Links: A. Turkey unilaterally invades Iraq to launch attacks against Kurdish PKK militants.
B. Iraq claims to have retaken 60% of Ramadi City.
In a move that will no doubt escalate already dangerously high tensions in the area, Turkey deployed military units into northeastern Iraq, just outside of Mosul, in order to more effectively launch attacks against militants from the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). If Turkish President Erdogan was looking for the quickest way to unite the Kurds, and at the same time, bring the Iraqi government and the Kurdish authorities closer together, they found it. Turkey's actions are almost inexplicable, unless Erdogan is determine to make things difficult for Barack Obama as he tries to leave office gracefully. At the same time, the Pentagon is preparing to deploy roughly 200 U.S. Army Special Forces elements into Iraq, to act as a mobile "hit squad" to take out ISIS leaders, if you will. This policy seems to fly in the face of Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, which prohibits any Agent or Representative of the United States Government from involvement in assassinations. I may be nit-picking here, especially since we already are aware of this Administration's perception of the Constitution and the laws of this nation. Either way, the arrival of this American Special Forces Unit has already come under heavy criticism in Baghdad, where Prime Minister Abadi is doing everything he can to keep the ship of state from sinking altogether. Abadi is under particular pressure from the Shi'a elements in the Council of Representatives, who are angling to bring a vote of no confidence against the Iraqi Prime Minister. Also, Iranians in Baghdad are as thick as fleas on a mongrel's back, and they are also putting pressure on the government, both to oppose the deployment of more U.S. troops, and to take action against the Turkish incursion northeast of Mosul. Abadi has been under fire before, but this time his administration may not survive.
One of the most appalling and embarrassing developments in the region has been the continued intransigence from the Iranians with regards to any U.S. diplomatic or military initiatives. I assume that following the nuclear treaty negotiations, the Obama Administration (the President, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry in particular) expected the Iranian government to lighten the anti-U.S. rhetoric and to be less aggressive in opposing every U.S. action in the region. I knew better, and you knew better, but for some reason, the three men with the greatest access to intelligence on this planet, didn't see this coming. Or did they, and it just didn't matter? At the moment, events in Iraq and Syria need to be stabilized, before the Iraqi's end up at war with Turkey, or the Turks decide that the time is right to "ethnic-cleanse" northern Iraq of Kurds once and for all. The action ordered by the President and taken by the Pentagon to deploy Special Forces is way too little and way too late, and will cause more harm than good, especially if Abadi falls from power. It has been suggested (whispered more like) in DC that the Obama Administration is hesitant to take stronger military action against ISIS, because increased U.S. presence in the region will infuriate Iran, and put Obama's "legacy treaty" with Iran in jeopardy.
What we can expect is the Administration attempting to steer the media away from connecting the recent terror attack in San Bernardino to the ongoing conflict in Syria. Obama is bound and determined to avoid getting drawn into a full-scale war in Syria/Iraq. I'm not so reactionary that I don't see the ideological motivation; the United States has a tempestuous relationship with most of the governments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and lets not forget that we invaded Iraq twice in the last thirty years. Our historical tradition of supporting unpopular governments in Egypt and Iran and our long-term, close relationship with Israel, have not endeared the U.S. to the people of the region, that's for sure. But the clock is ticking (excuse the cliché); ISIL/ISIS/Daesh or whatever you want to call them, have not been really impacted by the Russian intervention in Syria (probably because most of the Russian bombs were dropped on anti-government Syrian groups as opposed to ISIS). ISIS is increasing its activities in Africa and in the Far East, and I expect we will soon see a more regular pattern to domestic terror events (God forbid). Still today, on December 9, 2015, the United States is military capable of destroying ISIS on our own. But a serious effort at building a military coalition, to include our European allies and Russia (who should be told, bluntly, to "get on board or get out of the way"), would a tremendous advantage in eliminating this scourge once and for all. Why now? Because if ISIS continues to raise money and recruit, I have no idea how improved their conventional army will become (with modern weapons, tanks, artillery, and possibly and Air element), nor can we accurately gauge how complicated and dangerous the situation will be in the urban and residential areas of Europe and the United States. Some crusty old General once said, that when you go to war, you must use everything at your disposal, every weapon, no matter how heinous, and you must fight with the utmost aggression and determination. This is the formula for ending a war quickly, which will save countless lives on both sides, especially when compared to wars that drag on and on and on......
Showing posts with label PKK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PKK. Show all posts
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
Sunday, August 23, 2015
Kurdish politics, and other confusing headaches.
Links: A. Kurdish political parties trying to resolve presidential debate.
B. Wikipedia entry for Peshmerga.
C. Wikipedia entry for PKK.
During my career, I was fortunate enough to work closely with representatives of both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 2003 and 2004, the opposing Kurdish political parties had set aside much of their differences, at least in Baghdad, for the best interests of the greater Iraqi Kurdish community. Both groups were represented by well-educated, deferential, hard-working people, who were tremendously supportive of the United States and our military forces in particular. I remember that the PUK had taken possession of two large, adjoining compounds in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, which they utilized for a variety of purposes, including regular meetings with representatives of U.S. government agencies. Jalal Talabani, founder and leader of the PUK, maintained a much more elaborate residence in Baghdad, closer to the Karada neighborhood. My initial visit to the PUK compound brought me into contact with Peshmerga (Kurdish for "one who confronts death") for the first, but certainly not the last time. The Peshmerga are the military forces for the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; they attempt to maintain a non-aligned posture with regards to the PUK and KDP, who have, at times, really had a go at each other. Although I've never seen a female Peshmerga, I've been told that they exist. This group represents the type of self-reliant, hardy, low-maintenance soldier that we don't see much anymore. They are brave, well-trained, and move together flawlessly when operational. That being said, I wouldn't invite them to a candlelight dinner party. From my experience (forgive the stereotyping), they stink, and although not rude, normally haven't picked up much in the way of manners. I wrote in my book about a meeting I had once at the PUK house, where we discovered two Peshmerga asleep under the table because of the volume and frequency of their farts. Aside from the U.S. Armed Forces, I can't think of any group that I would want fighting by my side more than the Peshmerga.
I have at times been accused of being biased towards the Kurds. I am guilty as charged. I have no qualms about admitting that I support the Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland. As a people, they are kind, generous, welcoming, hard-working and very family-oriented. They can also hold a grudge for a very long, long time. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but the manner of worship in the Kurdish community, regardless of affiliation, is much different than what is normally observed in the Arab world. Kurds are private about their religious observations, although most Kurds are very observant of Islamic obligations. They go about their business in such a way as to not draw attention to themselves. This is a true example of a community that values the private nature of its religious identity. Sure, the majority are Sunni Muslim, but they don't advocate the use of shura to settle every issue, nor do they feel this automatic disconnect with Christians and Jews. I understand the reasoning behind keeping Iraq united. If the Kurds were granted a homeland in northern Iraq, the rest of the country would be in danger of disintegration. Maybe its time for that disintegration to take place, given that the area that was once known as Babylon, then Mesopotamia, and now Iraq, has not made a great success of ethnic integration. It might happen with or without the Kurds, especially if the majority Shi'a continue to assert themselves and the Sunni start to consider life inside the Islamic Republic of Iraq.
Turkey's recent decision to end the de-facto cease fire with the quasi-military organization the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), has been a reminder that the ISIS crisis is one of a number of unresolved conflicts in this part of the world, that sit just under the skin, waiting to erupt again. Northern Syria is home to a substantial number of ethnic Kurds, and the anti-ISIS coalition has benefitted tremendously from their willingness to stand up and defend their own communities. Even the Turks have benefitted, as Ankara is not keen about having ISIS as a direct neighbor. But the Turks are experts at separating one group of Kurds from another. According to Ankara, the Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS tooth-and-nail are not connected to the "terrorist" PKK. Turkey's decision to conduct bombing sorties against suspected PKK locations was a naked political move on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to energize anti-Kurd elements in Turkey before pivotal fall elections. Not surprisingly, many in the Turkish electorate will scream for vengeance regarding three Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack, and not think twice about the Kurds whose murder precipitated the retaliatory ambush. All the while, the Kurdistan Parliament, which sits in Arbil, is struggling with the never-ending debate over the office of President. The current office-holder, President Masoud Barzani, is the head of the KDP. In 2009, Barzani was elected with 69.9 % of the vote, and in 2013, the parliament decided to extend his term until 2015. The five major Kurdish political parties were attempting to resolve the issue of succession, but failed before Barzani's term expired on August 20. Believe me, Kurdish politics can get very complicated. Its imperative that Kurdistan present a united front, given the renewed trouble with Turkey and the continuing war against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. The PDK will argue for another extension for Barzani, which, for political expediency, will be supported by the PUK. The remaining parties do not represent enough votes to budge a joint KDP/PUK effort. Expect the Kurdistan Parliament to extend Barzani's term to 2017, when it meets to debate the issue on August 23.
B. Wikipedia entry for Peshmerga.
C. Wikipedia entry for PKK.
During my career, I was fortunate enough to work closely with representatives of both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). In 2003 and 2004, the opposing Kurdish political parties had set aside much of their differences, at least in Baghdad, for the best interests of the greater Iraqi Kurdish community. Both groups were represented by well-educated, deferential, hard-working people, who were tremendously supportive of the United States and our military forces in particular. I remember that the PUK had taken possession of two large, adjoining compounds in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, which they utilized for a variety of purposes, including regular meetings with representatives of U.S. government agencies. Jalal Talabani, founder and leader of the PUK, maintained a much more elaborate residence in Baghdad, closer to the Karada neighborhood. My initial visit to the PUK compound brought me into contact with Peshmerga (Kurdish for "one who confronts death") for the first, but certainly not the last time. The Peshmerga are the military forces for the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; they attempt to maintain a non-aligned posture with regards to the PUK and KDP, who have, at times, really had a go at each other. Although I've never seen a female Peshmerga, I've been told that they exist. This group represents the type of self-reliant, hardy, low-maintenance soldier that we don't see much anymore. They are brave, well-trained, and move together flawlessly when operational. That being said, I wouldn't invite them to a candlelight dinner party. From my experience (forgive the stereotyping), they stink, and although not rude, normally haven't picked up much in the way of manners. I wrote in my book about a meeting I had once at the PUK house, where we discovered two Peshmerga asleep under the table because of the volume and frequency of their farts. Aside from the U.S. Armed Forces, I can't think of any group that I would want fighting by my side more than the Peshmerga.
I have at times been accused of being biased towards the Kurds. I am guilty as charged. I have no qualms about admitting that I support the Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland. As a people, they are kind, generous, welcoming, hard-working and very family-oriented. They can also hold a grudge for a very long, long time. The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but the manner of worship in the Kurdish community, regardless of affiliation, is much different than what is normally observed in the Arab world. Kurds are private about their religious observations, although most Kurds are very observant of Islamic obligations. They go about their business in such a way as to not draw attention to themselves. This is a true example of a community that values the private nature of its religious identity. Sure, the majority are Sunni Muslim, but they don't advocate the use of shura to settle every issue, nor do they feel this automatic disconnect with Christians and Jews. I understand the reasoning behind keeping Iraq united. If the Kurds were granted a homeland in northern Iraq, the rest of the country would be in danger of disintegration. Maybe its time for that disintegration to take place, given that the area that was once known as Babylon, then Mesopotamia, and now Iraq, has not made a great success of ethnic integration. It might happen with or without the Kurds, especially if the majority Shi'a continue to assert themselves and the Sunni start to consider life inside the Islamic Republic of Iraq.
Turkey's recent decision to end the de-facto cease fire with the quasi-military organization the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), has been a reminder that the ISIS crisis is one of a number of unresolved conflicts in this part of the world, that sit just under the skin, waiting to erupt again. Northern Syria is home to a substantial number of ethnic Kurds, and the anti-ISIS coalition has benefitted tremendously from their willingness to stand up and defend their own communities. Even the Turks have benefitted, as Ankara is not keen about having ISIS as a direct neighbor. But the Turks are experts at separating one group of Kurds from another. According to Ankara, the Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS tooth-and-nail are not connected to the "terrorist" PKK. Turkey's decision to conduct bombing sorties against suspected PKK locations was a naked political move on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to energize anti-Kurd elements in Turkey before pivotal fall elections. Not surprisingly, many in the Turkish electorate will scream for vengeance regarding three Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack, and not think twice about the Kurds whose murder precipitated the retaliatory ambush. All the while, the Kurdistan Parliament, which sits in Arbil, is struggling with the never-ending debate over the office of President. The current office-holder, President Masoud Barzani, is the head of the KDP. In 2009, Barzani was elected with 69.9 % of the vote, and in 2013, the parliament decided to extend his term until 2015. The five major Kurdish political parties were attempting to resolve the issue of succession, but failed before Barzani's term expired on August 20. Believe me, Kurdish politics can get very complicated. Its imperative that Kurdistan present a united front, given the renewed trouble with Turkey and the continuing war against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq. The PDK will argue for another extension for Barzani, which, for political expediency, will be supported by the PUK. The remaining parties do not represent enough votes to budge a joint KDP/PUK effort. Expect the Kurdistan Parliament to extend Barzani's term to 2017, when it meets to debate the issue on August 23.
Monday, August 3, 2015
Turkey continues pressure on PKK.
Link: Turkish military bombs PKK targets.
Turkey has decided that the time is right to tackle the difficult problem of independence for Iraq's Kurdish population. Turkey has an unfortunate history of dealing with the Kurds, including allegations of past genocide and pogroms. Turkey would like nothing more than to make the problem disappear, and the military solution seems to be the one that Turkey likes the most. The PKK, a self-appointed political and military representative of Turkey's Kurdish population, has been a thorn on the shoe of the Turkish Armed Forces, for years. The PKK has never suffered from lack of funding as the Kurd diaspora has generously supplied the movement with resources, weapons, and media representation. The PKK has created a difficult situation by utilizing locale familiarity and support to regularly ambush Turkish military patrols. Ankara has been very hesitant to unleash the full blunt of its military against the PKK, which is holed up in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, because of the fear that the international community would not approve. More importantly, a full military offensive involving the Air Force and Turkey's mighty armor units would give the impression that the PKK movement is making progress in its efforts.
What does the PKK want? Basically, the PKK is fighting for a Kurdish homeland in eastern Turkey, and at times the movement has garnered tremendous international attention from the actions of female suicide activists. At times, the PKK has played nice with its Iraq-based PUK and PDK counterparts, which has raised hopes in the Kurdish community that the three organizations might be able to exert enough influence to create a Kurdish independent state from Turkish and Iraqi territory. In fact, when the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq appeared close to actual success in seceding from Iraq, a great deal of pressure was exerted on the PKK to give up the armed struggle in Turkey, and join the new Kurdish state being born in northern Iraq. But the Iraqi Kurds got a bit ahead of themselves. The international community, and the United States in particular, decided that the time had not yet arrived to dissolving the Iraqi state as we know it, and the Kurds were left empty-handed. The PKK was probably thrilled that the effort failed, because a successful Kurdish state in northern Iraq would arguably remove the need for a Kurdish state in Anatolia. Its should come as no surprise that the PKK as it exists today, has become an enterprise of sorts, with people making a living from the continued struggle. The cessation of the effort would certainly close the pocket books of many in the Kurdish diaspora. In fact, the informal cease fire that existed between Turkey and the PKK since 2013, had started to impact the money-collection efforts in international Kurdish communities. But the recent attacks on PKK targets, including civilians, will certainly piss off Kurds everywhere, and the money flow should return to normal.
With the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the remaining forces of de facto Syrian president Bashir al-Assad continuing on its southern border, you would think that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would have enough trouble on his hands. But Erdogan is a master politician, who is always looking into the future before deciding what decisions to make today. Erdogan suffered badly in the last Turkish elections, which he probably didn't expect. He normally doesn't get surprised twice, at least not in the same manner. He is taking care of business. And in Turkey, nothing mobilizes the Turkish voter like a bit of Kurdish/PKK misbehavior, and if the cease fire is keeping the PKK quiet, then it was up to Erdogan to stir the hornets nest a bit. As usual, Erdogan displayed politically adept timing, and waited until the entire international community was focusing on the nuclear treaty between the United States and Iran, and also the continuing military drama evolving in Iraq's Anbar Province, to launch a completely unprovoked attack on a PKK target. Not surprisingly, the PKK, after taking a sigh of relief that its raison d'etre had made a new appearance, retaliated quickly by ambushing and killing a handful of Turkish soldiers. Since this development began last week, its been the usual tit-for-tat between the two groups, and has created an entirely new diplomatic front for the world to focus on. As for Erdogan, he gets to play the tough guy for the Turkish voter, and at the same time, may have the opportunity to also show is statesmen abilities, before the next round of Turkish elections.
Turkey has decided that the time is right to tackle the difficult problem of independence for Iraq's Kurdish population. Turkey has an unfortunate history of dealing with the Kurds, including allegations of past genocide and pogroms. Turkey would like nothing more than to make the problem disappear, and the military solution seems to be the one that Turkey likes the most. The PKK, a self-appointed political and military representative of Turkey's Kurdish population, has been a thorn on the shoe of the Turkish Armed Forces, for years. The PKK has never suffered from lack of funding as the Kurd diaspora has generously supplied the movement with resources, weapons, and media representation. The PKK has created a difficult situation by utilizing locale familiarity and support to regularly ambush Turkish military patrols. Ankara has been very hesitant to unleash the full blunt of its military against the PKK, which is holed up in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, because of the fear that the international community would not approve. More importantly, a full military offensive involving the Air Force and Turkey's mighty armor units would give the impression that the PKK movement is making progress in its efforts.
What does the PKK want? Basically, the PKK is fighting for a Kurdish homeland in eastern Turkey, and at times the movement has garnered tremendous international attention from the actions of female suicide activists. At times, the PKK has played nice with its Iraq-based PUK and PDK counterparts, which has raised hopes in the Kurdish community that the three organizations might be able to exert enough influence to create a Kurdish independent state from Turkish and Iraqi territory. In fact, when the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq appeared close to actual success in seceding from Iraq, a great deal of pressure was exerted on the PKK to give up the armed struggle in Turkey, and join the new Kurdish state being born in northern Iraq. But the Iraqi Kurds got a bit ahead of themselves. The international community, and the United States in particular, decided that the time had not yet arrived to dissolving the Iraqi state as we know it, and the Kurds were left empty-handed. The PKK was probably thrilled that the effort failed, because a successful Kurdish state in northern Iraq would arguably remove the need for a Kurdish state in Anatolia. Its should come as no surprise that the PKK as it exists today, has become an enterprise of sorts, with people making a living from the continued struggle. The cessation of the effort would certainly close the pocket books of many in the Kurdish diaspora. In fact, the informal cease fire that existed between Turkey and the PKK since 2013, had started to impact the money-collection efforts in international Kurdish communities. But the recent attacks on PKK targets, including civilians, will certainly piss off Kurds everywhere, and the money flow should return to normal.
With the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the remaining forces of de facto Syrian president Bashir al-Assad continuing on its southern border, you would think that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would have enough trouble on his hands. But Erdogan is a master politician, who is always looking into the future before deciding what decisions to make today. Erdogan suffered badly in the last Turkish elections, which he probably didn't expect. He normally doesn't get surprised twice, at least not in the same manner. He is taking care of business. And in Turkey, nothing mobilizes the Turkish voter like a bit of Kurdish/PKK misbehavior, and if the cease fire is keeping the PKK quiet, then it was up to Erdogan to stir the hornets nest a bit. As usual, Erdogan displayed politically adept timing, and waited until the entire international community was focusing on the nuclear treaty between the United States and Iran, and also the continuing military drama evolving in Iraq's Anbar Province, to launch a completely unprovoked attack on a PKK target. Not surprisingly, the PKK, after taking a sigh of relief that its raison d'etre had made a new appearance, retaliated quickly by ambushing and killing a handful of Turkish soldiers. Since this development began last week, its been the usual tit-for-tat between the two groups, and has created an entirely new diplomatic front for the world to focus on. As for Erdogan, he gets to play the tough guy for the Turkish voter, and at the same time, may have the opportunity to also show is statesmen abilities, before the next round of Turkish elections.
Friday, July 31, 2015
Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.
The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies. In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi. With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive. Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.
as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province. By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege. The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province. To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives. One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS. While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad. ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself. ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.
In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community. Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support. The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.
Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK. Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list. What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments. Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass. I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power. Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support". Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?
as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province. By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege. The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province. To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives. One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS. While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad. ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself. ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.
In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community. Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support. The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.
Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK. Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list. What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments. Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass. I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power. Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support". Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?
Sunday, July 26, 2015
Allies look to the U.S. to expand its military profile in the region; Turkish Air Force bombs both PKK and ISIS targets.
Links: A. Turkish Air Force hits both Kurdish/PKK and ISIS targets.
B. BBC comments on Turkish air strikes.
The current environment in the Middle East and the Levant (can't we just go back to using Mesopotamia?) has evolved so dramatically in the last month that regional players have been obliged to review, adjust, and re-apply strategies. The treaty drafted between Iranian officials and representatives from the United States and various European interested parties (the Foreign Minister of Austria was involved, and I swear to you that I have cans of corn older than he is) has been approved by the United Nations and now must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament. For the most part, the Iranians love this treaty, so the real test will be in the U.S. Congress. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (who, along with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, constitute the Gulf Monarchies) have unleashed their diplomats and foreign friends to investigate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons without having a production facility. Being rich in fossil fuels, The Gulf Emirates have no need for nuclear power; but you can guarantee that they will be looking to purchase a nuclear weapon or three and a delivery system effective enough to at least act as a deterrent (how far are Tehran and Qom from King Khalid Air Force Base?). Not surprisingly, since the United States is responsible for the Iranian nuclear treaty, its allies in the region (including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait and Iraq) fully expect the U.S. to strengthen its military presence and involvement in the region. The argument will be that since the U.S. took it upon itself to make the region all the more dangerous, then the U.S. needs to share in the security responsibility. Obviously the Administration agrees, as diplomats have been scurrying to various capitals, including Baghdad and Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, to discuss the possibility of new arms treaties.
Also, Turkey has decided to become more aggressive on the military front, bombing both PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and ISIS (Islamic State) targets simultaneously. Turkey's attack on the PKK ended an unofficial truce between Ankara and the Kurdish independence organization that had existed since 2013. Before conducting the PKK raid, Turkey concluded an agreement with the United States for the use of the U.S. Air Force Base at Incirlik, Turkey, by the allied air coalition currently active against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Its obvious that Turkey timed its attack on the PKK only after placating U.S. efforts to use Incirlik. Also, Turkey sweetened the pot a bit by also bombing ISIS targets in Syria. We strongly suspect that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning to call for elections in the fall. His decision ratchet up military attacks on PKK targets after a two-year unofficial cease-fire is calculated to appeal to the Turkish voters, who are opposed to the PKK by a large percentage. At the same time, Turkish military action against ISIS, and the relaxation of opposition to the use of Incirlik, will no-doubt help to repair a damaged relationship with the United States, which is another issue that is very important to the average Turkish voter.
If Turkey were to decide to become one-hundred percent involved militarily in the efforts to defeat ISIS, the impact on the battlefield would be staggering. Similar to a full Iranian intervention in Iraq, the Turkish military would make short-order of ISIS, especially given that the Turks do not play with the same rule book as the United States. Turkey would have no hesitation using ISIS tactics to combat ISIS, which is one of the most effective ways to combat organizations of this nature. Any squeamishness or hesitance to act as barbarously as ISIS is automatically accepted as a sign of weakness, and used to ISIS' advantage, especially when utilizing the world press and social media. But Turkey will not be the agent of destruction for ISIS, because that result would leave Bashir al-Assad and his depleted regime military as the next biggest-fish in Syria. Erdogan despises Assad and will do nothing to aid the Syrian de-facto president and his Syrian Ba'ath Party cronies. Ideally, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and military leaders would convene a summit and create a military plan (with the U.S. and its European allies in full support) to destroy ISIS from two directions. Can you imagine two militarily powerful Muslim nations working together to destroy the world's worst terrorist threat of all time? It would send a tremendous message about the power of peace, and set an example for Christian nations to follow (Russia/Ukraine). Again, it won't happen, and not just because Erdogan hates Assad. The deep, ingrained prejudice that Sunnis and Shi'a have for one another will prevent any serious Muslim coalition. The best that can be hoped for is continued cooperation between the much smaller Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Units/PMUs (Shi'a militias). The tripartite grouping of the supposed secular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'a PMUs and Sunni tribal groups, has been kept in a very delicate balance up to now. The reason it has succeeded is because very little pressure has been exerted, i.e. the groups haven't been forced to merge as a fighting unit. Also, every effort is being made to keep one group from getting more credit for battlefield victories than the others. This effort has not always been successful.
B. BBC comments on Turkish air strikes.
The current environment in the Middle East and the Levant (can't we just go back to using Mesopotamia?) has evolved so dramatically in the last month that regional players have been obliged to review, adjust, and re-apply strategies. The treaty drafted between Iranian officials and representatives from the United States and various European interested parties (the Foreign Minister of Austria was involved, and I swear to you that I have cans of corn older than he is) has been approved by the United Nations and now must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament. For the most part, the Iranians love this treaty, so the real test will be in the U.S. Congress. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (who, along with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, constitute the Gulf Monarchies) have unleashed their diplomats and foreign friends to investigate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons without having a production facility. Being rich in fossil fuels, The Gulf Emirates have no need for nuclear power; but you can guarantee that they will be looking to purchase a nuclear weapon or three and a delivery system effective enough to at least act as a deterrent (how far are Tehran and Qom from King Khalid Air Force Base?). Not surprisingly, since the United States is responsible for the Iranian nuclear treaty, its allies in the region (including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait and Iraq) fully expect the U.S. to strengthen its military presence and involvement in the region. The argument will be that since the U.S. took it upon itself to make the region all the more dangerous, then the U.S. needs to share in the security responsibility. Obviously the Administration agrees, as diplomats have been scurrying to various capitals, including Baghdad and Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, to discuss the possibility of new arms treaties.
Also, Turkey has decided to become more aggressive on the military front, bombing both PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and ISIS (Islamic State) targets simultaneously. Turkey's attack on the PKK ended an unofficial truce between Ankara and the Kurdish independence organization that had existed since 2013. Before conducting the PKK raid, Turkey concluded an agreement with the United States for the use of the U.S. Air Force Base at Incirlik, Turkey, by the allied air coalition currently active against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Its obvious that Turkey timed its attack on the PKK only after placating U.S. efforts to use Incirlik. Also, Turkey sweetened the pot a bit by also bombing ISIS targets in Syria. We strongly suspect that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning to call for elections in the fall. His decision ratchet up military attacks on PKK targets after a two-year unofficial cease-fire is calculated to appeal to the Turkish voters, who are opposed to the PKK by a large percentage. At the same time, Turkish military action against ISIS, and the relaxation of opposition to the use of Incirlik, will no-doubt help to repair a damaged relationship with the United States, which is another issue that is very important to the average Turkish voter.
If Turkey were to decide to become one-hundred percent involved militarily in the efforts to defeat ISIS, the impact on the battlefield would be staggering. Similar to a full Iranian intervention in Iraq, the Turkish military would make short-order of ISIS, especially given that the Turks do not play with the same rule book as the United States. Turkey would have no hesitation using ISIS tactics to combat ISIS, which is one of the most effective ways to combat organizations of this nature. Any squeamishness or hesitance to act as barbarously as ISIS is automatically accepted as a sign of weakness, and used to ISIS' advantage, especially when utilizing the world press and social media. But Turkey will not be the agent of destruction for ISIS, because that result would leave Bashir al-Assad and his depleted regime military as the next biggest-fish in Syria. Erdogan despises Assad and will do nothing to aid the Syrian de-facto president and his Syrian Ba'ath Party cronies. Ideally, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and military leaders would convene a summit and create a military plan (with the U.S. and its European allies in full support) to destroy ISIS from two directions. Can you imagine two militarily powerful Muslim nations working together to destroy the world's worst terrorist threat of all time? It would send a tremendous message about the power of peace, and set an example for Christian nations to follow (Russia/Ukraine). Again, it won't happen, and not just because Erdogan hates Assad. The deep, ingrained prejudice that Sunnis and Shi'a have for one another will prevent any serious Muslim coalition. The best that can be hoped for is continued cooperation between the much smaller Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Units/PMUs (Shi'a militias). The tripartite grouping of the supposed secular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'a PMUs and Sunni tribal groups, has been kept in a very delicate balance up to now. The reason it has succeeded is because very little pressure has been exerted, i.e. the groups haven't been forced to merge as a fighting unit. Also, every effort is being made to keep one group from getting more credit for battlefield victories than the others. This effort has not always been successful.
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