Iraqi government faced with mounting lawlessness in Basra.

Since 2003, when the southern Iraqi city of Basra celebrated the fall of Saddam Hussein, it has always followed a direction uniquely its own.  Although the city has a distinct Shi'a majority, and the various militias make their presence apparent, Basra refuses to follow anyone's "party line", so to speak.  In 2007, following the departure of British forces, organized crime and the Shi'a militias became entrenched in Basra.  Given its strategic location as a entrepot of sorts,  a great deal of goods and merchandise transit Basra, especially in the form of imports and exports.  This type of traffic lends itself to all sorts of graft, which is how Basra became the organized crime center of Iraq.  In 2008, coalition and government forces launched a major operation in Basra, and successfully restored state-control, but since that time, the same players have returned and discreetly picked up right where they left off.  The Iraqi authorities have few options, as military operations elsewhere in Iraq have pulled troops normally posted to the Basra Governorate.  The police do what they can, but everyone is basically just trying to stay alive.  To stir the pot even more, Basra has been the scene of some of the larger anti-corruption demonstrations in the last year, and kidnappings for ransom have become a real problem.  To sum it up, there's a lot going on here!

As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration.  Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate.  Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration.  No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra.  Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time.  But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time.  Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized.  At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down.  But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation.  The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies.  It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control.  However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF. 

Kurdish politics, and other confusing headaches.

Links: A. Kurdish political parties trying to resolve presidential debate.
           B. Wikipedia entry for Peshmerga.
           C. Wikipedia entry for PKK.


During my career, I was fortunate enough to work closely with representatives of both the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).  In 2003 and 2004, the opposing Kurdish political parties had set aside much of their differences, at least in Baghdad, for the best interests of the greater Iraqi Kurdish community.  Both groups were represented by well-educated, deferential, hard-working people, who were tremendously supportive of the United States and our military forces in particular.  I remember that the PUK had taken possession of two large, adjoining compounds in the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad, which they utilized for a variety of purposes, including regular meetings with representatives of U.S. government agencies.  Jalal Talabani, founder and leader of the PUK, maintained a much more elaborate residence in Baghdad, closer to the Karada neighborhood.  My initial visit to the PUK compound brought me into contact with Peshmerga (Kurdish for "one who confronts death") for the first, but certainly not the last time.  The Peshmerga are the military forces for the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan; they attempt to maintain a non-aligned posture with regards to the PUK and KDP, who have, at times, really had a go at each other.  Although I've never seen a female Peshmerga, I've been told that they exist.  This group represents the type of self-reliant, hardy, low-maintenance soldier that we don't see much anymore.  They are brave, well-trained, and move together flawlessly when operational.  That being said, I wouldn't invite them to a candlelight dinner party.  From my experience (forgive the stereotyping), they stink, and although not rude, normally haven't picked up much in the way of manners.  I wrote in my book about a meeting I had once at the PUK house, where we discovered two Peshmerga asleep under the table because of the volume and frequency of their farts.  Aside from the U.S. Armed Forces, I can't think of any group that I would want fighting by my side more than the Peshmerga.

I have at times been accused of being biased towards the Kurds.  I am guilty as charged.  I have no qualms about admitting that I support the Kurdish struggle for an independent homeland.  As a people, they are kind, generous, welcoming, hard-working and very family-oriented.  They can also hold a grudge for a very long, long time.  The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslim, but the manner of worship in the Kurdish community, regardless of affiliation, is much different than what is normally observed in the Arab world.  Kurds are private about their religious observations, although most Kurds are very observant of Islamic obligations.  They go about their business in such a way as to not draw attention to themselves.  This is a true example of a community that values the private nature of its religious identity.  Sure, the majority are Sunni Muslim, but they don't advocate the use of shura to settle every issue, nor do they feel this automatic disconnect with Christians and Jews.  I understand the reasoning behind keeping Iraq united.  If the Kurds were granted a homeland in northern Iraq, the rest of the country would be in danger of disintegration.  Maybe its time for that disintegration to take place, given that the area that was once known as Babylon, then Mesopotamia, and now Iraq, has not made a great success of ethnic integration.  It might happen with or without the Kurds, especially if the majority Shi'a continue to assert themselves and the Sunni start to consider life inside the Islamic Republic of Iraq.

Turkey's recent decision to end the de-facto cease fire with the quasi-military organization the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK), has been a reminder that the ISIS crisis is one of a number of unresolved conflicts in this part of the world, that sit just under the skin, waiting to erupt again.  Northern Syria is home to a substantial number of ethnic Kurds, and the anti-ISIS coalition has benefitted tremendously from their willingness to stand up and defend their own communities.  Even the Turks have benefitted, as Ankara is not keen about having ISIS as a direct neighbor.  But the Turks are experts at separating one group of Kurds from another.  According to Ankara, the Syrian Kurds who fight ISIS tooth-and-nail are not connected to the "terrorist" PKK.  Turkey's decision to conduct bombing sorties against suspected PKK locations was a naked political move on the part of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to energize anti-Kurd elements in Turkey before pivotal fall elections.  Not surprisingly, many in the Turkish electorate will scream for vengeance regarding three Turkish soldiers killed in a PKK attack, and not think twice about the Kurds whose murder precipitated the retaliatory ambush.  All the while, the Kurdistan Parliament, which sits in Arbil, is struggling with the never-ending debate over the office of President. The current office-holder, President Masoud Barzani, is the head of the KDP.  In 2009, Barzani was elected with 69.9 % of the vote, and in 2013, the parliament decided to extend his term until 2015.  The five major Kurdish political parties were attempting to resolve the issue of succession, but failed before Barzani's term expired on August 20.  Believe me, Kurdish politics can get very complicated. Its imperative that Kurdistan present a united front, given the renewed trouble with Turkey and the continuing war against ISIS in both Syria and Iraq.  The PDK will argue for another extension for Barzani, which, for political expediency, will be supported by the PUK.  The remaining parties do not represent enough votes to budge a joint KDP/PUK effort.  Expect the Kurdistan Parliament to extend Barzani's term to 2017, when it meets to debate the issue on August 23. 

Turkey continues pressure on PKK.

Link: Turkish military bombs PKK targets.

Turkey has decided that the time is right to tackle the difficult problem of independence for Iraq's Kurdish population.  Turkey has an unfortunate history of dealing with the Kurds, including allegations of past genocide and pogroms.  Turkey would like nothing more than to make the problem disappear, and the military solution seems to be the one that Turkey likes the most.  The PKK, a self-appointed political and military representative of Turkey's Kurdish population, has been a thorn on the shoe of the Turkish Armed Forces, for years.  The PKK has never suffered from lack of funding as the Kurd diaspora has generously supplied the movement with resources, weapons, and media representation.  The PKK has created a difficult situation by utilizing locale familiarity and support to regularly ambush Turkish military patrols.  Ankara has been very hesitant to unleash the full blunt of its military against the PKK, which is holed up in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, because of the fear that the international community would not approve.  More importantly, a full military offensive involving the Air Force and Turkey's mighty armor units would give the impression that the PKK movement is making progress in its efforts.

What does the PKK want?  Basically, the PKK is fighting for a Kurdish homeland in eastern Turkey, and at times the movement has garnered tremendous international attention from the actions of female suicide activists.  At times, the PKK has played nice with its Iraq-based PUK and PDK counterparts, which has raised hopes in the Kurdish community that the three organizations might be able to exert enough influence to create a Kurdish independent state from Turkish and Iraqi territory.  In fact, when the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq appeared close to actual success in seceding from Iraq, a great deal of pressure was exerted on the PKK to give up the armed struggle in Turkey, and join the new Kurdish state being born in northern Iraq.  But the Iraqi Kurds got a bit ahead of themselves.  The international community, and the United States in particular, decided that the time had not yet arrived to dissolving the Iraqi state as we know it, and the Kurds were left empty-handed.  The PKK was probably thrilled that the effort failed, because a successful Kurdish state in northern Iraq would arguably remove the need for a Kurdish state in Anatolia.  Its should come as no surprise that the PKK as it exists today, has become an enterprise of sorts, with people making a living from the continued struggle.  The cessation of the effort would certainly close the pocket books of many in the Kurdish diaspora.  In fact, the informal cease fire that existed between Turkey and the PKK since 2013, had started to impact the money-collection efforts in international Kurdish communities.  But the recent attacks on PKK targets, including civilians, will certainly piss off Kurds everywhere, and the money flow should return to normal.

With the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the remaining forces of de facto Syrian president Bashir al-Assad continuing on its southern border, you would think that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would have enough trouble on his hands.  But Erdogan is a master politician, who is always looking into the future before deciding what decisions to make today.  Erdogan suffered badly in the last Turkish elections, which he probably didn't expect.  He normally doesn't get surprised twice, at least not in the same manner.  He is taking care of business. And in Turkey, nothing mobilizes the Turkish voter like a bit of Kurdish/PKK misbehavior, and if the cease fire is keeping the PKK quiet, then it was up to Erdogan to stir the hornets nest a bit.  As usual, Erdogan displayed politically adept timing, and waited until the entire international community was focusing on the nuclear treaty between the United States and Iran, and also the continuing military drama evolving in Iraq's Anbar Province, to launch a completely unprovoked attack on a PKK target.  Not surprisingly, the PKK, after taking a sigh of relief that its raison d'etre had made a new appearance, retaliated quickly by ambushing and killing a handful of Turkish soldiers.  Since this development began last week, its been the usual tit-for-tat between the two groups, and has created an entirely new diplomatic front for the world to focus on.  As for Erdogan, he gets to play the tough guy for the Turkish voter, and at the same time, may have the opportunity to also show is statesmen abilities, before the next round of Turkish elections.

Updates From The Ground War In Iraq

Links: A.  Iraqi Troops Retake Three Tents And A Camel Repair Shop
           B.  Women Warriors Not New To Kurdistan

I woke up late this morning and missed Mass.  When I finally got my wits about me I remembered that the Dallas Cowboys game against the Washington Foreskins was on Monday night, so I was a bit grumpy when I turned on the computer and saw the headline, "Iraqi Troops Retake Town". Allegedly the Iraqi Army already controls most of Ramadi, so if the Iraqi Army could dislodge the Islamic State (IS) from Fallujah, it would clearly disrupt the IS efforts to methodically destabilize Baghdad.  Unfortunately, the town that was retaken was not Fallujah, but Jurf al-Sakhar, a Sunni town with roughly 80,000 inhabitants.

For most folks, Jurf al-Sakhar is just another hard-to-pronounce Iraqi village in the middle of nothing.  As a former CIA Case Officer, I recall Jurf al-Sakhar as being home to Saddam Hussein's most important biological weapons research facility.  The town is part of a ribbon of Sunni communities that hug the Euphrates and are buffered to the east and west by Shia villages.  It is strategically located, with Karbala to the west and Hillah to the south.  I made light of the fact that Jurf al-Sakhar is unfamiliar to most people reading this post, but in reality the retaking of Jurf al-Sakhar disrupts any attempt by the IS to encircle Baghdad.  All in all, the deliverance of Jurf al-Sakhar from the IS is good news.  What would truly justify a celebration would be the removal of all IS operatives from Ramadi, and the retaking of Fallujah.  If the Iraqi Army could accomplish these two goals, then my readers would get a respite from daily postings about Baghdad.

I do not purposely neglect discussing the Iraqi northern front.  The truth is, I have some trouble locating dependable reporting from this area.  The Iraqi Army is active not only in and around Tikrit, but also in Baiji, Baqubah, and Kirkuk.

It can be difficult determining exactly where the Iraqi Army leaves off the front line and the Kurdish forces pick it up.  The Iraqi Army and the various Kurdish military elements recognize the need to work together against a common enemy, in this case the IS.  Interestingly enough, I haven't seen much information online regarding the actual authority that Kurdish leaders bequeath to the Peshmerga.  The Peshmerga is the largest, best equipped, best trained, and most respected of all the various military forces that have represented Kurdish interests.  I spent some time with the Peshmerga in 2003, and as I see it, they are the true representative Army of the Kurdish people.  No doubt other groups representing particular political interests will make themselves useful in the war against the IS (these include PUK, PDK, etc. who will always have their own large cadre of bodyguards). But at the end of the day, there is only one Peshmerga.  If it were possible to triple the number of Peshmerga fighters, the IS would be swept away in a month or so.  I have tremendous confidence in these Kurdish soldiers because I have watched them in action both nearby and from afar.  The Peshmerga has never been accused of "too much discipline" during down-time, and the  subject of hygiene seems to escape Peshmerga training programs, but these guys and gals know how to fight.  When the bullets start to fly, the Peshmerga seems to maneuver as one unit with one mind.  They are just as effective in small units as they are in groups of twenty or fifty, and they can transport an amazing amount of heavy weaponry over great distances in no time at all.  In reality, I believe that the IS has stolen its tactics from the Peshmerga.  When I worked with the Peshmerga, there was no consistency to the weaponry.  Some preferred to carry the M16, and others (most) were comfortable with the ubiquitous AK-47.  Any more commentary regarding the Peshmerga will require me to share parts of my book.  Suffice to say that I have great faith in the Peshmerga and only wish we had more.  The many times that I observed Peshmerga during down time made me realize that the cohesiveness that is so apparent during battle, seems to melt away during personal time. Each Peshmerga is responsible for their own personal issues such as health, hygiene, entertainment, and comfort.  In fact, the only time I saw an administrative angle was during meals (not always) and during issues related to ammunition and supply.

Link B is an important article for anyone who requires an accurate vision of the ground war in Syria and Iraq.  Women have always been militarily active in Kurdish history.  The only militaries that use women as effectively as the Peshmerga are the Israelis and the United States, of course.  Kurdish women fighters carry their own equipment and show the same level of personal independence that is such a big part of the Peshmerga way.  The Iraqi Army has a respectable number of female troops, and it is my understanding that they have shown promise on the battlefield.  Any current female troops in the Iraqi Army are part of the new structure implemented after the fall of Saddam Hussein.  This structure is very focused on military instruction and weapons training, so it shouldn't be surprising that so many female troops have achieved success early in their careers.  But at the end of the day, all soldiers must fight and fight well to be successful.  In warfare, the soldier who is unsuccessful at his or her job, never leaves the battlefield.  The IS has made a bit of a public show over the number of female recruits that have arrived from the United States and Europe.  Its one thing to display photos and videos on social media of American and European females sporting the latest in Burkha-wear and waving little Islamic State flags for the camera.  Here in Mookie World we are all about the truth, and I want to hear from these same young ladies a month after their arrival in camp.  I understand that the IS has a few (formerly English) female fighters who have taken to the life of being an Islamic Warrior.  My question is, what would The Prophet say?  Isn't "soldiering" an occupation reserved for men in the world of the "Caliphate"?