Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.
Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS). Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah. The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force. If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west. After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi. But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death. Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication. In this theater, nothing would surprise me.
The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts. The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design. Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs. Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad. The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority. In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations. While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire. Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.
The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front. Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time. The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing. Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions. Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq. The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack. At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi. The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces. As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties. Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply. Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult. But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements. Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.
Showing posts with label IS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IS. Show all posts
Saturday, July 18, 2015
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces launch offensive to retake Ramadi; PMUs tackling Fallujah separately.
Links: A. ISF launches offensive in Anbar.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.
Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province. The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi. Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah. The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend. It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi? I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS. There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad. In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province. But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce. The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province. This strategy does include a certain level of risk. What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi. The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police. We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade. On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran. This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".
In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013. The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16. A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition. Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development. With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition. weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars? Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy. One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night. That hasn't been the case. One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes. Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple. But something just doesn't add up. We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS. And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria. In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.
Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity. And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS. These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake. Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria? I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads. And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq? Are we out of bombs? Have we run out of drones? One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.
Friday, July 10, 2015
Hezbollah keeping Assad regime from rapid contraction.
Link: Hezbollah assists regime forces to retake Syrian border city.
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
Thursday, June 25, 2015
Islamic State focuses on Diyala Province
Link: Suicide bomber kills 14 in Iraq
Operative from the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization continue to utilize suicide bombings in their efforts to take control of strategic areas of Iraq. In recent weeks, the IS has increased its activity in Diyala Province, just east of Baghdad. Normally, the media focuses on events on Baiji, Anbar (Ramadi) and Salah ad-Din (Samarrah) Provinces, although the IS has been active in Diyala for many months. This week, an IS suicide bomber killed fourteen people at a gathering of Sunni tribal leaders in Baqubah. Analysts might be tempted to assume that this event will drive the Sunni community further away from the IS and its mission. But to predict the actions of the various different Iraqi groups is dangerous business. During my career, I learned to never forget that different cultures respond in different ways to particular stimuli. Its very possible that the IS is using violence to portray strength, which in turn might (ideally) frighten the Sunni community into joining their cause. One thing is certain - if the Sunnis of Iraq sense that an IS victory is inevitable, you can guarantee that they will start setting up their tents under a different flag.
Diyala Province presents a strategic target for the IS for a number of reasons. The people of Iraq are already aware of IS aggression in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, not to mention the initial incursion into northern Iraq, which resulted in the occupation of Mosul and Tikrit (since retaken), and the apparently never-ending struggle for Baiji and its oil refinery. Adding Diyala Province to the mix, effectively surrounds Baghdad, and provides a visual impression of IS domination. Also, the IS would like nothing better than to see the Iranians decide that Iraq isn't worth the sacrifice, and stop its support for the government in Baghdad and the various Shi'a militias that have actually had some battlefield success against IS forces. Since Diyala Province shares a lengthy border with Iran, no doubt the Iranians will feel a bit of pressure, as the boundaries of Iran have not been legitimately threatened since the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran War. You can be sure that the IS will turn up the heat in just the right way, so that the Iranians will be forced to consider just how much their involvement in Iraq is worth. Its actually a bit of a gamble; the IS military campaign in Diyala might also force Iran to recognize how much its national security equities are inexorably tied to a peaceful Iraq. We've always considered the possibly that Iran might tip over the entire table by launching a full invasion of Iraq. We believe that the Iranian military has the capability of destroying IS' conventional military capability, as long as the Syrian border does not present a problem. Chasing the IS into Syria will only grant them a reprieve. If the Iranians were to invade Iraq with their regular Armed Forces, they should be prepared to finish the job, which may require an incursion into Syria, all the way to the doorsteps of Aleppo and Damascus. You would be hard pressed to find someone as opposed to the current Iranian regime as we are, but it would be nice to see someone with a pair of balls, no matter from what corner of the ring the emerge. And the Iranians have been known to pull a few surprises. Its probably unlikely that the Iranians would commit their regular Armed Forces in this manner, but its getting more and more difficult everyday to handicap this conflict.
Operative from the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization continue to utilize suicide bombings in their efforts to take control of strategic areas of Iraq. In recent weeks, the IS has increased its activity in Diyala Province, just east of Baghdad. Normally, the media focuses on events on Baiji, Anbar (Ramadi) and Salah ad-Din (Samarrah) Provinces, although the IS has been active in Diyala for many months. This week, an IS suicide bomber killed fourteen people at a gathering of Sunni tribal leaders in Baqubah. Analysts might be tempted to assume that this event will drive the Sunni community further away from the IS and its mission. But to predict the actions of the various different Iraqi groups is dangerous business. During my career, I learned to never forget that different cultures respond in different ways to particular stimuli. Its very possible that the IS is using violence to portray strength, which in turn might (ideally) frighten the Sunni community into joining their cause. One thing is certain - if the Sunnis of Iraq sense that an IS victory is inevitable, you can guarantee that they will start setting up their tents under a different flag.
Diyala Province presents a strategic target for the IS for a number of reasons. The people of Iraq are already aware of IS aggression in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, not to mention the initial incursion into northern Iraq, which resulted in the occupation of Mosul and Tikrit (since retaken), and the apparently never-ending struggle for Baiji and its oil refinery. Adding Diyala Province to the mix, effectively surrounds Baghdad, and provides a visual impression of IS domination. Also, the IS would like nothing better than to see the Iranians decide that Iraq isn't worth the sacrifice, and stop its support for the government in Baghdad and the various Shi'a militias that have actually had some battlefield success against IS forces. Since Diyala Province shares a lengthy border with Iran, no doubt the Iranians will feel a bit of pressure, as the boundaries of Iran have not been legitimately threatened since the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran War. You can be sure that the IS will turn up the heat in just the right way, so that the Iranians will be forced to consider just how much their involvement in Iraq is worth. Its actually a bit of a gamble; the IS military campaign in Diyala might also force Iran to recognize how much its national security equities are inexorably tied to a peaceful Iraq. We've always considered the possibly that Iran might tip over the entire table by launching a full invasion of Iraq. We believe that the Iranian military has the capability of destroying IS' conventional military capability, as long as the Syrian border does not present a problem. Chasing the IS into Syria will only grant them a reprieve. If the Iranians were to invade Iraq with their regular Armed Forces, they should be prepared to finish the job, which may require an incursion into Syria, all the way to the doorsteps of Aleppo and Damascus. You would be hard pressed to find someone as opposed to the current Iranian regime as we are, but it would be nice to see someone with a pair of balls, no matter from what corner of the ring the emerge. And the Iranians have been known to pull a few surprises. Its probably unlikely that the Iranians would commit their regular Armed Forces in this manner, but its getting more and more difficult everyday to handicap this conflict.
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.
[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
The Shit is About to Hit The Fan, Folks.
Links: A. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Iraq.
B. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Syria.
C. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Ukraine.
Before we take a graceful swan-dive into the subject of today's post, I want to bring attention to the three links that I have provided. All three links are generated from the same blog, "The Institute for the Study of War" (ISW). At times I have praised certain websites and blogs, especially if I find myself becoming a regular visitor. But I must truly take my hat off to the people behind this blog. I am repeatedly amazed by the detail, accuracy, and familiarity with ground truth, that is so evident in ISW updates. I am most impressed with ISW's ability to provide the same high-caliber reporting from three separate battlefields. Personally, I'm already combining the Syrian and Iraqi zone of conflict, but Ukraine is entirely different nut altogether. Everyday I wait for my email from ISW; kudos to whoever runs the show for turning me into and out-and-out ISW junkie!
After taking a few minutes to praise another blog, allow me to take a few more to praise my own. We have been raising the warning flag regarding the Islamic State's (IS) ability to threaten Baghdad for some months now. Yesterday, the IS launched a furious assault on Ramadi and also NW of Ramadi in the direction of al-Asad Air Base, a location that had received a great deal of attention from just about everyone. It is likely that the IS will occupy Ramadi, at least most of it, and also probable that the ISF, and or a Shi'a militia, will snatch it back. But this game of give-and-take is accomplishing something strategic and tremendously valuable to IS. You see, the continued battles for the Sunni communities on the road to Jordan provide the IS with the opportunity to seed the bedroom communities of Baghdad with sympathizers, and eventually operatives. The style of semi-urban warfare takes a page out of Vietnam. One of the many reasons that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were initially so successful in the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pre-positioning of sympathizers and irregular forces in the close suburb communities outside Saigon, DaNang, and Hue. We are convinced that the IS has been seeding various Sunni residential areas outside the capital with supporters and operatives, waiting for the order to become operational. The IS also seeded the Yarmouk Refugee Camp just outside of Damascus, and they were so successful that analysts are already conceding that territory to the IS. Its not rocket science.
We at Mukhabarat, Baby! are growing more concerned every day for the still-substantial number of American and European non-combatants in Baghdad. Its my understanding that certain agencies have re-deployed officers back to Iraq after the Obama drawdown. Here is a very important question: if the U.S. has non-combatants (intelligence officers, engineers, instructors, linguists, support staff, etc.) widely dispersed in places such as Basra, Erbil, Mosul, and Baghdad, who do these people look to for protection? I'm not exactly sure how many U.S. troops are in Iraq and what their designation happens to be, by last November President Obama was given approval to send 1,500 troops (specifically in a training posture) to Iraq. So whatever civilians the U.S. government and its contractors have in Iraq are relying upon the lightly-trained Iraqi Security Forces and possibly the odd Shi'a militia for protection. Forgive me, but we find this arrangement unacceptable, given the IS' track record in dealing with prisoners. We must be proactive, and either move our people out, or take steps to ensure their safety by the U.S. military.
Syria also appears to be nearing the finishing line, but we've been beating this horse to death lately. Because of the myriad of equities involved, the IS may not go in for the "coup de grace" for some time yet. If Russia had given the slightest inclination of providing Assad the military support he needs, then possibly it would be best for the IS to strike while the iron's hot. But Russia seems solely interested in dumping its excess weaponry and equipment in eastern Ukraine, where it is greedily gobbled up by the various separatists groups. I saw a video clip last week that I haven't been able to relocate, otherwise I would have included it on my links. It was a clip of a group of separatists trying to make heads or tails out of a relatively small missile or grenade launcher of some sort. To cut to the chase, the evil guerilla driving accidentally ran over one of his guerilla buddies. I haven't laughed so much since the photo of the Pakistani guy catching his arm on fire as he tries to ignite a U.S. flag. Priceless. Back to Syria.....certainly it appears that the IS is in position to pick off regime-held towns along the Anti-Lebanon mountain chain, until reaching Damascus. If Assad were still in town, then the IS could seal up the place and starve him out. But by then, Assad will have vacated the premises for more pleasant digs. But the IS must eventually address a few political issues regarding the various factions that have been opposing Assad as well, some of them for a much longer period of time. We have argued that the numerous groups, including Jabhat al-Nusrah, Khorasan, and the IS, are, at the end of the day, loyal to the Sunni cause and the leadership of Osama bin-Laden. Would the IS share authority with the others? And what of the Free Syrian Army? Obviously they can't be abandoned after volunteering to fight as a proxy ground force for the Pentagon. Something tells me that the lot of 'em, families in tow, will be receiving Resident Alien status. And who am I to complain? At least its something that this administration does well.
Of the three trouble spots that we've been examining (with the expert guidance of the ISW), Ukraine appears to be the one with the most staying power. I can't imagine that the Russian Army will roll across the Ukrainian border, make short work of the Ukrainian Army, and then occupy the entire country. This festering boil will continue to fester for some time to come. Putin is obviously committed at some level. Russian troops and tanks are in Ukraine, and Russian Migs and Sukhois are patrolling the skies in the east. At one point, it appeared that Putin was attempting to use the Donbas region as a bargaining chip, to ensure that Kiev and the west recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea. As Putin, who still thinks like an intelligence officer, sees it, a simple trade would have been sufficient. We stop destabilizing Donbas, you forget about Crimea. But we've moved quite a bit down the road since then. The Ukrainian Army has shown itself to be far less effective than originally thought. In fact, in many instances, it has been the separatists who have won the day in direct clashes with the Ukrainian Army. Its possible that the government of Ukraine is holding back its major military resources in case a defense of Kiev of the heartland is necessary. We can't say. One thing is for sure...the Ukrainian Army currently in the field in the southeast, will be chewed up quickly if the anticipated offensive takes place as expected. Its true that members of the U.S. military are currently in Ukraine, assisting in the training of the many new recruits that have poured into the recruitment offices in the west of the country. But what the Ukrainian military needs more than anything else (short of western military intervention), is a dump of military weapons and equipment. If the G.I. from Savannah, Georgia is going to tech the young Ukrainian private how to shoot an M16, it would be nice if an M16 were available for the private to use. Back to the bigger picture....we still aren't convinced that Putin has in interest in swallowing up the entire Ukraine. It would be more trouble than its worth. A struggling economy, reliance on Russia for energy, a vocal, agitated youth movement, and issues with NATO would be waiting for Vladimir if he managed to occupy the entire country. Its possible that he simply wants to bring Ukraine back into the fold, and at the same time, annex both Donbas and Crimea. Crimea is worth the hassle....but Donbas?
B. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Syria.
C. Real-time situation report from the battlefields of Ukraine.
Before we take a graceful swan-dive into the subject of today's post, I want to bring attention to the three links that I have provided. All three links are generated from the same blog, "The Institute for the Study of War" (ISW). At times I have praised certain websites and blogs, especially if I find myself becoming a regular visitor. But I must truly take my hat off to the people behind this blog. I am repeatedly amazed by the detail, accuracy, and familiarity with ground truth, that is so evident in ISW updates. I am most impressed with ISW's ability to provide the same high-caliber reporting from three separate battlefields. Personally, I'm already combining the Syrian and Iraqi zone of conflict, but Ukraine is entirely different nut altogether. Everyday I wait for my email from ISW; kudos to whoever runs the show for turning me into and out-and-out ISW junkie!
After taking a few minutes to praise another blog, allow me to take a few more to praise my own. We have been raising the warning flag regarding the Islamic State's (IS) ability to threaten Baghdad for some months now. Yesterday, the IS launched a furious assault on Ramadi and also NW of Ramadi in the direction of al-Asad Air Base, a location that had received a great deal of attention from just about everyone. It is likely that the IS will occupy Ramadi, at least most of it, and also probable that the ISF, and or a Shi'a militia, will snatch it back. But this game of give-and-take is accomplishing something strategic and tremendously valuable to IS. You see, the continued battles for the Sunni communities on the road to Jordan provide the IS with the opportunity to seed the bedroom communities of Baghdad with sympathizers, and eventually operatives. The style of semi-urban warfare takes a page out of Vietnam. One of the many reasons that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were initially so successful in the Tet Offensive of 1968 was the pre-positioning of sympathizers and irregular forces in the close suburb communities outside Saigon, DaNang, and Hue. We are convinced that the IS has been seeding various Sunni residential areas outside the capital with supporters and operatives, waiting for the order to become operational. The IS also seeded the Yarmouk Refugee Camp just outside of Damascus, and they were so successful that analysts are already conceding that territory to the IS. Its not rocket science.
We at Mukhabarat, Baby! are growing more concerned every day for the still-substantial number of American and European non-combatants in Baghdad. Its my understanding that certain agencies have re-deployed officers back to Iraq after the Obama drawdown. Here is a very important question: if the U.S. has non-combatants (intelligence officers, engineers, instructors, linguists, support staff, etc.) widely dispersed in places such as Basra, Erbil, Mosul, and Baghdad, who do these people look to for protection? I'm not exactly sure how many U.S. troops are in Iraq and what their designation happens to be, by last November President Obama was given approval to send 1,500 troops (specifically in a training posture) to Iraq. So whatever civilians the U.S. government and its contractors have in Iraq are relying upon the lightly-trained Iraqi Security Forces and possibly the odd Shi'a militia for protection. Forgive me, but we find this arrangement unacceptable, given the IS' track record in dealing with prisoners. We must be proactive, and either move our people out, or take steps to ensure their safety by the U.S. military.
Syria also appears to be nearing the finishing line, but we've been beating this horse to death lately. Because of the myriad of equities involved, the IS may not go in for the "coup de grace" for some time yet. If Russia had given the slightest inclination of providing Assad the military support he needs, then possibly it would be best for the IS to strike while the iron's hot. But Russia seems solely interested in dumping its excess weaponry and equipment in eastern Ukraine, where it is greedily gobbled up by the various separatists groups. I saw a video clip last week that I haven't been able to relocate, otherwise I would have included it on my links. It was a clip of a group of separatists trying to make heads or tails out of a relatively small missile or grenade launcher of some sort. To cut to the chase, the evil guerilla driving accidentally ran over one of his guerilla buddies. I haven't laughed so much since the photo of the Pakistani guy catching his arm on fire as he tries to ignite a U.S. flag. Priceless. Back to Syria.....certainly it appears that the IS is in position to pick off regime-held towns along the Anti-Lebanon mountain chain, until reaching Damascus. If Assad were still in town, then the IS could seal up the place and starve him out. But by then, Assad will have vacated the premises for more pleasant digs. But the IS must eventually address a few political issues regarding the various factions that have been opposing Assad as well, some of them for a much longer period of time. We have argued that the numerous groups, including Jabhat al-Nusrah, Khorasan, and the IS, are, at the end of the day, loyal to the Sunni cause and the leadership of Osama bin-Laden. Would the IS share authority with the others? And what of the Free Syrian Army? Obviously they can't be abandoned after volunteering to fight as a proxy ground force for the Pentagon. Something tells me that the lot of 'em, families in tow, will be receiving Resident Alien status. And who am I to complain? At least its something that this administration does well.
Of the three trouble spots that we've been examining (with the expert guidance of the ISW), Ukraine appears to be the one with the most staying power. I can't imagine that the Russian Army will roll across the Ukrainian border, make short work of the Ukrainian Army, and then occupy the entire country. This festering boil will continue to fester for some time to come. Putin is obviously committed at some level. Russian troops and tanks are in Ukraine, and Russian Migs and Sukhois are patrolling the skies in the east. At one point, it appeared that Putin was attempting to use the Donbas region as a bargaining chip, to ensure that Kiev and the west recognize the Russian occupation of Crimea. As Putin, who still thinks like an intelligence officer, sees it, a simple trade would have been sufficient. We stop destabilizing Donbas, you forget about Crimea. But we've moved quite a bit down the road since then. The Ukrainian Army has shown itself to be far less effective than originally thought. In fact, in many instances, it has been the separatists who have won the day in direct clashes with the Ukrainian Army. Its possible that the government of Ukraine is holding back its major military resources in case a defense of Kiev of the heartland is necessary. We can't say. One thing is for sure...the Ukrainian Army currently in the field in the southeast, will be chewed up quickly if the anticipated offensive takes place as expected. Its true that members of the U.S. military are currently in Ukraine, assisting in the training of the many new recruits that have poured into the recruitment offices in the west of the country. But what the Ukrainian military needs more than anything else (short of western military intervention), is a dump of military weapons and equipment. If the G.I. from Savannah, Georgia is going to tech the young Ukrainian private how to shoot an M16, it would be nice if an M16 were available for the private to use. Back to the bigger picture....we still aren't convinced that Putin has in interest in swallowing up the entire Ukraine. It would be more trouble than its worth. A struggling economy, reliance on Russia for energy, a vocal, agitated youth movement, and issues with NATO would be waiting for Vladimir if he managed to occupy the entire country. Its possible that he simply wants to bring Ukraine back into the fold, and at the same time, annex both Donbas and Crimea. Crimea is worth the hassle....but Donbas?
Monday, May 18, 2015
Developments in Ukraine and Syria.
Links: A. U.S. Troops Training Ukrainian Army.
B. Syrian War Nearing Conclusion?
No doubt the Ukrainian military is pleased that the United States has provided military trainers to prepare the growing number of Ukrainian Army recruits for combat, as all indications point to an escalation in hostilities. Although I don't recall the legislation that allows for U.S. troops to be peripherally involved in the conflict, I'm glad that at least we have made it clear that we believe Russia to be the antagonist. Like most of Congress, I urgently call for the Obama Administration to provide immediate military assistance to Ukraine. Today I noticed a Reuters Article that quoted Vladimir Putin as identifying Ukraine as a "fascist state". Not to be outdone, Reuters took the time to educate all of us idiots out here that the Ukrainian government and parliament were passing legislation that could be interpreted as "fascist". News flash to Reuters (News Flash to a premier news organization?): Ukraine is under military assault by a nation with a much larger army and greater access to military resources. What country does not rely on extreme internal measures during war, to protect the safety of the people and the integrity of the state? Heck, Russia has draconian internal laws and they are always the aggressor in these instances. By my history book, Russia has not been invaded since Hitler's Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Since the dissolution of Communist Russia, the Russians have managed to be militarily aggressive towards Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine. I'm waiting for Reuters to point out that "invading your neighbors under false pretenses" is a tad bit fascist, but I'm not holding my breath.
During the 9 May May Day celebrations in Donetsk and Luhansk, the separatists paraded all sorts of military gear in front of small of enthusiastic crowds. Interestingly enough, much of the hardware on display was supposed to be removed from Ukraine according to the provisions of the 12 February Cease Fire signed in Minsk by Russia and Ukraine. Of course, the Russians will claim that the military vehicles and weapons on display were removed according to the Cease Fire obligations, but had only recently been returned. And those of us with a shred of common sense will chalk that claim up to another in a long list of outright Russian lies. Here is a bit of free intelligence for everyone who hasn't caught on yet: Vladimir Putin is a liar, and the Russian government cannot be trusted to fulfill a treaty requiring it to clean a litter box. And yet, looking about as moronic as is humanly possible, here is Secretary of State John "Frankenstein" Kerry, discussing the possibility of a new Cease Fire with Putin. What is congenitally wrong with these people, that they continue to go on trusting people who have proven time and again that they can't be trusted? Has it been that long since the Russian separatists in Ukraine, misusing the latest in Russian military equipment, shot down a commercial jet full of innocent men, women and children? Lets not forget that the Russian government disseminated every kind of bizarre "breaking news story" to try and blame the incident on everyone from the Ukrainians to the United States. The Ukrainian front line in southeastern Ukraine is soon to be assaulted by Russian weapons, Russian warplanes, and probably even Russian troops. The brave of ineffectual Ukrainian Army (and the undisciplined collection of foreign mercenaries they've contracted, who can walk off the battlefield at any moment, and will) will be no match for the firestorm that approaches, and when we all wake up a few weeks later, Kiev itself maybe in the Russian's gun sights.
Simply put, the only action that Putin will respect is a hard military response. And you can bet your last ruble that he needn't worry about seeing one.
As we have been reporting over the last month, the pro-Assad military has suffered one strategic calamity after another, mostly at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN). In reality, aside from a few isolated and unimportant outposts out in the eastern desert, Assad's authority is limited to Syria "west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. He has lost both the border in the north to the Kurds, and the Jordanian border to a variety of opposition. Folks are beginning to grumble about chemical agents because the use of such unpredictable weapons is usually reserved for desperate times. And lets be clear about one thing: the clock is ticking on the Assad Presidency. The key was the lack of real support from his usual sugar daddy, Russia. We had expected the Russians to take advantage of last year's lull in fighting to rebuild Assad's armor capabilities and air force. Aside from a few new helicopters, we see no indication that Russia has made any kind of effort to strengthen Assad's army. Is it possible that Putin realized that his dream of a Russian naval port on the Mediterranean wasn't going to happen, at least not on the Syrian coast? Is it possible that the situation in Ukraine demanded too much focus from the Russian military, so Assad was cut lose? That would be highly unlikely, so the decision was more of a pragmatic, realistic choice on the part of Putin. With the extremist armies growing in strength, and Turkey screaming for Assad's removal, Putin probably weighed his equities and decided that Assad would have to sink-or-swim on his own. And the last few weeks have been all about swimming for Assad and his dwindling military.
Indications are that the Islamic State (IS), which had been quiet on the Syrian front as of late (and making lots of noise in Iraq), is about to launch a two-pronged offensive in Syria, exclusively targeting regime forces. So let me scream this from the rafters, so those in Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon can hear: we need a proactive plan regarding what happens after Assad leaves. The United States cannot find itself in a Libya, part II situation. Even though the Free Syrian Army still hasn't made an impression on the battlefield, is it possible that they can be utilized to protect our interests and equities in Syria? We didn't spend billions of dollars on training an army and leading an air campaign in order to have no say-so in post-Assad Syria. But this is where my suggestions end. I have no idea what to do with this mess. If it had been up to me, we would have mobilized the entire U.S. military to destroy the IS in both Syria and Iraq, and left a few useful military bases behind us. But I guess I can be labeled as a bit of a "Hawk". Both JN and IS have legitimate claim to rule in Syria, if we follow the law of the desert: he who stands last, stands tallest. If the IS flushes Assad and his herd of cronies out of Damascus, have they not earned their "Caliphate"? I have a sneaky feeling that the end of Assad will result in a "rapprochement" with JN, the IS, Khorasan, and all the other shitty little groups out here in the desert. They all fight for the same goal: Islamic extremist hegemony, under the guise of Al-Qaeda. So dealing with is may be all that will be needed. Either way, do we try and negotiate with them, or do we go to war again? Is there another option? I guess we could just evacuate all of our folks and let Israel sort it out.
B. Syrian War Nearing Conclusion?
No doubt the Ukrainian military is pleased that the United States has provided military trainers to prepare the growing number of Ukrainian Army recruits for combat, as all indications point to an escalation in hostilities. Although I don't recall the legislation that allows for U.S. troops to be peripherally involved in the conflict, I'm glad that at least we have made it clear that we believe Russia to be the antagonist. Like most of Congress, I urgently call for the Obama Administration to provide immediate military assistance to Ukraine. Today I noticed a Reuters Article that quoted Vladimir Putin as identifying Ukraine as a "fascist state". Not to be outdone, Reuters took the time to educate all of us idiots out here that the Ukrainian government and parliament were passing legislation that could be interpreted as "fascist". News flash to Reuters (News Flash to a premier news organization?): Ukraine is under military assault by a nation with a much larger army and greater access to military resources. What country does not rely on extreme internal measures during war, to protect the safety of the people and the integrity of the state? Heck, Russia has draconian internal laws and they are always the aggressor in these instances. By my history book, Russia has not been invaded since Hitler's Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Since the dissolution of Communist Russia, the Russians have managed to be militarily aggressive towards Moldova, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine. I'm waiting for Reuters to point out that "invading your neighbors under false pretenses" is a tad bit fascist, but I'm not holding my breath.
During the 9 May May Day celebrations in Donetsk and Luhansk, the separatists paraded all sorts of military gear in front of small of enthusiastic crowds. Interestingly enough, much of the hardware on display was supposed to be removed from Ukraine according to the provisions of the 12 February Cease Fire signed in Minsk by Russia and Ukraine. Of course, the Russians will claim that the military vehicles and weapons on display were removed according to the Cease Fire obligations, but had only recently been returned. And those of us with a shred of common sense will chalk that claim up to another in a long list of outright Russian lies. Here is a bit of free intelligence for everyone who hasn't caught on yet: Vladimir Putin is a liar, and the Russian government cannot be trusted to fulfill a treaty requiring it to clean a litter box. And yet, looking about as moronic as is humanly possible, here is Secretary of State John "Frankenstein" Kerry, discussing the possibility of a new Cease Fire with Putin. What is congenitally wrong with these people, that they continue to go on trusting people who have proven time and again that they can't be trusted? Has it been that long since the Russian separatists in Ukraine, misusing the latest in Russian military equipment, shot down a commercial jet full of innocent men, women and children? Lets not forget that the Russian government disseminated every kind of bizarre "breaking news story" to try and blame the incident on everyone from the Ukrainians to the United States. The Ukrainian front line in southeastern Ukraine is soon to be assaulted by Russian weapons, Russian warplanes, and probably even Russian troops. The brave of ineffectual Ukrainian Army (and the undisciplined collection of foreign mercenaries they've contracted, who can walk off the battlefield at any moment, and will) will be no match for the firestorm that approaches, and when we all wake up a few weeks later, Kiev itself maybe in the Russian's gun sights.
Simply put, the only action that Putin will respect is a hard military response. And you can bet your last ruble that he needn't worry about seeing one.
As we have been reporting over the last month, the pro-Assad military has suffered one strategic calamity after another, mostly at the hands of Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN). In reality, aside from a few isolated and unimportant outposts out in the eastern desert, Assad's authority is limited to Syria "west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. He has lost both the border in the north to the Kurds, and the Jordanian border to a variety of opposition. Folks are beginning to grumble about chemical agents because the use of such unpredictable weapons is usually reserved for desperate times. And lets be clear about one thing: the clock is ticking on the Assad Presidency. The key was the lack of real support from his usual sugar daddy, Russia. We had expected the Russians to take advantage of last year's lull in fighting to rebuild Assad's armor capabilities and air force. Aside from a few new helicopters, we see no indication that Russia has made any kind of effort to strengthen Assad's army. Is it possible that Putin realized that his dream of a Russian naval port on the Mediterranean wasn't going to happen, at least not on the Syrian coast? Is it possible that the situation in Ukraine demanded too much focus from the Russian military, so Assad was cut lose? That would be highly unlikely, so the decision was more of a pragmatic, realistic choice on the part of Putin. With the extremist armies growing in strength, and Turkey screaming for Assad's removal, Putin probably weighed his equities and decided that Assad would have to sink-or-swim on his own. And the last few weeks have been all about swimming for Assad and his dwindling military.
Indications are that the Islamic State (IS), which had been quiet on the Syrian front as of late (and making lots of noise in Iraq), is about to launch a two-pronged offensive in Syria, exclusively targeting regime forces. So let me scream this from the rafters, so those in Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon can hear: we need a proactive plan regarding what happens after Assad leaves. The United States cannot find itself in a Libya, part II situation. Even though the Free Syrian Army still hasn't made an impression on the battlefield, is it possible that they can be utilized to protect our interests and equities in Syria? We didn't spend billions of dollars on training an army and leading an air campaign in order to have no say-so in post-Assad Syria. But this is where my suggestions end. I have no idea what to do with this mess. If it had been up to me, we would have mobilized the entire U.S. military to destroy the IS in both Syria and Iraq, and left a few useful military bases behind us. But I guess I can be labeled as a bit of a "Hawk". Both JN and IS have legitimate claim to rule in Syria, if we follow the law of the desert: he who stands last, stands tallest. If the IS flushes Assad and his herd of cronies out of Damascus, have they not earned their "Caliphate"? I have a sneaky feeling that the end of Assad will result in a "rapprochement" with JN, the IS, Khorasan, and all the other shitty little groups out here in the desert. They all fight for the same goal: Islamic extremist hegemony, under the guise of Al-Qaeda. So dealing with is may be all that will be needed. Either way, do we try and negotiate with them, or do we go to war again? Is there another option? I guess we could just evacuate all of our folks and let Israel sort it out.
Sunday, March 29, 2015
Why should the West be concerned with the intentions of the Islamic State in Africa? (Part I)
Links: A. The Islamic State in Africa
B. So this is the latest version of the Caliphate.....
We've already addressed the presence of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in Africa in a number of posts. FYI, I'm one of those bloggers who analyzes statistics, and I'm well-aware, that for my core audience, anything having to do with the continent of Africa is about as welcome as a fart in a spacesuit. Its vital to me that my blog remain relevant; unfortunately, that requires continued efforts to increase my audience, but it also obligates me to discuss all theaters of conflict. No doubt this includes both North and Sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa is rather simple to break down, and I usually include it with the Middle East anyway.
Egypt. This particular piece of Mediterranean-bordered geography is important because Egypt shares a border with Israel, and has a huge, well-equipped and well-trained army. And in spite of the best efforts of the current government, Egyptian society is inundated with extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood, which commands a shockingly impressive number of supporters, is lurking around every corner. Egypt also borders Libya.
Lybia. When Libya started to crack at the edges, Muammar Gaddafi looked to the West, particularly to the United States, for assistance in creating some level of order. Gaddafi had recently taken the first step and reached out to the West and the United States. But the Department of State under Hillary Clinton never seemed prepared for any contingency. When she accepted the position of Secretary of State, the Department itself was meant to be a vehicle for her star-studded arrival at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia in 2016. A review of foreign affairs during the Clinton tenure at Foggy Bottom makes it clear that the only events, issues or summits that were worth our attention were the ones that allowed Hillary to shine. It's as if the entire State Department morphed into her make-up closet. As for developments in the real world, our entire diplomatic posture was reactive. Again, except for the New Start Treaty, and a handful of other expertly-crafted engagements, the State Department just waited for things to happen, and then looked to the White House for direction. Gaddafi was left out in the cold, and the opportunity to create something positive for the Libyan people, from the people of the United States, never materialized. We sat back and watched Gaddafi get butchered, and a flock of nasty extremists move in to fight over what's left of Libya. The night of the Benghazi incident, the State Department claims that efforts were made to contact the Libyan government. WHICH ONE?
Tunisia. Tunisia is very important. The people of Tunisia fought and sacrificed to keep their nation from falling into the talons of extremists. The removal of the ruling family, which had become so corrupt that certain members of the ruling family actually considered the Gross National Product (GNP) of Tunisia to be their own personal ATM account, was absolutely essential. Since independence from France, the governments of Tunisia have always been at least a little corrupt, but they also exhibited a love of country that allowed for most of the GNP to be used for the good of the state. Because Tunisia had good roads, nice resorts, and well-maintained historic sites, revenue from tourism continued to support economic growth and job creation. But recently, things had begun to get a bit out of hand. Tunisia deserves an honest, Democratic government, and their relatively low population removes a major stress faced by many of Tunisia's neighbors. But one threat that won't go away without a fight, is the presence of Islamic extremists. Last week they shot up the Bardo Museum in Tunis and killed a bunch of European tourists. The government of Tunisia, fresh off free and fair elections, needs the support of the United States and the international community now more than ever.
Morocco & Algeria. At present, both Morocco and Algeria enjoy the security of effective, no-nonsense security forces. The military in both countries, which traditionally seconds the security forces, are both disciplined, well-equipped, well-trained, and loyal to the government. Hell, for all practical purposes, the military IS the government in Algeria. But don't quote me, please. I'm a huge fan of King Mohammed VI of Morocco. Like his father, he has a keen sense of politics in the Islamic world, and manages to avoid really pissing off anyone. Mohammed VI is as progressive as it gets for a Muslim regent, and he considers his inherited position to be a full-time job which he takes with the utmost seriousness. Algeria's economy can rely on oil for the foreseeable future, but Morocco imports $38.7 billion worth or goods every year, and exports only $16.8 billion. Thank goodness for the relatively low population growth rate and high revenues from tourism. But the pseudo-fascist government in Algiers and the monarchy in Rabat must look at the same map I have provided (link B). Both Morocco and Algeria are part of the Caliphate, baby. Realistically, the armies of either Morocco or Algeria could defeat the IS in a conventional war. But the trick is, the IS won't limit itself to a conventional war. The IS will engage in every type of warfare at its disposal. The tourists will stop coming to the beaches of Morocco after a few well-placed incendiary devices and blown people to pieces. And the Algerian government will lose its cash cow if the IS can successfully capture or blow up a refinery here and there. And if this conflict grows to the point of endangering Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, then the IS will have grown into a military force to be feared.
North Africa is very important to the conflict that currently is being waged in Iraq and Syria. The IS is in Egypt, it is in Libya, and it is in Tunisia. I guarantee you that operatives are in place in Algeria and Morocco, recruiting, reminding poor, jobless young men about the lifestyles of the rich diplomats and generals in Algiers, and the sinful lifestyle of the monarch in Rabat (it has long been suspected, and in fact, discreetly accepted that King Mohammed VI lived a homosexual lifestyle in Europe before the death of his father. He has since married and fathered and heir, which at this point is all anyone seems to care about).
Click here to continue to Part II of this post.
B. So this is the latest version of the Caliphate.....
We've already addressed the presence of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in Africa in a number of posts. FYI, I'm one of those bloggers who analyzes statistics, and I'm well-aware, that for my core audience, anything having to do with the continent of Africa is about as welcome as a fart in a spacesuit. Its vital to me that my blog remain relevant; unfortunately, that requires continued efforts to increase my audience, but it also obligates me to discuss all theaters of conflict. No doubt this includes both North and Sub-Saharan Africa. North Africa is rather simple to break down, and I usually include it with the Middle East anyway.
Egypt. This particular piece of Mediterranean-bordered geography is important because Egypt shares a border with Israel, and has a huge, well-equipped and well-trained army. And in spite of the best efforts of the current government, Egyptian society is inundated with extremists. The Muslim Brotherhood, which commands a shockingly impressive number of supporters, is lurking around every corner. Egypt also borders Libya.
Lybia. When Libya started to crack at the edges, Muammar Gaddafi looked to the West, particularly to the United States, for assistance in creating some level of order. Gaddafi had recently taken the first step and reached out to the West and the United States. But the Department of State under Hillary Clinton never seemed prepared for any contingency. When she accepted the position of Secretary of State, the Department itself was meant to be a vehicle for her star-studded arrival at the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia in 2016. A review of foreign affairs during the Clinton tenure at Foggy Bottom makes it clear that the only events, issues or summits that were worth our attention were the ones that allowed Hillary to shine. It's as if the entire State Department morphed into her make-up closet. As for developments in the real world, our entire diplomatic posture was reactive. Again, except for the New Start Treaty, and a handful of other expertly-crafted engagements, the State Department just waited for things to happen, and then looked to the White House for direction. Gaddafi was left out in the cold, and the opportunity to create something positive for the Libyan people, from the people of the United States, never materialized. We sat back and watched Gaddafi get butchered, and a flock of nasty extremists move in to fight over what's left of Libya. The night of the Benghazi incident, the State Department claims that efforts were made to contact the Libyan government. WHICH ONE?
Tunisia. Tunisia is very important. The people of Tunisia fought and sacrificed to keep their nation from falling into the talons of extremists. The removal of the ruling family, which had become so corrupt that certain members of the ruling family actually considered the Gross National Product (GNP) of Tunisia to be their own personal ATM account, was absolutely essential. Since independence from France, the governments of Tunisia have always been at least a little corrupt, but they also exhibited a love of country that allowed for most of the GNP to be used for the good of the state. Because Tunisia had good roads, nice resorts, and well-maintained historic sites, revenue from tourism continued to support economic growth and job creation. But recently, things had begun to get a bit out of hand. Tunisia deserves an honest, Democratic government, and their relatively low population removes a major stress faced by many of Tunisia's neighbors. But one threat that won't go away without a fight, is the presence of Islamic extremists. Last week they shot up the Bardo Museum in Tunis and killed a bunch of European tourists. The government of Tunisia, fresh off free and fair elections, needs the support of the United States and the international community now more than ever.
Morocco & Algeria. At present, both Morocco and Algeria enjoy the security of effective, no-nonsense security forces. The military in both countries, which traditionally seconds the security forces, are both disciplined, well-equipped, well-trained, and loyal to the government. Hell, for all practical purposes, the military IS the government in Algeria. But don't quote me, please. I'm a huge fan of King Mohammed VI of Morocco. Like his father, he has a keen sense of politics in the Islamic world, and manages to avoid really pissing off anyone. Mohammed VI is as progressive as it gets for a Muslim regent, and he considers his inherited position to be a full-time job which he takes with the utmost seriousness. Algeria's economy can rely on oil for the foreseeable future, but Morocco imports $38.7 billion worth or goods every year, and exports only $16.8 billion. Thank goodness for the relatively low population growth rate and high revenues from tourism. But the pseudo-fascist government in Algiers and the monarchy in Rabat must look at the same map I have provided (link B). Both Morocco and Algeria are part of the Caliphate, baby. Realistically, the armies of either Morocco or Algeria could defeat the IS in a conventional war. But the trick is, the IS won't limit itself to a conventional war. The IS will engage in every type of warfare at its disposal. The tourists will stop coming to the beaches of Morocco after a few well-placed incendiary devices and blown people to pieces. And the Algerian government will lose its cash cow if the IS can successfully capture or blow up a refinery here and there. And if this conflict grows to the point of endangering Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, then the IS will have grown into a military force to be feared.
North Africa is very important to the conflict that currently is being waged in Iraq and Syria. The IS is in Egypt, it is in Libya, and it is in Tunisia. I guarantee you that operatives are in place in Algeria and Morocco, recruiting, reminding poor, jobless young men about the lifestyles of the rich diplomats and generals in Algiers, and the sinful lifestyle of the monarch in Rabat (it has long been suspected, and in fact, discreetly accepted that King Mohammed VI lived a homosexual lifestyle in Europe before the death of his father. He has since married and fathered and heir, which at this point is all anyone seems to care about).
Click here to continue to Part II of this post.
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part II)
Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
I believe that Yemen and Iraq, and possibly locations in Pakistan and Africa, are currently being utilized as training locations for the IS foot soldier. Intelligence services have already located a number of locations in Iraq which are suspected of being training centers of IS, but I believe that Yemen should be added to the list. Those who disagree with me with point out that AQ already uses Yemen as a "breaking-in" location for its members. No doubt AQ continues to conduct certain types of training in Yemen, alongside the IS. In fact, I believe that they are one and the same. We will know soon enough. Eventually a few IS prisoners of war from the Iraq and Syria conflict will, during interrogation, mention travel to Yemen for training purposes. If I'm correct, hopefully this will be the catalyst for the west to stop the damaging and wasteful routine of differentiating between these Sunni Muslim extremist groups. I do not buy into the narrative that the leader of Khorasan is angry at al-Baghdadi, so the IS and Khorasan can't be friends, or that AQ is embarrassed by the number of young men who were decapitated by IS this week, so AQ can't be tainted by association. Believe me, at the end of the day, that AK47 will be pointed at you and I and our children, it will not be pointed at another extremist. I might be a bit more sympathetic to the argument that major rifts exist between various Sunni Muslim extremist groups, if I could be presented with hard evidence. Social media captures aren't worth a bucket of shit, and neither are rumors that someone from one group shot up a few people from another group.
Islamic extremism is a giant of a beast, but at present, it has only one head, and that is Ayman al-Zawahiri. Beneath that head, a number of phalanges are jockeying, positioning themselves to move into the void once the sixty-three year old Zawahiri finally floats off to meet his virgins (we might just find him as well). For anyone who argues that these groups are not fighting together with a unique, singular goal in mind, I would ask them to please have look at the state of affairs in the world today. I cannot recall a time in my life when terrorism was so rampant and so conventional. Our military is handicapped by an Administration made up of political appointees and outright amateurs, and every move we make is reactive. Not surprisingly, the same can be said for our efforts and strategy in the Ukraine. When IS originally became aggressive in Iraq, our attempt at being an ally resulted in an entire Iraqi Army Corps deserting the field of battle, and people scurrying out of Baghdad as if it were Atlanta before Sherman came to town. The Iranians step in, and IS appears to be in retreat. The case is different in Syria, which is almost impossible to evaluate effectively. The IS (and AQ) are active in Tunisia, Libya, and various other countries in Africa. Its interesting to note that the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram recently declared its allegiance to the IS. Well guess what folks; Boko Haram has already declared its loyalty to AQ. Really, what is the difference? Both groups are working in the same arena towards the same goal: the destruction of the west and Israel. You can put all that Caliphate bullshit into the backseat. No doubt Mr. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi envisions himself as the Caliph in such a manifestation, but Zawahiri sees it for what it is: just another story in a sea of distractions, that keep the infidels from unifying their aim at the singular target.
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part I)
Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
If I get something wrong, I can rely upon my readers to send enough emails to ensure that I am corrected. I get so little correspondence (the email address is provided below), that I welcome a polite scolding, just for the opportunity to interact with someone who has given consideration to my perspective. And that, basically, is what the blog means to me. It provides an opportunity for me to share my perspective with an unlimited number of people around the world. Now my perspective is biased by definition. I do my best to present a balanced viewpoint, supported by my personal life experiences. But I am a citizen of the United States, and I fully believe in the exceptional nature of our Constitution and the American people; let there be no doubt that I would lay down my life for my country. But I am half-French, and I cherish every part of me that is France. That being said, I have been a world traveler, and I make a supreme effort to give full consideration to all viewpoints. One issue that seems to draw sharp dividing lines is the relationship between the two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). I have included two links that present opinions which are contrary to my own, in an effort to jump-start a conversation which is truly very important. The sources for the links I have provided, continually use information obtained from Social Media as evidence of a rift between the two organizations. We have also heard vague rumors of actual violence between the groups, and also conflict with some of the other players on the ground in Iraq, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group (K). Both links are well-written and ideally sourced. I found both commentaries to be full of well-intended, useful information. But in the end, I disagree with their basic premise. I believe that AQ and IS are closely linked and work within a loose, coordinated Confederation of sorts. And the sooner we recognize this fact, the better.
Its no secret that the IS has evolved from the remnants of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). I see many similarities. The first link above continues to highlight the atrocities committed by IS and its obvious propensity towards violence, as if AQ plays the game differently. The history of the AQ movement begs to differ. AQ brought us televised beheadings from Afghanistan when such demonstrations were still good for a bit of shock value. AQ has ordered the slaughter of entire villages in Afghanistan and whole families in Pakistan. I assume that I don't have to remind anyone about the amount of blood shed on September 11, 2001, or the desecration of the bodies of three U.S. contractors in Fallujah/Ramadi during Operation Enduring Freedom. Osama bin-Laden fully understood the power of violence as a tool in both warfare and perception. Bin-Laden frequently used violence to create fear in his enemies and the public in general, who would in turn acquiesce to his will. Its not a new approach, nor is it Rocket Science (damn to hell all those clichés!). I believe the attacks of September 11 carried a different message, a declaration of war against Christianity, Judaism and the west, as represented by the United States. President George W. Bush recognized the determination in his enemy, and decided upon a course of action that will be debated until the end of time. Bush decided to force AQ into a conventional conflict, in AQ's own backyard. He used the issue of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" as a platform (excuse? justification?) from which to force AQ into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. He correctly deduced that AQ could not avoid the confrontation with the U.S. Army in the heart of Islam, or risk losing legitimacy with the Muslim community internationally. He was also correct in assuming that AQ would suffer logistics and funding crises, which would hamper its ability to stay active elsewhere. I don't believe Bush, Rumsfeld or the Pentagon anticipated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the depth of the Iraqi insurgency, but before leaving office in 2008, he could be satisfied with the status quo in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bin-Laden and his elderly Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Physician-turned sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri (now that was a mouthful) obviously assessed the situation and realized early on that Bush was attempting to paint them into a corner. But for the time being, they were obliged to play the game. But Bin-Laden considered our Democratic habits to be our Achilles tendon, and in this instance he may have been correct. in 2008, the American people voted for a new direction, and a new direction is what we received. Although it didn't begin immediately, you might as well circle President Obama's first day in office as the start of the U.S. military's draw-down and eventual departure from Iraq. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri anticipated this, and focused on rebuilding their movement from the ground-up (I'm frequently including Zawahiri because he now runs the show, and we need to get accustomed to his brand of terrorism. He is methodical, detail-oriented, brilliant and probably a sociopath, and he is the enemy). If the west wanted a conventional war, then the movement was happy to oblige. First and foremost, I believe that sometime in between 2007 and 2009, AQ reviewed and rebuilt its internal security network. Bin-Laden realized that many parts of his network had been compromised and a simpler, more effective plan was put in place. The key to this plan was to limit the amount of time members engaged in face to face contact outside of the battlefield, and to severely limit all contact with Bin-Laden and Zawahiri. Steps were taken to eliminate the need for direct contact. As long as the brain could communicate with the limbs, everything else was almost superfluous. Also, a designation must exist between highly-trained, professional operatives and the continued stream of unskilled volunteers that make there way into the organization. I believe the root of the original AQ, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which trains highly skilled and motivated operatives for complex operations, still functions as it always has. What has changed is the growth of another type of operative, the foot soldier who will give the movement a resource which was sorely lacking in Afghanistan and Iraq: a conventional offensive capability.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
If I get something wrong, I can rely upon my readers to send enough emails to ensure that I am corrected. I get so little correspondence (the email address is provided below), that I welcome a polite scolding, just for the opportunity to interact with someone who has given consideration to my perspective. And that, basically, is what the blog means to me. It provides an opportunity for me to share my perspective with an unlimited number of people around the world. Now my perspective is biased by definition. I do my best to present a balanced viewpoint, supported by my personal life experiences. But I am a citizen of the United States, and I fully believe in the exceptional nature of our Constitution and the American people; let there be no doubt that I would lay down my life for my country. But I am half-French, and I cherish every part of me that is France. That being said, I have been a world traveler, and I make a supreme effort to give full consideration to all viewpoints. One issue that seems to draw sharp dividing lines is the relationship between the two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). I have included two links that present opinions which are contrary to my own, in an effort to jump-start a conversation which is truly very important. The sources for the links I have provided, continually use information obtained from Social Media as evidence of a rift between the two organizations. We have also heard vague rumors of actual violence between the groups, and also conflict with some of the other players on the ground in Iraq, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group (K). Both links are well-written and ideally sourced. I found both commentaries to be full of well-intended, useful information. But in the end, I disagree with their basic premise. I believe that AQ and IS are closely linked and work within a loose, coordinated Confederation of sorts. And the sooner we recognize this fact, the better.
Its no secret that the IS has evolved from the remnants of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). I see many similarities. The first link above continues to highlight the atrocities committed by IS and its obvious propensity towards violence, as if AQ plays the game differently. The history of the AQ movement begs to differ. AQ brought us televised beheadings from Afghanistan when such demonstrations were still good for a bit of shock value. AQ has ordered the slaughter of entire villages in Afghanistan and whole families in Pakistan. I assume that I don't have to remind anyone about the amount of blood shed on September 11, 2001, or the desecration of the bodies of three U.S. contractors in Fallujah/Ramadi during Operation Enduring Freedom. Osama bin-Laden fully understood the power of violence as a tool in both warfare and perception. Bin-Laden frequently used violence to create fear in his enemies and the public in general, who would in turn acquiesce to his will. Its not a new approach, nor is it Rocket Science (damn to hell all those clichés!). I believe the attacks of September 11 carried a different message, a declaration of war against Christianity, Judaism and the west, as represented by the United States. President George W. Bush recognized the determination in his enemy, and decided upon a course of action that will be debated until the end of time. Bush decided to force AQ into a conventional conflict, in AQ's own backyard. He used the issue of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" as a platform (excuse? justification?) from which to force AQ into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. He correctly deduced that AQ could not avoid the confrontation with the U.S. Army in the heart of Islam, or risk losing legitimacy with the Muslim community internationally. He was also correct in assuming that AQ would suffer logistics and funding crises, which would hamper its ability to stay active elsewhere. I don't believe Bush, Rumsfeld or the Pentagon anticipated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the depth of the Iraqi insurgency, but before leaving office in 2008, he could be satisfied with the status quo in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bin-Laden and his elderly Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Physician-turned sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri (now that was a mouthful) obviously assessed the situation and realized early on that Bush was attempting to paint them into a corner. But for the time being, they were obliged to play the game. But Bin-Laden considered our Democratic habits to be our Achilles tendon, and in this instance he may have been correct. in 2008, the American people voted for a new direction, and a new direction is what we received. Although it didn't begin immediately, you might as well circle President Obama's first day in office as the start of the U.S. military's draw-down and eventual departure from Iraq. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri anticipated this, and focused on rebuilding their movement from the ground-up (I'm frequently including Zawahiri because he now runs the show, and we need to get accustomed to his brand of terrorism. He is methodical, detail-oriented, brilliant and probably a sociopath, and he is the enemy). If the west wanted a conventional war, then the movement was happy to oblige. First and foremost, I believe that sometime in between 2007 and 2009, AQ reviewed and rebuilt its internal security network. Bin-Laden realized that many parts of his network had been compromised and a simpler, more effective plan was put in place. The key to this plan was to limit the amount of time members engaged in face to face contact outside of the battlefield, and to severely limit all contact with Bin-Laden and Zawahiri. Steps were taken to eliminate the need for direct contact. As long as the brain could communicate with the limbs, everything else was almost superfluous. Also, a designation must exist between highly-trained, professional operatives and the continued stream of unskilled volunteers that make there way into the organization. I believe the root of the original AQ, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which trains highly skilled and motivated operatives for complex operations, still functions as it always has. What has changed is the growth of another type of operative, the foot soldier who will give the movement a resource which was sorely lacking in Afghanistan and Iraq: a conventional offensive capability.
Friday, March 13, 2015
Tikrit Falls To The ISF
Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein. A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers. While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government. The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin. Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts. The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces. The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle. It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.
Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area. There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur. If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself. While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul. There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq. Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory. Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement.
The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF. Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army. The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention. The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room. The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country. It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue. If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.
Friday, March 6, 2015
How effective are the Armed Forces of the Persian Gulf? (Part I)
Links A. Global Firepower Ranks the Armed Forces of the World
B. World's Largest Armies, According to Global Security
C. Business Insider's 35 Most Powerful Militaries
Now this is the kind of post I love to write. I've been an armchair General since I could stand on my own two feet. I grew up in a U.S. Army family stationed in Bad Hersfeld, Germany, and a number of other lovely towns. My older brother (and sister, on occasion) were always playing soldier. By the time I reached eight years old, my brother and I had accumulated a truly unbelievable collection of soldiers and tanks. In those days, you could mail-order military figures from the last page of Sgt. Rock, the Haunted Tank, The Unknown Soldier, or my favorite, Weird Wars comic books. We had Romans, Greeks and Persians, fully equipped with Trebuchets, Ballistas and Catapults (usually hand-carved by my father), and we had Red Coats and Blue Coats from the American Revolution. Because we were in Europe, it was difficult to obtain soldiers from the war for Texas Independence or the Civil Wart, but we more than made up for it with Napoleon's Imperial Guard and Wellington's Cavalry. But my brother and I spent most of our time re-living the battles of World War II. My father (a bit of an occasional participant, when the adults weren't looking) built a huge battlefield for us to use. It must have been six foot by six foot. I started life as a pine wood crate, but all we needed was one complete side (for the bottom) and about six inches (high) of pine barrier all along the edge. My father filled this with dirt and then added trees and rocks. The villages and rivers could be easily added as required. To complete this young boy's dream, I must have had one hundred same-scale little German tanks, and my brother, of course, had the same number of American (being older, he was always the good guys). Christmas and Birthdays weren't that difficult for my folks. Just go to the German toy store downtown, and buy Second World War-era soldiers and tanks. I had Tiger I and Tiger II tanks, Panthers, mobile artillery, half tracks, regular artillery, bridge-building Engineers, EVERYTHING! My father spent years, and my parents probably a fortune, turning our basement into the most amazing, easy-to-convert, battlefield. Needless to say, the neighborhood boys flocked to our basement. We fought Rommel vs. Montgomery in North Africa, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Kursk, Anzio, you name it. Today, kids still fight the same battles, but everything is done with computer graphics. Blah. Give me my die-cast armor and by rubber bands as weapons any day over "Call of Duty". My siblings and I were very fortunate children. My folks worked diligently at perfecting the balance between discipline and responsibility, and they sacrificed to give us every opportunity in life. I still consider the important decisions of my life using the same variables that I was taught as a child. Any success that I've had is a direct reflection of my parents.
By now you've grown used accustomed to my minor digressions, so lets move forward. I'm fascinated by the subject of military strength, especially as it relates to the hot spots of today's world. Over the next week, utilizing all the data I can access through the web and my personal library, I hope to provide a clear perception of the state of military affairs in the Middle East, in Africa, in Europe, the Indian sub-continent, and the Far East. The war gaming of my youth was without air and naval elements, which are a necessity in today's conflicts. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East. For the sake of our discussion, we will include in our "Middle East", the nations of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. As for the Gulf States, which will be the (eventual) subjects of this post, I have selected Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and Iraq. The world's major suppliers of weapons have offices in every large city. The United States has traditionally supplied weapons to and assisted training of the Saudi Royal Armed Forces (all branches), Kuwait Royal Armed Forces (all branches), and Bahrain. The French provide Qatar with a handful of tanks, a few naval craft, and Mirage fighters. The UAE, Iraq, Iran and Yemen have been more flexible with weapons purchases, and therefore field an interesting variety. Oman continues to cultivate close military links to the United Kingdom, and by convenience, the United States. Iraq and Iran are caught in a similar predicament. Iraq has a veritable butt-load of old Russian tanks, from T-55s to T-72s. Some of Iraq's armor has been rebuilt , not by the Russians, but by American and Iraqi techs. God Bless the USA. The Iraqi Air Force is flying Apache Helicopters, and its my understanding that some of the ancient MIGS have been cleaned up. During both Gulf Wars, the Iraqi Air Force attempted to save its own ass by flying to various airbases in the region and asking for asylum. Most of those fighter jets never returned, although its my understanding that Jordan has recently returned a few. I can't help but be entertained by the Iranians, who IMMEDIATELY painted the Iraqi MIGS that sought refuge in Tehran, in Iranian Air Force livery and started training pilots. The Iraqi Army carries both AK-47s and M-16s, and has been vigorously re-trained by the U.S. It has had a handful of high profile victories, but way too many defeats. The Shi'a militia has helped, but Iraqi Society itself lives everyday in the midst of a schism. The Sunni and The Shi'a not only lack trust in one another, they despise each other. This issue has always crippled the Iraqi military and times haven't changed. The tiny Iraqi Navy consists of a few craft donated by the United States, to allow the Iraqi's to conduct customs inspections.
Iran has a very large military, with the Army alone consisting of various different elements. It reminds me of National Socialist Germany before 1939, when Hitler could rely on the SA, the SD, the Gestapo, and the regular army. You see, the religious leaders who sit in Qom and pray all day, don't trust the secular traditions of the regular Iranian Army. So alongside the regular army, Iran has the massive Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), and numerous smaller groups, including the Badr Corps, that have been active in Iraq and are tasked with protecting sacred Shi'a sites. The Iranian regular army is well-trained, equipped, and disciplined. I can't speak for the IRGC, but if the Iraq/Iran War is any indication, they will have no problem sacrificing their lives for the Islamic Revolution. The problem faced by the Iranian army is one of armor. The Iranians are obliged to continue using T-55s and T-72s, and even a few ancient British Chieftains. Iran has the capacity and the know-how to create an indigenous heavy battle tank, and the fact that this weakness has not been addressed is hard to understand. The Iranian Air Force is in the same predicament. The most modern and effective elements of the Iranian Air Force are the Iraqi fighters that fled to Iranian airports to avoid contact with U.S. fighters. This includes a number of Russian Sukhois and MIGS. The Iranians are also still flying U.S.-made F-4s. Why haven't the Iranians gone shopping in Russia for a new Air Force? Iran has an active, noisy, but relatively weak navy. In fact, the Iranian army is the only factor that allows Iran to remain an active participant in the current mess that is Iraq. Recently, the Iranian Air Force attempted to support offensive actions being taken by Shi'a militia in Iraq. The results were less than stellar. The Iranian government (both of them...the one in Qom and the one in Tehran) has been horrified by the advances made by the Islamic State (IS) in the Iraq/Iran border province of Diyala. If the United States had an effective diplomatic corps, they would have recognized this fact, and used it to pressure the Iranians to join the fight against the IS and to negotiate the nuclear issue in good faith. Instead, the United States had no reaction whatsoever. I would bet my last Dinar that John Kerry couldn't find Diyala Province on a map for a million bucks. But I digress...again. If the Iranian government felt sufficiently threatened, they could effect 100% mobilization, invade Iraq, and crush the IS in a month or less. The United States, Turkey, and possibly even Saudi Arabia have the capacity to destroy the IS in a ground campaign. But a military campaign of that size and commitment would also expose Iran's military weaknesses to the world, so it must be avoided. Perception is everything, the man said.
B. World's Largest Armies, According to Global Security
C. Business Insider's 35 Most Powerful Militaries
Now this is the kind of post I love to write. I've been an armchair General since I could stand on my own two feet. I grew up in a U.S. Army family stationed in Bad Hersfeld, Germany, and a number of other lovely towns. My older brother (and sister, on occasion) were always playing soldier. By the time I reached eight years old, my brother and I had accumulated a truly unbelievable collection of soldiers and tanks. In those days, you could mail-order military figures from the last page of Sgt. Rock, the Haunted Tank, The Unknown Soldier, or my favorite, Weird Wars comic books. We had Romans, Greeks and Persians, fully equipped with Trebuchets, Ballistas and Catapults (usually hand-carved by my father), and we had Red Coats and Blue Coats from the American Revolution. Because we were in Europe, it was difficult to obtain soldiers from the war for Texas Independence or the Civil Wart, but we more than made up for it with Napoleon's Imperial Guard and Wellington's Cavalry. But my brother and I spent most of our time re-living the battles of World War II. My father (a bit of an occasional participant, when the adults weren't looking) built a huge battlefield for us to use. It must have been six foot by six foot. I started life as a pine wood crate, but all we needed was one complete side (for the bottom) and about six inches (high) of pine barrier all along the edge. My father filled this with dirt and then added trees and rocks. The villages and rivers could be easily added as required. To complete this young boy's dream, I must have had one hundred same-scale little German tanks, and my brother, of course, had the same number of American (being older, he was always the good guys). Christmas and Birthdays weren't that difficult for my folks. Just go to the German toy store downtown, and buy Second World War-era soldiers and tanks. I had Tiger I and Tiger II tanks, Panthers, mobile artillery, half tracks, regular artillery, bridge-building Engineers, EVERYTHING! My father spent years, and my parents probably a fortune, turning our basement into the most amazing, easy-to-convert, battlefield. Needless to say, the neighborhood boys flocked to our basement. We fought Rommel vs. Montgomery in North Africa, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Kursk, Anzio, you name it. Today, kids still fight the same battles, but everything is done with computer graphics. Blah. Give me my die-cast armor and by rubber bands as weapons any day over "Call of Duty". My siblings and I were very fortunate children. My folks worked diligently at perfecting the balance between discipline and responsibility, and they sacrificed to give us every opportunity in life. I still consider the important decisions of my life using the same variables that I was taught as a child. Any success that I've had is a direct reflection of my parents.
By now you've grown used accustomed to my minor digressions, so lets move forward. I'm fascinated by the subject of military strength, especially as it relates to the hot spots of today's world. Over the next week, utilizing all the data I can access through the web and my personal library, I hope to provide a clear perception of the state of military affairs in the Middle East, in Africa, in Europe, the Indian sub-continent, and the Far East. The war gaming of my youth was without air and naval elements, which are a necessity in today's conflicts. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East. For the sake of our discussion, we will include in our "Middle East", the nations of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman. As for the Gulf States, which will be the (eventual) subjects of this post, I have selected Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iran, Yemen and Iraq. The world's major suppliers of weapons have offices in every large city. The United States has traditionally supplied weapons to and assisted training of the Saudi Royal Armed Forces (all branches), Kuwait Royal Armed Forces (all branches), and Bahrain. The French provide Qatar with a handful of tanks, a few naval craft, and Mirage fighters. The UAE, Iraq, Iran and Yemen have been more flexible with weapons purchases, and therefore field an interesting variety. Oman continues to cultivate close military links to the United Kingdom, and by convenience, the United States. Iraq and Iran are caught in a similar predicament. Iraq has a veritable butt-load of old Russian tanks, from T-55s to T-72s. Some of Iraq's armor has been rebuilt , not by the Russians, but by American and Iraqi techs. God Bless the USA. The Iraqi Air Force is flying Apache Helicopters, and its my understanding that some of the ancient MIGS have been cleaned up. During both Gulf Wars, the Iraqi Air Force attempted to save its own ass by flying to various airbases in the region and asking for asylum. Most of those fighter jets never returned, although its my understanding that Jordan has recently returned a few. I can't help but be entertained by the Iranians, who IMMEDIATELY painted the Iraqi MIGS that sought refuge in Tehran, in Iranian Air Force livery and started training pilots. The Iraqi Army carries both AK-47s and M-16s, and has been vigorously re-trained by the U.S. It has had a handful of high profile victories, but way too many defeats. The Shi'a militia has helped, but Iraqi Society itself lives everyday in the midst of a schism. The Sunni and The Shi'a not only lack trust in one another, they despise each other. This issue has always crippled the Iraqi military and times haven't changed. The tiny Iraqi Navy consists of a few craft donated by the United States, to allow the Iraqi's to conduct customs inspections.
Iran has a very large military, with the Army alone consisting of various different elements. It reminds me of National Socialist Germany before 1939, when Hitler could rely on the SA, the SD, the Gestapo, and the regular army. You see, the religious leaders who sit in Qom and pray all day, don't trust the secular traditions of the regular Iranian Army. So alongside the regular army, Iran has the massive Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution (IRGC), and numerous smaller groups, including the Badr Corps, that have been active in Iraq and are tasked with protecting sacred Shi'a sites. The Iranian regular army is well-trained, equipped, and disciplined. I can't speak for the IRGC, but if the Iraq/Iran War is any indication, they will have no problem sacrificing their lives for the Islamic Revolution. The problem faced by the Iranian army is one of armor. The Iranians are obliged to continue using T-55s and T-72s, and even a few ancient British Chieftains. Iran has the capacity and the know-how to create an indigenous heavy battle tank, and the fact that this weakness has not been addressed is hard to understand. The Iranian Air Force is in the same predicament. The most modern and effective elements of the Iranian Air Force are the Iraqi fighters that fled to Iranian airports to avoid contact with U.S. fighters. This includes a number of Russian Sukhois and MIGS. The Iranians are also still flying U.S.-made F-4s. Why haven't the Iranians gone shopping in Russia for a new Air Force? Iran has an active, noisy, but relatively weak navy. In fact, the Iranian army is the only factor that allows Iran to remain an active participant in the current mess that is Iraq. Recently, the Iranian Air Force attempted to support offensive actions being taken by Shi'a militia in Iraq. The results were less than stellar. The Iranian government (both of them...the one in Qom and the one in Tehran) has been horrified by the advances made by the Islamic State (IS) in the Iraq/Iran border province of Diyala. If the United States had an effective diplomatic corps, they would have recognized this fact, and used it to pressure the Iranians to join the fight against the IS and to negotiate the nuclear issue in good faith. Instead, the United States had no reaction whatsoever. I would bet my last Dinar that John Kerry couldn't find Diyala Province on a map for a million bucks. But I digress...again. If the Iranian government felt sufficiently threatened, they could effect 100% mobilization, invade Iraq, and crush the IS in a month or less. The United States, Turkey, and possibly even Saudi Arabia have the capacity to destroy the IS in a ground campaign. But a military campaign of that size and commitment would also expose Iran's military weaknesses to the world, so it must be avoided. Perception is everything, the man said.
Saturday, November 8, 2014
Its Time To Get To Know Jabhat al-Nusrah
Links: A. Al-Nusrah Claims That U.S. Has Bombed Its Territory
B. Al-Nusrah Front, Jun al-Aqsa Terrorist Groups In Idlib
C. Al-Nusrah Forces U.S.-Backed Group From Idlib
We've managed to dissect just about every player in Syria except Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front), the regular Syrian Army, and the Free Syrian Army.
support, the army had lost its eyes and was finding itself caught in one ambush after another. But the regular Syrian Army has been given the opportunity to retreat behind the front lines and lick its wounds, while the Kurds struggle against the IS in Kobani and forces supported by the U.S.(?) are driven out of Idlib (were the elements that were routed in Idlib connected to the Free Syrian Army?). Make no mistake, when the time is most advantageous to Assad, his military will return to the battlefield, and don't be surprised if Putin has assisted in rebuilding the Syrian Air Force.
Back to Jabhat al-Nusrah. This group announced its formation in Syria in January 2012, and states that its end goal is the creation of a Pan-Islamic State under Sharia Law and ruled by a Caliph. If we switched out "Jabhat al-Nusrah" with "Islamic State of the Levant", who would know the difference? And yet, according to Twitter, the international media, and the Pentagon, the two groups are at each other's throats. It is believed that many of the original members of Al-Nusrah are Syrians who were fighting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) group during Operation Enduring Freedom. The members of Al-Nusrah are believed to be the best trained and the best equipped of all the Sunni Extremist groups in the Syria/Iraq theater. Al-Nusrah is known for conducting suicide attacks. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the head of Al-Nusrah, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, appear to have had numerous discussions about the merging of the two groups. According to Al-Jazeera, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the only remaining leader of Al-Qaeda without two bullet holes in his forehead (so far), instructed the two groups not to merge. Al-Baghdadi ignored this instruction and continued to publicly declare a merger between the two. Since they appear to be separate today, I'm assuming al-Julani won that argument. But lets be honest; who really gives a shit about any of the back-and-forth that I just repeated (direct from Wikipedia)? Al-Nusrah is on the battlefield in Syria, its fighters are well-trained, disciplined, and like to blow themselves up for Allah. Much of the same can be said for the Islamic State, so as far as I see it, we are looking at two peas in a pod. When the bullets start to fly, I guarantee that these two groups (and any other Sunni-affiliated armed extremist groups) will join ranks. To be honest, the war in Syria means very little to me. The Russians will find a way to protect their interests in the end, so I am forced to accept that Assad isn't going anywhere. My interest is in Iraq, where we have easily identified allies in the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga/Kurdish regular forces. Actually, it becomes more apparent everyday that Iranian military units have been participating in the war against IS. From Assad in Syria to the Iranians in Iraq, we keep ending up with the strangest of bedfellows! I recognize that the Iraqi Army has been strengthened by groups of both Shia militia and Sunni tribal fighters. I see a real opportunity in Iraq to defeat Al-Qaeda/IS, solidify the Kurdish homeland, and greatly improve Sunni/Shia relations. Insha'Allah!
B. Al-Nusrah Front, Jun al-Aqsa Terrorist Groups In Idlib
C. Al-Nusrah Forces U.S.-Backed Group From Idlib
We've managed to dissect just about every player in Syria except Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front), the regular Syrian Army, and the Free Syrian Army.
The Regular Syrian Army
The regular Syrian Army consists of whatever Syrian President Bashir al-Assad has been able to patch together from the pre-war Syrian Army. The Syrian Air Force has been decimated and will have to be rebuilt from scratch (which isn't necessarily that difficult if you have the cash to buy new jets from Russia), but the Army, which has basically been inactive over the past few months, really only needs reorganizing and a strong leader who can inspire men to fight. Syria continues to have an absurd advantage in armor over all the players in this drama, and I imagine a great deal has been done to repair vehicles/tanks and train new soldiers. For Assad, the allied air intervention was like water to the man in the desert dying of thirst. He has been given a reprieve, and I have no doubt that he has been making the most of this down-time. We can't forget that Russia continues to support the Syrian government in Damascus. Vlad Putin is also grateful of the allied air campaign because the situation in Syria was becoming dire for Assad and his Ba'athist buddies. The IS was making preparations for an assault on Aleppo, which would have only been the precursor to an attack on Damascus itself. The Syrian Air Force, with most of its Air Bases overrun by the IS and other Islamic terrorist groups, had basically collapsed (with the exception of a few helicopter gunships, which Assad loves to call into action). Without airThe Free Syrian Army
What about the Free Syrian Army (forgive me; for some time I was referring to this group as the "New Syrian Army")? We digested news reports last week from Idlib (see link C) that detailed the rout of U.S.-backed fighters. Were these fighters part of the Free Syrian Army that we are supposed to be training and wasn't supposed to be operational for at least another month? And what about the statement from the Pentagon that the Free Syrian Army would be deployed in a defensive capacity only. Were "our" fighters in Idlib in a defensive posture before they were run out of town? Maybe this is a different group, and this is an indication that we are training other military elements that will have a more "offensive" plan of action. I find this hypothesis to be the most hard to believe, because until now the Obama Administration has been very generous sharing every last detail of its intentions. I see no reason to believe that the leopard has changed his spots; why train others as offensive pieces on the board, but leave the main body of your forces, the Free Syrian Army, in a purely defensive posture? I am surprised that we don't have more information regarding the Free Syrian Army, especially regarding its timetable. I can't help but wonder if this Free Syrian Army, in its effort to be "defensive", is going to get caught between the various Islamic groups in the east, and a reconstituted regular Syrian military in the west.Jabhat al-Nusrah (Al-Nusrah Front)
The first two links I chose to share provide important details regarding Jabhat al-Nusrah, or the Nusrah Front. The press, in its daily effort to retweet all the propaganda fed to it by the terrorist groups via social media, continues to remind us that al-Nusrah is the Al-Qaeda representative in Syria and that they are not friends with the IS whatsoever. Common sense, and a career of working against Islamic terror groups, leads me to suspect that someone is falling hook, line and sinker for the most obvious of disinformation campaigns. Khorasan hates al-Nusrah and al-Nusrah hates the Islamic State and since al-Nusrah is the representative of Al-Qaeda in Syria (?), then Al-Qaeda must also hate the Islamic State. Please, folks....listen carefully and try to see the truth in all its simplicity. All of these groups are Sunni affiliated and all have historic Al-Qaeda connections of one type or another. The Islamic State of the Levant was called Al-Qaeda in Iraq not to long ago, for goodness sake. I think the decision by the Qatari Air Force to only bomb targets selectively (no Al-Nusrah targets, please) was part of the effort to convince us that there is freedom of thought and movement in its each individual group. I don't accept this; as far as I'm concerned they are all Sunni terrorist groups who prey upon the weak and helpless. In fact, our military would be best served by keeping all these groups under one header: "THE ENEMY", and let the CTC analysts at Langley worry about the personalities within.Back to Jabhat al-Nusrah. This group announced its formation in Syria in January 2012, and states that its end goal is the creation of a Pan-Islamic State under Sharia Law and ruled by a Caliph. If we switched out "Jabhat al-Nusrah" with "Islamic State of the Levant", who would know the difference? And yet, according to Twitter, the international media, and the Pentagon, the two groups are at each other's throats. It is believed that many of the original members of Al-Nusrah are Syrians who were fighting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI) group during Operation Enduring Freedom. The members of Al-Nusrah are believed to be the best trained and the best equipped of all the Sunni Extremist groups in the Syria/Iraq theater. Al-Nusrah is known for conducting suicide attacks. The leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the head of Al-Nusrah, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, appear to have had numerous discussions about the merging of the two groups. According to Al-Jazeera, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the only remaining leader of Al-Qaeda without two bullet holes in his forehead (so far), instructed the two groups not to merge. Al-Baghdadi ignored this instruction and continued to publicly declare a merger between the two. Since they appear to be separate today, I'm assuming al-Julani won that argument. But lets be honest; who really gives a shit about any of the back-and-forth that I just repeated (direct from Wikipedia)? Al-Nusrah is on the battlefield in Syria, its fighters are well-trained, disciplined, and like to blow themselves up for Allah. Much of the same can be said for the Islamic State, so as far as I see it, we are looking at two peas in a pod. When the bullets start to fly, I guarantee that these two groups (and any other Sunni-affiliated armed extremist groups) will join ranks. To be honest, the war in Syria means very little to me. The Russians will find a way to protect their interests in the end, so I am forced to accept that Assad isn't going anywhere. My interest is in Iraq, where we have easily identified allies in the Iraqi military and the Peshmerga/Kurdish regular forces. Actually, it becomes more apparent everyday that Iranian military units have been participating in the war against IS. From Assad in Syria to the Iranians in Iraq, we keep ending up with the strangest of bedfellows! I recognize that the Iraqi Army has been strengthened by groups of both Shia militia and Sunni tribal fighters. I see a real opportunity in Iraq to defeat Al-Qaeda/IS, solidify the Kurdish homeland, and greatly improve Sunni/Shia relations. Insha'Allah!
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
What is in a Name? IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh
By Jennifer Jennings, Guest Blogger
sistereight@icloud.com Twitter @Sistereight
sistereight@icloud.com Twitter @Sistereight
B. Levant and al-Sham are not Synonyms
C. France Swtiches to Daesh Acronym
What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
- Act II, Scene II of Romeo and Juliet, William Shakespeare
What is in a name? Well, when it comes to branding … everything. And that includes the branding of political groups. While the truth of what a group represents is defined in large part by their deeds and actions, it is also defined, in part, by what others can be convinced to believe they represent. And this all starts with nomenclature, known in contemporary terms as “spin”. Normally I would have expected that a group lacking a clear, unambiguous, and universally recognized name would have difficulty maintaining legitimacy or attention. Perhaps this is my business background biasing my view. You usually can't get widespread attention for a product or your brand if everyone is referring to it as something different. But over the last four months I've seen the militant terrorists in Iraq and Syria get just this kind of attention despite the fact that no one can quite seem to agree on what to call them. I suppose when you destroy lives and property, take control of and oppress populations, and publicly behead those who disagree . . . well then you are bound to capture attention regardless of what various names are being used to refer to you. So why then all the disparity in names? And why the multiple news articles and mentions addressing the disparity? Wouldn’t it just be easiest to go with the self-given name of the group? Well, let's start with this then.
الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام
This is the self-given name of the militant terrorist group in question. Not so easy to use in European/western conversation, or oral news reporting, or even for readers to continually recognize in print. Even the romanization of the Arabic script leaves us with the lengthy: ad-Dawlah al-Islāmīyah fīl-ʻIraq wa ash-Shām, which is difficult for western ears, tongues and memories. So a translation seems the natural course: Put the name in the native language of the reader/listener. This will make it easier to refer to, easier to remember, and easier to understand in an instant just what it is that the group is self-proclaiming via their name. If only translation were so simple a task . . .
- ad-Dawlah translates easy enough as “the State” (which brings its own issues)
- al-Islāmīyah is also an easy translation to “Islamic” (also creating issues)
- fīl-ʻIraq is accepted to translate as “of Iraq”
The first two easily translated words form the “IS” basis of the names IS, ISIS, and ISIL, since there is no dispute that they translate as “the Islamic State”. And while it’s also readily accepted that the next portion translates as “of Iraq”, it is ambiguity with the final part that leads to the split between the users of ISIS and those of ISIL, and ultimately to those that avoid the dispute entirely by sticking simply with IS.
wa ash-Shām/ ISIS v ISIL
For translators, this is the most complicated portion of the self-given name. It refers to “al-Sham”: a region that is translated either as the Levant or as Syria. There are some that
claim that al-Sham and the Levant are essentially, or even exactly, the same thing, while others argue that there are cultural differences that indicate the true motivation of the jihadist group we are dealing with.
- The Levant: The term first appeared in English in 1497 and is borrowed from the French, levant, meaning “rising”. It is used to refer to the east Mediterranean, where the sun rises and is accepted to refer to a geographical and cultural region that includes Cyrpus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and part of Southern Turkey.
- al-Sham: This term refers to Bilad al-Sham which is sometimes also called “Greater Syria”. It is a province that is roughly incorporated by the same area as the Levant, but was in existence far earlier (630s-940s) as an Islamic Caliphate with Damascus as its capital.
DAESH
Another major difference in nomenclature for this militant jihadist group comes from the refusal to recognize them as a State, or as representing Islam. Daesh is a loose
As a civilized people, we like to label and neatly categorize. I started off feeling this same way; I was simply annoyed when one newscast said "ISIS" while the U.S. Government said "ISIL" and my Kurd Tweeps said "Daesh". Like most people, I am more comfortable if everyone is on the same page. I have come to accept that everyone is not. In my personal journey to figure out the “right name” for this group, I can’t say that I’ve come to any definitive conclusions. I know they’re the bad guys. But I have come to realize that it is much less important what I personally call "them", those evil militant beheaders in the Middle East, and more important that I keep listening to all the different names they call themselves and are being called by others. And that then I ask “why”? What motives and beliefs does each group have that cause it to refuse the name that others use and offer one of its own? Only then can I begin to get a glimmer of understanding into the chaos of this region.
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