Iraqi military and special police preparing assault to retake Ramadi.

Link: Iraqi government forces close in on Ramadi.


With recent events in Syria and Paris dominating the international press, the Iraqi government's much-publicized offensive to retake Ramadi is no longer front-page news.  Actually, the struggle to retake Ramadi has taken much longer than the government and the Iraqi people expected.  Combat around Baiji and in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have made for much more interesting journalism, as the average person begins to consider that the Ramadi campaign has become a stalemate.  Fortunately, in the last few days, news reports from the Iraqi government and the Pentagon indicate that the Iraqi Armed Forces are getting very close to recapturing the capital city of Anbar Province.  It is estimated that ISIS has roughly 600 to 1000 fighters still hunkered down in the few downtown neighborhoods that government forces have yet to reoccupy.  The fact that the Iraqi government is determined to complete this operation according to plan, with minimal casualties and damage to infrastructure, is very encouraging.  Its true that the campaign to retake the city has not followed the most ideal timetable, but the Iraqi authorities have been able to carefully search areas formally occupied by ISIS, in order to remove any improvised explosive devices or abandoned munitions.

Last Wednesday, Iraqi forces took possession of the Palestine Bridge in the northwest part of the city.  The bridge, which spans the Euphrates River, was a vital link to food and other supplies for ISIS.  The coalition air campaign continues to harass ISIS by strafing supply routes and bombing key defensive positions.  In fact, air support has proven particularly effective in destroying explosives that were purposely planted in abandoned structures in the downtown part of the city.  Aggressive action by the coalition air support has been instrumental in saving the lives of ground troops, as explosives disposal teams prepare to enter neighborhoods that have been cleared of ISIS snipers.  Iraqi authorities fully expect the remaining ISIS operatives to fight to the death.

Once the military campaign to liberate Ramadi is complete, the Iraqi military will focus on bringing relief to Haditha, which although occupied by Iraqi forces, has been under assault by ISIS for most of the year.  In recent weeks, coalition air attacks have successfully targeted ISIS positions and prevented the delivery of supplies to ISIS operatives near Haditha.  Al-Asad Air Base in outside of Haditha, and presents a valuable target for ISIS.  U.S. troops have been present at Al-Asad for some time, providing important training to Iraqi personnel.  For some inexplicable reason, the Obama Administration made no attempt to keep this particular bit of information confidential.  Once the international media got wind of the presence of U.S. troops at Al-Asad, ISIS wasn't far behind.  Can you imagine if ISIS were to overrun that base and take our young men and women prisoner?  Fortunately, recent combat in the Haditha area has severely compromised ISIS' ability to conduct offensive activity.  No doubt the Iraqis are also determined to remove ISIS from Fallujah, which sits northeast of Ramadi and is actually closer to Baghdad (as the crow flies).  The various Shi'a militias were more-or-less assigned the task of retaking Fallujah, while the Iraqi Regular Army and Special Police targeted Ramadi.  At various times over the past six months, it appeared that Fallujah would fall first.  The fact that Ramadi will indeed be reoccupied by government forces before the Iranian-backed militias have removed ISIS from Fallujah will be celebrated in Baghdad, where the populace has begun to voice its annoyance at what is perceived to be Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.

Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.

[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.


A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed.  The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government.  They would be absolutely correct in their assessment.  They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through.  Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow.  Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition.  The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone.  All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar.  The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar.  The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit.  If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit.  As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit.  Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.

Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed.  We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block.  Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass.  What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi!  I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them?  We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I.  At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military.  But this time around, I expect some accounting!  Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability?  How about, "once-burned, twice shy"?  I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery,  rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition?  Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS?  From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment. 

Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA).  That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it.  True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines.  The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict.  Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue.  Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself.  I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action.  In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting.  We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target?  Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.

I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA.  I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime.  Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis.  So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point?  All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely.  The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles.  What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS.  Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move.  But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies.  If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.   

The Shit is About to Hit The Fan, Folks.

Links: A. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Iraq.
           B. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Syria.
           C. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Ukraine.

Before we take a graceful swan-dive into the subject of today's post, I want to bring attention to the three links that I have provided.  All three links are generated from the same blog, "The Institute for the Study of War" (ISW).  At times I have praised certain websites and blogs, especially if I find myself becoming a regular visitor.  But I must truly take my hat off to the people behind this blog.  I am repeatedly amazed by the detail, accuracy, and familiarity with ground truth, that is so evident in ISW updates.  I am most impressed with ISW's ability to provide the same high-caliber reporting from three separate battlefields.  Personally, I'm already combining the Syrian and Iraqi zone of conflict, but Ukraine is entirely different nut altogether.  Everyday I wait for my email from ISW; kudos to whoever runs the show for turning me into and out-and-out ISW junkie!

After taking a few minutes to praise another blog, allow me to take a few more to praise my own.  We have been raising the warning flag regarding the Islamic State's (IS) ability to threaten Baghdad for some months now.  Yesterday, the IS launched a furious assault on Ramadi and also NW of Ramadi in the direction of al-Asad Air Base, a location that had received a great deal of attention from just about everyone.  It is likely that the IS will occupy Ramadi, at least most of it, and also probable that the ISF, and or a Shi'a militia, will snatch it back.  But this game of give-and-take is accomplishing something strategic and tremendously valuable to IS.  You see, the continued battles for the Sunni communities on the road to Jordan provide the IS with the opportunity to seed the bedroom communities of Baghdad with sympathizers, and eventually operatives.  The style of semi-urban warfare takes a page out of Vietnam.  One of the many reasons that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were initially so successful in the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pre-positioning of sympathizers and irregular forces in the close suburb communities outside Saigon, DaNang, and Hue.  We are convinced that the IS has been seeding various Sunni residential areas outside the capital with supporters and operatives, waiting for the order to become operational.  The IS also seeded the Yarmouk Refugee Camp just outside of Damascus, and they were so successful that analysts are already conceding that territory to the IS.  Its not rocket science.

We at Mukhabarat, Baby! are growing more concerned every day for the still-substantial number of American and European non-combatants in Baghdad.  Its my understanding that certain agencies have re-deployed officers back to Iraq after the Obama drawdown.  Here is a very important question: if the U.S. has non-combatants (intelligence officers, engineers, instructors, linguists, support staff, etc.) widely dispersed in places such as Basra, Erbil, Mosul, and Baghdad, who do these people look to for protection?  I'm not exactly sure how many U.S. troops are in Iraq and what their designation happens to be, by last November President Obama was given approval to send 1,500 troops (specifically in a training posture) to Iraq.  So whatever civilians the U.S. government and its contractors have in Iraq are relying upon the lightly-trained Iraqi Security Forces and possibly the odd Shi'a militia for protection.  Forgive me, but we find this arrangement unacceptable, given the IS' track record in dealing with prisoners.  We must be proactive, and either move our people out, or take steps to ensure their safety by the U.S. military.

Syria also appears to be nearing the finishing line, but we've been beating this horse to death lately.  Because of the myriad of equities involved, the IS may not go in for the "coup de grace" for some time yet.  If Russia had given the slightest inclination of providing Assad the military support he needs, then possibly it would be best for the IS to strike while the iron's hot. But Russia seems solely interested in dumping its excess weaponry and equipment in eastern Ukraine, where it is greedily gobbled up by the various separatists groups. I saw a video clip last week that I haven't been able to relocate, otherwise I would have included it on my links.  It was a clip of a group of separatists trying to make heads or tails out of a relatively small missile or grenade launcher of some sort.  To cut to the chase, the evil guerilla driving accidentally ran over one of his guerilla buddies.  I haven't laughed so much since the photo of the Pakistani guy catching his arm on fire as he tries to ignite a U.S. flag.  Priceless.  Back to Syria.....certainly it appears that the IS is in position to pick off regime-held towns along the Anti-Lebanon mountain chain, until reaching Damascus.  If Assad were still in town, then the IS could seal up the place and starve him out.  But by then, Assad will have vacated the premises for more pleasant digs.  But the IS must eventually address a few political issues regarding the various factions that have been opposing Assad as well, some of them for a much longer period of time.  We have argued that the numerous groups, including Jabhat al-Nusrah, Khorasan, and the IS, are, at the end of the day, loyal to the Sunni cause and the leadership of Osama bin-Laden.  Would the IS share authority with the others?  And what of the Free Syrian Army?  Obviously they can't be abandoned after volunteering to fight as a proxy ground force for the Pentagon.  Something tells me that the lot of 'em, families in tow, will be receiving Resident Alien status.  And who am I to complain?  At least its something that this administration does well.

Of the three trouble spots that we've been examining (with the expert guidance of the ISW), Ukraine appears to be the one with the most staying power.  I can't imagine that the Russian Army will roll across the Ukrainian border, make short work of the Ukrainian Army, and then occupy the entire country.  This festering boil will continue to fester for some time to come.  Putin is obviously committed at some level.  Russian troops and tanks are in Ukraine, and Russian Migs and Sukhois are patrolling the skies in the east.  At one point, it appeared that Putin was attempting to use the Donbas region as a bargaining chip, to ensure that Kiev and the west recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea.  As Putin, who still thinks like an intelligence officer, sees it, a simple trade would have been sufficient.  We stop destabilizing Donbas, you forget about Crimea.  But we've moved quite a bit down the road since then.  The Ukrainian Army has shown itself to be far less effective than originally thought.  In fact, in many instances, it has been the separatists who have won the day in direct clashes with the Ukrainian Army.  Its possible that the government of Ukraine is holding back its major military resources in case a defense of Kiev of the heartland is necessary.  We can't say.  One thing is for sure...the Ukrainian Army currently in the field in the southeast, will be chewed up quickly if the anticipated offensive takes place as expected.  Its true that members of the U.S. military are currently in Ukraine, assisting in the training of the many new recruits that have poured into the recruitment offices in the west of the country.  But what the Ukrainian military needs more than anything else (short of western military intervention), is a dump of military weapons and equipment.  If the G.I. from Savannah, Georgia is going to tech the young Ukrainian private how to shoot an M16, it would be nice if an M16 were available for the private to use.  Back to the bigger picture....we still aren't convinced that Putin has in interest in swallowing up the entire Ukraine. It would be more trouble than its worth.  A struggling economy, reliance on Russia for energy, a vocal, agitated youth movement, and issues with NATO would be waiting for Vladimir if he managed to occupy the entire country.  Its possible that he simply wants to bring Ukraine back into the fold, and at the same time, annex both Donbas and Crimea.  Crimea is worth the hassle....but Donbas?     

Islamic State Weakesses Exposed In Iraq; Netanyahu Struggling To Get Electoral Traction

Links: A. Islamic State Losses Mount In Iraq
           B. Netanyahu Facing Difficult Election


The Obama Administration and the governments in Tehran and Baghdad have reason to breathe a long sigh of relief.  It seems as if only yesterday, the Islamic State (IS) was aggressively expanding its military presence, to include Diyala Province and the Shi'a holy cities in central and southern Iraq.  The allied air campaign appeared to have little impact against an enemy that was comfortable using the weather forecast in its operational planning, and the Iranian government was faced with increased international attention because of intended diplomatic discussions with the Obama Administration regarding its Nuclear Program.  The IS was threatening Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) positions in the west, and U.S. instructors and advisors at the al-Asad Air Base, after overrunning the nearby town of al-Baghdadi.  Roughly four weeks later, the ISF has successfully conducted a multi-faceted operation to retake Saddam Hussein's home of Tikrit, The Peshmerga are consolidating their control over important communities in northwest Iraq, and operations outside of Kirkuk might demonstrate a level of cooperation between the Peshmerga, the ISF, and local militia that has yet to be noted.  Last year, the Kirkuk government had expressed opposition to federal forces (ISF) operating in the province.  If the hardline position taken by authorities in Kirkuk has been reversed, it would be significant, as the IS would be forced to defend against a united enemy, as opposed to three separate, smaller opponents, each with their own focus and agenda.

The string of recent IS losses point to an opponent that has become better funded, equipped and motivated.  There was some concern that regular Iranian forces would be obliged to enter the conflict, especially if the IS had been able to consolidate its operations in Diyala Province.  But the IS has adopted a defensive posture in much of Iraq, as its units were over-extended in numerous locations, and unable to find adequate supplies or food.  It should be noted, however, that the structure of the IS allows it to continue aggressive offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, while pulling back in Tikrit and Kirkuk.  It took some time and a few desperate engagements, but the ISF and its surrogate Shi'a militia partners have started to function much more like a single unit, which increases the impact of offensive operations.  If you include the Peshmerga and local anti-IS Sunni militia in the mix, and the IS is in real danger of being swept up in north central Iraq.  The existence of an effective support network has proven invaluable for the ISF and the Peshmerga, and the lack of has been crippling for IS forces.  If the ISF and Peshmerga successfully continue their campaign to push the IS out of the areas of Erbil, Mosul, Baiji and Kirkuk, then we will be returning almost exclusively to the still-familiar battlefields of 2007-2008: Ramadi and Fallujah.  It will be interesting to observe what lessons the IS has learned from the battle of Fallujah between insurgents and the U.S. military, and also if the ISF will follow the same strategy that eventually won the day for U.S. and Iraqi government forces.

Iranian Diplomacy and the Issue of Iraq: recent positive developments on the battlefields of Iraq have given the Iranian government a bit more breathing room.  The announcement last month by the Obama Administration of an effort to engage the Iranian government directly and address the nuclear issue, increased the pressure on the government in Tehran to avoid the appearance of aggressive, unwelcome military operations in Iraq.  Tehran has been able to support the Iraqi government (and military) with advisors and military aid, but the real benefit from Iran comes from the involvement of the Shi'a militias.  These militias, who follow the guidance of religious leaders as opposed to the orders of politicians or generals, act as a surrogate military presence in lieu of regular Iranian units.  They are not necessarily well-trained, but are usually well-equipped and highly motivated to die for their religion (they consider the IS to be the worst kind of Sunni movement, one that directly threatens the very existence of the Shi'a community).  Even with the presence of the militias, there was a period when analysts were considering the probability of direct Iranian military intervention.  By avoiding this development, Tehran can keep the international focus on its apparent "forward-leaning" attitude vis-a-vis meeting with the Obama Administration to discuss a possible resolution to the nuclear issue.  Such an agreement would not only help to reform the Iranian image worldwide, it would more than likely include a return to normal diplomatic relations with the United States (first Cuba, then Iran....whose next, North Korea?).

On March 17, the people of Israel will elect a new Knesset.  This election was not mandatory; when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the decision to conduct early elections, analysts anticipated a strong Likud victory, and possibly a bit of a mandate for Netanyahu to continue his hardline policies.  What has transpired has been nothing short of astounding, and I'm sure will result in an interesting documentary ort film one day.  Forces opposed to Netanyahu coalesced, and using lessons learned from the last two U.S. presidential elections, have created an electoral juggernaut that could very well put a center-left government in office, when over seventy percent of Israelis still identify themselves as either conservatives or supporters of Likud.  The strategy relies on a number of factors: first, all voters who support or lean towards the center-left must be identified, located and registered to vote.  Next, a full-proof transportation network must be put in place, to ensure that voters reach the correct voting station before it closes (Israeli electoral law has no absentee voting provision, and voting locations are instructed to close exactly on a pre-designated time; if you arrived late, too bad).  As is usually the case, this election will be decided by turnout.  The Israeli press, much of it hostile to Netanyahu, has been aggressively attacking the Prime Minister on every aspect of his leadership, and Netanyahu's allegation that foreign money has entered the Israeli political system is correct.  A great deal of money from outside Israel has found its way into this election, especially with regards to anti-Netanyahu advertisements.  On the other hand, Netanyahu is wildly popular in the United States, and Likud has certainly benefited from the financial support of Americans.  I'm not prepared to write-off Netanyahu.  He has worked tirelessly to galvanize Likud voters against a threat to the party, and no doubt on election day, a certain percentage of other rightist and religious parties will cross lines and vote Likud, just to show opposition to The Zionist Union.