Link: Rare ISIS VBIED in Basra.
As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to inch closer to the strategic areas of Ramadi, ISIS reminds Baghdad of the breadth of its reach, as Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are detonated in suburban areas of Baghdad, Diyala Province, and south of Basra. The attack in Zubair, south of Basra was especially concerning as only one previous VBIED has ever been detonated this far south. The weekend of bloodshed is a clear indication that ISIS will not deter from its overall plan to make the provinces of Iraq more and more difficult to govern. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Diyala Province, where a VBIED in the town of Khalis casts doubt on the success of recent security measures taken by the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). With much of the police manpower at the front, supplementing the Armed Forces, the PMUs have taken a more visible role in providing security on the streets of Iraq. The PMUs have elaborate mechanisms in place to defeat the attempts to successfully detonate a VBIED. All of the roads are monitored closely, with numerous checkpoints and roadblocks. Somehow, ISIS continues to get VBIEDs on the roads. Almost every VBIED has been driven by a single male, usually in his 20's. Unfortunately, in Iraq, the highways are full of cars whose only passenger is the young man behind the wheel. The only truly effective way to eliminate the use of vehicles as moving bombs is to force everyone to either walk, bicycle, or use public transportation. Sadly, this would probably result in the use of buses as mass killing machines.
With recent VBIED attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra and Salah al-Din Provinces, ISIS continues to demonstrate basic freedom of movement. The ISF has also ben unable to permanently cut the roads between Fallujah and Ramadi. ISIS is able to move personnel and supplies into Ramadi, although with the Allied Air Campaign in full swing and the ISF artillery getting more and more accurate, I wouldn't chance a trip on that road. Why haven't all the roads leading into and out of Ramadi and Fallujah been completely destroyed? Is it out of concern for the number of civilians who still live in these communities and rely on the roads for food, medical care, and as a means of last-minute evacuation? No one has been able to come up with a reliable figure as to how many civilians remain in Fallujah and Ramadi (it appears that Fallujah is less deserted than Ramadi), but it can't be a pleasant place to be at the moment. What is most frustrating is that while the government is training its resources to the breaking point in an attempt to recapture Ramadi, ISIS is able to plan and execute daily VBIED attacks in Baghdad and numerous bordering provinces. The giant pink elephant in everyone's living room at present, though, is Ramadi- what is going on in Ramadi? Are the special police units and military actually making daily progress in retaking the city, or have we passed the point for reasonable expectation of victory? In fact, does evidence exist that the ISF has broken off offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah? Is the government just waiting for the best time to spill the bad news? Serious fighting continues in and around Baiji and in Salad al-Din Province, and the Kurds in the north regularly find ways to ambush ISIS patrols, so how important is Ramadi? From a confidence perspective, it means everything. If the government announces a general retreat from Anbar, then they had better be prepared to invite the Iranian Army across the border, because someone has to stop ISIS before they storm Baghdad. Actually, a military collapse would provide just the justification for direct Iranian military intervention. The players would then be in place for Putin's grand scheme. The Russians destroy Assad's opposition in Syria, then tackle ISIS head-on, while the Iranians engage ISIS in Iraq. Ideally, in the end, with ISIS vanquished, the Russians and the Iranians would meet up and shake hands, like the Russians and the Americans/British did in April 1945 at the River Elbe in Germany. Putin would be hailed as a tremendous leader and the man of the hour, and the Iranians would have totally reformed their image, and could for the most part dictate the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf. Lets meet in year, same time, same place, and see how my prognostications played out.
Showing posts with label Diyala. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Diyala. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 7, 2015
Sunday, August 30, 2015
Block by block, Iraqi forces begin to dislodge ISIS from the outskirts of Ramadi.
Link: ISIS kills two Iraqi generals in separate attacks on the same day outside Ramadi.
Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west. For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense. In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity. At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion. Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield. Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer. People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties. Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine). All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS. The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July. Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din. As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji. The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands). Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.
Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers. The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches. This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable. With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces. The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out? Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47? The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse. It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause. Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.
The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late. The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press. But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi? If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time. You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning. This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi. Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies. But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before. ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen. In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap. ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule. ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again. One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units. ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units. It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped. What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq. At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army. Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go. We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks. At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street. We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.
The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package. On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings. No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias. The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity. Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters. Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.
Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west. For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense. In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity. At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion. Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield. Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer. People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties. Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine). All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS. The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July. Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din. As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji. The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands). Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.
Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers. The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches. This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable. With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces. The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out? Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47? The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse. It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause. Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.
The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late. The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press. But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi? If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time. You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning. This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi. Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies. But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before. ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen. In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap. ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule. ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again. One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units. ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units. It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped. What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq. At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army. Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go. We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks. At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street. We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.
The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package. On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings. No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias. The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity. Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters. Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.
Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.
It was too good to be true. The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs. For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet. In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki. The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all. Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar. If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk. Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has? Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other? Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces launch offensive to retake Ramadi; PMUs tackling Fallujah separately.
Links: A. ISF launches offensive in Anbar.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
Tuesday, June 9, 2015
Iraq threatening to descend into all-out war, mirroring Syria.
Link: ISIS threatens water supply to Iraqi civilians.
Last year, the Islamic State (IS) used its control of certain dams to impact the Iraqi civilian population's access to water. In the end, their actions led to the flooding of Ramadi and other smaller, nearby communities. The IS is again threatening to use its control of dams to further its military objectives. The IS has already closed the Warrar Dam, north of Ramadi, jeopardizing water supplies to Habaniya and Khalidiya, two towns east of Ramadi. There is concern that the IS as also closed the Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah. These developments can only increase the pressure on the civilian population, and bring Iraq that much closer to a humanitarian crisis. In the big picture, these events demonstrate the rapid break-down in civil authority throughout Iraq. The central government in is control of maybe fifty percent of the country. In fact, the Shi'a south, from Hillah and Najaf down to Basra (and east to the Iranian border), appears to be the only part of the country that has not been infiltrated by the IS. Anbar and Salah al-Din Provinces are war zones, as is Diyala Province, which borders Iran. Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Nineveh Province in the west have been scenes of sporadic fighting and numerous SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) for the past year. Basically, whatever authority exists in the north is attributed to Kurdish forces. As long as the IS occupies large parts of Anbar and continues to pressure the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala, Salah al-Din, Baiji, and numerous other strategic areas, the authority of the Iraqi central government is diminished.
The operational execution of the IS forces continues to impress. There is an obvious long-term focus on all offensive maneuvers, and every opportunity to exploit the lack of training and discipline of the ISF is exploited to the furthest degree. The maturity exhibited by the strategic planning and decision making conflicts with the unnecessary civilian executions, although some will argue that the brutalization of the civilian population is intended to create a pliable and easy to govern people. The IS is not a typical terrorist organization by any stretch. With the exception of the Taliban (and this claim is open for discussion), the IS is the first terrorist organization with a true conventional military capability. This fact is one of the reasons that we suspect a much more cordial relationship exists with Al-Qaeda than what has been demonstrated for the media. President George Bush was determined to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional military confrontation in Afghanistan and (eventually) Iraq. Once Saddam was defeated, it was imperative that Al-Qaeda not sit idly by as an infidel army occupied an Islamic nation. Al-Qaeda took the bait, and from 2005 to 2008, was surprisingly resilient. But in the end, George Bush was able to expose a flaw in the Al-Qaeda structure: it was not built for conventional combat. By 2010 (thanks to the Sunni "Great Awakening" and the ultimate sacrifice of over 3,000 American heroes), Iraq was well on its way to building a middle class and reviving from decades of totalitarianism. The one development which could torpedo all the progress, would be the rash and speedy withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq. You see, the ISF was not yet prepared to defend Iraq. The U.S. military was following a timetable that they had been led to believe, was "in stone". The plan was to train the Iraqi security forces, police and special ops folks included, until they showed the capacity to protect their own people. Instead, we announced to the world (and the IS, who were sitting in Syria, licking their chops, so to speak) that the U.S. military was leaving the security of Iraq to the ISF and departing Iraq on a fast timetable.
Even before the IS moved into Iraq, the organization had shown its ability to conduct conventional military operations. Syria was the ideal location to try out the world's first conventional terrorist army. The most important factor for the IS is discipline. Second is resources. The IS does not seem to have any problem attracting volunteers, but, like any army, they can't be useful until they are trained and equipped. The IS trains its recruits, and uses them where they are most useful. Language is considered a valuable tool, especially in the media war. The IS enjoys nothing more than shocking the folks sitting down to tea in London, with the image of a beheading carried out by a young man with a striking Cockney accent. One of the factors that continues to impress us is the IS' ability to access and deliver resources to its units stretched out all over Syria and Iraq, and in the middle of an Allied Air Campaign, no less. At least the IS has lost the element of surprise; they won't be sneaking up on anyone anymore, with "ISIS" being a dirty word in just about every language. As it exists, the IS really is nothing but an army, fighting a conflict in Syria and Iraq. The IS does not occupy the Executive Mansion of any particular country, nor does it have a representative political party that dominates a parliament somewhere. Aside from sycophants and recruiters, ISIS is whatever we have before us in Iraq and Syria. Which begs the question, with the dastardly and evil deeds they have committed, why haven't they been destroyed? With the entire U.N. condemning their actions, and their every move likened to "terrorism", why are they still hanging around?
Last year, the Islamic State (IS) used its control of certain dams to impact the Iraqi civilian population's access to water. In the end, their actions led to the flooding of Ramadi and other smaller, nearby communities. The IS is again threatening to use its control of dams to further its military objectives. The IS has already closed the Warrar Dam, north of Ramadi, jeopardizing water supplies to Habaniya and Khalidiya, two towns east of Ramadi. There is concern that the IS as also closed the Fallujah Dam, south of Fallujah. These developments can only increase the pressure on the civilian population, and bring Iraq that much closer to a humanitarian crisis. In the big picture, these events demonstrate the rapid break-down in civil authority throughout Iraq. The central government in is control of maybe fifty percent of the country. In fact, the Shi'a south, from Hillah and Najaf down to Basra (and east to the Iranian border), appears to be the only part of the country that has not been infiltrated by the IS. Anbar and Salah al-Din Provinces are war zones, as is Diyala Province, which borders Iran. Dohuk, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Nineveh Province in the west have been scenes of sporadic fighting and numerous SVBIED (suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) for the past year. Basically, whatever authority exists in the north is attributed to Kurdish forces. As long as the IS occupies large parts of Anbar and continues to pressure the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Diyala, Salah al-Din, Baiji, and numerous other strategic areas, the authority of the Iraqi central government is diminished.
The operational execution of the IS forces continues to impress. There is an obvious long-term focus on all offensive maneuvers, and every opportunity to exploit the lack of training and discipline of the ISF is exploited to the furthest degree. The maturity exhibited by the strategic planning and decision making conflicts with the unnecessary civilian executions, although some will argue that the brutalization of the civilian population is intended to create a pliable and easy to govern people. The IS is not a typical terrorist organization by any stretch. With the exception of the Taliban (and this claim is open for discussion), the IS is the first terrorist organization with a true conventional military capability. This fact is one of the reasons that we suspect a much more cordial relationship exists with Al-Qaeda than what has been demonstrated for the media. President George Bush was determined to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional military confrontation in Afghanistan and (eventually) Iraq. Once Saddam was defeated, it was imperative that Al-Qaeda not sit idly by as an infidel army occupied an Islamic nation. Al-Qaeda took the bait, and from 2005 to 2008, was surprisingly resilient. But in the end, George Bush was able to expose a flaw in the Al-Qaeda structure: it was not built for conventional combat. By 2010 (thanks to the Sunni "Great Awakening" and the ultimate sacrifice of over 3,000 American heroes), Iraq was well on its way to building a middle class and reviving from decades of totalitarianism. The one development which could torpedo all the progress, would be the rash and speedy withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq. You see, the ISF was not yet prepared to defend Iraq. The U.S. military was following a timetable that they had been led to believe, was "in stone". The plan was to train the Iraqi security forces, police and special ops folks included, until they showed the capacity to protect their own people. Instead, we announced to the world (and the IS, who were sitting in Syria, licking their chops, so to speak) that the U.S. military was leaving the security of Iraq to the ISF and departing Iraq on a fast timetable.
Even before the IS moved into Iraq, the organization had shown its ability to conduct conventional military operations. Syria was the ideal location to try out the world's first conventional terrorist army. The most important factor for the IS is discipline. Second is resources. The IS does not seem to have any problem attracting volunteers, but, like any army, they can't be useful until they are trained and equipped. The IS trains its recruits, and uses them where they are most useful. Language is considered a valuable tool, especially in the media war. The IS enjoys nothing more than shocking the folks sitting down to tea in London, with the image of a beheading carried out by a young man with a striking Cockney accent. One of the factors that continues to impress us is the IS' ability to access and deliver resources to its units stretched out all over Syria and Iraq, and in the middle of an Allied Air Campaign, no less. At least the IS has lost the element of surprise; they won't be sneaking up on anyone anymore, with "ISIS" being a dirty word in just about every language. As it exists, the IS really is nothing but an army, fighting a conflict in Syria and Iraq. The IS does not occupy the Executive Mansion of any particular country, nor does it have a representative political party that dominates a parliament somewhere. Aside from sycophants and recruiters, ISIS is whatever we have before us in Iraq and Syria. Which begs the question, with the dastardly and evil deeds they have committed, why haven't they been destroyed? With the entire U.N. condemning their actions, and their every move likened to "terrorism", why are they still hanging around?
Sunday, March 15, 2015
Islamic State Weakesses Exposed In Iraq; Netanyahu Struggling To Get Electoral Traction
Links: A. Islamic State Losses Mount In Iraq
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election
The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief. It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq. The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program. The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi. Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted. Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province. If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.
The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated. There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province. But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food. It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk. It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations. If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq. The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces. If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah. It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.
Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room. The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq. Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias. These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units. They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community). Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention. By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue. Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).
On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset. This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies. What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day. Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud. The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote. Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad). As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout. The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct. A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements. On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans. I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu. He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.
Friday, March 13, 2015
Tikrit Falls To The ISF
Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
Friday, March 6, 2015
How effective are the Armed Forces of the Persian Gulf? (Part I)
Links A. Global Firepower Ranks the Armed Forces of the World
B. World's Largest Armies, According to Global Security
C. Business Insider's 35 Most Powerful Militaries
Now this is the kind of post I love to write. I've been an armchair General since I could stand on my own two feet. I grew up in a U.S. Army family stationed in Bad Hersfeld, Germany, and a number of other lovely towns. My older brother (and sister, on occasion) were always playing soldier. By the time I reached eight years old, my brother and I had accumulated a truly unbelievable collection of soldiers and tanks. In those days, you could mail-order military figures from the last page of Sgt. Rock, the Haunted Tank, The Unknown Soldier, or my favorite, Weird Wars comic books. We had Romans, Greeks and Persians, fully equipped with Trebuchets, Ballistas and Catapults (usually hand-carved by my father), and we had Red Coats and Blue Coats from the American Revolution. Because we were in Europe, it was difficult to obtain soldiers from the war for Texas Independence or the Civil Wart, but we more than made up for it with Napoleon's Imperial Guard and Wellington's Cavalry. But my brother and I spent most of our time re-living the battles of World War II. My father (a bit of an occasional participant, when the adults weren't looking) built a huge battlefield for us to use. It must have been six foot by six foot. I started life as a pine wood crate, but all we needed was one complete side (for the bottom) and about six inches (high) of pine barrier all along the edge. My father filled this with dirt and then added trees and rocks. The villages and rivers could be easily added as required. To complete this young boy's dream, I must have had one hundred same-scale little German tanks, and my brother, of course, had the same number of American (being older, he was always the good guys). Christmas and Birthdays weren't that difficult for my folks. Just go to the German toy store downtown, and buy Second World War-era soldiers and tanks. I had Tiger I and Tiger II tanks, Panthers, mobile artillery, half tracks, regular artillery, bridge-building Engineers, EVERYTHING! My father spent years, and my parents probably a fortune, turning our basement into the most amazing, easy-to-convert, battlefield. Needless to say, the neighborhood boys flocked to our basement. We fought Rommel vs. Montgomery in North Africa, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Kursk, Anzio, you name it. Today, kids still fight the same battles, but everything is done with computer graphics. Blah. Give me my die-cast armor and by rubber bands as weapons any day over "Call of Duty". My siblings and I were very fortunate children. My folks worked diligently at perfecting the balance between discipline and responsibility, and they sacrificed to give us every opportunity in life. I still consider the important decisions of my life using the same variables that I was taught as a child. Any success that I've had is a direct reflection of my parents.
By now you've grown used accustomed to my minor digressions, so lets move forward. I'm fascinated by the subject of military strength, especially as it relates to the hot spots of today's world. Over the next week, utilizing all the data I can access through the web and my personal library, I hope to provide a clear perception of the state of military affairs in the Middle East, in Africa, in Europe, the Indian sub-continent, and the Far East. The war gaming of my youth was without air and naval elements, which are a necessity in today's conflicts. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East. For the sake of our discussion, we will include in our "Middle East", the nations of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. As for the Gulf States, which will be the (eventual) subjects of this post, I have selected Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and Iraq. The world's major suppliers of weapons have offices in every large city. The United States has traditionally supplied weapons to and assisted training of the Saudi Royal Armed Forces (all branches), Kuwait Royal Armed Forces (all branches), and Bahrain. The French provide Qatar with a handful of tanks, a few naval craft, and Mirage fighters. The UAE, Iraq, Iran and Yemen have been more flexible with weapons purchases, and therefore field an interesting variety. Oman continues to cultivate close military links to the United Kingdom, and by convenience, the United States. Iraq and Iran are caught in a similar predicament. Iraq has a veritable butt-load of old Russian tanks, from T-55s to T-72s. Some of Iraq's armor has been rebuilt , not by the Russians, but by American and Iraqi techs. God Bless the USA. The Iraqi Air Force is flying Apache Helicopters, and its my understanding that some of the ancient MIGS have been cleaned up. During both Gulf Wars, the Iraqi Air Force attempted to save its own ass by flying to various airbases in the region and asking for asylum. Most of those fighter jets never returned, although its my understanding that Jordan has recently returned a few. I can't help but be entertained by the Iranians, who IMMEDIATELY painted the Iraqi MIGS that sought refuge in Tehran, in Iranian Air Force livery and started training pilots. The Iraqi Army carries both AK-47s and M-16s, and has been vigorously re-trained by the U.S. It has had a handful of high profile victories, but way too many defeats. The Shi'a militia has helped, but Iraqi Society itself lives everyday in the midst of a schism. The Sunni and The Shi'a not only lack trust in one another, they despise each other. This issue has always crippled the Iraqi military and times haven't changed. The tiny Iraqi Navy consists of a few craft donated by the United States, to allow the Iraqi's to conduct customs inspections.
Iran has a very large military, with the Army alone consisting of various different elements. It reminds me of National Socialist Germany before 1939, when Hitler could rely on the SA, the SD, the Gestapo, and the regular army. You see, the religious leaders who sit in Qom and pray all day, don't trust the secular traditions of the regular Iranian Army. So alongside the regular army, Iran has the massive Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), and numerous smaller groups, including the Badr Corps, that have been active in Iraq and are tasked with protecting sacred Shi'a sites. The Iranian regular army is well-trained, equipped, and disciplined. I can't speak for the IRGC, but if the Iraq/Iran War is any indication, they will have no problem sacrificing their lives for the Islamic Revolution. The problem faced by the Iranian army is one of armor. The Iranians are obliged to continue using T-55s and T-72s, and even a few ancient British Chieftains. Iran has the capacity and the know-how to create an indigenous heavy battle tank, and the fact that this weakness has not been addressed is hard to understand. The Iranian Air Force is in the same predicament. The most modern and effective elements of the Iranian Air Force are the Iraqi fighters that fled to Iranian airports to avoid contact with U.S. fighters. This includes a number of Russian Sukhois and MIGS. The Iranians are also still flying U.S.-made F-4s. Why haven't the Iranians gone shopping in Russia for a new Air Force? Iran has an active, noisy, but relatively weak navy. In fact, the Iranian army is the only factor that allows Iran to remain an active participant in the current mess that is Iraq. Recently, the Iranian Air Force attempted to support offensive actions being taken by Shi'a militia in Iraq. The results were less than stellar. The Iranian government (both of them...the one in Qom and the one in Tehran) has been horrified by the advances made by the Islamic State (IS) in the Iraq/Iran border province of Diyala. If the United States had an effective diplomatic corps, they would have recognized this fact, and used it to pressure the Iranians to join the fight against the IS and to negotiate the nuclear issue in good faith. Instead, the United States had no reaction whatsoever. I would bet my last Dinar that John Kerry couldn't find Diyala Province on a map for a million bucks. But I digress...again. If the Iranian government felt sufficiently threatened, they could effect 100% mobilization, invade Iraq, and crush the IS in a month or less. The United States, Turkey, and possibly even Saudi Arabia have the capacity to destroy the IS in a ground campaign. But a military campaign of that size and commitment would also expose Iran's military weaknesses to the world, so it must be avoided. Perception is everything, the man said.
B. World's Largest Armies, According to Global Security
C. Business Insider's 35 Most Powerful Militaries
Now this is the kind of post I love to write. I've been an armchair General since I could stand on my own two feet. I grew up in a U.S. Army family stationed in Bad Hersfeld, Germany, and a number of other lovely towns. My older brother (and sister, on occasion) were always playing soldier. By the time I reached eight years old, my brother and I had accumulated a truly unbelievable collection of soldiers and tanks. In those days, you could mail-order military figures from the last page of Sgt. Rock, the Haunted Tank, The Unknown Soldier, or my favorite, Weird Wars comic books. We had Romans, Greeks and Persians, fully equipped with Trebuchets, Ballistas and Catapults (usually hand-carved by my father), and we had Red Coats and Blue Coats from the American Revolution. Because we were in Europe, it was difficult to obtain soldiers from the war for Texas Independence or the Civil Wart, but we more than made up for it with Napoleon's Imperial Guard and Wellington's Cavalry. But my brother and I spent most of our time re-living the battles of World War II. My father (a bit of an occasional participant, when the adults weren't looking) built a huge battlefield for us to use. It must have been six foot by six foot. I started life as a pine wood crate, but all we needed was one complete side (for the bottom) and about six inches (high) of pine barrier all along the edge. My father filled this with dirt and then added trees and rocks. The villages and rivers could be easily added as required. To complete this young boy's dream, I must have had one hundred same-scale little German tanks, and my brother, of course, had the same number of American (being older, he was always the good guys). Christmas and Birthdays weren't that difficult for my folks. Just go to the German toy store downtown, and buy Second World War-era soldiers and tanks. I had Tiger I and Tiger II tanks, Panthers, mobile artillery, half tracks, regular artillery, bridge-building Engineers, EVERYTHING! My father spent years, and my parents probably a fortune, turning our basement into the most amazing, easy-to-convert, battlefield. Needless to say, the neighborhood boys flocked to our basement. We fought Rommel vs. Montgomery in North Africa, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Kursk, Anzio, you name it. Today, kids still fight the same battles, but everything is done with computer graphics. Blah. Give me my die-cast armor and by rubber bands as weapons any day over "Call of Duty". My siblings and I were very fortunate children. My folks worked diligently at perfecting the balance between discipline and responsibility, and they sacrificed to give us every opportunity in life. I still consider the important decisions of my life using the same variables that I was taught as a child. Any success that I've had is a direct reflection of my parents.
By now you've grown used accustomed to my minor digressions, so lets move forward. I'm fascinated by the subject of military strength, especially as it relates to the hot spots of today's world. Over the next week, utilizing all the data I can access through the web and my personal library, I hope to provide a clear perception of the state of military affairs in the Middle East, in Africa, in Europe, the Indian sub-continent, and the Far East. The war gaming of my youth was without air and naval elements, which are a necessity in today's conflicts. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East. For the sake of our discussion, we will include in our "Middle East", the nations of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. As for the Gulf States, which will be the (eventual) subjects of this post, I have selected Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and Iraq. The world's major suppliers of weapons have offices in every large city. The United States has traditionally supplied weapons to and assisted training of the Saudi Royal Armed Forces (all branches), Kuwait Royal Armed Forces (all branches), and Bahrain. The French provide Qatar with a handful of tanks, a few naval craft, and Mirage fighters. The UAE, Iraq, Iran and Yemen have been more flexible with weapons purchases, and therefore field an interesting variety. Oman continues to cultivate close military links to the United Kingdom, and by convenience, the United States. Iraq and Iran are caught in a similar predicament. Iraq has a veritable butt-load of old Russian tanks, from T-55s to T-72s. Some of Iraq's armor has been rebuilt , not by the Russians, but by American and Iraqi techs. God Bless the USA. The Iraqi Air Force is flying Apache Helicopters, and its my understanding that some of the ancient MIGS have been cleaned up. During both Gulf Wars, the Iraqi Air Force attempted to save its own ass by flying to various airbases in the region and asking for asylum. Most of those fighter jets never returned, although its my understanding that Jordan has recently returned a few. I can't help but be entertained by the Iranians, who IMMEDIATELY painted the Iraqi MIGS that sought refuge in Tehran, in Iranian Air Force livery and started training pilots. The Iraqi Army carries both AK-47s and M-16s, and has been vigorously re-trained by the U.S. It has had a handful of high profile victories, but way too many defeats. The Shi'a militia has helped, but Iraqi Society itself lives everyday in the midst of a schism. The Sunni and The Shi'a not only lack trust in one another, they despise each other. This issue has always crippled the Iraqi military and times haven't changed. The tiny Iraqi Navy consists of a few craft donated by the United States, to allow the Iraqi's to conduct customs inspections.
Iran has a very large military, with the Army alone consisting of various different elements. It reminds me of National Socialist Germany before 1939, when Hitler could rely on the SA, the SD, the Gestapo, and the regular army. You see, the religious leaders who sit in Qom and pray all day, don't trust the secular traditions of the regular Iranian Army. So alongside the regular army, Iran has the massive Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), and numerous smaller groups, including the Badr Corps, that have been active in Iraq and are tasked with protecting sacred Shi'a sites. The Iranian regular army is well-trained, equipped, and disciplined. I can't speak for the IRGC, but if the Iraq/Iran War is any indication, they will have no problem sacrificing their lives for the Islamic Revolution. The problem faced by the Iranian army is one of armor. The Iranians are obliged to continue using T-55s and T-72s, and even a few ancient British Chieftains. Iran has the capacity and the know-how to create an indigenous heavy battle tank, and the fact that this weakness has not been addressed is hard to understand. The Iranian Air Force is in the same predicament. The most modern and effective elements of the Iranian Air Force are the Iraqi fighters that fled to Iranian airports to avoid contact with U.S. fighters. This includes a number of Russian Sukhois and MIGS. The Iranians are also still flying U.S.-made F-4s. Why haven't the Iranians gone shopping in Russia for a new Air Force? Iran has an active, noisy, but relatively weak navy. In fact, the Iranian army is the only factor that allows Iran to remain an active participant in the current mess that is Iraq. Recently, the Iranian Air Force attempted to support offensive actions being taken by Shi'a militia in Iraq. The results were less than stellar. The Iranian government (both of them...the one in Qom and the one in Tehran) has been horrified by the advances made by the Islamic State (IS) in the Iraq/Iran border province of Diyala. If the United States had an effective diplomatic corps, they would have recognized this fact, and used it to pressure the Iranians to join the fight against the IS and to negotiate the nuclear issue in good faith. Instead, the United States had no reaction whatsoever. I would bet my last Dinar that John Kerry couldn't find Diyala Province on a map for a million bucks. But I digress...again. If the Iranian government felt sufficiently threatened, they could effect 100% mobilization, invade Iraq, and crush the IS in a month or less. The United States, Turkey, and possibly even Saudi Arabia have the capacity to destroy the IS in a ground campaign. But a military campaign of that size and commitment would also expose Iran's military weaknesses to the world, so it must be avoided. Perception is everything, the man said.
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