and at the same time, enjoying air support from the allied coalition, which continues to wreck havoc with any ISIS attempts to operate during clear weather.  Early indications are that the ISF is having success retaking neighborhood after neighborhood, and that ISIS forces in Ramadi are virtually surrounded.  Since we've been down this road before, the Iraqis know to expect very few if any prisoners, and that the mopping up operation could take weeks.  An important element of the effort to retake Ramadi, is that it is taking place concurrently with operations in Salah ad-Din Province, where the Shi'a militias Asa'aib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and the Badr Organization have been successfully retaking territory northeast of Fallujah. In fact, the Popular Mobilization is active throughout Salah ad-Din Province, as Shi'a militias have retaken territory from ISIS south and southwest of Samarrah city.  The key to current operations against ISIS is the joint-activity of the allied air campaign and the Popular Mobilization.  At times, both the air coalition, led by the United States, and the Shi'a militias, backed by Iran, refused to participate in military operations as long as the other was involved.  It was an odd situation, given that at the time, Iran and the United States were conducting negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions.  Be that as it may, the tide appears to be turning in Iraq (again), especially given that ISIS has been unable to gain complete control of the Baiji refinery, a piece of real estate that may appear to be worth more than it actually is.  But it has become a bit of a rallying cry for the ISF, and they are very determined to relieve its defenders and remove the threat of ISIS control of the entire refinery.  Once Ramadi has been relieved, and the ISF and its militia partners are able to consolidate gains in Salah ad-Din province and around Baiji, then ISIS may be obliged to re-evaluate its long-term strategy.  Almost everyday brings more bad news for Bashir al-Assad in Syria, and its not necessarily ISIS that is causing the trouble.  Jabhat al-Nusrah, considered by many analysts to by Al-Qaeda's "representative" in Syria, has been conducting one successful military operation after another.  In reality, all the Islamic extremist groups who envision some form of a Sunni-based caliphate, are representing Al-Qaeda, including ISIS.  That certainly does not imply that Assad is a friend to the west, it only means that the various Islamic Sunni extremist military groups around the world all have the same goal and the same motivation.  At this point, keeping them separate no longer seems to serve a point.

News from northwest Syria is that Idlib Province has, for the most part, fallen to Jabhat al-Nusrah.  Everyday, village by village, town by town, and province by province, the end draws nearer for Bashir Al-Assad; and once it comes, no doubt there will be a serious vengeance visited upon all those who were loyal to the regime.  And as the situation becomes more desperate, the regime continues to make enemies by its use of weaponized chlorine gas attacks, barrel bombs, and indiscriminate air attacks on civilian areas.  Sooner or later, the last handful of troops loyal to Assad will realize that he and his closest comrades will escape Damascus to end their days in luxury, probably in a villa on the Black Sea.  Its no secret that the Assad family has treated the Syrian treasury as its own personal bank account, not to mention all the cash derived from all manner of bribes.  So the Assad clan will be just fine, but what about the troops who have been loyal to the end?    In Libya, the number of loyal troops disintegrated at the end, and I expect the same situation to happen in Syria.  Assad will have a limited amount of time to decide when to leave, and if he misses the deadline by the smallest of margins, we might just see Bashir lit up like a Christmas tree, inside of a cage.

We have been monitoring the media reports regarding Syria, for any indication that the clocks are ticking in Paris, Moscow, Washington, London, etc., on Bashir al-Assad's Syria. The west was taken by surprise at the swift removal of Gaddafi (no doubt he was surprised by the swift removal of his head), and I wonder if the analysts aren't giving Assad a bit more staying power than he actually has.  True, we had him practically written off once before and he bounced back.  But the giant difference between then and now is Russia. We believe that Putin is willing to allow Assad and his flock of butchers and thieves to go into exile in Russia, but that's about it.  He does not appear willing to expend anymore political capital or money on the Syrian Ba'ath movement.  Assad's predicament isn't complicated; its simply a matter of diminishing returns.  Unless the Syrian military is preparing some awe-inspiring major offensive (it would have to be out of Damascus) to turn the tide of battle, then everyday Assad can expect his loyalists to decrease in number.  A few gone over here, and a few more missing over there.  Don't be surprised to see a Syrian pilot asking for asylum soon, although I don't know if any are left that can pretend to have clean hands, i.e. never having targeted civilians.  The truth is, we're getting a little impatient.  We want to know what will happen "apres les deluge", so we are discreetly trying to nudge Assad in the right direction.  "Hey Bashir, I understand that Black Sea caviar is the richest.  Don't take any chances, Bashir; you already have no chin, how will you look with no head?  Be careful, Bashir, I opened the refrigerator this morning only to find a frozen Jabhat al-Nusrah guy inside.  Oh, that was your doing?  Sorry....."