The Sunnis of Iraq..what does the future hold? (Part I)

Link: The Sunni of Iraq - caught in the middle again.


Although plenty of Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds would disagree with me, I'm beginning to develop a real sense of sympathy for the Sunni of Iraq.  For half of century, they had one of their own running the show in Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein showed just as much disdain for his fellow Sunni as he did for the Shi'a, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Assyrians in his country.  Sadly, though, the non-Sunni Iraqis will forever associate Saddam Hussein and his rule with the Sunni community.  Its the name of the game in Mesopotamia this century.  While Europeans and Americans many times are never even aware of the particular religious affiliation of their neighbors, in this part of the world, it means everything.  Although the Sunni suffered under Saddam Hussein, it is true that a semblance of a middle class developed in Iraq.....and it was mostly Sunni.  Those who were lucky enough to belong to this small middle class had the opportunity to attend university in Baghdad, and following graduation, join the ranks of physicians, architects, engineers, teachers, and businessmen who kept the country from following any further into chaos.  It was no surprise that by the arrival of the U.S. Army in 2003, the Sunni reputation as being the educated and "established" demographic in Iraq, was well established.  It was an easy assumption to make; the Shi'a seemed to prefer living in the south, and engaging in small-scale agriculture for sustenance (with the exception of the half-million or so living in the squalid slums of Sadr City, in northeast Baghdad).  As for the Kurds, well, they preferred to keep to themselves in the north of the country.  In fact, a large percentage of northern Iraq actually functioned for some time as a separate political entity, run by and representing the Kurdish people.  With a "de-facto" capital city at Sulimaniyah, a functioning economic system and large urban centers in Erbil and Mosul, the Kurds were able to demonstrate to the world, just how ready they were an independent state.  But Turkey absolutely refused to sign-off on the idea, as they always had and probably always will.

The Sunni are spread out in Iraq, as are all the different ethnicities.  There is a substantial Sunni community in Basra in the south and in Mosul in the far north.  But the Sunnis are the dominant ethnic group in central Iraq, west of Baghdad in Anbar Province, and just north of Baghdad in Salah al-Din Province, including the cities of Samarrah and Tikrit.  With the end of the Ba'ath Party, a great deal of influence was returned to the Sunni tribal leaders and the "Shaykh" system of authority.  The United States was well aware of this development following the ouster of Saddam and the emergence of the Sunni insurgency.  The United States military and CIA (and to a lesser extent, Dept. of State) were able to co-opt the Sunni tribal leaders and bring the Sunni community onto the side of the good guys.  It took a great deal of influence and suggestion (read: money), but in the end, the Sunni rose up against Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and helped bring peace and stability to their nation.  But for a few years following the U.S. entry into Baghdad, the Sunni were connected to the violence caused by Zarqawi just because of their shared religious affiliation.  And Zarqawi played this to the hilt by sending suicide bombers into Shi'a religious gatherings, and then repeating the heinous act at the funeral for the victims.  For a time, the U.S. had to be concerned that open hostilities were going to break put between the Sunni and the Shi'a.  And all the while, the U.S. is trying to help Iraq stand back up on its feet, by rebuilding the transportation network, repairing the electrical grid, refurbishing the international airport, building schools, repairing refineries, and most important, organizing national elections.  These efforts were confounded by Zarqawi because of his daily use of suicide vehicles.  But Zarqawi went to far.  He was killing just as many Sunni as he was anyone else, and the Sunni were tired of the destabilization and the bloodshed.  This fact was a large factor in convincing the Sunni tribes to support the U.S. effort and defeat the insurgency for good.
 

  

Tikrit Falls To The ISF

Link: A. Iraqi Forces Retake Saddam's Home Of Tikrit

On Wednesday, March 11, units of the Iraqi Army had taken control of most of Tikrit, raising the Iraqi flag over many landmarks in the birthplace of former President Saddam Hussein.  A Shi'a Militia fought alongside the Iraqi Army, which was also advised by roughly one hundred Iranian military officers.  While Iraqi soldiers celebrated their apparent victory, news from Ramadi indicates that the Islamic State (IS) forces have launched another focused attack on this strategic Sunni city. But the campaign to oust the IS from Tikrit can only be considered a victory for the Iraqi government.  The intention to conduct a full-scale operation to recover Tikrit had been leaked to the press days before the operation was to begin.  Once the operation commenced, it was apparent that a great deal of planning was involved in the pre-engagement efforts.  The Iraqi forces moved deliberately, never losing the initiative or the advantage to the IS forces.  The IS for their part, did not appear to consider Tikrit worth too much sacrifice, as the defenders appeared to give up ground without much of a struggle.  It is anticipated that the ISF will consolidate its position and resupply before commencing its next operation.

Last year after occupying Tikrit, forces from the IS were accused of massacring 1,700 mostly young men from the local area.  There has been some concern that Iraqi forces make seek retribution over any IS members that have been detained during the current operation, although Iraqi government officials stress that steps have been taken to ensure that all human rights are respected and that no "revenge killings" will occur.  If the Iraqi Army can strengthen its hold on Tikrit, it will provide an opportunity to resupply beleaguered Iraqi government forces in the north, and possibly consolidate the tenuous Iraqi control over the Baiji oil refinery and the town of Baiji itself.  While occupying
Tikrit, the IS was in an ideal position to threaten any attempt to relieve or resupply Iraqi forces in the areas around Baiji, Erbil, Kirkuk and Mosul.  There can be no doubt that the Iranian military has stepped up its "advisory" efforts, and are having a much more profound impact than the oddly nebulous "allied air campaign" is having on the ground game in Iraq.  Events in Iraq are hitting close to home in Tehran, as the government continues its diplomatic discourse with the United States over its nuclear program, and IS guerillas are within a days march of Iranian territory.  Given the success of the Tikrit operation, expect to see the Iranian presence increase over the next few weeks, and if the result is continued victories over the IS, there will be no reason to question Iranian involvement. 

The current Iraqi government is considered sympathetic to the Shi'a cause, which has facilitated Iranian military assistance to the ISF.  Normally, the Iranian advisors would be found embedded with the Shi'a militia, but during the Tikrit campaign, the Iranians were much more conspicuous in their direct advisement to the Iraqi Army.  The deepening crisis in Ramadi and Fallujah, along with an IS presence in Diyala province, led many analysts to expect direct military Iranian intervention.  The resurgence of the ISF (albeit aided by Shi'a militia and Iranian advisors) has given the Iranian government some breathing room.  The last thing that Tehran needs at the moment, is a full-scale military mobilization into a foreign country.  It would certainly confuse the impending negotiations with the Obama Administration over the Nuclear issue.  If the ISF can follow up their success by consolidating their positions in Baiji, Erbil and other strategic points in the north, and react swiftly to any new IS operations in Ramadi and Fallujah, then the momentum may be changing sides.