Blame to go around as the Anbar Offensive against ISIS sputters to a halt on the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: The Anbar offensive appears to be failing.

Over the past few weeks, we've scoured news sources coming from Iraq, trying to get an accurate perspective on the offensive in Anbar Province that the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) launched in May.  The offensive operation, which included a simultaneous attack on ISIS-held Fallujah by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), had been planned to the smallest detail and included the training and equipment to deal with remote detonation explosives, booby-traps and urban warfare.  The last few days of May slipped away, then June.  In July, the Iraqi government started hinting that progress was being made, and that bit-by-bit, landmarks on the outskirts of the two cities had been secured.  In July, the government responded to questions about the slow pace of the offensive by reminding the media that the ISF wasn't singularly tasked with removing ISIS from Ramadi; the ISF was also responsible for locating and removing/defusing all the explosives and booby traps being left by ISIS to greet the returning residents of Ramadi.  The Iraqi government added that all the lessons learned from the last ISIS occupation of Ramadi were being considered in the staging of the current offensive.  That explanation sure sounded good to me, especially when the Iraqi government also took the time to thank the coalition air campaign for its accurate and decidedly helpful bombing sorties.  As August started to roll by, I was distracted by ISIS attacks in Diyala Province and the concerns regarding Baiji and Haditha.  Then the government announced its reform agenda, which immediately pushed Ramadi from the front page, and temporarily from my mind.  So we've waded through the reform issue, knowing as we did beforehand that Nouri al-Maliki would call in every marker owed to him to fight off this assault on his power base.  Now that the militias have cast their lot with Maliki, the political battle-lines are drawn.  But with the militias in the mix, we may end up seeing more violence on the streets of Basra than we are seeing on the streets of Ramadi.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's bold moves to reform the Iraqi political system will play out as a backdrop to developments in Anbar.  The Iraqi government's most immediate concern must be the growing impression that ISIS has not only fought off the Anbar offensive, but has started harassing the outlying villages around Baghdad as they had done before.  Iraqi Major General Qasim al-Mohammadi, the head of Anbar Operations Command, is quick with assurances that the offensive is still on track, and that it takes time to clear out every housing cluster, every shop, and every abandoned structure, taking care to remove all unexploded ordinance.  The fact that we've heard this line before doesn't make it any less accurate. From the beginning, our sources stressed that the Iraqi operational plan was built on lessons learned from previous encounters with ISIS.  Also, the Iraqi Army had a serious morale problem that had to be addressed before the Anbar operation.  One of the most frequent complaints was that officers showed indifference to the lives of the frontline troops.  The training modules for the Iraqi Army, including officers, now address that issue.  The slow rate of advance could be a reflection of Iraqi officers being more careful when putting troops in danger.  But Major General al-Mohammadi also expressed frustration with the allied air campaign.  He was very clear, as he was interviewed from his hospital bad after surviving a suicide bomb attack, that the allied air resources are stretched too thin, that there are too many competing targets.  The Pentagon was quick to deny this claim, pointing out that the U.S. spends roughly ten million dollars everyday on the allied air campaign, and that over the last year, coalition warplanes have carried out over four thousand airstrikes in Iraq. 

If history is any indication, then bad news is just around the corner.  Normally, when fingers get pointed, accountability is a no-show, and vital questions remain unanswered, then something is about to fall apart.  We were surprised to learn from the linked Washington Post article that ISIS maintains contact between its Fallujah and Ramadi cells, through the continued existence of a well-known road.  Why hasn't this road been obliterated by airstrikes?  How is it, that after months of news releases from not only the Iraqi government but on occasion by the Pentagon, pointing out the growing encirclement of ISIS units in Ramadi and Fallujah, that we now learn that ISIS forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are not isolated and are actually in regular contact with each other.  Given the ground resources poured into this operation, and the complete lack of heavy armor and very limited use of artillery on behalf of ISIS, how is it that after almost four months, the enemy is still able to re-enforce and re-supply its forces in Ramadi?  What about the F16s delivered to Iraq a few months back- its my understanding that their pilots spent years in the U.S. learning to fly those birds.  So why aren't they out there, bombing the hell out if ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah?  More training?  I know that only four planes are being delivered at a time, but when the enemy has NO air resources and very limited anti-aircraft equipment, I would imagine that those F16s would be out there everyday.  True, they will face the same obstacles as the allied air coalition, including unpredictable weather shifts and sandstorms, so maybe they are out there, doing as much as mother nature will allow.  I hope so.  At the end of the day, I don't see how the Abadi Administration can survive a failure of this magnitude.  A crippled government may be the smallest problem, though, as ISIS appears to be ready in a moments notice, to jump back on the offensive.

Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.

The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies.  In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi.  With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive.  Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.

as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province.  By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege.  The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province.  To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives.  One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS.  While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad.  ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself.  ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.

In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community.  Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support.  The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.

Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK.  Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list.  What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments.  Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass.  I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power.  Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support".  Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?

Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.

Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.

As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran.  Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable".  The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war.  We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.

The Iranians are faced with a number of options.  Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups.  The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province.  If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border.  In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero".  The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories.  On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat.  Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create.  Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord.  The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi.  The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.

Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala.  The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order.  But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years.  The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria).  The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban.  Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations.  You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around.  One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran.  So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?

Iraqi forces facing serious challenges from ISIS in Diyala and Babil provinces.

Link: ISIS attack on market leaves 115 dead.

As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province.  ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad.  Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary.  In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.

The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned.  According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar.  The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there.  Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure.  Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time.  The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.

And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar.  What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi.  It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad.  The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture.  The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs.  How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?

Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.

Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.

Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS).  Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah.  The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.  If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west.  After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi.  But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death.  Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication.  In this theater, nothing would surprise me.

The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts.  The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design.  Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs.  Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad.  The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority.  In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations.  While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire.  Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.

The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front.  Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time.  The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing.  Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions.  Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq.  The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack.  At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi.  The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces.  As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties.  Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply.  Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult.  But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements.  Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.  

Who lost Iraq?

Link: Politico magazine's take on "Who Lost Iraq"?


(Update: Before tackling today's unwieldy subject matter, it's time for a quick update, for any of our readers who have an interest.  The book that actually spawned this blog, Mukhabarat, Baby!, has been available at all the usual places (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Booklocker, etc.) for roughly three months.  While the blog has proven to be quite popular and continues to grow in viewership, the book has not done well.  The reviews have been tremendous; in fact, we have yet to receive a negative review.  But at the end of the day, the success of a book is measured in how much it is appreciated by readers, especially readers of its particular genre.  Its safe to say that MB has been unsuccessful with every particular genre.  Since the book has received great reviews, and does provide insight into a world that many seem to hold in fascination, what seems to be the problem?  We even have a comedy out this week with Melissa McCarthy playing a spy.  I have to be honest; it does look funny, and she always seems to make me laugh.  As for MB, the problem is simple to diagnose.  I have been unable to gain traction with regards to exposure.  People aren't buying my book because they don't know it exists.  I haven't been reviewed in the NY Times, Wall Street Journal, or Washington Post, and I haven't been invited onto any news programs to discuss my career and the book.  If an author is fortunate enough to have a good agent and publisher, they run a strong likelihood of being successful, like the Housewives from Beverly Hills and the Duck Dynasty folks (both of whom are or were on the Non-Fiction Best Seller List), while self-published authors like me, even if they follow all of the good advice out there, end up with beautiful blogs and amazing internet book sites, and spend their week nights introducing their book to a virtually deserted VFW somewhere in the middle of the desert in Arizona.  But I won't throw in the towel.  I'm still out there, setting up speaking engagements and talking up my book.  Why not hop on to Amazon and buy it?  Better yet, hop on to Amazon and buy a copy for yourself and separate copies for your friends.  Cheers, friends.)

When someone forwarded me a link to the Politico article which attempts to address the question, "Who lost Iraq?", I had no idea what to expect.  Occasionally Politico will throw a curve, and this has been a rather popular subject in recent weeks.  I read the article through twice, and I can't say that they did a bad job.  Politico assembled a group of persons that it has decided are experts on Iraq, and asked them particular questions regarding the insurgency, the surge, the draw-down, and the current conflict involving ISIS.  After taking a look at the lineup assembled to give us our answers, I couldn't help but wonder, how did they decide which questions to ask what person?  And who chose the "experts" to begin with?  For the sake of the argument, lets give Politico the benefit of the doubt, and move on with the conversation.

Let's start with two basic facts.  First, in 2009, Iraq was making great strides in its recovery from three wars and almost five decades of Saddam Hussein.  The economy was growing, the refineries were functioning, the job market was growing, and construction projects were going on everywhere.  The school were open, including a number of new institutions that were built and paid for by the United States.  In fact, we paid for just about everything, including the infrastructure repair.  The roads and bridges were usable, traffic flowed with working signals and traffic cops were around to assist with accidents and back-ups.  International flights were landing at Baghdad International and, most importantly, the job market was growing. Iraq was on its feet and nearly ready to run its own show.  The past remaining piece of the puzzle?  Iraq was in serious need of a reliable police force and a dependable, well-trained and well-supplied army.  The U.S. military can be given all the credit for the positive changes in Iraq, and should have been left alone to complete the training of the Iraqi Security apparati (police, military, border control, customs, etc.) on their own schedule.

The second point that we can all agree on is that Iraq is now in a state of war with the "Islamic State for the creation of a Caliphate in the Levant", or ISIS, as it is commonly known.  ISIS is a terrorist organization that has developed a powerful, mobile, well-armed conventional army, and it is determined to gain effective control of both Syria and Iraq (and eventually the rest of the Levant).  In 2012 and 2013, ISIS, which until then had been content to raise hell with Bashir al-Assad and his forces in Syria, decided to expand its religious war into northern Iraq.  Mosul fell, and Kirkuk and Arbil were threatened.  The Kurds were put on the defensive and had to military repel ISIS with very little assistance from the outside.  Each new bit of territory that ISIS occupied brought with it new victims; Christians or the wrong kind of Muslims, who were lined up and executed by the hundreds.  At present, ISIS controls much of northwest Iraq, including the border crossings into Syria.  ISIS also controls parts of Anbar Province, including both Ramadi and Fallujah.  Although Tikrit was recently retaken by the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIS continues to put pressure on Baiji and its valuable oil refinery, and recently has stepped up suicide attacks in Diyala Province to the east of Baghdad.  Control of Anbar and Diyala Provinces will allow ISIS to pay siege to Baghdad itself.

So given those two points, what happened to turn situation number one into situation number two?  I will save everyone a little time and answer this myself, because its really not very complicated.  The U.S. military had a timetable for all operations dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Because of the success of the surge and the positive involvement of the Sunni community in defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, it was imperative that the United States not lose that goodwill by abandoning the Iraqi people before their government and its functions were in place to work effectively.  This is exactly the action that was taken by President Obama.  Ignoring the advice of the Pentagon, Obama ordered an increase in the U.S. military departure schedule.  President Obama was bound and determined that our troops would be out of Iraq by such-and-such date.  Soldiers, including Generals, will only object for so long before they will just shut-up and carry out their orders.  We left Iraq before any of their Security forces were prepared.  In fact, we left before the police were prepared to issue speeding tickets, let alone stand up to ISIS.  In response to the growing alarm in the civilian community, the Iraqi government ordered its army to confront ISIS on the battlefield outside Tikrit.  I don't have to remind everyone about the mass desertions, the equipment left on the battlefield for ISIS to steal, and the prisoners captured for more video of mass executions.  Iraq has fallen to shit because we left before our military had sufficiently trained the Iraqis to successfully defend their country in what is obviously an evolving and very dangerous environment.  Why?  Where was the fire, as my grandma used to say?  Why was it so damn necessary to leave Iraq so quickly, instead of a few years down the road when the Iraqis were in a better position to stand up to ISIS?  Our policy not only let down the Iraqi people, it also played into the hands of Iran, who is now seen as the hero in this unfolding nightmare, because the Shi'a militias they train and advise have come to the aid of the Iraqi Security Forces, and with some success.

Let me leave you with the biggest irony of all: how is the Obama Administration dealing with the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces?  Why, we are sending in Army trainers and instructors....the same folks who should have been left to do their jobs in the first place.  Que loco.

Islamic State focuses on Diyala Province

Link: Suicide bomber kills 14 in Iraq

Operative from the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization continue to utilize suicide bombings in their efforts to take control of strategic areas of Iraq.  In recent weeks, the IS has increased its activity in Diyala Province, just east of Baghdad.  Normally, the media focuses on events on Baiji, Anbar (Ramadi) and Salah ad-Din (Samarrah) Provinces, although the IS has been active in Diyala for many months.  This week, an IS suicide bomber killed fourteen people at a gathering of Sunni tribal leaders in Baqubah.  Analysts might be tempted to assume that this event will drive the Sunni community further away from the IS and its mission.  But to predict the actions of the various different Iraqi groups is dangerous business.  During my career, I learned to never forget that different cultures respond in different ways to particular stimuli.  Its very possible that the IS is using violence to portray strength, which in turn might (ideally) frighten the Sunni community into joining their cause.  One thing is certain - if the Sunnis of Iraq sense that an IS victory is inevitable, you can guarantee that they will start setting up their tents under a different flag.

Diyala Province presents a strategic target for the IS for a number of reasons.  The people of Iraq are already aware of IS aggression in Anbar and Salah ad-Din Provinces, not to mention the initial incursion into northern Iraq, which resulted in the occupation of Mosul and Tikrit (since retaken), and the apparently never-ending struggle for Baiji and its oil refinery.  Adding Diyala Province to the mix, effectively surrounds Baghdad, and provides a visual impression of IS domination.  Also, the IS would like nothing better than to see the Iranians decide that Iraq isn't worth the sacrifice, and stop its support for the government in Baghdad and the various Shi'a militias that have actually had some battlefield success against IS forces.  Since Diyala Province shares a lengthy border with Iran, no doubt the Iranians will feel a bit of pressure, as the boundaries of Iran have not been legitimately threatened since the 1980 to 1988 Iraq-Iran War.  You can be sure that the IS will turn up the heat in just the right way, so that the Iranians will be forced to consider just how much their involvement in Iraq is worth.  Its actually a bit of a gamble; the IS military campaign in Diyala might also force Iran to recognize how much its national security equities are inexorably tied to a peaceful Iraq.  We've always considered the possibly that Iran might tip over the entire table by launching a full invasion of Iraq.  We believe that the Iranian military has the capability of destroying IS' conventional military capability, as long as the Syrian border does not present a problem.  Chasing the IS into Syria will only grant them a reprieve.  If the Iranians were to invade Iraq with their regular Armed Forces, they should be prepared to finish the job, which may require an incursion into Syria, all the way to the doorsteps of Aleppo and Damascus.  You would be hard pressed to find someone as opposed to the current Iranian regime as we are, but it would be nice to see someone with a pair of balls, no matter from what corner of the ring the emerge.  And the Iranians have been known to pull a few surprises.  Its probably unlikely that the Iranians would commit their regular Armed Forces in this manner, but its getting more and more difficult everyday to handicap this conflict.

Back to the Sunni versus Shi'a, a bit of historical perspective.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Sunni Islam.
           B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
           C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.

When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim.  I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times.  But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you.  Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially.  The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite.  I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave.  Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991.  As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good.  For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort.  The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion.  It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.

But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences.  Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a.  This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network.  In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual.  Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular.  This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was  the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I.  The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness.  If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.

We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries.  The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government.  For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military.  This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority).  The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed.  On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq.  Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran.  In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a.  Iraq is a prime example.  The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense).  The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.

For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement.  As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over.  What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever.  In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback.  With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.

The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?

Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
           B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
           C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq

We all have our routines.  In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news.  I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media.  For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq.  Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically.  As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth.  When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy.  Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network.  Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail.  The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces".  Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria.  Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army".  The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only.  About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush.  An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.

For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope.  In other words, its a mess.  Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered.  I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three.  Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive.  In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area.  I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am.  As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran.  No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat.  This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well.  The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad.  Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.

I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army.  I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin.  Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus.  I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad.  Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria.  I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad.  But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon.  This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.

Back to my simple list of questions:

• What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?  
• Has the FSA been stood up?  
• Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?  
• What is the status of the air campaign?  
• What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?  
• If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?  
• If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved? 

The War Against ISIL Is Being Lost While Obama Vacations...Again

Links: A. Iranian Militia-Leader Killed In Iraq
           B. ISIL Retakes Baiji In Iraq 
           C. Russia Steps Up Involvement In Syria


I read in today's Washington Post that President Barrack Obama's favorability rating had improved up to 47 percent.  I guess we should infer that the American people approve of the President acting unilaterally for the sole purpose of creating voters to support his political ideology.  And, if the Amnesty issue wasn't irksome enough, Obama has decided (again, UNILATERALLY), to start the process of normalizing relations with Cuba.  Obama announced this effort in his usual fashion.  By declaring that the United States would be making all of the compromises and that in order to gain our friendship, Cuba would have to do....nothing.  No, they were not required to release political prisoners, or legalize opposition parties, or end detention without trail.  They weren't even asked to end their campaign of terror against U.S. citizens living in Florida who happen to oppose the Castro dictatorship.  Obama makes two huge unilateral decisions and goes on vacation, and his approval jumps to 47 percent.  Obviously he has this country figured out and I'm living in the past.

Lets cool off a bit by discussing the Islamic State (ISIL) and its offensives in both Syria and Iraq.  Link C details very recent Russian efforts to get diplomatic traction in Syria.  Not surprisingly, the EU bent over and greased up for Putin, I guess to reward him for not snatching another piece of Ukraine this week (I shouldn't complain....and least it was the EU and not Uncle Sam taking it south-ways this week).  Putin's recent interest in Syria comes on the heels of recent unexpected military disasters for the regular Syrian Army in battles with ISIL.  Remember, you heard it hear first (at least two months ago); Putin will not forsake Bashir al-Assad, at least not until he can replace him with another sycophant who will provide the Russian navy with a full-size (read: ballistic submarines) naval facility on Syria's Mediterranean Coast.  What were John Kerry and the U.S. State Department doing while Putin was snuggling up to the EU? Probably smoking celebratory cigars with the Castro brothers.  Since Obama enjoys adulation so much, I predict a trip to Havana is in the planning stages (again, remember you heard it here!).  I wonder if he will think twice about the hundreds, maybe thousands of political prisoners that are rotting in Cuban jails without any kind of due process, some as young as thirteen years old. While Putin was re-establishing his Bona Fides vis-a-vis the Syrian conflict, the United States was continuing its illustrious Air Campaign against ISIL.  In all honestly, the ineffectiveness of this military initiative has been a shock.  Knowing the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force, I fully expected that ISIL would be suffering by now from supply problems.  Our Air Force in Iraq and Afghanistan, using drones and ground troops to locate and verify targets, made it impossible for the enemy to move, let alone refuel, rearm and resupply.    As I woke up this Sunday morning and read the news before Mass, I was reminded that ISIL has devastated regular Syrian Army positions in Eastern and Western Syria, and also retaken the town of Baiji, which was surrendered by the Iraqi Army without so much as fart in the direction of the enemy.  But the Oil Refinery was heavily defended, which illustrates the priority of the Iraqi government.  Let the people in Baiji get abused and in some cases, murdered by ISIL, as long as the money-maker keeps pumping.

Lately I've been very impressed with the willingness of the Iranians to take on ISIL in Iraq.  The truth is, they recognize the threat that this group represents.  Link A details the assassination of an important Iranian militia leader, who was active in Iraq's Diyala Province.  Well, Diyala is in Eastern Iraq, just outside of Baghdad, and could not be more strategic.  I was a bit perplexed by the number of individual Iranian-backed Shiite militias that were active in Iraq.  These include, but are not limited to, the Mukhtar Army, Hezbollah Brigades (Hezbollah in Iraq, not Lebanon), Badr Brigades, Asaib al Haq, and something called the Peace Brigade.  C'mon, Ayatollah whoever you are, don't you realize how much more effective to would be if you just merged these groups together?  Each militia, fighting separately, with its own politically-focused leader, will have a miniscule impact on the conflict as opposed to what could be accomplished with one, well-equipped and properly led militia.  At least the Iranians are recognizing the seriousness of the situation.  The Iraqi Army cannot gain any traction.  After publicizing the recapture of one or two towns, they pray that the local press won't also announced that four towns were occupied by ISIL during the same time period.  Something tells me that the Iranians will be forced to launch a full-scale military  intervention in Iraq.  Its obviously something they would like to avoid, or at least delay until Obama finds a way to diplomatically allow them to enrich as much uranium as they want. Since Obama has been in office, the Iranians have moved closer and closer to complete independence for their nuclear program.

ISIL is on the offensive in Syria, and giving the Iraqi Army and the Iranian militias fits in Iraq.  What about our bombing campaign?  Where are the figures?  I want to know how much ordinance has been expended and what the enemy has lost.  You know the military has those figures at their fingertips.  Normally I wouldn't care, but I'm trying to understand how a ragtag group of terrorists, totally without air support (except for a few drones, we're told), is moving around Iraq and Syria with impunity?  How was ISIL able to reoccupy a town as large and strategic as Baiji, under the nose of the air coalition led by the United States Air Force, and including elements from France, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE?  Anyone?  I don't see any slowdown in ISIL, so how about we save the U.S. taxpayer billions of dollars and just pull out?  John Kerry should understand the policy.  Its what he advocated for when he returned from Vietnam, remember?

On a separate note, I want to acknowledge all the media reports of Fidel Castro announcing Cuba's refusal to move one inch away from its Communist principles.  I'm shocked that anyone would be surprised.  Cuba isn't going to change, folks.  What will happen, is a bunch of rich businessmen who donated money to Obama (and possibly Rand Paul as well), will build new, flashy resorts around the island, and make a ton of money.  The Cuban elite will get their cut, the black market that runs the Cuban economy will get its due, and Obama's base will hail their icon as the man who saved the Cuban people (from the mean, ol' USA).  Folks, the reality is, no one gives a shit about Cuba or the Cuban people.  If Obama thought about Cuba even once while trotting from the sixth hole to the seventh, I will eat my hat.  The goal isn't to change Cuba.  ITS TO CHANGE THE UNITED STATES.  More damage has been done to our Constitution in the last six years than has been done in the previous two hundred.  This Imperial Administration is allowed to ignore an obvious electoral mandate, and just sideswipe Congress to enact monumental legislation.  And the nut-less wonders Boehner and McConnell got over on us again, as nothing as yet to be even suggested in opposition to Obama's actions.  Well, the GOP will have a nice surprise come 2016.  I'm not sure about the Presidential Election, but conservative and moderate independent voters will either split the primary or not vote.  The GOP rhinos have called the bluff of their own voters one too many times.