Turkey continues pressure on PKK.

Link: Turkish military bombs PKK targets.

Turkey has decided that the time is right to tackle the difficult problem of independence for Iraq's Kurdish population.  Turkey has an unfortunate history of dealing with the Kurds, including allegations of past genocide and pogroms.  Turkey would like nothing more than to make the problem disappear, and the military solution seems to be the one that Turkey likes the most.  The PKK, a self-appointed political and military representative of Turkey's Kurdish population, has been a thorn on the shoe of the Turkish Armed Forces, for years.  The PKK has never suffered from lack of funding as the Kurd diaspora has generously supplied the movement with resources, weapons, and media representation.  The PKK has created a difficult situation by utilizing locale familiarity and support to regularly ambush Turkish military patrols.  Ankara has been very hesitant to unleash the full blunt of its military against the PKK, which is holed up in eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, because of the fear that the international community would not approve.  More importantly, a full military offensive involving the Air Force and Turkey's mighty armor units would give the impression that the PKK movement is making progress in its efforts.

What does the PKK want?  Basically, the PKK is fighting for a Kurdish homeland in eastern Turkey, and at times the movement has garnered tremendous international attention from the actions of female suicide activists.  At times, the PKK has played nice with its Iraq-based PUK and PDK counterparts, which has raised hopes in the Kurdish community that the three organizations might be able to exert enough influence to create a Kurdish independent state from Turkish and Iraqi territory.  In fact, when the Kurdish independence movement in Iraq appeared close to actual success in seceding from Iraq, a great deal of pressure was exerted on the PKK to give up the armed struggle in Turkey, and join the new Kurdish state being born in northern Iraq.  But the Iraqi Kurds got a bit ahead of themselves.  The international community, and the United States in particular, decided that the time had not yet arrived to dissolving the Iraqi state as we know it, and the Kurds were left empty-handed.  The PKK was probably thrilled that the effort failed, because a successful Kurdish state in northern Iraq would arguably remove the need for a Kurdish state in Anatolia.  Its should come as no surprise that the PKK as it exists today, has become an enterprise of sorts, with people making a living from the continued struggle.  The cessation of the effort would certainly close the pocket books of many in the Kurdish diaspora.  In fact, the informal cease fire that existed between Turkey and the PKK since 2013, had started to impact the money-collection efforts in international Kurdish communities.  But the recent attacks on PKK targets, including civilians, will certainly piss off Kurds everywhere, and the money flow should return to normal.

With the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the remaining forces of de facto Syrian president Bashir al-Assad continuing on its southern border, you would think that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan would have enough trouble on his hands.  But Erdogan is a master politician, who is always looking into the future before deciding what decisions to make today.  Erdogan suffered badly in the last Turkish elections, which he probably didn't expect.  He normally doesn't get surprised twice, at least not in the same manner.  He is taking care of business. And in Turkey, nothing mobilizes the Turkish voter like a bit of Kurdish/PKK misbehavior, and if the cease fire is keeping the PKK quiet, then it was up to Erdogan to stir the hornets nest a bit.  As usual, Erdogan displayed politically adept timing, and waited until the entire international community was focusing on the nuclear treaty between the United States and Iran, and also the continuing military drama evolving in Iraq's Anbar Province, to launch a completely unprovoked attack on a PKK target.  Not surprisingly, the PKK, after taking a sigh of relief that its raison d'etre had made a new appearance, retaliated quickly by ambushing and killing a handful of Turkish soldiers.  Since this development began last week, its been the usual tit-for-tat between the two groups, and has created an entirely new diplomatic front for the world to focus on.  As for Erdogan, he gets to play the tough guy for the Turkish voter, and at the same time, may have the opportunity to also show is statesmen abilities, before the next round of Turkish elections.

Allies look to the U.S. to expand its military profile in the region; Turkish Air Force bombs both PKK and ISIS targets.

Links: A. Turkish Air Force hits both Kurdish/PKK and ISIS targets.
           B. BBC comments on Turkish air strikes.

The current environment in the Middle East and the Levant (can't we just go back to using Mesopotamia?) has evolved so dramatically in the last month that regional players have been obliged to review, adjust, and re-apply strategies.  The treaty drafted between Iranian officials and representatives from the United States and various European interested parties (the Foreign Minister of Austria was involved, and I swear to you that I have cans of corn older than he is) has been approved by the United Nations and now must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament.  For the most part, the Iranians love this treaty, so the real test will be in the U.S. Congress.    Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (who, along with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, constitute the Gulf Monarchies) have unleashed their diplomats and foreign friends to investigate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons without having a production facility.  Being rich in fossil fuels, The Gulf Emirates have no need for nuclear power; but you can guarantee that they will be looking to purchase a nuclear weapon or three and a delivery system effective enough to at least act as a deterrent (how far are Tehran and Qom from King Khalid Air Force Base?).  Not surprisingly, since the United States is responsible for the Iranian nuclear treaty, its allies in the region (including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait and Iraq) fully expect the U.S. to strengthen its military presence and involvement in the region.  The argument will be that since the U.S. took it upon itself to make the region all the more dangerous, then the U.S. needs to share in the security responsibility.  Obviously the Administration agrees, as diplomats have been scurrying to various capitals, including Baghdad and Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, to discuss the possibility of new arms treaties.

Also, Turkey has decided to become more aggressive on the military front, bombing both PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and ISIS (Islamic State) targets simultaneously.  Turkey's attack on the PKK ended an unofficial truce between Ankara and the Kurdish independence organization that had existed since 2013. Before conducting the PKK raid, Turkey concluded an agreement with the United States for the use of the U.S. Air Force Base at Incirlik, Turkey, by the allied air coalition currently active against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.  Its obvious that Turkey timed its attack on the PKK only after placating U.S. efforts to use Incirlik.  Also, Turkey sweetened the pot a bit by also bombing ISIS targets in Syria.  We strongly suspect that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning to call for elections in the fall.  His decision ratchet up military attacks on PKK targets after a two-year unofficial cease-fire is calculated to appeal to the Turkish voters, who are opposed to the PKK by a large percentage.  At the same time, Turkish military action against ISIS, and the relaxation of opposition to the use of Incirlik, will no-doubt help to repair a damaged relationship with the United States, which is another issue that is very important to the average Turkish voter.

If Turkey were to decide to become one-hundred percent involved militarily in the efforts to defeat ISIS, the impact on the battlefield would be staggering.  Similar to a full Iranian intervention in Iraq, the Turkish military would make short-order of ISIS, especially given that the Turks do not play with the same rule book as the United States.  Turkey would have no hesitation using ISIS tactics to combat ISIS, which is one of the most effective ways to combat organizations of this nature.  Any squeamishness or hesitance to act as barbarously as ISIS is automatically accepted as a sign of weakness, and used to ISIS' advantage, especially when utilizing the world press and social media.  But Turkey will not be the agent of destruction for ISIS, because that result would leave Bashir al-Assad and his depleted regime military as the next biggest-fish in Syria.  Erdogan despises Assad and will do nothing to aid the Syrian de-facto president and his Syrian Ba'ath Party cronies.  Ideally, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and military leaders would convene a summit and create a military plan (with the U.S. and its European allies in full support) to destroy ISIS from two directions.  Can you imagine two militarily powerful Muslim nations working together to destroy the world's worst terrorist threat of all time?  It would send a tremendous message about the power of peace, and set an example for Christian nations to follow (Russia/Ukraine).  Again, it won't happen, and not just because Erdogan hates Assad.  The deep, ingrained prejudice that Sunnis and Shi'a have for one another will prevent any serious Muslim coalition.  The best that can be hoped for is continued cooperation between the much smaller Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Units/PMUs (Shi'a militias).  The tripartite grouping of the supposed secular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'a PMUs and Sunni tribal groups, has been kept in a very delicate balance up to now.  The reason it has succeeded is because very little pressure has been exerted, i.e. the groups haven't been forced to merge as a fighting unit.  Also, every effort is being made to keep one group from getting more credit for battlefield victories than the others.  This effort has not always been successful. 

Can Erdogan recreate the Ottoman Empire from the existing Turkey?

Links: A. Turkey goes to the polls on 7 July.
           B. Turkey's Prime Minister Davutoglu caught between a rock and a hard space.
           C. Turkish President Erdogan revives the ghosts of Ottoman glory.

If there is one thing that I really appreciate about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, it is his taste for history.  Erdogan enjoys reminding the Turkish people of the long history of Turkish military conquest, when the Ottoman Empire stretched from Algeria to Oman and up to the gates of Vienna in Europe.  Oddly enough, when I hear the Islamic State ramble on about the creation of an Islamic Caliphate, I can't help but think of the Ottomans.  In reality, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic Caliphate.  The Sultan wasn't only the head of state for the Empire, he was also the Caliph, or leader of the faithful, with the authority to issue fatwas and declare war not just for the Empire, but for all Muslims.  Correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't this appear to be very similar to what the Islamic State is demanding?  In reality, the Ottomans were nothing like today's terrorist bad-boy of the moment, the Islamic State (IS).  Millions of practicing Christians lived within the Ottoman Empire, and with very few exceptions, enjoyed the protection of the state.  Jews were also welcome in the Empire, as the Ottomans recognized the importance of international trade and banking.  The Ottoman Empire also had close, personal diplomatic relationships with France, England, Austria and the United States.  If it weren't for European banks, the Ottoman Empire would have lived up to its nickname as "the sick man of Europe" and expired long before the actual end came in 1923.  What happened to the Ottomans, that they went from world power to an impoverished state, rife with revolutionaries and anarchists?  In a word, corruption.  And interestingly enough, the word continues to be in vogue a century later.

Turkey's Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, is a member of President Recep Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and considered a close ally of the President.  Davutoglu had an auspicious start as Prime Minister when he publicly proclaimed that fighting corruption would be a top priority.  Davutoglu hinted that he would support the nation's Supreme Court if it chose to put on trial the four government ministers who were forced to quit in 2013 after a large-scale corruption probe produced evidence of their involvement in bribery and influence peddling.  Davutoglu was even quoted as saying that he "would break off the arm of anyone who gets involved in corruption, even if its my brother."  But timing got in the way, and Davutoglu was forced to eat his words, so to speak.  Erdogan had no intention of allowing the Supreme Court to air the AKP's dirty laundry, and the motion to call for a trial by the Supreme Court was voted down in Parliament by the AKP.  This incident is not the only example of Erdogan's opposition to Davutoglu's stated goal of combatting Turkish political corruption.  Erdogan has no intention of fighting corruption.  It has become the military wing of his political ambitions.  Erdogan can no longer play the game successfully without the use of some phalange of corruption, whether it be bribery or intimidation (a favorite of his).  Davutoglu has been given the crash course in Erdogan politics 101, highlighted by the Jan. 19 meeting of Davutoglu's cabinet.  Erdogan called the meeting, chaired the meeting, and ended the meeting, with Davutoglu having not a word to say.  It was an obvious reminder to Davutoglu that Erdogan was the real Prime Minister.  More importantly, it sent a message that from Erdogan's optic, the actual position of Prime Minister itself was on borrowed time.  Erdogan has been discussing the possibility of Turkey adopting a Presidential system of government that does not include a Prime Minister.  It would consist of an Executive Branch (President and Cabinet), a Legislative Branch (Parliament), and a Judicial Branch (Supreme Court of Turkey).  For someone who is so critical of the United States, he certainly seems to appreciate our style of government.  Be that as it may, Erdogan's idea of a presidential system does not include our checks-and-balances.  Erdogan sees the Executive as having full authority over the other two, which would leave the office of president with increased powers.  And who would be the president in this system?  Why, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  For more than just a couple reasons, it was in Davutoglu's best interest to sit still and keep quiet.

There are times when I see similarities between Erdogan and Italy's former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.  Erdogan, like Berlusconi, never gives up; he realizes that in most instances all you have to do is show more staying power than your opponent.  Erdogan uses national ideals to stir up the people, especially near election time, another useful habit of Berlusconi.  The exist some obvious differences between the two, though.  Italy's electoral system is not as easy to manipulate as Turkey's, and its very difficult to bribe or unfairly influence the Italian judiciary.  Also, everywhere Berlusconi goes, his businesses follow like a heavy shadow.  Most of the offenses of which he has been accused have to do with manipulation for the benefit of his companies.  Erdogan has no business obligations to weight him down, at least none that are known to us.  He is a political animal, through and through.  When his political party originally burst onto the scene, I was concerned that he was an Islamic extremist, or at least an ideologue.  I was worried that Turkey, such an important part of NATO, with a large, well-trained and equipped military, would lose its identification as a secular state.  In reality, the AKP and Erdogan approached power with a much more pragmatic, long-term perspective.  Then I became concerned that he was playing up to the nationalist element in Turkish politics (in Turkey, there is a fine-line between the Islamist parties and the Nationalist parties, although they wouldn't agree).  Now, after more than a decade of Erdogan, I think I finally have an accurate assessment.  Erdogan isn't about Islamic domination, nor is he about Turkish nationalism.  Erdogan is about Erdogan.  He is determined to create a new niche in Turkish politics that allows him to govern as a king, but with the title of president.  And he wants his Turkey to be militarily and economically powerful and dominant in the region, a 21st century Ottoman Empire, more or less.  I'm not convinced that he will succeed; a growing number of very brave Turks have become vociferously opposed to Erdogan, led by a few independent journalists.  And I've always wondered if he was completely successful in excising all the military brass who were dedicated to keeping Turkey secular and free.  Maybe the Turkish Military has one coup still left in the pipeline.  Now would be a good time.........