Link: Wikipedia entry for the Benghazi scandal.
Part I
The recent opening of a well-produced and costly film on the 2012 Benghazi incident in which four Americans, including an Ambassador were killed, reminds us of the sadly dangerous world we live in. Ambassador Chris Stevens and the three young men that lost their lives that night, believed that they were in Benghazi, Libya, to help spread America's message of freedom and give hope to a nation in great need of something in which to believe. When I was a child, I would spend hours looking at the globe my parents bought me for my ninth birthday, and try to learn, day by day, a little bit about all the different countries around the world. Over the year, I remember using that globe to identify places where war had broken out. As I've gotten older, the areas free from conflict has continually gotten smaller. Today, as I look at a map of the world, I can no longer identify a place which isn't in some way either directly under attack or threatened by the plague of Islamic Extremist terrorism. In the seven years following the 9-11 tragedy, the United States used its military capability to force the terrorist elements to fight in their own backyard. True, Al-Qaeda was guest-of-honor of the Taliban in Afghanistan, not Saddam Hussein in Iraq. But strategically, the best way to get at Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan was by using Iraq as a spring-board. The Bush Administration had been in a war of words with Iraq and its manipulation of the oil-for-food program to ignore United Nation's Resolutions. I don't know the real answer, but it would seem that the Bush Administration gambled that the Democrats, the United Nations, and the rest of the world wouldn't mind if the U.S. borrowed Iraq's U.N. Resolution violations as an excuse to invade Iraq and turn it into a U.S. military base. I understand the reasoning behind the strategy: the best was to annihilate Al-Qaeda was to force them into a conventional war (to which they were wholly unsuited) in their own backyard; no place to retreat.
As for the politics involved, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction issue, I understand the frustration of folks who did not follow the Bush Administration's lead. But Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant who had ignored every attempt by the United Nations to get him in line. And by 2009, the Iraqi insurgency was over, and Iraq was beginning, for the first time as an independent and free nation, to stand on its own feet (thank you, U.S. taxpayer). You see, while the military was defeating first, Saddam loyalists and second, the insurgency, we had engineers, architects, plumbers, construction specialists, electricians, town planners, and all sorts of other "nation rebuilding" experts in place, to rebuild Iraq. Highways were put back in order, from one side of Iraq to the other. The urban transportation systems were modernized and put back on line, along with traffic lights and speed limits. The water distribution and waste disposal systems in place were practically from the time of the Ottomans, and we fixed what was repairable and replaced the rest. Education was important to President Bush, and school building was a priority, from grade school to university-level education. A tremendous effort to put Iraq's refining capacity back on line was not complete by 2009, but a great deal had been accomplished. Also, the U.S. military was in the process of training a streamlined, effective, modern Iraqi Armed Forces.
Showing posts with label Saddam Hussein. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Saddam Hussein. Show all posts
Thursday, January 21, 2016
Wednesday, September 2, 2015
Iraqi government faced with mounting lawlessness in Basra.
Since 2003, when the southern Iraqi city of Basra celebrated the fall of Saddam Hussein, it has always followed a direction uniquely its own. Although the city has a distinct Shi'a majority, and the various militias make their presence apparent, Basra refuses to follow anyone's "party line", so to speak. In 2007, following the departure of British forces, organized crime and the Shi'a militias became entrenched in Basra. Given its strategic location as a entrepot of sorts, a great deal of goods and merchandise transit Basra, especially in the form of imports and exports. This type of traffic lends itself to all sorts of graft, which is how Basra became the organized crime center of Iraq. In 2008, coalition and government forces launched a major operation in Basra, and successfully restored state-control, but since that time, the same players have returned and discreetly picked up right where they left off. The Iraqi authorities have few options, as military operations elsewhere in Iraq have pulled troops normally posted to the Basra Governorate. The police do what they can, but everyone is basically just trying to stay alive. To stir the pot even more, Basra has been the scene of some of the larger anti-corruption demonstrations in the last year, and kidnappings for ransom have become a real problem. To sum it up, there's a lot going on here!
As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration. Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate. Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration. No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra. Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time. But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time. Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized. At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down. But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation. The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies. It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control. However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF.
As Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi doggedly sticks to his reform agenda, he faces the daily threat of Iraq breaking up under his administration. Since the fall of Saddam, the Iraqi people rarely miss an opportunity to gather and demonstrate. Lately, Baghdad itself has become the location for the largest of the protests, although Basra continues to hold the crown for duration. No matter what else is happening in Iraq, chances are there will be a demonstration in Basra. Al-Abadi has been impressive in his determination to follow through on promised reforms, and also in his support for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), who have methodically bottled up Ramadi, and are beginning to re-occupy the city, one neighborhood at a time. But sometimes it seems as if Abadi and the entire governing structure of Iraq are hanging by a shoestring. For all practical purposes, the Kurdistan Parliament and the PUK/KDP govern northern Iraq, central Iraq is under siege by ISIS, and everything south of Baghdad appears to be under the influence of Shi'a militia or another, depending on where you are at the time. Abadi, his Cabinet, and the Parliament sit in Baghdad, debating reforms that hopefully will help to keep Iraq from becoming even more regionalized. At the moment, the Iraqi people and the political forces that matter are standing behind Abadi, and he shows no indication of slowing down. But the outbreak of lawlessness in Basra must be treated as a national security issue; Basra is too important strategically and economically to not address the problem immediately, even if it requires pulling some troops from the Anbar operation. The cities of Basra and Umm Qasr are non-replaceable pieces of the Iraqi economic lifeline, and will only grow in importance as the country moves away from war and diversifies. It is possible that Abadi can co-opt one or two of the larger, more traditionally stable militias, and use them to help get the situation under control. However its done, this problem won't go away without movement from Baghdad and the ISF.
Tuesday, June 23, 2015
Should Iraq be partitioned?
Links: A. Considerations on partitioning Iraq.
B. The U.S. contemplates partitioning Iraq.
In 2006, then-Senator Joe Biden suggested that consideration be given to the partition of Iraq. I believe at the time, that the idea was to allow the Kurds a homeland in the north, the Sunni would stay put in the central belt region, and the Shi'a would have an independent state in the south. For some reason, I couldn't buy into this argument, although for the life of me I can't recall why. I know that Turkey would have had a proverbial herd of cows if the Kurds had been given a homeland, and the Sunni, who as a minority have always ruled Iraq, would've been forced to accept a smaller and less-wealthy nation, but something else kept me from joining the "pro-partition" partisans. I think it was probably just an example of the traditionalist in me not wanted to change the maps again. But we've reached that point again, when folks in position of authority are whispering about partitioning Iraq. It does piss me off a bit, because this discussion wasn't really necessary. We could have avoided this position if we hadn't been in such a hurry to get out of Iraq.
Our rapid departure from Iraq was not necessary. The Iraqis were not requesting it, and our military leaders were strongly advising otherwise. Everyone seemed to be in agreement that the Iraqi military needed to be responsible for Iraq's external security, but only after sufficient training had taken place. Its my understanding that the training program that had been approved by the administration hadn't even started before Obama changed his mind and pulled the rug out from under everyone. So we left Iraq in the hands of an untrained, unprofessional army, with a huge invitation to ISIS to "come on in, folks!" And they didn't need to be asked twice. The real tragedy is that Iraq was beginning to settle into existence as a unitary state, with an economy that connected all the various regions and ethnicities. As its traditional boundaries are drawn, Iraq is fortunate to have natural resources distributed in all parts of the nation. This fact contributed to the successful re-establishment of an internationally-focused economy. The presence of the U.S. military allowed for consecutive years of peace, something foreign to many Iraqis. Markets were open and full of produce, schools were full, traffic lights worked, the electoral process was improving with each election, Iraq's airports were using the designation "international" again, the national soccer team was winning (occasionally), and an Olympic team existed to represent all Iraqis. Compare those few facts with the situation in Iraq today. You can lay all of this at the feet of Barrack Obama. He felt the political pressure from his base to follow through on his irresponsible pledge to rid Iraq of U.S. military forces at the earliest possible opportunity. And lets face it: the ultimate sacrifice of all those American young men and women....does it mean nothing to Obama? Peace was achieved and prosperity was at hand, and for politics' sake, he turned success into failure. His actions did everything possible to encourage sectarian movement amongst the various ethnicities of Iraq. Without the U.S. Army, the only security is with your own kind. That is the perspective of the various groups trying to survive in Iraq today.
Back to the idea of partitioning Iraq. First and foremost, its really absurd of the United States to be considering the limits of the national boundaries of a sovereign nation which is diplomatically accredited in the United States and a member in good standing of the United Nations (what the hell is that, anyway?). Be that as it may, I have always supported the Kurdish independence movement. The Kurds have played the game so long, and been such good team players, that they deserve the opportunity to govern themselves. The truth is, Kurdistan would probably exist today as a separate and legitimate nation-state if it weren't for issues regarding oil. How much oil are the Kurds sitting on, and should it belong to all the people of Iraq, and not just the Kurds? A specious argument, considering that the Kurds have never benefitted from any of the other oil deposits in Iraq. Most Iraqis don't consider the Kurds to be Iraqi, even though most Kurds are Muslim. If Iraq were at peace, it might not be a bad idea to consider three separate nations, one for each ethnicity. But given the current conflict raging against the Islamic State, its really a moot point. The good guys are hoping to find a way to keep Iraq from becoming one united nation under the Islamic State, and don't have much time to sit around discussing the viability of a Kurdish, Sunni and Shia separation.
A quick review of the excellent links that I've provided will remind everyone that efforts to create multiple nations based on ethnicity, from the remains of a failed, much larger state (Yugoslavia, for example), have usually not been successful. I don't know if those examples are applicable in this instance, though. If Iraq were divided into three nations, the two voices that would be screeching the loudest would be Turkey and the Iraqi Sunnis. The Turks are paranoid that the establishment of a Kurdish state will eventually lead to an attempt to annex parts of eastern Asia Minor (Turkey), where the Turks constitute a majority of the population. As long as Erdogan is in office, I'm all for anything that will piss off the Turks, so no problem there. The Iraqi Sunnis will also threaten to hold their breath until they turn blue and pass out, because they've always been the chosen ones. The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Shi'a, the Jews, have always had to sit way in the back of the Iraqi bus, so to speak. Even though Saddam rarely spent money on infrastructure or social projects, when he did, it was for the benefit of a Sunni community. That explains the abject poverty that exists in the Iraqi Shi'a communities located in the south-central and southern parts of Iraq. The Kurds, God love 'em, didn't wait around for a handout from Saddam's Baghdad; they created their own economy, and also benefitted greatly from the Kurdish diaspora. For all practical purposes, Kurdistan has been a self-sufficient nation-state for some time now. Its just not recognized outside of Sulimaniyah. The Kurds even have their own military, and as I've commented before, you don't want to pick a fit with the Pesh Merga. As for the Iraqi Sunni, I don't think they will have much luck finding a sympathetic ear anytime soon.
Under ideal circumstances, It might just be time for serious consideration to be given to the partition of Iraq. But given the current state of affairs, it just doesn't make sense. We might be re-writing the boundaries of a nation that won't exist in 2016. Lets focus on winning this war first.
B. The U.S. contemplates partitioning Iraq.
In 2006, then-Senator Joe Biden suggested that consideration be given to the partition of Iraq. I believe at the time, that the idea was to allow the Kurds a homeland in the north, the Sunni would stay put in the central belt region, and the Shi'a would have an independent state in the south. For some reason, I couldn't buy into this argument, although for the life of me I can't recall why. I know that Turkey would have had a proverbial herd of cows if the Kurds had been given a homeland, and the Sunni, who as a minority have always ruled Iraq, would've been forced to accept a smaller and less-wealthy nation, but something else kept me from joining the "pro-partition" partisans. I think it was probably just an example of the traditionalist in me not wanted to change the maps again. But we've reached that point again, when folks in position of authority are whispering about partitioning Iraq. It does piss me off a bit, because this discussion wasn't really necessary. We could have avoided this position if we hadn't been in such a hurry to get out of Iraq.
Our rapid departure from Iraq was not necessary. The Iraqis were not requesting it, and our military leaders were strongly advising otherwise. Everyone seemed to be in agreement that the Iraqi military needed to be responsible for Iraq's external security, but only after sufficient training had taken place. Its my understanding that the training program that had been approved by the administration hadn't even started before Obama changed his mind and pulled the rug out from under everyone. So we left Iraq in the hands of an untrained, unprofessional army, with a huge invitation to ISIS to "come on in, folks!" And they didn't need to be asked twice. The real tragedy is that Iraq was beginning to settle into existence as a unitary state, with an economy that connected all the various regions and ethnicities. As its traditional boundaries are drawn, Iraq is fortunate to have natural resources distributed in all parts of the nation. This fact contributed to the successful re-establishment of an internationally-focused economy. The presence of the U.S. military allowed for consecutive years of peace, something foreign to many Iraqis. Markets were open and full of produce, schools were full, traffic lights worked, the electoral process was improving with each election, Iraq's airports were using the designation "international" again, the national soccer team was winning (occasionally), and an Olympic team existed to represent all Iraqis. Compare those few facts with the situation in Iraq today. You can lay all of this at the feet of Barrack Obama. He felt the political pressure from his base to follow through on his irresponsible pledge to rid Iraq of U.S. military forces at the earliest possible opportunity. And lets face it: the ultimate sacrifice of all those American young men and women....does it mean nothing to Obama? Peace was achieved and prosperity was at hand, and for politics' sake, he turned success into failure. His actions did everything possible to encourage sectarian movement amongst the various ethnicities of Iraq. Without the U.S. Army, the only security is with your own kind. That is the perspective of the various groups trying to survive in Iraq today.
Back to the idea of partitioning Iraq. First and foremost, its really absurd of the United States to be considering the limits of the national boundaries of a sovereign nation which is diplomatically accredited in the United States and a member in good standing of the United Nations (what the hell is that, anyway?). Be that as it may, I have always supported the Kurdish independence movement. The Kurds have played the game so long, and been such good team players, that they deserve the opportunity to govern themselves. The truth is, Kurdistan would probably exist today as a separate and legitimate nation-state if it weren't for issues regarding oil. How much oil are the Kurds sitting on, and should it belong to all the people of Iraq, and not just the Kurds? A specious argument, considering that the Kurds have never benefitted from any of the other oil deposits in Iraq. Most Iraqis don't consider the Kurds to be Iraqi, even though most Kurds are Muslim. If Iraq were at peace, it might not be a bad idea to consider three separate nations, one for each ethnicity. But given the current conflict raging against the Islamic State, its really a moot point. The good guys are hoping to find a way to keep Iraq from becoming one united nation under the Islamic State, and don't have much time to sit around discussing the viability of a Kurdish, Sunni and Shia separation.
A quick review of the excellent links that I've provided will remind everyone that efforts to create multiple nations based on ethnicity, from the remains of a failed, much larger state (Yugoslavia, for example), have usually not been successful. I don't know if those examples are applicable in this instance, though. If Iraq were divided into three nations, the two voices that would be screeching the loudest would be Turkey and the Iraqi Sunnis. The Turks are paranoid that the establishment of a Kurdish state will eventually lead to an attempt to annex parts of eastern Asia Minor (Turkey), where the Turks constitute a majority of the population. As long as Erdogan is in office, I'm all for anything that will piss off the Turks, so no problem there. The Iraqi Sunnis will also threaten to hold their breath until they turn blue and pass out, because they've always been the chosen ones. The Kurds, the Assyrians, the Shi'a, the Jews, have always had to sit way in the back of the Iraqi bus, so to speak. Even though Saddam rarely spent money on infrastructure or social projects, when he did, it was for the benefit of a Sunni community. That explains the abject poverty that exists in the Iraqi Shi'a communities located in the south-central and southern parts of Iraq. The Kurds, God love 'em, didn't wait around for a handout from Saddam's Baghdad; they created their own economy, and also benefitted greatly from the Kurdish diaspora. For all practical purposes, Kurdistan has been a self-sufficient nation-state for some time now. Its just not recognized outside of Sulimaniyah. The Kurds even have their own military, and as I've commented before, you don't want to pick a fit with the Pesh Merga. As for the Iraqi Sunni, I don't think they will have much luck finding a sympathetic ear anytime soon.
Under ideal circumstances, It might just be time for serious consideration to be given to the partition of Iraq. But given the current state of affairs, it just doesn't make sense. We might be re-writing the boundaries of a nation that won't exist in 2016. Lets focus on winning this war first.
Wednesday, June 17, 2015
Sure, the Islamic State has its share of Ex-Ba'athists; but its still a religiously motivated organization at heart.
Links: A. ISIS fighters in Ramadi are ex-Ba'ath Party members.
B. Ex-Ba'athists helping organize ISIS.
In the past few weeks, I have repeatedly heard a bit of information that is taking on a life of its own. I have been told by persons I respect and persons whose news sources are dubious at best, that the Islamic State/ISIS, is being controlled and run by ethnic Iraqi former Saddam loyalists and Ba'ath Party members. Last year I had a long conversation with a good friend who happens to be a retired Iraqi General and a former Ba'ath Party member (his brother and father, now deceased, were both party representatives from Baghdad). He informed me, almost off-handedly, that some of his former colleagues were involved with ISIS. He elaborated that these individuals were assisting in the creation and expansion of different departments within the organization, including intelligence and recruitment. He laughed as he pointed out that like many Iraqis, they were desperate to bring home a paycheck, and at least someone was willing to compensate them for their skills. So the demographic that is the Islamic State now includes a number of former Ba'ath Party hacks, I thought. It only strengthened my existing opinion that the Islamic State is determined to develop the characteristics of a conventional military force. When George Bush (and more importantly Donald Rumsfeld) was considering the best way to defeat Al-Qaeda, the decision was made to force the terrorist organization to fight a conventional war, something it was not designed to do. Although the insurgency and the Abu Ghraib fiasco dragged things out way longer than should have been necessary, the strategy actually worked, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaida and the Taliban just did not have the personnel, the equipment, the resources, or the infrastructure to combat the U.S. military. Interestingly enough, the Islamic State has been successful since it started behaving more as a legitimate armed forces, which requires a plan for resupply and reinforcements, and also must include a transportation and communication network. When Al-Qaeda works in small units, transportation and communication are much simpler. But the Islamic State now commands tens of thousands of personnel, and it can be no surprise that former regime elements, Sunni no doubt, have joined the cause, and that ISIS, which had a definite need for that expertise, welcomed them with open arms.
But this development can be easily misunderstood. In no way does the motivation expressed by the Islamic State dovetail with the Socialist manifesto of the Arab Ba'ath Party that at one time controlled both Iraq and Syria. Do not read too much into the fact that the intelligence branch of the Islamic State is run in the same manner as the intelligence branch of the Iraqi Army. Certainly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, is ethnic Iraqi. But he was not a supporter of Saddam Hussein. Because the roots of the ISIS movement can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", it should be no surprise that a number of Iraqis are prominent in the organization. But I am beginning to see this perspective take root that the ghost of Saddam and Ba'ath Party adherents are dictating policy for the Islamic State. Do not be distracted by this red herring. Do not forget what the Islamic State represents and exactly what methods it has used to achieve its ends. No doubt Saddam did some heinous things, but is always attempted to cover-up or deny the existence of such government-sanctioned activity. The Islamic State WANTS you as a first-row witness to its execution of persons because of religious persuasion. More importantly, don't forget that the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein were interested in political motivation as opposed to religious. Saddam (and his buddy Bashir al-Assad) were in fear of the Islamic Extremist movement, and directed their security forces to deal with it harshly. In its inception and at the height of its popularity, the Ba'ath movement was inherently political. It sought to enfranchise the Arab worker in all nations and create a political movement with Socialist leanings that would sweep the party into power in places like Egypt and Turkey. The Islamic State exists for the purpose of the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, a nation ruled by a Caliph (religious leader) with the Quran as the law of the land.
The former Iraqi Ba'ath Party members who are active in the Islamic State are the ones being co-opted, not vice versa. And that should have been expected. When the U.S. arrived in Iraq in 2003 and the Iraqi military has ceased to exist, everyone wanted to become a part of the U.S. military force that now appeared to hold the reigns of power. In reality, its just a circumstance of survival. People have families to provide for, and they will do what is necessary to reach that goal. What would I do to feed my family? Just about anything.
B. Ex-Ba'athists helping organize ISIS.
In the past few weeks, I have repeatedly heard a bit of information that is taking on a life of its own. I have been told by persons I respect and persons whose news sources are dubious at best, that the Islamic State/ISIS, is being controlled and run by ethnic Iraqi former Saddam loyalists and Ba'ath Party members. Last year I had a long conversation with a good friend who happens to be a retired Iraqi General and a former Ba'ath Party member (his brother and father, now deceased, were both party representatives from Baghdad). He informed me, almost off-handedly, that some of his former colleagues were involved with ISIS. He elaborated that these individuals were assisting in the creation and expansion of different departments within the organization, including intelligence and recruitment. He laughed as he pointed out that like many Iraqis, they were desperate to bring home a paycheck, and at least someone was willing to compensate them for their skills. So the demographic that is the Islamic State now includes a number of former Ba'ath Party hacks, I thought. It only strengthened my existing opinion that the Islamic State is determined to develop the characteristics of a conventional military force. When George Bush (and more importantly Donald Rumsfeld) was considering the best way to defeat Al-Qaeda, the decision was made to force the terrorist organization to fight a conventional war, something it was not designed to do. Although the insurgency and the Abu Ghraib fiasco dragged things out way longer than should have been necessary, the strategy actually worked, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaida and the Taliban just did not have the personnel, the equipment, the resources, or the infrastructure to combat the U.S. military. Interestingly enough, the Islamic State has been successful since it started behaving more as a legitimate armed forces, which requires a plan for resupply and reinforcements, and also must include a transportation and communication network. When Al-Qaeda works in small units, transportation and communication are much simpler. But the Islamic State now commands tens of thousands of personnel, and it can be no surprise that former regime elements, Sunni no doubt, have joined the cause, and that ISIS, which had a definite need for that expertise, welcomed them with open arms.
But this development can be easily misunderstood. In no way does the motivation expressed by the Islamic State dovetail with the Socialist manifesto of the Arab Ba'ath Party that at one time controlled both Iraq and Syria. Do not read too much into the fact that the intelligence branch of the Islamic State is run in the same manner as the intelligence branch of the Iraqi Army. Certainly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, is ethnic Iraqi. But he was not a supporter of Saddam Hussein. Because the roots of the ISIS movement can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", it should be no surprise that a number of Iraqis are prominent in the organization. But I am beginning to see this perspective take root that the ghost of Saddam and Ba'ath Party adherents are dictating policy for the Islamic State. Do not be distracted by this red herring. Do not forget what the Islamic State represents and exactly what methods it has used to achieve its ends. No doubt Saddam did some heinous things, but is always attempted to cover-up or deny the existence of such government-sanctioned activity. The Islamic State WANTS you as a first-row witness to its execution of persons because of religious persuasion. More importantly, don't forget that the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein were interested in political motivation as opposed to religious. Saddam (and his buddy Bashir al-Assad) were in fear of the Islamic Extremist movement, and directed their security forces to deal with it harshly. In its inception and at the height of its popularity, the Ba'ath movement was inherently political. It sought to enfranchise the Arab worker in all nations and create a political movement with Socialist leanings that would sweep the party into power in places like Egypt and Turkey. The Islamic State exists for the purpose of the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, a nation ruled by a Caliph (religious leader) with the Quran as the law of the land.
The former Iraqi Ba'ath Party members who are active in the Islamic State are the ones being co-opted, not vice versa. And that should have been expected. When the U.S. arrived in Iraq in 2003 and the Iraqi military has ceased to exist, everyone wanted to become a part of the U.S. military force that now appeared to hold the reigns of power. In reality, its just a circumstance of survival. People have families to provide for, and they will do what is necessary to reach that goal. What would I do to feed my family? Just about anything.
Wednesday, June 3, 2015
The Sunnis of Iraq..what does the future hold? (Part I)
Link: The Sunni of Iraq - caught in the middle again.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq. For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country. Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community. Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century. While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything. Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni. Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos. It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established. It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad). As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country. In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people. With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state. But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.
The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities. There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north. But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit. With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority. The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency. The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys. It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation. But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation. And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims. For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a. And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections. These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles. But Zarqawi went to far. He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed. This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
Sunday, April 12, 2015
Is Yemen, 2015, a renewal of the Battle of Karbala, 680 AD?
Links: A. Saudi military on Yemeni border.
B. Is conflict in Yemen a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
No need to get out your history books or almanacs, unless you really want to. The Battle of Karbala was fought in central Iraq in 680 AD, with most religious scholars agreeing that the
violent clash went a long way to settling the question of The Prophet Mohammed's succession. This is important because the two opponents came to represent the Sunni and Shia elements within Islam. Until recently, the two groups seemed to co-exist within an awkward kind of avoidance, although on a few occasions, the international community has been given a glimpse of the emotions involved in the Sunni-Shia schism. Following the first Gulf War, once it became apparent that President George H. Bush was not going to force Saddam Hussein from power, Saddam fired-up what was left of his war machine and butchered thousands of Shia in areas south of Iraq. Saddam was legitimately concerned that the "Marsh Arabs", as these particular Shia were called, were rising up to possibly threaten his hold on power. This was the moment in life that I went over to an Encyclopedia and educated myself on the Sunni and the Shia. Having spent time in Iraq within the last decade, I became familiar with the two groups and the antagonism that basically defines their relationship. Simply put, since Karbala in 680 AD, the Shia have been looking for a little respect. For the most part, the Sunni are considered better educated, more intelligent, and wealthier. The Shia are more the "manual laborers and farmers" of Islam, and they have a tendency to carry a chip on their shoulder as big as Manhattan.
In the last fifty years, the Shia, who are the majority in only two countries (Lebanon being a plurality, folks), have fought fiercely for causes that they support. Following the revolution in Iran in 1979-1980, which deposed the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shia-led government of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw everything but the kitchen sink at Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Since then, the Shia seem to be more comfortable standing up for their interests. In Iraq in 2005, the Shia were quick to create militias to defend Shia communities and Holy Sites, when it became apparent that certain anti-U.S. groups were going to incite various causes to violence. The Iranians were more than happy to provide training and equipment to these militias, who are even more powerful and active today than they were during the insurgency. The Iranian government, and the Guardian Council in Qom, must be pleased by the expression of free will exhibited by the Shia Houthis of Yemen. The Houthis have been around for sometime, and to their credit, they tried a number of non-violent approaches to the former government over the years, in an attempt to end discrimination against the Houthi community. Eventually they were compelled to resort to violence, and the Yemeni government, already under siege from Al-Qaeda, was a bit of an easy target. Today, as April passes us by, The Houthis are in control of the capital city of Sana, and are strategically positioned to move against Yemen's second city (and port/economic lifeline), Aden. Interestingly enough, just to the east of Aden lies a reasonably large area which is controlled by (Sunni) Al-Qaeda. And just when things couldn't get any more confusing, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force, which continues to recognize the legitimacy of the recently removed Yemeni government, has started bombing Houthi forces.
Why do the Saudis care if the Houthis run the table in Yemen? Who knows, they may do a better job than the last few thugs that sat in Sana. Actually, the answer is simple: the Saudis cannot continence a Shia government on the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain is an island, so it doesn't count), and certainly not with a common border. Publicly, the Saudis claim that they are only trying to restore peace and the democratically elected Yemeni government. The truth is, the Saudis and the Iranians can't stand each other, and the Houthis have been heavily supported by Iran since the beginning. Mark my word, the Saudis will do whatever is necessarily to guarantee that the Iranians do not have a presence on the Arabian Peninsula. Just as I was starting this post, I noticed a news report come across the wire (yes, folks...I'm so cool and important that I have one of those "news wires") that Iranian warships were headed for Yemen. Now that would be an
escalation along the lines of Kennedy and Khrushchev back in 1962. Then, as I was looking for an additional article, I came across The Times Of Israel piece titled, "Iran sends battleships to Yemen amid standoff with Saudis". I had to take a break, I was laughing so hard. A journalist actually WROTE that header, and then added a photo of a warship the size of a shrimp boat flying the Iranian flag! I guess "battleships" ain't what they used to be. Regardless of my welcome moment of humor, be assured that the Iranian navy only has a handful of ships that are capable of sailing as far as Yemen. The people of Aden need not lose any sleep; I can categorically guarantee that tomorrow morning when they wake up and look in the direction of the Indian Ocean, they will not see Iranian battleships on the horizon.
Which brings me to my next point of interest. This is something my friend Jennifer and I have been discussing for a few weeks now. Occasionally the media will release a story that mentions "Saudi ground forces", or "Saudi armor being moved to the Yemeni border". For the moment, this is the most important issue that comes to my mind. The Saudis have committed themselves to some level of conflict by conducting air operations against Houthi targets in Sana and other strategic locations. If the Houthis were to go head-to-head against the Saudi military, the result would be beyond ugly. It would be a monumental mismatch. As far as I know, what was the Yemeni Army is still making noise in and around Aden (Houthis on one side, Al-Qaeda on the other....one hell of a spot to be in). If so, then in all likelihood the Houthis have not taken possession of the most modern and useful military vehicles and equipment. So we are talking about Abrams tanks, state-of-the-art Artillery (trained in the Iraq war), fully-equipped infantry and special forces, support from helicopter gunships and guided missiles, etc., on one side, and the Houthis on the other. A few months back I commented that I had seen a video of the Houthis storming some government building in Sana, and actually saw a guy on a camel, with a musket. Holy Lawrence of Arabia, folks. Well, at least, historically, we are on the right continent.
The Saudis should make short work of the Houthis, and then what? Clean out Al-Qaeda from eastern Yemen? Now here is the potential complication that I have been discussing with Jennifer. Everyone keeps talking about a Saudi ground invasion as if its a simple operation. No way. The Saudi armor is normally home-based in the north of the country and around Riyadh (I'm sure some units are also deployed in the Mecca/Medina/Jeddah triangle). Would the Saudis transport their armor and artillery down west, to the coast, then down the coast road to Yemen? Or is there another route that skirts the Rub al-Khali? Whatever the case, for Saudi Arabia to relocate a military force large enough to finish the job at hand (the destruction of the Houthis), it would involve the mobilization of multiple divisions. All of this activity should be visible for the world to watch on satellite. I have yet to hear any media announce that a full-scale Saudi military build-up is taking place near Najran or Abu Arish. So if it hasn't been noted, then how can it be taking place? Now I'm taking a big chance with this post, because I'm writing it four days before it will see the light of day. Many things can happen since then which would resolve the issues I have pointed out. But as things stand today, from the perspective of this armchair general, I do not believe Saudi Arabia is preparing a full-out ground invasion of Yemen.
B. Is conflict in Yemen a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran?
No need to get out your history books or almanacs, unless you really want to. The Battle of Karbala was fought in central Iraq in 680 AD, with most religious scholars agreeing that the
In the last fifty years, the Shia, who are the majority in only two countries (Lebanon being a plurality, folks), have fought fiercely for causes that they support. Following the revolution in Iran in 1979-1980, which deposed the Pahlavi Dynasty, the Shia-led government of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini threw everything but the kitchen sink at Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Since then, the Shia seem to be more comfortable standing up for their interests. In Iraq in 2005, the Shia were quick to create militias to defend Shia communities and Holy Sites, when it became apparent that certain anti-U.S. groups were going to incite various causes to violence. The Iranians were more than happy to provide training and equipment to these militias, who are even more powerful and active today than they were during the insurgency. The Iranian government, and the Guardian Council in Qom, must be pleased by the expression of free will exhibited by the Shia Houthis of Yemen. The Houthis have been around for sometime, and to their credit, they tried a number of non-violent approaches to the former government over the years, in an attempt to end discrimination against the Houthi community. Eventually they were compelled to resort to violence, and the Yemeni government, already under siege from Al-Qaeda, was a bit of an easy target. Today, as April passes us by, The Houthis are in control of the capital city of Sana, and are strategically positioned to move against Yemen's second city (and port/economic lifeline), Aden. Interestingly enough, just to the east of Aden lies a reasonably large area which is controlled by (Sunni) Al-Qaeda. And just when things couldn't get any more confusing, the Royal Saudi Arabian Air Force, which continues to recognize the legitimacy of the recently removed Yemeni government, has started bombing Houthi forces.
Why do the Saudis care if the Houthis run the table in Yemen? Who knows, they may do a better job than the last few thugs that sat in Sana. Actually, the answer is simple: the Saudis cannot continence a Shia government on the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain is an island, so it doesn't count), and certainly not with a common border. Publicly, the Saudis claim that they are only trying to restore peace and the democratically elected Yemeni government. The truth is, the Saudis and the Iranians can't stand each other, and the Houthis have been heavily supported by Iran since the beginning. Mark my word, the Saudis will do whatever is necessarily to guarantee that the Iranians do not have a presence on the Arabian Peninsula. Just as I was starting this post, I noticed a news report come across the wire (yes, folks...I'm so cool and important that I have one of those "news wires") that Iranian warships were headed for Yemen. Now that would be an
 |
| Yemen |
Which brings me to my next point of interest. This is something my friend Jennifer and I have been discussing for a few weeks now. Occasionally the media will release a story that mentions "Saudi ground forces", or "Saudi armor being moved to the Yemeni border". For the moment, this is the most important issue that comes to my mind. The Saudis have committed themselves to some level of conflict by conducting air operations against Houthi targets in Sana and other strategic locations. If the Houthis were to go head-to-head against the Saudi military, the result would be beyond ugly. It would be a monumental mismatch. As far as I know, what was the Yemeni Army is still making noise in and around Aden (Houthis on one side, Al-Qaeda on the other....one hell of a spot to be in). If so, then in all likelihood the Houthis have not taken possession of the most modern and useful military vehicles and equipment. So we are talking about Abrams tanks, state-of-the-art Artillery (trained in the Iraq war), fully-equipped infantry and special forces, support from helicopter gunships and guided missiles, etc., on one side, and the Houthis on the other. A few months back I commented that I had seen a video of the Houthis storming some government building in Sana, and actually saw a guy on a camel, with a musket. Holy Lawrence of Arabia, folks. Well, at least, historically, we are on the right continent.
The Saudis should make short work of the Houthis, and then what? Clean out Al-Qaeda from eastern Yemen? Now here is the potential complication that I have been discussing with Jennifer. Everyone keeps talking about a Saudi ground invasion as if its a simple operation. No way. The Saudi armor is normally home-based in the north of the country and around Riyadh (I'm sure some units are also deployed in the Mecca/Medina/Jeddah triangle). Would the Saudis transport their armor and artillery down west, to the coast, then down the coast road to Yemen? Or is there another route that skirts the Rub al-Khali? Whatever the case, for Saudi Arabia to relocate a military force large enough to finish the job at hand (the destruction of the Houthis), it would involve the mobilization of multiple divisions. All of this activity should be visible for the world to watch on satellite. I have yet to hear any media announce that a full-scale Saudi military build-up is taking place near Najran or Abu Arish. So if it hasn't been noted, then how can it be taking place? Now I'm taking a big chance with this post, because I'm writing it four days before it will see the light of day. Many things can happen since then which would resolve the issues I have pointed out. But as things stand today, from the perspective of this armchair general, I do not believe Saudi Arabia is preparing a full-out ground invasion of Yemen.
Tuesday, December 16, 2014
Who Are The Gulf States, Exactly?
Links: A. United Arab Emirates Wikipedia
B. Oman Wikipedia
C. Kuwait Wikipedia
D. Qatar Wikipedia
E. Bahrain Wikipedia
When I was a young boy, I was fascinated with maps. I spent hours trying to determine the methodology for the color-coding of different countries, and also did my best to learn the correct pronunciations of the countless rivers, mountains, towns, and cities. When I grew a little older, I became interested in history, so the Atlas section of my family's Encyclopedias got put down, and the Encyclopedias themselves got put to use. Not surprisingly, I gravitated towards some places more than others (it might be déjà vu, reincarnation, or it might be coincidence, but most people who look at maps and globes will feel an odd familiarity with certain place names). I was drawn to a political entity known as "The Trucial States". I counted seven oddly-shaped little places, all hugging the south shore of the Persian Gulf. In my mind's eye, I pictured camels, men in white, flowing robes with rope-ring head pieces to keep their head-covering on, tents, and sand......lots and lots of sand. This description wasn't far from the truth back in the 1930s and 1940s. As far a colonial influences go, the Persian Gulf was a British lake. Following the death of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the British happily moved into the void.
In most of Great Britain's colonies, calls for independence put pressure on the British government to relinquish control to the indigenous peoples. In some countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, the process was observed internationally, and there was great optimism that the transition from one form of government to another, would go smoothly. Interestingly enough, the Trucial States were in no hurry to separate from great Britain. The importance of oil in the region was on everyone's mind, and the various Shaykhs of the Trucial States enjoyed having the protection of the British navy and Air Force. It was actually the British who insisted on the Declaration of Independence in 1971. The seven Trucial States, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Fujairah, Ajman, Sharjah, Um al-Quwain, and Ras al-Khaimah, each had its own Shaykh. Representatives from the seven Shaykhdoms met and decided to form a federation, which called itself the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abu Dhabi and Dubai are larger in size and population than the other five Emirates, and there was some concern that the smaller Shaykhdoms might feel slighted because of the greater influence that Dubai and Abu Dhabi naturally possessed. But it never really has been a problem. The Emirates are incredibly wealthy, and the largesse has been distributed in a smart and effectual manner. The UAE has a surprisingly large and well-equipped Armed Forces (thank you, United States), and shares one common currency. Certain political positions are granted on a rotating basis, while others are voted upon. The leaders of the UAE have traditionally been from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, but they have done such a stellar
job negotiating the Emirates away from conflict and towards greater wealth, that no one dares complain. The UAE has become a popular tourist destination, especially for the British (just don't get caught kissing in public, especially if you are gay). The Emirates prides itself on having some of the tallest buildings in the world, including the astounding Burj Khalifa Tower in Dubai. The UAE can also be proud of its research and discoveries in desalinization. A great deal of Emirati wealth has found its way to the California real estate market, especially high-end shopping center projects. The current Prime Minister of the UAE, Mohammed bin Rashid al-Mahktoum, is a true lover of horse racing, and owns stables and breeding centers in Australia and the United States.
I love Oman. Of all the gulf States, and I include Saudi Arabia and Yemen in this instance, Oman, has managed to follow its own, independent course. Oman, which has a relatively small population, has extremely good relations with the west. Sultan Qaboos, who deposed his father in 1970 during what has been Oman's only internal conflict of the modern era, has not shown a fear of modern development, and welcomes tourists from Europe and the United States. The women of Oman do not suffer under the same prohibitions as exist in Saudi Arabia. The Omani Army is well-trained and equipped (mostly by the Brits), but for practical purposes is too small to be useful for anything other than self-defense and internal conflict. I have a personal affinity for Oman because it is an absolutely lovely place. Muscat, the capital city, is filled with buildings that could have
been plucked right out of the seventeenth century. The original Portuguese fort built in 1580 to guard the entrance to Muscat (Fort Al-Jalali) continues its timeless duty of protecting the Omanis from Pirates and other ne'er do wells. The Omani people are a pleasure to look at, and take great care in their appearance without obvious signs of vanity. Qaboos has been a loyal friend to the United States and western Europe since he first sat on the throne. I'm sure at one time or another, extremists have attempted to set-up shop in Oman. But I guessing that they didn't make much progress, as the people seem very loyal to their sovereign and content with their lives.
Kuwait reminds me of the opposite of Oman in many ways. Although the Al-Sabah family keeps a tight grip on power, the political environment in Kuwait has become much noisier as of late. The Sabahs have to contend with a very vocal women's right lobby and a population that at times appears sympathetic to Islamic extremist groups. Was it that long ago that Saddam Hussein's Army poured into Kuwait, emptied the stores and dumped babies out of incubators? A Kuwaiti friend of mine explained why a segment of the population of Kuwait has become sympathetic to the jihadis. From 1990 to the present, the United States military has had a large presence in Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis are not happy with the inevitable influence that this group of young Americans has had on their country. This includes the relaxation of attitudes regarding liquor consumption, the fraternization between Kuwaiti women and U.S. servicemen, and the unavoidable evolution of the Kuwaiti economy to accommodate all those U.S. dollars. Another unintended result of the U.S. presence is the perceived growth of the Christian community and the movement away from the teachings of Islam. A not insignificant percentage of native-born Kuwaitis are convinced that Kuwait needs to embrace a traditional brand of Islam that will remove the Game Boys, the mini-skirts and the six packs of Budweiser. It is rumored that a well-placed member of the Sabahs is very sympathetic towards conservative Islam and is working hard to influence his family. Help may be on the way. Its my understanding that the draw-down of U.S. military forces overseas includes most of our Army facilities in Kuwait.
Forgive me for including Qatar and Bahrain in the same paragraph. It's a bad habit that is shared by many. Qatar is a small but very wealthy country that borders Saudi Arabia on the west and the Perisan Gulf on the east. The Qataris have the highest per capita income in the world (according to Wikipedia), and Qatar itself has over 100 billion dollars in investments worldwide. Each year those investments grow from 30 to 40 billion dollars. The Qatari government, ostensibly loyal to Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, has been accused of supporting extremist causes, including Hamas. The Qataris deny supporting any extremist groups in Gaza, Lebanon or the West Bank, but Qatar readily admits to supporting the Palestinian people. With regards to Syria, Qatar has been supporting various factions opposed to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. In fact, Qatar is one of the nations included in President Obama's anti-ISIS air campaign coalition. I'm still trying to determine who exactly were the Qataris supporting before the air campaign? At first glance, it would appear that the Qataris were supporting ISIS, a claim which they deny. If Qatar was not supporting Assad, then who on the rebel side was receiving funding from Qatar? Sadly, the five Guantanamo-based terrorists that Barrack Obama traded for the release of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl were deposited in Qatar, with the understanding that the Qataris would keep them under thumb. Fat chance....its my understanding that at least two have already rejoined the struggle against "The Great Satan". We don't have much to say about Bahrain. In 2011, the ruling al-Khalifa house was given quite a scare with the almost spontaneous demonstrations in the capital city Manama. Eventually the police and riot control units were mobilized to disperse the crowds and they seemed to disappear as quickly as they assembled, although some human rights organizations claim that whenever people congregate in the same fashion, the police move in quickly. Half of Bahrain's 1.2 million population are working foreigners. Bahrain has a strong economy, built on oil just like its fellow Gulf States. Bahrain has arguably the closest relationship with the United States, as the U.S. Navy has a base in Bahrain and the U.S. military trains and equips the Bahraini military. Recently tensions arose between Qatar and Bahrain which resulted in the recalling of ambassadors; but that issue appears to have since resolved itself, and diplomatic personnel have returned to their jobs.
B. Oman Wikipedia
C. Kuwait Wikipedia
D. Qatar Wikipedia
E. Bahrain Wikipedia
When I was a young boy, I was fascinated with maps. I spent hours trying to determine the methodology for the color-coding of different countries, and also did my best to learn the correct pronunciations of the countless rivers, mountains, towns, and cities. When I grew a little older, I became interested in history, so the Atlas section of my family's Encyclopedias got put down, and the Encyclopedias themselves got put to use. Not surprisingly, I gravitated towards some places more than others (it might be déjà vu, reincarnation, or it might be coincidence, but most people who look at maps and globes will feel an odd familiarity with certain place names). I was drawn to a political entity known as "The Trucial States". I counted seven oddly-shaped little places, all hugging the south shore of the Persian Gulf. In my mind's eye, I pictured camels, men in white, flowing robes with rope-ring head pieces to keep their head-covering on, tents, and sand......lots and lots of sand. This description wasn't far from the truth back in the 1930s and 1940s. As far a colonial influences go, the Persian Gulf was a British lake. Following the death of the Ottoman Empire in 1922, the British happily moved into the void.
In most of Great Britain's colonies, calls for independence put pressure on the British government to relinquish control to the indigenous peoples. In some countries, such as Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana, the process was observed internationally, and there was great optimism that the transition from one form of government to another, would go smoothly. Interestingly enough, the Trucial States were in no hurry to separate from great Britain. The importance of oil in the region was on everyone's mind, and the various Shaykhs of the Trucial States enjoyed having the protection of the British navy and Air Force. It was actually the British who insisted on the Declaration of Independence in 1971. The seven Trucial States, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Fujairah, Ajman, Sharjah, Um al-Quwain, and Ras al-Khaimah, each had its own Shaykh. Representatives from the seven Shaykhdoms met and decided to form a federation, which called itself the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abu Dhabi and Dubai are larger in size and population than the other five Emirates, and there was some concern that the smaller Shaykhdoms might feel slighted because of the greater influence that Dubai and Abu Dhabi naturally possessed. But it never really has been a problem. The Emirates are incredibly wealthy, and the largesse has been distributed in a smart and effectual manner. The UAE has a surprisingly large and well-equipped Armed Forces (thank you, United States), and shares one common currency. Certain political positions are granted on a rotating basis, while others are voted upon. The leaders of the UAE have traditionally been from Abu Dhabi and Dubai, but they have done such a stellar
 |
| Burj Khalifa Tower, Dubai |
I love Oman. Of all the gulf States, and I include Saudi Arabia and Yemen in this instance, Oman, has managed to follow its own, independent course. Oman, which has a relatively small population, has extremely good relations with the west. Sultan Qaboos, who deposed his father in 1970 during what has been Oman's only internal conflict of the modern era, has not shown a fear of modern development, and welcomes tourists from Europe and the United States. The women of Oman do not suffer under the same prohibitions as exist in Saudi Arabia. The Omani Army is well-trained and equipped (mostly by the Brits), but for practical purposes is too small to be useful for anything other than self-defense and internal conflict. I have a personal affinity for Oman because it is an absolutely lovely place. Muscat, the capital city, is filled with buildings that could have
.jpg) |
| Fort Al-Jalali, Muscat, Oman |
Kuwait reminds me of the opposite of Oman in many ways. Although the Al-Sabah family keeps a tight grip on power, the political environment in Kuwait has become much noisier as of late. The Sabahs have to contend with a very vocal women's right lobby and a population that at times appears sympathetic to Islamic extremist groups. Was it that long ago that Saddam Hussein's Army poured into Kuwait, emptied the stores and dumped babies out of incubators? A Kuwaiti friend of mine explained why a segment of the population of Kuwait has become sympathetic to the jihadis. From 1990 to the present, the United States military has had a large presence in Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis are not happy with the inevitable influence that this group of young Americans has had on their country. This includes the relaxation of attitudes regarding liquor consumption, the fraternization between Kuwaiti women and U.S. servicemen, and the unavoidable evolution of the Kuwaiti economy to accommodate all those U.S. dollars. Another unintended result of the U.S. presence is the perceived growth of the Christian community and the movement away from the teachings of Islam. A not insignificant percentage of native-born Kuwaitis are convinced that Kuwait needs to embrace a traditional brand of Islam that will remove the Game Boys, the mini-skirts and the six packs of Budweiser. It is rumored that a well-placed member of the Sabahs is very sympathetic towards conservative Islam and is working hard to influence his family. Help may be on the way. Its my understanding that the draw-down of U.S. military forces overseas includes most of our Army facilities in Kuwait.
Forgive me for including Qatar and Bahrain in the same paragraph. It's a bad habit that is shared by many. Qatar is a small but very wealthy country that borders Saudi Arabia on the west and the Perisan Gulf on the east. The Qataris have the highest per capita income in the world (according to Wikipedia), and Qatar itself has over 100 billion dollars in investments worldwide. Each year those investments grow from 30 to 40 billion dollars. The Qatari government, ostensibly loyal to Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, has been accused of supporting extremist causes, including Hamas. The Qataris deny supporting any extremist groups in Gaza, Lebanon or the West Bank, but Qatar readily admits to supporting the Palestinian people. With regards to Syria, Qatar has been supporting various factions opposed to Syrian President Bashir al-Assad. In fact, Qatar is one of the nations included in President Obama's anti-ISIS air campaign coalition. I'm still trying to determine who exactly were the Qataris supporting before the air campaign? At first glance, it would appear that the Qataris were supporting ISIS, a claim which they deny. If Qatar was not supporting Assad, then who on the rebel side was receiving funding from Qatar? Sadly, the five Guantanamo-based terrorists that Barrack Obama traded for the release of Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl were deposited in Qatar, with the understanding that the Qataris would keep them under thumb. Fat chance....its my understanding that at least two have already rejoined the struggle against "The Great Satan". We don't have much to say about Bahrain. In 2011, the ruling al-Khalifa house was given quite a scare with the almost spontaneous demonstrations in the capital city Manama. Eventually the police and riot control units were mobilized to disperse the crowds and they seemed to disappear as quickly as they assembled, although some human rights organizations claim that whenever people congregate in the same fashion, the police move in quickly. Half of Bahrain's 1.2 million population are working foreigners. Bahrain has a strong economy, built on oil just like its fellow Gulf States. Bahrain has arguably the closest relationship with the United States, as the U.S. Navy has a base in Bahrain and the U.S. military trains and equips the Bahraini military. Recently tensions arose between Qatar and Bahrain which resulted in the recalling of ambassadors; but that issue appears to have since resolved itself, and diplomatic personnel have returned to their jobs.
Tuesday, November 25, 2014
Weapons Of Mass Destruction...Revisited.
Link: Chemical Weapons In Iraq
Anyone in Iraq in 2003-2004 would have come across evidence that the Saddam Hussein regime was not only in possession of chemical weapons, but that they were preparing to use them against U.S. forces. The truth is, Saddam had a number of nasty little ambushes planned for our brave soldiers, but our victory was so total and engulfing that he and his coward sons were obliged to leave town before any of their "surprises" could be visited on our young men and women in uniform. The Iraqi army disappeared from the battlefield almost as quickly as they did recently outside of Tikrit. Let's face it, no one wanted to die for Saddam, which was fortunate for everyone because the end result was fewer casualties on either side. The fact is Iraq had compiled a frightening arsenal of chemical weapons which were stored at various locations around the country. There is no doubt in my mind that Iraq was developing less complicated, easy to deliver batches of biological agents as well. It's not difficult to keep these labs simple and mobile, and we have yet to get satisfactory clarification on what exactly the Iraqis were transporting in convoys from central Iraq to Syria in the dead of the night. Who was surprised when Syrian de facto President Bashir al-Assad began using chemical weapons against the Syrian opposition?
I'm not writing this post in support of the argument that the Bush Administration went to war against Iraq because Iraq was a threat to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). I won't make that argument because I don't believe that Operation Enduring Freedom had anything to do with Iraq's weapons initiatives, be they chemical, biological, nuclear or all three. I believe the intention was to force the war onto a battlefield that was less comfortable for Al-Qaida (AQ): away from U.S. population centers and into AQ's backyard. Bringing the conflict to Iraq and Afghanistan forced the enemy to fight a conventional war in which he would be totally ill-suited. Iraq would be freed from the rule of a bloodthirsty despot and would be rebuilt; the Taliban would be destroyed once and for all; and both nations would embrace the promise of democracy, education, and free trade. I believe the idea was to create a long-term military presence in this part of the world, possibly in the form of an Army and Air Force Base to compliment the current U.S. Naval facilities in the Gulf States. I don't think the Bush Administration was prepared for the scope and the breadth of the Sunni Insurgency coupled with the Sunni-Shia conflict purposely exacerbated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). A change in the White House and a definite change in policy ended any hope of achieving the original goals of Operation Enduring Freedom. But this is all conjecture, which is a nice way of saying bullshit. I have no proof for my supposition, nor do I care anymore. The discussion today focuses on the claim by the left that Iraq did not possess WMD when we invaded in 2003.
After the decision by George Bush Sr. to leave Saddam Hussein in power (following the first Gulf War in 1991), Saddam showed his appreciation by using chemical weapons against the rebellious Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. Saddam's appreciation of chemical weapons did not end with his collection of a nice supply, tucked away in various bunkers. Iraqi scientists continued to do research with both chemical and biological agents. Initially, because the U.S. Army chose not to get involved in the controversy, the discovery of cache upon cache of chemical weapons went unreported in the U.S. press. Granted, the Iraqi Survey Group was in place for the express purpose of locating WMD, but they were focused on locating mobile and stationary labs for creating biological and chemical agents. Unfortunately for the Bush Administration, the "smoking gun" was either never discovered or never revealed.
For the simple point of argument about the presence of WMD in Iraq, anyone who says that Iraq was not in possession of WMD is mistaken at best. The latest version of the conversation from the left, is that the chemical weapons discovered by the U.S. Army were caches dating back to 1991 and before. Even though I don't believe that all the chemical agents discovered in Iraq (and they're still digging stuff up, folks) have a birthdate of 1991 and before, I think the argument is absurd. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions did not specify if Iraq was currently cooking up chemical agents, it was addressing Iraq's possession of chemical agents. Saddam Hussein did indeed have WMDs; in fact, he had a proverbial butt-load of WMD. If you want to argue that the real reasons for going to war had nothing to do with WMDs, then I won't stand in your way. But to continue the false narrative that Iraq did not possess WMD and was not a threat to its neighbors (including, with an adequate delivery system, Israel) is to ignore real evidence. A decade after the fact, poor souls are still stumbling into Saddam's stash of unconventional weapons. We may yet uncover a well-buried mobile biological laboratory. I've given you my opinion regarding the true motivation for the war, which is certainly open to debate. But the caches of chemical weapons found in Iraq isn't.
Anyone in Iraq in 2003-2004 would have come across evidence that the Saddam Hussein regime was not only in possession of chemical weapons, but that they were preparing to use them against U.S. forces. The truth is, Saddam had a number of nasty little ambushes planned for our brave soldiers, but our victory was so total and engulfing that he and his coward sons were obliged to leave town before any of their "surprises" could be visited on our young men and women in uniform. The Iraqi army disappeared from the battlefield almost as quickly as they did recently outside of Tikrit. Let's face it, no one wanted to die for Saddam, which was fortunate for everyone because the end result was fewer casualties on either side. The fact is Iraq had compiled a frightening arsenal of chemical weapons which were stored at various locations around the country. There is no doubt in my mind that Iraq was developing less complicated, easy to deliver batches of biological agents as well. It's not difficult to keep these labs simple and mobile, and we have yet to get satisfactory clarification on what exactly the Iraqis were transporting in convoys from central Iraq to Syria in the dead of the night. Who was surprised when Syrian de facto President Bashir al-Assad began using chemical weapons against the Syrian opposition?
I'm not writing this post in support of the argument that the Bush Administration went to war against Iraq because Iraq was a threat to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). I won't make that argument because I don't believe that Operation Enduring Freedom had anything to do with Iraq's weapons initiatives, be they chemical, biological, nuclear or all three. I believe the intention was to force the war onto a battlefield that was less comfortable for Al-Qaida (AQ): away from U.S. population centers and into AQ's backyard. Bringing the conflict to Iraq and Afghanistan forced the enemy to fight a conventional war in which he would be totally ill-suited. Iraq would be freed from the rule of a bloodthirsty despot and would be rebuilt; the Taliban would be destroyed once and for all; and both nations would embrace the promise of democracy, education, and free trade. I believe the idea was to create a long-term military presence in this part of the world, possibly in the form of an Army and Air Force Base to compliment the current U.S. Naval facilities in the Gulf States. I don't think the Bush Administration was prepared for the scope and the breadth of the Sunni Insurgency coupled with the Sunni-Shia conflict purposely exacerbated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). A change in the White House and a definite change in policy ended any hope of achieving the original goals of Operation Enduring Freedom. But this is all conjecture, which is a nice way of saying bullshit. I have no proof for my supposition, nor do I care anymore. The discussion today focuses on the claim by the left that Iraq did not possess WMD when we invaded in 2003.
After the decision by George Bush Sr. to leave Saddam Hussein in power (following the first Gulf War in 1991), Saddam showed his appreciation by using chemical weapons against the rebellious Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south. Saddam's appreciation of chemical weapons did not end with his collection of a nice supply, tucked away in various bunkers. Iraqi scientists continued to do research with both chemical and biological agents. Initially, because the U.S. Army chose not to get involved in the controversy, the discovery of cache upon cache of chemical weapons went unreported in the U.S. press. Granted, the Iraqi Survey Group was in place for the express purpose of locating WMD, but they were focused on locating mobile and stationary labs for creating biological and chemical agents. Unfortunately for the Bush Administration, the "smoking gun" was either never discovered or never revealed.
For the simple point of argument about the presence of WMD in Iraq, anyone who says that Iraq was not in possession of WMD is mistaken at best. The latest version of the conversation from the left, is that the chemical weapons discovered by the U.S. Army were caches dating back to 1991 and before. Even though I don't believe that all the chemical agents discovered in Iraq (and they're still digging stuff up, folks) have a birthdate of 1991 and before, I think the argument is absurd. The United Nations Security Council Resolutions did not specify if Iraq was currently cooking up chemical agents, it was addressing Iraq's possession of chemical agents. Saddam Hussein did indeed have WMDs; in fact, he had a proverbial butt-load of WMD. If you want to argue that the real reasons for going to war had nothing to do with WMDs, then I won't stand in your way. But to continue the false narrative that Iraq did not possess WMD and was not a threat to its neighbors (including, with an adequate delivery system, Israel) is to ignore real evidence. A decade after the fact, poor souls are still stumbling into Saddam's stash of unconventional weapons. We may yet uncover a well-buried mobile biological laboratory. I've given you my opinion regarding the true motivation for the war, which is certainly open to debate. But the caches of chemical weapons found in Iraq isn't.
Thursday, October 30, 2014
What Is The Difference Between Sunni And Shia and Why Is It Important In The Struggle With ISIS?
Links: A. Difference Between Shia and Sunni
B. Islamic State Version of Hearts and Minds
I have always been a strong advocate of educating soldiers beyond the skills necessary to kill. I have had the good fortune to meet young men who are new to the service, and many have asked for advice. I have never been a soldier, at least not in uniform, but I have been in enough zones of conflict in my CIA career, and I have had the distinction to have worked with Navy Seals, Special Forces, Airborne Units, and Humint Collection Teams. My father was career army; he served in both Korea and Vietnam, earning three Purple Hearts. My cousin Lonnie is a decorated R.O.T.C. instructor at an inner-city school in Dallas and someone truly worthy of admiration. I am honored when members of the U.S. military
ask me for advice. If you have the opportunity beforehand, learn everything you can about the enemy and the location to which you are being deployed; combat-zones don't normally come with fully stocked libraries. Events in the last twenty years certainly suggest that the United States will be at war with Islamic Extremism for the indefinite future. My suggestions are to learn about Islam; read the Quran if possible. Chances are, sooner or later you will end up in a country full of Muslims. They will respect you if you show that you have made an attempt to learn about their traditions and religion. Also, learn about your environment. If I had a dime for every time I have recommended "Seven Pillars of Wisdom" by T.E. Lawrence, I could buy myself a new camel.
For someone wanting to expand their knowledge of Islam without becoming a full-on scholar, let's start with the important stuff: the difference between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Shia Muslims constitute a majority only in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, with a sizable minority in Lebanon. The difference between Sunni and Shia arose from the question of who should inherit the mantle of the Prophet following his death in 632. The group who supported the claim of Abu Bakr, friend of the Prophet and father of the Prophet's wife Aisha, became the Sunni's choice. The opposition believed the authority of the Prophet should belong to the nearest relation. They argued that the Prophet had actually anointed Ali, his son-in-law and cousin, as his successor. They became known as the "Shia", a contraction of "shiaat Ali" (the partisans of Ali). The supporters of Abu Bakr won out, although Ali did rule for a short time as the fourth Caliph, the title given to Muhammed's successors. The split became more or less permanent in 680, when Ali's son Hussein was killed by the ruling Sunni Caliph's troops in the Battle of Karbala. From that point on, the Sunni became the more political of the two groups and believe their leader should be elected from those most capable, while the Shia look to their Imams for guidance and believe the Imam is appointed by the Prophet or God Himself. It is estimated that eighty percent of Muslims are Sunni, and twenty percent are Shia.
The issue of the inheritance of the Prophet's authority has never really faded away. The date of the death of Hussein and his infant son at the hands of Sunnis in the Battle of Karbala is observed every year. Sunnis consider the event to be a very tragic occurrence, while the Shia observe a period of mourning, which includes episodes of self-flagellation by the extremely pious. It is a remarkable scene to behold. Over the centuries, Sunni and Shia have fought side-by-side against Christian Crusaders and other enemies of the faith; but in the end, the split always reappears. In Iraq, the Sunni have traditionally considered the Shia to be ignorant, farmer-types. Central Iraq is home to Karbala, Hillah and Najaf, three cities considered Holy by the Shia. During the first Gulf War, the Shia rose up in rebellion against Saddam Hussein. To this day, U.S. President George Bush is criticized for not coming to the aid of the Shia, who were mercilessly butchered by Saddam (in reality, the Shia expected assistance from the Americans, given the invasion that had just occurred; they didn't consider the possibility that Bush wanted to keep Saddam in place in order to avoid a power vacuum).
The Islamic State of the Levant (ISIS, ISIL, or IS) was originally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This group raised havoc with U.S. forces for some time during Operation Enduring Freedom. Zarqawi operated in mostly Sunni areas of Iraq, taking advantage of sympathy from fellow Sunnis. In an effort to cause problems between Sunni and Shia and therefore destabilize the situation more, Zarqawi began targeting Shia political rallies. He would then bomb the funeral ceremonies for the victims. The Sunni community of Iraq turned their back on Zarqawi and aided the U.S. efforts to destroy his organization. Zarqawi himself was on the receiving end of a five hundred-pound bunker buster bomb, and the remnants of his organization fled to greener pastures in Syria. Once it became apparent that the U.S. military would be leaving Iraq, they returned, only this time sporting a new name and mission. The Islamic State of the Levant is dedicated to the creation of a Caliphate: a Sunni-religious State created from pieces of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon (I think; I haven't seen the latest incarnation). The IS has been in a state of war with Shia Muslims since the days of Zarqawi, which explains why the Shia militias continue to accept hordes of volunteers (so many that the Iraqi Army is having trouble arming them). I predicted that the IS would make Baghdad an important target because I can imagine how incensed its leadership must be to see a Shia-led government in office. Also, Iraq is home to so many sensitive religious sites, it's not possible for the IS to focus exclusively on Syria. One fact is certain: the Shia and the IS despise each other. The United States and its allies should take full advantage of this reality.
B. Islamic State Version of Hearts and Minds
I have always been a strong advocate of educating soldiers beyond the skills necessary to kill. I have had the good fortune to meet young men who are new to the service, and many have asked for advice. I have never been a soldier, at least not in uniform, but I have been in enough zones of conflict in my CIA career, and I have had the distinction to have worked with Navy Seals, Special Forces, Airborne Units, and Humint Collection Teams. My father was career army; he served in both Korea and Vietnam, earning three Purple Hearts. My cousin Lonnie is a decorated R.O.T.C. instructor at an inner-city school in Dallas and someone truly worthy of admiration. I am honored when members of the U.S. military
 |
| T. E. Lawrence |
For someone wanting to expand their knowledge of Islam without becoming a full-on scholar, let's start with the important stuff: the difference between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Shia Muslims constitute a majority only in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, with a sizable minority in Lebanon. The difference between Sunni and Shia arose from the question of who should inherit the mantle of the Prophet following his death in 632. The group who supported the claim of Abu Bakr, friend of the Prophet and father of the Prophet's wife Aisha, became the Sunni's choice. The opposition believed the authority of the Prophet should belong to the nearest relation. They argued that the Prophet had actually anointed Ali, his son-in-law and cousin, as his successor. They became known as the "Shia", a contraction of "shiaat Ali" (the partisans of Ali). The supporters of Abu Bakr won out, although Ali did rule for a short time as the fourth Caliph, the title given to Muhammed's successors. The split became more or less permanent in 680, when Ali's son Hussein was killed by the ruling Sunni Caliph's troops in the Battle of Karbala. From that point on, the Sunni became the more political of the two groups and believe their leader should be elected from those most capable, while the Shia look to their Imams for guidance and believe the Imam is appointed by the Prophet or God Himself. It is estimated that eighty percent of Muslims are Sunni, and twenty percent are Shia.
 |
| Shia Muslims re-enact the Battle of Karbala [AP] |
The Islamic State of the Levant (ISIS, ISIL, or IS) was originally Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This group raised havoc with U.S. forces for some time during Operation Enduring Freedom. Zarqawi operated in mostly Sunni areas of Iraq, taking advantage of sympathy from fellow Sunnis. In an effort to cause problems between Sunni and Shia and therefore destabilize the situation more, Zarqawi began targeting Shia political rallies. He would then bomb the funeral ceremonies for the victims. The Sunni community of Iraq turned their back on Zarqawi and aided the U.S. efforts to destroy his organization. Zarqawi himself was on the receiving end of a five hundred-pound bunker buster bomb, and the remnants of his organization fled to greener pastures in Syria. Once it became apparent that the U.S. military would be leaving Iraq, they returned, only this time sporting a new name and mission. The Islamic State of the Levant is dedicated to the creation of a Caliphate: a Sunni-religious State created from pieces of Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon (I think; I haven't seen the latest incarnation). The IS has been in a state of war with Shia Muslims since the days of Zarqawi, which explains why the Shia militias continue to accept hordes of volunteers (so many that the Iraqi Army is having trouble arming them). I predicted that the IS would make Baghdad an important target because I can imagine how incensed its leadership must be to see a Shia-led government in office. Also, Iraq is home to so many sensitive religious sites, it's not possible for the IS to focus exclusively on Syria. One fact is certain: the Shia and the IS despise each other. The United States and its allies should take full advantage of this reality.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)