Sure, the Islamic State has its share of Ex-Ba'athists; but its still a religiously motivated organization at heart.

Links: A. ISIS fighters in Ramadi are ex-Ba'ath Party members.
           B. Ex-Ba'athists helping organize ISIS.

In the past few weeks, I have repeatedly heard a bit of information that is taking on a life of its own.  I have been told by persons I respect and persons whose news sources are dubious at best, that the Islamic State/ISIS, is being controlled and run by ethnic Iraqi former Saddam loyalists and Ba'ath Party members.  Last year I had a long conversation with a good friend who happens to be a retired Iraqi General and a former Ba'ath Party member (his brother and father, now deceased, were both party representatives from Baghdad).  He informed me, almost off-handedly, that some of his former colleagues were involved with ISIS.  He elaborated that these individuals were assisting in the creation and expansion of different departments within the organization, including intelligence and recruitment.  He laughed as he pointed out that like many Iraqis, they were desperate to bring home a paycheck, and at least someone was willing to compensate them for their skills.  So the demographic that is the Islamic State now includes a number of former Ba'ath Party hacks, I thought.  It only strengthened my existing opinion that the Islamic State is determined to develop the characteristics of a conventional military force.  When George Bush (and more importantly Donald Rumsfeld) was considering the best way to defeat Al-Qaeda, the decision was made to force the terrorist organization to fight a conventional war, something it was not designed to do.  Although the insurgency and the Abu Ghraib fiasco dragged things out way longer than should have been necessary, the strategy actually worked, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Al-Qaida and the Taliban just did not have the personnel, the equipment, the resources, or the infrastructure to combat the U.S. military.  Interestingly enough, the Islamic State has been successful since it started behaving more as a legitimate armed forces, which requires a plan for resupply and reinforcements, and also must include a transportation and communication network.  When Al-Qaeda works in small units, transportation and communication are much simpler.  But the Islamic State now commands tens of thousands of personnel, and it can be no surprise that former regime elements, Sunni no doubt, have joined the cause, and that ISIS, which had a definite need for that expertise, welcomed them with open arms.

But this development can be easily misunderstood.  In no way does the motivation expressed by the Islamic State dovetail with the Socialist manifesto of the Arab Ba'ath Party that at one time controlled both Iraq and Syria.  Do not read too much into the fact that the intelligence branch of the Islamic State is run in the same manner as the intelligence branch of the Iraqi Army.  Certainly Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State, is ethnic Iraqi.  But he was not a supporter of Saddam Hussein.  Because the roots of the ISIS movement can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Al-Qaeda in Iraq", it should be no surprise that a number of Iraqis are prominent in the organization.  But I am beginning to see this perspective take root that the ghost of Saddam and Ba'ath Party adherents are dictating policy for the Islamic State.  Do not be distracted by this red herring.  Do not forget what the Islamic State represents and exactly what methods it has used to achieve its ends. No doubt Saddam did some heinous things, but is always attempted to cover-up or deny the existence of such government-sanctioned activity.  The Islamic State WANTS you as a first-row witness to its execution of persons because of religious persuasion.  More importantly, don't forget that the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein were interested in political motivation as opposed to religious.  Saddam (and his buddy Bashir al-Assad) were in fear of the Islamic Extremist movement, and directed their security forces to deal with it harshly.  In its inception and at the height of its popularity, the Ba'ath movement was inherently political.  It sought to enfranchise the Arab worker in all nations and create a political movement with Socialist leanings that would sweep the party into power in places like Egypt and Turkey.  The Islamic State exists for the purpose of the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate, a nation ruled by a Caliph (religious leader) with the Quran as the law of the land. 

The former Iraqi Ba'ath Party members who are active in the Islamic State are the ones being co-opted, not vice versa.  And that should have been expected.  When the U.S. arrived in Iraq in 2003 and the Iraqi military has ceased to exist, everyone wanted to become a part of the U.S. military force that now appeared to hold the reigns of power.  In reality, its just a circumstance of survival.  People have families to provide for, and they  will do what is necessary to reach that goal.  What would I do to feed my family?  Just about anything.

Defending Baghdad

Link: IS Occupies Abu Ghraib


As we predicted here in Mookieland, operatives from the Islamic States (ISIS or IS), have started to occupy villages and geographic points of interest on the outskirts of Baghdad.  Baghdad is defended by a large contingent of Iraqi National Army troops and with U.S. technical assistance and advice, a defensive perimeter has been established.  The most effective tool that the Iraqi government has at its disposal is the 20,000-strong (and growing) Shia volunteer army.  Its my understanding that the Iraqi Army is trying to equip the Shia volunteers and provide some rudimentary training, then determine how the Shia would best be deployed.  I assume that the Shia volunteers are most interested in protecting the Shia slum neighborhoods of Sadr City, but large pockets of Shia civilians also live in Al-Baya', Hay Al-A'amel (south of Airport Road and west of the former Green Zone), and Al-Khadhimya.  The biggest problem that the government faces as it prepares the defenses of Baghdad, is to convince the Sunni population not to harbor operatives from the IS (which is a Sunni-based movement).  If the population of Baghdad really begins to believe that the IS will take the city, then to save their own necks (and the neck of their family members), they won't oppose an IS presence in their community.

The IS will continue to occupy little villages on the outskirts of Baghdad, both for publicity and to help create a supply network for operatives already in place within the city.  I imagine the regular Iraqi Army will march forth and attempt to dislodge the IS from Abu Ghraib, and they may be successful.  But the IS will just relocate whatever operation was taking place at Abu Ghraib to some other little shitty bedroom community of Baghdad.  The IS does not have the ability to launch a frontal assault on Baghdad.  First and foremost, the IS does not have the troops needed to conventionally attack Baghdad.  And an assault on Baghdad would have to begin with an Artillery barrage, to soften up the Iraqi defenses.  The IS would need to set up a legitimate artillery capability (they are in possession of a number of modern artillery pieces), which would be visible to the U.S. Air Force and the Iraqi military (I'm still trying to determine if the Iraqi Air Force is in possession of any offensive air elements).  While its true that the IS collected U.S.-made artillery that the Iraqi Army had deserted, any effort to set up such artillery on the outskirts of Baghdad would be impossible to hide.  I assume that the U.S. Air Force would wipe out any IS artillery positions outside of Baghdad.  In addition, for a traditional assault on a city, the IS would need to possess sufficient Armor.  First comes the artillery, then the tanks.  Again, the IS falls way short of possessing enough "working" tanks for an assault on Baghdad.  I have seen the publicity photos of IS thugs riding around on a captured Abrams.  An assault on Baghdad would require more than a few Abrams tanks, backed up by a handful of T-72 and T-69 standard Iraqi army issue.  I assume that Obama would approve the use of U.S. Air elements in the defense of Baghdad, and as was demonstrated in Gulf Wars One and Two, enemy armor has no chance against the U.S. Air Force.  In a nutshell, I'm willing to go out on a limb and declare that the IS will not be conducting a conventional military assault on Baghdad.

Can the IS take Baghdad?  Absolutely, through the use of well-trained and disciplined operatives, who move through the city street-by-street, making each neighborhood ungovernable.  The first step in any such operation would be to destabilize the civil administration.  As I mentioned in a previous post, the United States of America, through the use of its military and a dedicated stream of agencies and organizations, rebuilt Baghdad after the end of the insurgency.  The roads were fixed, traffic lights worked, schools were rebuilt (or built from the ground up), buses started running again, the markets flourished, and the toilets flushed.  Drivers started obeying traffic signs, for goodness sake.  The residents of Baghdad responded with great appreciation to the "fixing" of their capital city.  A few car bombs and assassinations later, and the people of Baghdad may revert to their previous lives living under siege.  The IS needs to disrupt the daily functions of Baghdad, and instill fear and a complete lack of confidence in the Iraqi government.  Any fear created by the IS will infect the Iraqi Army as well, and we've seen what happens to the Iraqi Army when it meets opposition (Gulf War One, Gulf War Two, the IS conflict).  I can only hope that the U.S. military advisors currently working to train the Iraqis, have a little potion that will make the Iraqi troops grow some balls.  (I once saw a video of a Shia tribesman attacking an Iraqi Army unit with a sword, for goodness sake.  At least the Shia defenders won't need a potion.)  Once the IS has destabilized the city and handed a few defeats to the Iraqi Army, the people of Baghdad, to save their own skin, will go into the streets to welcome the IS (as liberators from the Shia governments, I assume).

Unless the Iraqi High Command can formulate a plan to draw the IS into a conventional conflict, then defeating the IS will eventually require the Iraqi Army and its Shia brigades to move into the neighborhoods and remove IS operatives one at a time. Allowing the IS to establish a presence in Abu Ghraib might work in the Iraq Army's favor.  If you allow the enemy to set up shop in a known location, its easier to disrupt the flow of supplies and men.  If I were in charge of the Iraqi Army, I would take a page out of George W. Bush's strategy: force the enemy to fight a battle to which they are ill-suited.  Bush knew Al-Qaeda could not take on the U.S. Army in a conventional war, but he forced them into one anyways, by taking the battle to Al-Qaeda's backyard (Afghanistan and Iraq).  Unfortunately, politics intervened and the rest is history.  The Iraqi High Command should allow the IS to comfortably establish itself to the west of Baghdad.  Let the IS begin to feel possessive of the towns and villages under their control.  Give them the confidence to locate all of their heavy equipment in Abu Ghraib.  Then the Iraqi Army can use its advantages (heavier artillery, U.S. Air Force, a 20 to 1 superiority in armor (a guess on my part), and a huge advantage in ground troops.  Force IS to defend Abu Ghraib, and Ramadi, and Fallujah.  Tempt the IS out of its rat holes and into the open, and then crush them, completely.  NO PRISONERS.  Hey, is there any more of that mustard gas left over from the Iran/Iraq war?