Surprise, surprise...the left trashes Chris Kyle again, as the post-mortem attacks continue.

I had never heard of the internet news magazine "The Intercept" until last week.  A friend of Taya and Chris Kyle's had forwarded a copy of a story that The Intercept had disseminated.  The article in question accused Chris Kyle of inflating his medal count when writing his autobiography.  In addition, the article revisited some of the other accusations that the left has made, leaving a great American's repuation in question.  It took some time for me to settle down after I had read The Intercept's story.  A quick Google search revealed a number of well-written articles defending Chris, including a particularly clear and concise rebuttal from former Texas Governor Rick Perry.  I also noticed that Texas' flagship magazine "Texas Monthly" had waded into the discussion.  I'm one of those rare Texas Conservatives who still reads Texas Monthly religiously.  I have learned to avoid the predictable left-leaning perspectives that the magazine takes with every issue, and to enjoy the amazing writing by the likes of Skip Hollingsworth.  Its sad how quickly things can change.  I actually had hope that Texas Monthly would do a bit of research and defend Texan Chris.  I couldn't have been more wrong.  Texas Monthly was unable to jump on the bandwagon regarding the exact number of Chris' medals because the information provided by The Intercept (The Inept would be more accurate) was quickly discredited.  You see, the folks at The Intercept contacted the Department of the Navy to request clarification regarding the exact number of Chris Kyle's medals.  Those of us who have a bit of experience dealing with Uncle Sam and the U.S. military know that contacting respective USG Departments directly is liable to get you incomplete information.  My first thought was,  "did anyone at The Intercept think to track down a copy of Chris' DD-214?"  This is the form that accurately collates a soldier's time in military service, and it includes the accurate number of medals awarded.  The Intercept was correct about one thing: in his book, Chris did not provide the correct number of medals he had earned.  Instead, he actually shorted himself by one.  Chris had been awarded more medals than he had claimed in his book. You would think that this discovery would have shut down the latest campaign by liberals to trash Chris in absentia.  Sadly, you would be mistaken.

Texas Monthly had frothed themselves up into such a fit of anticipation, they decided to do a hit-piece regardless of the dicredidation of the information originally reported by The Intercept.  Instead, the well-known Texas publication published an article titled, "How We Talk About Chris Kyle" and subtitled, "It's Possible To Be Both A Hero And A Liar".  Ouch.  Let me state unequivically:  I knew Chris Kyle.  We were not best friends, we were two Texans who started talking to each other one day in the Green Zone in Baghdad because we both were wearing Texas caps.  Chris was one of the older Navy Seals on his team, and I was one of the older Case Officers in my graduating class at the Farm.  Us old farts tend to stick together, especially Texas old farts.  We talked about High School football, the Dallas Cowboys, and the awesomeness of West Texas, especially Big Bend.  Chris did not have a whole lot to say, which suited me fine.  Two things I can guarantee you about Chris Kyle- he loved his family, and he was no liar.  Texas Monthly wants us to know that it's possible to be both a hero and a liar.  Actually, all they've proven from my optic is that it's possible to be a magazine and a pile of shit at the same time.

In order to flesh-out its paper-thin and whiney accusations, Texas Monthly rehashed a few accusations that really strain credulity.  The events repeated by Texas Monthly could easily be chalked up to a misunderstanding, bad memory, or just a case of simple confusion on someone's part. Allegedly, Chris told someone about a shootout in which he was involved somewhere out in rural Texas.  The Texas Monthly reporter (or whoever was checking up on the story) drove out to the Farm Road that Chris had (again, allegedly) identified as the location of the incident.  It should come as no surprise that this intrepid investigator was unable to locate an establishment or any persons who could bear witness to the story.  This was one example of what Texas Monthly concludes is a pattern of lies.  Texas Monthly also mentions the well-known trial in which it was decided that Chris had lied in his book about an encounter with former Governor Jesse Ventura.  All of these examples may seem convincing to the folks in Austin, but what they have in common is the one fact that renders them useless: Chris died before he had a chance to defend himself from this slander.  My Daddy used to tell me that "if you want to ruin anybody's good name, just wait a few minutes til after they've gone to their just reward".

Chris is not here to point out that maybe he had gotten confused in the information he provided someone, or maybe the other person just mixed things up?  It happens all the time, folks, at least to me.  If you consider all the sacrifces Chris made for his country, not to mention his other heroic contributions, hasn't he earned the benefit of the doubt?  He has in my book, and I hope also in yours.  Its time for the media and the left to steer clear of Chris and his family, and go back to attacking Donald Trump.

Iraqi forces surround Fallujah, continue efforts to push ISIS from Anbar Province.

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have surrounded ISIS elements in Fallujah, taking the northern suburbs and clearing ISIS from the Baghdad area.   ISF have also punished ISIS forces further, retaking territory around Hit and giving some relief to hard-pressed Habaniyah.  Over the past few months, Iraqi forces, aided by elements of the Popular Mobilization Units (Iranian supported Shi'a militia) and air support from coalition forces, have broken the back of ISIS in Anbar Province and central Iraq.  In order to put pressure on the Iraqi government and hopefully encourage the recall of Iraqi troops to the capital, ISIS stepped up suicide bomb attacks against Shi'a targets, inflicting large number of fatalities and injuries.  Shi'a leaders did put pressure on the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, but Abadi has managed to keep control of the government and focus on the efforts to remove ISIS from Iraq altogether.  If the military situation doesn't improve for ISIS, the terrorist organization will have to reconsider its intentions in Iraq.  No doubt Fallujah will fall, and as the ISF continues to retake territory once occupied by ISIS, it will become impossible for ISIS to not only continue suicide and vehicular explosive attacks, but to keep its units supplied and reinforced.

With the encouraging advances the ISF has made in Samarra and Baiji, and the advances made by the Kurds in the north, ISIS will be hard-pressed to regain the initiative on any of the Iraqi fronts.  Mosul is also in the sights of the ISF, with word that except for a small contingent of die-hard operatives, ISIS has basically already abandoned the city.  That remains to be seen, but there can ge no doubt that the ISF appears to be in the last stages of defeating ISIS in Iraq.  This development has already started to impact the political environment in Baghdad.  For some time, Shi'a politicians and religious leaders have been engaging in efforts to discredit and destabilize the Ababi Administration.  No doubt Iran, who continues to interfere in internal Iraqi affairs, has been behind the effort to see Abadi replaced.  The dynamics of this situation can be very confusing to anyone who has not been following Iraqi politics. losels.  When Abadi took office as Iraq's second Shi'a Prime Minister, the Sunni community was convinced that we would act in Iran's interest foremost, and the Sunni community would suffer.  In fact, Abadi has not taken one side over the other.  He has proven to be a true statesman and leader, and he truly deserves tremendous credit for the optimistic military situation.

Iraqi Armed Forces, alongside Shi'a militia, making progress in retaking territory from ISIS.

Since the recovery of Ramadi, the Iraqi Armed Forces have continued to put pressure on ISIS elements by clearing ISIS from the Hit District, and moving to isolate ISIS forces in Fallujah.  The Shi'a militias, still fighting under the banner of "Popular Mobilization Units", have also been successful, as ISIS seems to be unable to conduct the daily terror attacks and suicide bombings that were conducted last summer with such frequency.  In particular, Baghdad and Diyala Province are no longer suffering from the terrorist attacks that had become so familiar.  The Iraqi military is determined to consolidate its position in Baiji and to end ISIS operations against Hadithah, but efforts to retake Mosul remain a priority.  ISIS has had the opportunity to consolidate its hold on Mosul and to fortify the city in typical ISIS fashion, which includes booby traps and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  The Iraqi Army currently in the field is not the Iraqi Army that faced off against ISIS outside of Tikrit in 2014.  The Iraqi military of today has become familiar with the strategy and tactics of ISIS, including the use of human hostages and hidden explosive devices, and has turned the table on ISIS attempts to utilize fear and intimidation as a weapon.  The Iraqi military has benefitted greatly from the training providing by U.S. Special Forces.  ISIS was using the same strategies employed by the Iraqi insurgents in 2006-7, which included targeting civilians and taking hostages; the Iraqi Army is using tactics employed by the U.S. Army against the insurgency, which included using superior manpower, weaponry and air elements to constantly harass the enemy into retreating.  The Iranian-supported and Shi'a led Popular Mobilization Forces have been acting in concert with the Iraqi military, and has succeeded in pushing ISIS out of Sammarah.

It is obvious that ISIS has suffered some serious setbacks in Iraq during the first months of 2016.  ISIS has had difficulty resupplying its forces in Iraq, and continued Russian pressure in Syria is forcing ISIS leaders to make difficult decisions regarding reinforcements.  Although ISIS has not been forced to retreat in Syria as it has been obliged to do in Iraq, the issue of supply has become a priority.  ISIS continues to successfully recruit outside of the Middle East, and funding has not diminished.  But the United States and its European partners have had success intercepting and disrupting some of ISIS' funding mechanisms, which has impacted the organization's ability to pay its operatives.  Also, resupplying has been very difficult, and almost always conducted under the cover of night. The overall situation on the ground in Syria and Iraq and moved decidedly in favor of the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Bashar al-Assad.  With the involvement of Russia in Syria, very attempt to degrade ISIS will be an effort in support of al-Assad and his Syrian Ba'ath party.  This conclusion is unavoidable.  Given the nuclear treaty drafted last year and signed by the U.S., major European nations, and Iran, it appears as if the U.S. is interested in furthering the influence and military presence of Iran.  For the moment, the Iranians appear content to meddle with  Iraqi internal political affairs, and will let the Popular Mobilization Units do its fighting.  It will be interesting to see what policy is adopted by the United States, provided a Republican wins the presidency in 2016.  Obviously, its traditional to oppose the Iranians, but if events continue to favor al-Assad, Russia and Iran, it will prove very difficult to revert to previous policy.    

Current political situation in Iraq may result in the fall of Prime Minister al-Albadi

The current Iraqi political mess appears to be more focused and organized than in the past.  A rump parallel paliament, determined to increase Iranian influence in Baghdad, continues to challenge the authority of the Council of Representatives.  The Iraqi Constitution is written to provide a checks and balances system that is similar to the U.S. Constitution, but Iraqi politics really is about who has the most supporters and authority with the militias.  Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has managed to fight off a number of efforts to remove him from office.  When the war against ISIS goes badly, the various political groups lay-off the anti-Abadi campaign, for fear that if Abadi falls and ISIS takes comtrol of Baghdad, then the Iranians may not be so willing to interfere in Iraqi politics.  But when the military situation is positive, as appears to be the case currently, the effort to remove Abadi and install an Iranian puppet regime.  As long as ISIS constitues a real threat to Iraq, the Iranians will not commit themselves militarily.  Currently the Iranians are content to have operatives on the ground in every province, and to to keep advisors in place with the various Shia militias.  The recent successes on the battlefield have emboldened the pro-Iranian elements to attempt a coup and install a pro-Iranian government while the military situation is positive.  Teheran is a bit more pragmatic than its Shia supporters in Iraq, and will no doubt wait for what it considers to be an ideal environment before commiting regular forces to the conflict in Iraq.

Given the equities involved, why haven't the Iranians moved into Iraqi full-force and push ISIS out of Iraq?  Such an effort would certainly increase the public support for Iran and embarrass the United States, which has been supporting the Abadi Administration with military aid and U.S. Special Forces.  No doubt Iran is determined to control Iraq, and the Iranians would welcome the opportunity to play the role of "liberators", but the Iranian military is not up to the task of providing military support and troops to the Hezbollah-supported effort in Syria.  Iran has a long history of supporting Hezbollah and the de facto president of Syria, Bashar al-Assad.  The situation could change dramatically within the next month.  If the Russian effort to prop-up Bashar al-Assad is successful, and the Iranian troops who have been fighting on the Syrian front are welcomed home as victors, the pressure would be on Teheran to follow up the victory in Syria with a successful campaign against ISIS in Iraq.  As things stand, Teheran does not appear to be ready to commit regular military elements into Iraq, especially when Iran has ongoing commitments in Syria and Yemen.  Don't expect to see an increase in Iranian military activity while the conflict in Syria continues.  Teheran loves a military parade, but when it comes to commiting resources in a foreign conflict, the Iranians will be patient and wait until the situation either deteriorates further, or an armistace or ceasefire manages to take hold.  Another variable in the mix is the U.S. political season.  The Iranians will want to know who sits in the Oval Office before embarking on a full-scale military effort in Iraq.  The Iranians do not want a confrontation with the United States, especially given the freedom they have to basically act unilaterally in the region.  The Iranians will be content to continue its efforts in supporting Hezbollah in Syria, and by providing advisors and military specialists to the Shia militias in Iraq.  So much will depend on who sits in the White House in 2017.

Iraq: U.S. compromises with Iran have not influenced the Iranians to abandon the policy of undermining United States initiatives.

Links: A. Turkey unilaterally invades Iraq to launch attacks against Kurdish PKK militants.
           B.  Iraq claims to have retaken 60% of Ramadi City.

In a move that will no doubt escalate already dangerously high tensions in the area, Turkey deployed military units into northeastern Iraq, just outside of Mosul, in order to more effectively launch attacks against militants from the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK).  If Turkish President Erdogan was looking for the quickest way to unite the Kurds, and at the same time, bring the Iraqi government and the Kurdish authorities closer together, they found it.  Turkey's actions are almost inexplicable, unless Erdogan is determine to make things difficult for Barack Obama as he tries to leave office gracefully.  At the same time, the Pentagon is preparing to deploy roughly 200 U.S. Army Special Forces elements into Iraq, to act as a mobile "hit squad" to take out ISIS leaders, if you will.  This policy seems to fly in the face of Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, which prohibits any Agent or Representative of the United States Government from involvement in assassinations.  I may be nit-picking here, especially since we already are aware of this Administration's perception of the Constitution and the laws of this nation.  Either way, the arrival of this American Special Forces Unit has already come under heavy criticism in Baghdad, where Prime Minister Abadi is doing everything he can to keep the ship of state from sinking altogether.  Abadi is under particular pressure from the Shi'a elements in the Council of Representatives, who are angling to bring a vote of no confidence against the Iraqi Prime Minister.  Also, Iranians in Baghdad are as thick as fleas on a mongrel's back, and they are also putting pressure on the government, both to oppose the deployment of more U.S. troops, and to take action against the Turkish incursion northeast of Mosul.  Abadi has been under fire before, but this time his administration may not survive.

One of the most appalling and embarrassing developments in the region has been the continued intransigence from the Iranians with regards to any U.S. diplomatic or military initiatives.  I assume that following the nuclear treaty negotiations, the Obama Administration (the President, Vice President Biden, and Secretary of State Kerry in particular) expected the Iranian government to lighten the anti-U.S. rhetoric and to be less aggressive in opposing every U.S. action in the region.  I knew better, and you knew better, but for some reason, the three men with the greatest access to intelligence on this planet, didn't see this coming.  Or did they, and it just didn't matter?  At the moment, events in Iraq and Syria need to be stabilized, before the Iraqi's end up at war with Turkey, or the Turks decide that the time is right to "ethnic-cleanse" northern Iraq of Kurds once and for all.  The action ordered by the President and taken by the Pentagon to deploy Special Forces is way too little and way too late, and will cause more harm than good, especially if Abadi falls from power.  It has been suggested (whispered more like) in DC that the Obama Administration is hesitant to take stronger military action against ISIS, because increased U.S. presence in the region will infuriate Iran, and put Obama's "legacy treaty" with Iran in jeopardy.

What we can expect is the Administration attempting to steer the media away from connecting the recent terror attack in San Bernardino to the ongoing conflict in Syria.  Obama is bound and determined to avoid getting drawn into a full-scale war in Syria/Iraq.  I'm not so reactionary that I don't see the ideological motivation; the United States has a tempestuous relationship with most of the governments in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and lets not forget that we invaded Iraq twice in the last thirty years.  Our historical tradition of supporting unpopular governments in Egypt and Iran and our long-term, close relationship with Israel, have not endeared the U.S. to the people of the region, that's for sure.  But the clock is ticking (excuse the cliché); ISIL/ISIS/Daesh or whatever you want to call them, have not been really impacted by the Russian intervention in Syria (probably because most of the Russian bombs were dropped on anti-government Syrian groups as opposed to ISIS).  ISIS is increasing its activities in Africa and in the Far East, and I expect we will soon see a more regular pattern to domestic terror events (God forbid).  Still today, on December 9, 2015, the United States is military capable of destroying ISIS on our own.  But a serious effort at building a military coalition, to include our European allies and Russia (who should be told, bluntly, to "get on board or get out of the way"), would a tremendous advantage in eliminating this scourge once and for all.  Why now?  Because if ISIS continues to raise money and recruit, I have no idea how improved their conventional army will become (with modern weapons, tanks, artillery, and possibly and Air element), nor can we accurately gauge how complicated and dangerous the situation will be in the urban and residential areas of Europe and the United States.  Some crusty old General once said, that when you go to war, you must use everything at your disposal, every weapon, no matter how heinous, and you must fight with the utmost aggression and determination.  This is the formula for ending a war quickly, which will save countless lives on both sides, especially when compared to wars that drag on and on and on......

Russia taking advantage of disinterested Obama Administration to project military strength internationally.

In the last few months, Russia has aggressively extended its military footprint around the globe.  While most eyes are focused on Russian military action in Syria, Moscow has completed construction on a military facility in the Arctic, and stepped up diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis Baghdad, Cuba, and the United Nations.  Everytime that Russia succeeds in extending its military influence, the United States suffers accordingly.  Russia's move to establish s military base in the Arctic comes on the heels of discoveries that the vast frozen areas north of the Arctic Circle hold great potential for mineral and fossil fuel exploration.  Researchers and businesses in the United States have also expressed interest in Arctic resource exploration, but the Obama Administration has responded to such entreaties with suspicion and concern regarding the potential ecological impact.  Also, the recent rapprochement between the United States and Cuba has apparently not dimmed the close relationship between Moscow and Havana.  Many expect Cuba to lead the proposed Russian military "coalition" in Syria.  Presently, this coalition can count Iran, pro-regime Syria, Hezbollah, and possibly Belarus as members; many consider this grouping of Russian allies to be a counter to the U.S. coalition already in place in Syria.

A number of U.S. allies are beginning to discreetly express concern over the apparent apathy that appears to dominate the foreign policy of the United States in the later period of the Obama Presidency.  Since the election of 2008, most European leaders have been quick to support the Obama Aministration's policies, with the crises in Ukraine and Syria being two prime examples.  But as the failure of these policies become more apparent, and Obama seems unwilling to stand up and confront increased Russian global activity, certain European leaders are reviewing what options might be available that do not require the presence of the United States government in a leadership role.  No doubt our allies outside of Europe are also concerned about the lack of movement on the part of the United States.  China must also recognize that an opportunity currently exists, and will assuredly take advantage as well, while Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Australia wonder if the status quo can hold until a new administration takes over in Washington DC.

At present, more so than at any point in the last seven years, the United States needs to be an international leader.  This administration was quick to mobilize its diplomatic resources to conclude terrible treaties with both Russia (2010 New Start disarmament treaty with Russia), and Iran (2015 agreement on Iranian nuclear research).  Given that our allies are simply waiting for some sign of strength and consistency, it's not too late to check Vladimit Putin's strategy to create in Russia the world's sole super-power.  A fascinating aspect of these developments is that Russia's aggressive military and diplomatic moves have come while the Obama Administration continues to characterize Russia's economy as being close to collapse.  It seems as is if we've been waiting for that collapse ever since the beginning of the sanctions regime that was imposed on Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.  I'm glad we weren't holding our breath.....

Events in Iraq strengthen Iran's position.

On October 14, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) announced the commencement of a military ground offensive in the direction of Baiji and the strategic Baiji Oil Refinery.  Possession of the refinery has been contested since the initial early successes of the Islamic State (ISIS) in its invasion of Iraq.  This particular military initiative is being conducted in close cooperation with the Iranian-backed Shi'a militia Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, with a number of recognizable Iranian military advisers directly involved.  The announcement of this effort came as a bit of a suprise as beforehand the priority of the Haider al-Abadi Administration had been the recapture of Ramadi City and the defeat of ISIS in Anbar Province.

Early reports from Baiji indicate that the ISF and the Kata'ib militia have made impressive gains against ISIS positions.  A number a small, strategic communities to the west of Baiji have been recaptured, and The refinery itself has been returned to Iraqi government control.  We repeat these reports with a word of caution: the Iraqi press has a tendency to produce over-optimistic battlefield reporting, especially in the early stages of a new ISF offensive.  ISIS has been on the run in Baiji before, only to return quickly with stronger forces.  The Baiji Refinery has consistently been the site of heavy fighting because of its strategic value.  Additionally, the Iraqi people have expressed great interest in this particular contested location, which increases its importance from a public morale perspective.  During the next week, the actual success of the ground offensive in Baiji will become clearer.  If indeed the ISF, with strong support from the proxy militia Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, has reoccupied both Baiji City and the Refinery, it will constitute another victory for Iran over the United States in the effort to curry favor and influence with the Abadi Administration.

Because the United States was heavily involved in training the military units that are currently engaged in the effort to recapture Ramadi City, if the offensive fails, it will have a potentially catastrophic impact on U.S. influence in Baghdad.  Coincidentally, since the genesis of recent direct Russian military involvement in Syria, the Iranians have increased their visibility in Iraq.  In the past, the Iranians were content to limit their overt exposure to involvement with the Shi'a militias.  This has changed, as the Iranians,Russia and Iraq recently created a military coordination office in Baghdad, alongside offers from Moscow to the Abadi Administration to provide valuable intelligence  on ISIS.  The U.S. responded with a successful raid alongside Kurdish Peshmerga to rescue seventy Kurdish hostages from imminent beheading, but otherwise, the United States appears content to discuss cooperation with Russia regarding Syria, and to leave present military influence in Iraq to Iran.

Foreign Policy Armageddon: Obama fiddles as the Middle East burns.

Link: Syria is showplace for Russia's new military.

We keep waiting for the Obama Administration to introduce a flurry of new policy initiatives to counter the aggressive movements made by Russia in Syria and Iraq, but all we get from the Oval Office is diplomatic double-speak.  The fact is, it appears that the job of President no longer interests Barack Obama, and he's just counting down the days until he can become a permanent fixture on the celebrity golf circuit.  Actually, I'm convinced that Obama has one more important presidential decision to make before 2016 comes to an end.  I believe Obama will use Executive Action to provide a direct path to citizenship for up to twenty million illegal aliens living in the United States.
We will hear the tired excuse that Congress is broken and that the American people deserve action.  I guess the American people don't deserve action as far as the Middle East is concerned, regardless of our security concerns and the fact that every country in the region short of Iran is swarming with U.S. intelligence officers, military training specialists, diplomats, aid workers, State Department personnel, evangelists, and last and least, media correspondents.  I can only assume that Europe has its fair share of citizens traipsing around Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and Jerusalem as well.  One interesting development to note about the European nations is their willingness to follow the United States hook, line, and sinker since Barack Obama took office.  I haven't decided if its just another symptom of Obamamania, or fear on the part of the Merkels and the Hollandes that their people would remove them from office if they step out of the Obama line. 

One thing is certain: now would be an ideal time to create a coalition to either oppose Putin's heavy-handedness, or build a military coalition to fight ISIS side-by-side with the Russians.  It would allow the west to reap some of the good press that will result from the squashing of the Islamic State.  How can I be sure that Europe would support an appeal from Obama for some kind of collective response to Russia's heavy-handed military intrusion into Syria?  For the answer, all that is needed is a simple review of every policy move made by Obama since he took office.  Count the times that his initiatives were in the smallest manner opposed or criticized by a European government outside of Hungary; probably never.  Actually, all you need to do is observe how quickly the European leaders suffered "shrinkage" when Putin pushed the envelope on Ukraine.  Obama was quick to announce that NOTHING would make him take steps harsher than sanctions in response to blatant Russian aggression.  Obama provided the Russians with the European, NATO and U.S. strategy in one fell swoop:  regardless of what you do, Mr. Putin, you will never have to deal with anything more uncomfortable than economic sanctions, which in reality will only end up hurting the middle-class and poor in Russia.  Putin with his KGB background has never expressed the slightest sympathy for the average Russian.  Once Putin knew Obama's limits, he announced the permanent annexation of Crimea.  

Back to the Middle East, where President Obama continues to argue that he sits in a position of "strength", and Russia "argues from a position of weakness".  Anyone who makes that statement is trying to convince an audience of something that they themselves know to be untrue.  Obama has been drowning in sycophant bullshit for so long, that he thinks he can get away with anything.  Hell, what am I taking about; he can.  A treaty with Iran that legitimizes their in-your-face effort to obtain a home-brewed nuclear weapon (just like whiskey, home brew is always better than purchased, because if you want more, you can always make it yourself), turns Inspections into an embarrassing waste of time, and gives the Ayatollahs access to buy freely from the world's most modern stockpiles of weapons, is declared a victory by Obama.  Also, he doesn't see any connection whatsoever to the return of ISIS to Iraq and the simultaneous departure of most of the U.S. military personnel.  The Obama Administration's policy vs-a-vis the Arab World is so convoluted, that even the press seems about ready to throw in the towel.   I give Obama some credit; in other regions, including the South China Sea, Obama appears willing to allow the experts to run the show, i.e. the U.S. Navy.  In fact, for some time it appeared that he was determined not to allow the Taliban to regenerate in Afghanistan.  But the Taliban are like cactus; sooner or later, they'll be back.  The key is, when one of those nasty bastards shows his bearded mug in public, he should have a 500-lb bomb dropped in his lap. Considering the number of troops that have been withdrawn from Afghanistan in the last two years, I'm not optimistic regarding the success of the above-mentioned Operation Bomb the Bad Guys.

Russia is running rampant, using Turkey as its roadmap to Syria, eliminating the groups that originally opposed Bashar al-Assad, and making friends in Baghdad by providing intelligence on ISIS to the Iraqi military.  Every step seems well-thought and executed, with the Iranians along for the ride.  The relationship between Tehran and Moscow has become increasingly friendly as the Russians expressed their willingness to sell anything that wasn't cemented down, including nuclear-related goodies.  In my next blog post, we will discuss what Iran hopes to gain from its involvement in Iraq and its evolving partnership with Russia.   

Iraqi Security Forces beginning final push on Ramadi, while Iranian-backed Shi'a militias confront Baiji.

Link: Iraqis closing in on Ramadi.

In May, 2015, forces of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), sometimes referred to as ISIL, captured the Sunni controlled city of Ramadi, which is located in the far east of Anbar Province, within roughly sixty miles of Baghdad.  ISIS was also able to capture the city of Fallujah, which is even closer to the capital city.  Americans may remember the names "Ramadi" and "Fallujah", as U.S. military forces had a difficult time clearing both cities of insurgents during the Iraq conflict.  Ramadi and Fallujah are part of a string of Sunni-dominated cities in Anbar that stretch from Ramadi in the east to Qa'im in the west.  There has been some concern that the Sunni community in Iraq might eventually join ISIS in an effort to avoid domination by Iran and the Iraqi Shi'a population.  Following the occupation of Ramadi by ISIS in May, the government in Baghdad made the recapture of the city its highest military priority.  In July, amid much fanfare, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside elements of the Iraqi Police, launched an offensive aimed not only at Ramadi, but to rid Anbar Province of ISIS completely.  As a sign of cooperation, the Iranian backed Shi'a militias (or the Popular Mobilization Units, as they prefer to be called) would attack Fallujah simultaneously.  For both the militias and the ISF, the road west to Ramadi and Fallujah has been costly and increasingly difficult.  At times, the Iraqi General Command expressed frustration with what they saw as lack of support from the U.S.-led coalition air campaign.  Also, ISIS utilized distraction-attacks in other provinces to encourage respective governors to demand a return of all provincial troops taking part in the Anbar offensive.  As the ISF and the militias slowly moved closer to their targets, ISIS has increased SVBIED attacks, not to mention the booby traps left behind as ISIS strategically retreats and redeploys.  As of October 2015, it is estimated that ISIS has somewhere in between 600 and 1000 fighters hunkered down in Ramadi (I have found no estimates of the ISIS forces in Fallujah)  As the ISF and the militias begin what they hope is the last phase of the offensive, it has become apparent that ISIS has rigged the entire inner city of Ramadi with IEDs and various just-as-deadly booby traps.  The air coalition and the Iraqi General Staff have moved past any disagreements, and during the last month, air sorties in and around Ramadi and Fallujah have caused ISIS serious casualties.  Certain roads in and out of both cities have remained open, which has allowed supplies and fighters to get through.  Regardless, for the sake of the independence of the Abadi Administration in Baghdad, Ramadi must be recaptured.

If Ramadi remains under ISIS control, it will reflect negatively on the United States.  The ISF have been trained by U.S. specialists, and the coalition air campaign is perceived as basically controlled by the Pentagon.  Failure to take Ramadi would result in tremendous criticism of the Abadi Administration's close relationship with the United States.  Can you imagine if ISIS keeps control of Ramadi, but Fallujah falls to the militias?  This would provide the Iranians and their Iraqi supporters will all the ammunition they need to force Abadi into adopting a more pro-Iranian policy.  With the Shi'a community in control of the government, and the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassim Suleimani already spotted in Baiji, there can be no doubt that the Iranians intend to push the United States out of Iraq for good.  Certainly the success of militias operations led by Iranian military personnel, combined with the failure of the U.S.-supported ISF offensive in Anbar, will impact the amount of influence the Iranians have in Baghdad, not to mention the all-important battle for hearts-and-minds.  Since our precipitous military departure from Iraq in 2010, leaving building projects unfinished and, more importantly, military training programs incomplete, the Iranians have kept up a media campaign to portray the United States as undependable.  Once the Iranians drop the pretense and we see Iranian military forces on the ground in Iraq, then the game will be over.  Iran, alongside its ISF partner, will force ISIS out of Iraq and back into the deserts of Syria, where the Russian Air Force and Special Forces will be waiting.  The International Community will give thanks, appropriately, to Russia and Iran, for their willingness to sacrifice the lives of their sons and daughters in the noble effort to destroy ISIS.  That's when things will get really interesting...... 

How serious is the most recent resurgence of the Taliban?

Link: Taliban forces making gains in Kunduz.


In the last few weeks, the Taliban have demonstrated the ability to rise from the ashes once again.  Just a few years past, many thought that the Taliban had become just a footnote in Afghan history.  The nation was at peace, and the Afghan people seemed to embrace the idea of a more open, modern society.  Satellite dishes popped up everywhere, including outside of the capital city, and internet cafes could be found on just about every corner in Kabul.  Most impressive was the school attendance statistics, with boys and girls attending classes all over the country.  The freedom with which young Afghans embraced education, both grade school and secondary, was an indication that he continued presence of NATO and U.S. military forces was providing a strong sense of security.  But insidious organizations like the Taliban, ISIS, and Al-Qaida, never really go away.  They will always find another avenue of anger, disappointment and rage to tap into and use to their advantage.  In Afghanistan, the Taliban has always directed their recruitment efforts at the young make section of the population.  Many young men in Afghanistan have difficult lives and not much hope for a better future.  The Taliban blames this on the pervading influence of western culture, and exhorts their target audience to return to Islam, with its familiar traditions and promises of eternal life, scores of virgins, and whatever else is included in the brochure.  Another strong appeal for young Afghan men is the Taliban strict interpretation of the Quran in its instruction regarding women.  The idea of a totally subservient, uneducated wife, always waiting at home and never leaving the house without a burqa, is appealing.  Not to mention that in Taliban society, a woman is not allowed to disagree with her husband.  Beatings are common, and on the occurrence of "accidental" death, no one is prosecuted.  The Taliban has been beaten before and re-emerged, as we are seeing again today.  The ability to always appeal to the same particular common denominators guarantees that they will always have a certain percentage of the population who are willing to drink the Taliban Kool-Aid.

Following the successful September 28 offensive against Kunduz city, the Taliban have increased operational activity all throughout northern Afghanistan.  The initial display of strength has been troubling to NATO and U.S. military officials currently serving in Afghanistan.  The attempt to invest Kunduz city was expected, but the Taliban's ability to conduct large offensive operations in other provinces was not anticipated.  All intelligence had pointed to a resurgence in Taliban influence and numbers, but the Taliban is demonstrating an offensive capacity, including weapons and supplies, that was unknown before the week of September 28th.  It appears that the intel folks will have to review their assessment.  Interestingly, some concern is already being expressed regarding the defense of the capital Kabul.  A quick glance at Iraq reveals a similar scenario.  Iraq has Ramadi, Afghanistan has Kunduz; both the extremists and the government are willing to expend great resources to gain full control of this particular city.  In the last year or so, concern has been raised regarding the threat that ISIS poses to Baghdad.  With ISIS able to conduct operations in Diyala Province to the east of Baghdad, Salah al-Din to the north and Anbar to the west, Iraq's capital city is indeed in a difficult position, although ISIS' ability to actually lay siege to such a large city is in question.  Kabul is also under threat, but just how long it will take the Taliban to reach that point is unknown.  The Taliban will be just as interested in taking Kabul as ISIS is in occupying Baghdad because for many average Afghans the news that Kabul is under the control of the Taliban is all they would need to fall back into the extremist footstep.  Due to predictable Taliban infighting, the Afghan government does have some time to prepare its Armed Forces for a counter-offensive in the north, probably focusing on the recapture of Kunduz.  As far as the Taliban are concerned, Mullah Akthar Mansour is still consolidating his power base by establishing a presence in Badakhshan, Takhar and Bakhlan Provinces.  No doubt the current offensives in Jowzjan, Faryab, and Farah Provinces were also part of that effort.   

ISIS continues attacks on provincial targets, as civilain casualties mount.

Link: Rare ISIS VBIED in Basra.

As the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to inch closer to the strategic areas of Ramadi, ISIS reminds Baghdad of the breadth of its reach, as Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED) are detonated in suburban areas of Baghdad, Diyala Province, and south of Basra.  The attack in Zubair, south of Basra was especially concerning as only one previous VBIED has ever been detonated this far south.  The weekend of bloodshed is a clear indication that ISIS will not deter from its overall plan to make the provinces of Iraq more and more difficult to govern.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in Diyala Province, where a VBIED in the town of Khalis casts doubt on the success of recent security measures taken by the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).  With much of the police manpower at the front, supplementing the Armed Forces, the PMUs have taken a more visible role in providing security on the streets of Iraq.  The PMUs have elaborate mechanisms in place to defeat the attempts to successfully detonate a VBIED.  All of the roads are monitored closely, with numerous checkpoints and roadblocks.  Somehow, ISIS continues to get VBIEDs on the roads.  Almost every VBIED has been driven by a single male, usually in his 20's.  Unfortunately, in Iraq, the highways are full of cars whose only passenger is the young man behind the wheel.  The only truly effective way to eliminate the use of vehicles as moving bombs is to force everyone to either walk, bicycle, or use public transportation.  Sadly, this would probably result in the use of buses as mass killing machines.

With recent VBIED attacks in Baghdad, Diyala, Basra and Salah al-Din Provinces, ISIS continues to demonstrate basic freedom of movement.  The ISF has also ben unable to permanently cut the roads between Fallujah and Ramadi.  ISIS is able to move personnel and supplies into Ramadi, although with the Allied Air Campaign in full swing and the ISF artillery getting more and more accurate, I wouldn't chance a trip on that road.  Why haven't all the roads leading into and out of Ramadi and Fallujah been completely destroyed?  Is it out of concern for the number of civilians who still live in these communities and rely on the roads for food, medical care, and as a means of last-minute evacuation?  No one has been able to come up with a reliable figure as to how many civilians remain in Fallujah and Ramadi (it appears that Fallujah is less deserted than Ramadi), but it can't be a pleasant place to be at the moment.  What is most frustrating is that while the government is training its resources to the breaking point in an attempt to recapture Ramadi, ISIS is able to plan and execute daily VBIED attacks in Baghdad and numerous bordering provinces.  The giant pink elephant in everyone's living room at present, though, is Ramadi- what is going on in Ramadi?  Are the special police units and military actually making daily progress in retaking the city, or have we passed the point for reasonable expectation of victory?  In fact, does evidence exist that the ISF has broken off offensive operations in Ramadi and Fallujah?  Is the government just waiting for the best time to spill the bad news?  Serious fighting continues in and around Baiji and in Salad al-Din Province, and the Kurds in the north regularly find ways to ambush ISIS patrols, so how important is Ramadi?  From a confidence perspective, it means everything.  If the government announces a general retreat from Anbar, then they had better be prepared to invite the Iranian Army across the border, because someone has to stop ISIS before they storm Baghdad.  Actually, a military collapse would provide just the justification for direct Iranian military intervention.  The players would then be in place for Putin's grand scheme.  The Russians destroy Assad's opposition in Syria, then tackle ISIS head-on, while the Iranians engage ISIS in Iraq.  Ideally, in the end, with ISIS vanquished, the Russians and the Iranians would meet up and shake hands, like the Russians and the Americans/British did in April 1945 at the River Elbe in Germany.  Putin would be hailed as a tremendous leader and the man of the hour, and the Iranians would have totally reformed their image, and could for the most part dictate the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf.  Lets meet in year, same time, same place, and see how my prognostications played out.

Incoherent, ineffective U.S. policy in Syria and Iraq continues to create opportunity for Iran and Russia.

Links: A. Putin steps up rhetoric against the West.
           B. Russia, Iran and Iraq set up military joint coordination cell.

Everyday the media presents the international community with another example of motivated, well-planned Russian activity vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq.  Three weeks ago, the Russians announced their intention to become directly militarily involved in Syria, and since that time every day brings additional evidence of the arrival in Syria of Russian troops, personnel accommodation, artillery, mobile surface-to-air units, tanks, and air resources.  Week-by-week, northeastern Syria, so recently threatened by both ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, becomes more militarized; soon we can expect to see Russian jets flying sorties against ISIS positions.  Putin has already demanded that the Allied Air Coalition, led by the United States, must coordinate its activities with Russia, although he made no mention of advising the Pentagon regarding Russian military deployments in Syria.  Interestingly, the Russians are becoming more active in Iraq, having the confidence to openly announce the creation of a joint military coordination cell.  Given that the Russians have recently started construction on two large military bases on the border with Ukraine, and that negotiations are underway for the creation of a Russian Air Base in Belarus, the events we are witnessing are obviously part of a much broader, long-term strategy which is aimed at eclipsing the United States as the world superpower, and they couldn't have asked for a more compliant U.S. president.

Putin has managed to push Ukraine completely off of the headlines, which is one goal achieved, and his willingness to accept the mantle of "defender of the west" against ISIS will do wonders in reforming his image in Europe.  The Russian diplomatic maneuvers, including the establishment of the Baghdad military coordination cell, alongside the relaxation of tension in Ukraine and the building of military bases, obviously point to the existence of a much more intensive Russian agenda.  Putin has signed on with Iran, who will play a pivotal role in the new world that Putin envisions.  Russia has fought hard in the United Nations on Iran's behalf.  Any one of a dozen efforts to punish Iran for violating international treaty regarding their nuclear research, could have put the Iranians back another decade from their end goal.  But Russia stepped in as they always do when creating a client state (see Hafez al-Assad and Syria), and blocked any real effort to bring the Iranians into compliance.  Russia realized that it was only time until Barack Obama, in search of a "Legacy" event, would step up and lead the emasculated Europeans right into a Treaty with Iran which requires nothing of Tehran, and gives them what they most need: not continued nuclear research, but access to the international arms market sans sanctions.  Now that Russia has declared her intentions in Syria (to defeat ISIS), Turkey and the United States had better be prepared for the damage coming vis-à-vis the proposed "ISIS-free zone".  Turkey will give Russia a free-hand in Syria for the moment, in order to not compromise the all-important natural gas pipeline plan, even though watching Assad use up another one of his nine lives must be driving Erdogan bananas.  And the United States?  As long as Obama is in office, Putin, Iran and Russia have an open playing field.  You see, Obama will not take any action that might endanger his legacy nuclear treaty with Iran.  He knows that many Iranians, especially in the religious extremist community, are opposed to any treaty with "The Great Satan".  He will not approve any diplomatic or military action that might offend the Iranians.

There can be no doubt that Russia intends to make martyrs out of ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  Expect Iranian activity in Iraq to increase dramatically in the next few months, with the possibility of Iranian troops either swelling the ranks of the militias incognito, or with the intrusion into Iraq of the Iranian Army at the invitation of the Iraqi govt.  Very soon the political stalemate in Baghdad will work itself out, with one of three outcomes: first, the Abadi govt. holds firm, but the failure of the Iranian Security Forces in Ramadi and the real threat to the capital posed by ISIS compels Abadi to welcome Iranian military involvement; second, Abadi falls and is replaced by a compliant, pro-Iranian govt., which immediately begins to cross the Iran/Iraq border; or third, the Iranians just do as the wish and cross the border on their own schedule, as the United States won't complain much.  The next month will probably provide an ample supply of fireworks, and demonstrate just how prostrate the United States has become internationally.

  

The Shi'a militias line up in opposition to reforms in Iraq, threaten to disperse demonstrators in Basra with bullets.

Link: Voice Of America considers the impact of reforms in Iraq.

In the last few days, a line in the sand has been drawn in Iraq, between those who support anti-corruption initiatives and government reform, and those who are in opposition.  A number of Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) have come out in opposition to the reforms being introduced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  Former Iraqi Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, who exerts a fair amount of influence with the militias, was schedule to lose his job, as the elimination of the position of Vice President was one of the more prominent features of Abadi's reform package.  The reforms are designed to tackle redundancy in various Iraqi Ministries, which would negatively impact Maliki's political party and his overall position of authority.  Abadi did not invent the issue of reform; in the past few months, the Iraqi people have begun to mobilize and demonstrate in every large city, calling for an end to government corruption and the passage of legitimate, effective reform.  The media in Iraq has had a field day highlighting the countless instances of corruption within the Maliki Administration.  Probably the most prolific and often-discussed example was the creation of a 55,000-strong "ghost army" within the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Maliki's government began paying the salaries of 55,000 soldiers who didn't in fact exist.  The money was graft and was spread around to various military officers in an effort to bolster Maliki's support within the military.  Maliki didn't invent corruption in Iraq; much of the waste and bribery that occurred during his administration was just a repeat of business-as-usual during the days of the Ba'ath Party.  Maliki insisted that anyone who was appointed to a useful position in the government must by loyal to him and his political party.  This rule crippled some Iraqi Ministries, as persons with no experience or knowledge about their particular job, found themselves in charge.

Maliki eventually was replaced by Abadi, who seems determined to succeed in his effort to clean up the government and isolate Maliki altogether.  Abadi appeared to have caught some head-wind, with the support of the Council of Representatives in Parliament, and the backing of the huge crowds of demonstrators that continued to choke the downtown areas of Baghdad and Basra. Both Shi'a and Sunni Iraqis were in approval of his reform efforts.  The Abadi Administration made efforts to explain the importance of proceeding with caution with regards to the Ramadi Offensive, because it was also necessary to locate and destroy all the booby-traps and bombs that ISIS had left to greet the returning civilians.  The people seemed to accept the need for patience, even as ISIS continued his campaign of SVBIEDS and VBIEDS in all the provinces surrounding the capital.  Abadi can even count the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'a population, as an ally.  Maliki seemed to be unstoppable, although behind the scenes, we all were whispering about the level of Maliki's influence with Iran and the militias.  During his administration, the relationship was at times strained, at least with certain groups, including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which had trouble trusting Maliki because of his ties to the United Kingdom and the United States.  In the last few days, though, it has become apparent that the militias have come out united in support of Maliki and opposed to Abadi's reform agenda.  Although the militia movement does not have the opportunity to impact the reform issue at the ballot box, they have no problem intimidating people from the end of a machine gun.

One of Abadi's targets in the reform campaign was the Iraqi judiciary.  Historically rife with bribery and the target of countless complaints, , Abadi saw an opportunity to appease the masses and also push along the reform agenda.  Medhat al-Mahmud, the head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council and the first and current Chief Justice of Iraq, is an ally of Maliki, probably only because he wants to keep Abadi from cleaning out Iraq's Judicial Council, so to speak.  Mahmud has been quite fortunate over the past decade, presiding over the creation of the Iraqi Judiciary, then finding himself as its first Chief Justice.  This position has given him tremendous influence and made him a rich man.  Under Mahmud's watch, the Judiciary was subject to no other authority, although the Constitution calls for oversight by Parliament.  Abadi's reforms have made Medhat al-Mahmud and the Shi'a militias strange bedfellows, as the expression goes.  Interestingly enough, the head of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, met with Iraqi President Fuad Masum on August 25, and asked Masum not to finalize the Iraqi Parliament Council of Representative's decision to eliminate Maliki's Vice Presidential post.  We don't often speak of Fuad Masum because his job is usually ceremonial, but every avenue is being used to thwart the reform movement.  There has been no indication that Masum would give in to the request of Khazali, but the issue has yet to be resolved.

Now that the players are in place, the real struggle over the future of reform will begin.  The anti-reform side does not have numbers in its favor, so it will resort to other means to sabotage the reform agenda.  Already, the militias have announced in Basra that any protests or demonstrations were illegal and would be met with an aggressive response from the militias.  Business as usual for those guys, I assume.  We can expect the militias to use whatever is necessary to intimidate the opposition and scuttle the reform agenda.  This development could impact the military situation, as the militias have been vital to the efforts in Anbar Province.

Iraqi government faced with mounting lawlessness in Basra.

Since 2003, when the southern Iraqi city of Basra celebrated the fall of Saddam Hussein, it has always followed a direction uniquely its own.  Although the city has a distinct Shi'a majority, and the various militias make their presence apparent, Basra refuses to follow anyone's "party line", so to speak.  In 2007, following the departure of British forces, organized crime and the Shi'a militias became entrenched in Basra.  Given its strategic location as a entrepot of sorts,  a great deal of goods and merchandise transit Basra, especially in the form of imports and exports.  This type of traffic lends itself to all sorts of graft, which is how Basra became the organized crime center of Iraq.  In 2008, coalition and government forces launched a major operation in Basra, and successfully restored state-control, but since that time, the same players have returned and discreetly picked up right where they left off.  The Iraqi authorities have few options, as military operations elsewhere in Iraq have pulled troops normally posted to the Basra Governorate.  The police do what they can, but everyone is basically just trying to stay alive.  To stir the pot even more, Basra has been the scene of some of the larger anti-corruption demonstrations in the last year, and kidnappings for ransom have become a real problem.  To sum it up, there's a lot going on here!

As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration.  Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate.  Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration.  No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra.  Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time.  But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time.  Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized.  At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down.  But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation.  The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies.  It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control.  However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF. 

Block by block, Iraqi forces begin to dislodge ISIS from the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: ISIS kills two Iraqi generals in separate attacks on the same day outside Ramadi.


Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west.  For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense.  In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity.  At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion.  Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield.  Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer.  People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties.  Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine).  All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS.  The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July.  Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din.  As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji.  The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands).  Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.

Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers.  The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches.  This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable.  With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces.  The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out?  Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47?  The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse.  It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause.  Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.

The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late.  The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press.  But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi?  If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time.  You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning.  This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi.  Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies.  But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before.  ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen.  In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap.  ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule.  ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again.  One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units.  ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units.  It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped.  What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq.  At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army.  Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go.  We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks.  At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street.  We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.

The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package.  On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings.  No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias.  The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity.  Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters.  Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.

Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.

The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies.  In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi.  With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive.  Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.

as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province.  By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege.  The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province.  To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives.  One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS.  While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad.  ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself.  ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.

In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community.  Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support.  The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.

Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK.  Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list.  What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments.  Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass.  I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power.  Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support".  Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?

Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.

Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.

As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran.  Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable".  The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war.  We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.

The Iranians are faced with a number of options.  Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups.  The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province.  If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border.  In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero".  The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories.  On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat.  Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create.  Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord.  The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi.  The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.

Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala.  The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order.  But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years.  The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria).  The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban.  Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations.  You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around.  One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran.  So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?

Iraqi forces facing serious challenges from ISIS in Diyala and Babil provinces.

Link: ISIS attack on market leaves 115 dead.

As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province.  ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad.  Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary.  In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.

The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned.  According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar.  The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there.  Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure.  Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time.  The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.

And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar.  What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi.  It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad.  The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture.  The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs.  How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?

Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.

Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.

Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS).  Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah.  The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force.  If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west.  After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi.  But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death.  Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication.  In this theater, nothing would surprise me.

The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts.  The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design.  Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs.  Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad.  The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority.  In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations.  While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire.  Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.

The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front.  Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time.  The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing.  Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions.  Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq.  The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack.  At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi.  The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces.  As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties.  Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply.  Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult.  But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements.  Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.  

Iraqi Security Forces launch offensive to retake Ramadi; PMUs tackling Fallujah separately.

Links: A. ISF launches offensive in Anbar.
           B. U.S. delivers first shipment of 36 F-16s to Iraq.

Iraq continues to crowd-out Syria for front-page news, as the government in Baghdad on Monday announced the long-anticipated offensive in Anbar Province.  The first goal of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) is the recapture of Ramadi.  Interestingly enough, the much talked-about Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are targeting Fallujah.  The strategy, which appears sound, is to present the Islamic State (IS) forces with two cities to defend.  It will be interesting to see how the IS responds, given joint requests for resources; who gets the priority, Fallujah or Ramadi?  I like this strategy because it fully removes the initiative from the IS.  There had been concerns that the attack on Ramadi, along with the approach of the end of Ramadan, would encourage the IS to increase its Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) in Baghdad.  In fact, SVBIED attacks have increased in both Baghdad and Diyala Province.  But creating a two-front engagement in Anbar Province forces the IS to live and die by the effectiveness of its supply lines and ability to reinforce.  The IS may not have the capability to continue its SVBIED attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province.  This strategy does include a certain level of risk.  What if the PMUs succeed in retaking Fallujah, but the ISF fails with Ramadi.  The U.S. would also take the hit, because the Iraqi people affiliate the U.S. with the regular Army and Police.  We have been training these groups in one form or another for a decade.  On the other hand, the PMUs are obviously connected to Iran.  This might be an opportunity to Iran to chalk up another victory over the U.S. in the all-important "war of perceptions".

In another development, the United States began deliveries of thirty-six F-16s purchased by Iraq, eighteen in 2011 and another eighteen in 2013.  The reason for the delay in delivery vice the purchasing date, is directly related to the training of pilots to fly the F-16.  A majority of the training took place in the United States, and we are very confident that these Iraqi pilots will acquit themselves admirably. Once the Iraqi Air Force (IAF) is in possession of at least a handful of F-16s, it will be fascinating to compare the target selection with the target selection of the current allied air coalition.  Something tells us that the IAF will be much more active and aggressive, which will be a welcome development.  With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, I've never seen a military force be as successful as the IS has been with regards to the allied air coalition.  weren't we all taught that control of the air wins wars?  Hell, we aren't talking about control of the air, we are talking about complete air supremacy.  One would assume that the IS in Syria and Iraq would be obliged to conduct all military operations at night.  That hasn't been the case.  One would think that the world's greatest military superpower would be watching from satellites and drones, for any sign of activity whatsoever during daylight hours, and then call in the just call in the airstrikes.  Look, we realize that nothing is ever that simple.  But something just doesn't add up.  We are supposed to have the military air resources of the United States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Iraq dedicated to the destruction of the IS.  And yet we continue to see one IS victory after another, particularly in Syria.  In fact, in recent memory the only damage that the IS has sustained from the air has come from Assad's Air Units.

Each week seems to bring more horrid videos of IS crimes against humanity.  And these are videos that are being professionally recorded and distributed by the IS.  These beasts are beginning to make the Marquis De Sade look like Mary Poppins, for goodness sake.  Our question is, why have we been unable to implement blanket coverage over the skies of Iraq and Syria?  I remember a time not too long ago, when the Iraqi Army and former Iraqi Republican Guard, were too frightened to stick their heads outside of bunkers for fear that a bomb would land on their heads.  And remember the drone video clips from Afghanistan that we've all seen, of Taliban attempting to organize, only to be greeted by a cruise missile? Why isn't this the case with the IS in Syria and Iraq?  Are we out of bombs?  Have we run out of drones?  One day someone will ask the question, "why wasn't this plague destroyed while it was still in its infancy?" Actually, I'm asking the Administration and the Pentagon that question NOW.