Link: Political troubles distracting Iraqi government from ISIS campaign.
In spite of recent efforts by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) to oppose and discredit the reform agenda by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi, the Iraqi government continues to voice confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) attempt to retake Ramadi. Drip by drip, local Sunni Tribal Militia recruits complete training in Habaniya and join their compatriots outside Ramadi. The Iraqi Army and its Special Police Units have been making very slow progress, but ground is being taken. The ISF is not attacking Ramadi from only one direction; the effort is to invest the town from the east, west, north, and south. Ideally, this would have led to the isolation of Ramadi more quickly, but it hasn't happened. ISIS continues to have access to its forces in both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF has identified the roads which allow both cities to be accessed, and an effort is underway to shut them down. One road which is still open to ISIS actually leads from Fallujah to Ramadi. Why the allied air campaign hasn't turned this road into dust is a mystery, although if it continues to be heavily traveled by civilians, then bombing would be out of the question. What if ISIS disguises their reinforcements and supplies as civilian traffic, as they have done repeatedly in both Syria and Iraq? That is a question that as of yet has no answer.
The PMUs continue to destabilize the situation in Baghdad, as ISIS increases its attacks in the city and also in Baiji and Thar Thar, south of Samarrah. Its obvious that ISIS is attempting to exploit the showdown between the Iraqi government and Shi'a militias, by securing territory already occupied and launching attacks on fresh targets. The Iraqi government has the obvious support of the great majority of the population, including the Shi'a. But this is a population that has seen tremendous violence and has been terrorized for decades from the end of a gun barrel. The militias are threatening to treat any pro-reform demonstrations as a security threat, and as they have already declared themselves the de facto authority in both Baghdad and Basra, it must be assumed that they won't hesitate to shoot unarmed protesters. Abadi knows that the popular support of the people, along with the consistent support of Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, are all he can rely on as the ISF and police are occupied in Anbar. But Abadi appears understandably hesitant to call the people to the streets, for the showdown that would result which he cannot hope to win. With the army and police occupied on the front lines, there is some question as to why the militias haven't attempted to remove Abadi from office by force. Certainly there are enough Maliki supporters and Iranian hacks in the Iraqi government and Parliament for a new cabinet and administration to be formed, one that wouldn't try to enact all of the anti-corruption reforms that threaten Maliki so much. The reality is, any effort to remove Abadi would have to be approved by Tehran, and right now the Iranians are basking in the glow of their new-found reputation as Russia's partner in countering ISIS in Syria. The Iranians are just as anxious to move into the vacuum left by the United States, to take up a leadership role alongside the Russians in Syria in Putin's plan to stand up to ISIS. This effort, along with the new nuclear treaty written by the United States, a few European countries, and Iran, make Iran so squeaky clean that they can barely stand themselves. An Iranian-sponsored government change in Baghdad, with the battle of Ramadi raging to the west, would not be seen as a productive development. For this reason more than any other, Abadi is safe....for the moment.
Showing posts with label PMUs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label PMUs. Show all posts
Thursday, September 24, 2015
Tuesday, August 25, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces prepare for final push to retake Ramadi, as ISIS continues use of suicide bombers.
Links: A. ISIS suicide attacks target ISF forces in eastern Ramadi.
B. ISF prepares final push to retake Ramadi.
In early July, the Iraqi government announced with a bit of fanfare that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), would begin a military offensive dedicated to liberating Anbar Province from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Almost simultaneously, ISIS increased random fire and SVBIED attacks in Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, to distract from the ISF operation in Anbar, and to encourage Provincial Administrations to request a return of their troops from the Ramadi front. The Iraqi government has faced a great deal of pressure because of the time it has taken to liberate both Ramadi and Fallujah. In reality, the ISF and the PMUs have rationally adhered to the strategic plan originally agreed upon, which requires the removal of all explosives and booby traps, so that the civilian population of Ramadi that has been living in exile in Baghdad, can return in safety. Also, the ISF, which consists of both special police units and the Iraqi Army, has been very deliberate in its movements, taking care to consolidate all strategic gains and discourage a return by ISIS. The Iraqi people have been subject before to the occupation by ISIS, liberation, and re-occupation by ISIS, and it is important that the groundwork is laid to make the departure of ISIS permanent. On Sunday, ISIS launched SVBIED attacks and fired artillery at ISF positions, killing 17 soldiers and 6 Sunni militiamen. The ISF responded with heavy shelling of ISIS positions, alongside what has become a stepped-up presence by the allied air coalition, which has left ISIS occupied areas of the city in rubble. Also, as mentioned in Link A, a major commander in the Iraqi Army serving on the Anbar front, was removed from duty by officials in Baghdad. The announcement from the government would only comment that the general in question was guilty of dereliction of duty.
On Saturday, the Iraqi government has announced the formation of a joint police and Iraqi Army force, 10,000 strong, to renew the offensive to liberate Iraq. Plans to transfer these troops to Anbar had been underway for some time, and the second wave of the offensive which began in July, was about to commence. Some neighborhoods in eastern Ramadi have become intense battlegrounds, as city blocks change hands repeatedly. In particular, ISIS has focused its attention on retaking the Husaibiya District, but so far its efforts have been unsuccessful. The Iraqi military command is optimistic that the increase in troops will help the ISF to overwhelm ISIS positions in relatively short order, and that within the next few weeks, the ISF will be able to focus its operations on completing the liberation of Fallujah; presently, ISIS positions in Fallujah are under intense pressure from allied air attacks and regular attacks from the PMUs.
Iraqi civilians in Baghdad are increasing pressure on the government for the relief of Haditha, which is located to the northwest of Ramadi, and has been under siege by ISIS since mid-July. Up to now, the city has withstood the attempts at occupation by ISIS forces, and any positive developments from eastern Anbar can only increase pressure on ISIS to take Haditha, which they publicly declared as a target in July.
B. ISF prepares final push to retake Ramadi.
In early July, the Iraqi government announced with a bit of fanfare that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), would begin a military offensive dedicated to liberating Anbar Province from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Almost simultaneously, ISIS increased random fire and SVBIED attacks in Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, to distract from the ISF operation in Anbar, and to encourage Provincial Administrations to request a return of their troops from the Ramadi front. The Iraqi government has faced a great deal of pressure because of the time it has taken to liberate both Ramadi and Fallujah. In reality, the ISF and the PMUs have rationally adhered to the strategic plan originally agreed upon, which requires the removal of all explosives and booby traps, so that the civilian population of Ramadi that has been living in exile in Baghdad, can return in safety. Also, the ISF, which consists of both special police units and the Iraqi Army, has been very deliberate in its movements, taking care to consolidate all strategic gains and discourage a return by ISIS. The Iraqi people have been subject before to the occupation by ISIS, liberation, and re-occupation by ISIS, and it is important that the groundwork is laid to make the departure of ISIS permanent. On Sunday, ISIS launched SVBIED attacks and fired artillery at ISF positions, killing 17 soldiers and 6 Sunni militiamen. The ISF responded with heavy shelling of ISIS positions, alongside what has become a stepped-up presence by the allied air coalition, which has left ISIS occupied areas of the city in rubble. Also, as mentioned in Link A, a major commander in the Iraqi Army serving on the Anbar front, was removed from duty by officials in Baghdad. The announcement from the government would only comment that the general in question was guilty of dereliction of duty.
On Saturday, the Iraqi government has announced the formation of a joint police and Iraqi Army force, 10,000 strong, to renew the offensive to liberate Iraq. Plans to transfer these troops to Anbar had been underway for some time, and the second wave of the offensive which began in July, was about to commence. Some neighborhoods in eastern Ramadi have become intense battlegrounds, as city blocks change hands repeatedly. In particular, ISIS has focused its attention on retaking the Husaibiya District, but so far its efforts have been unsuccessful. The Iraqi military command is optimistic that the increase in troops will help the ISF to overwhelm ISIS positions in relatively short order, and that within the next few weeks, the ISF will be able to focus its operations on completing the liberation of Fallujah; presently, ISIS positions in Fallujah are under intense pressure from allied air attacks and regular attacks from the PMUs.
Iraqi civilians in Baghdad are increasing pressure on the government for the relief of Haditha, which is located to the northwest of Ramadi, and has been under siege by ISIS since mid-July. Up to now, the city has withstood the attempts at occupation by ISIS forces, and any positive developments from eastern Anbar can only increase pressure on ISIS to take Haditha, which they publicly declared as a target in July.
Monday, August 17, 2015
Iraqi parliament blames loss of Mosul to ISIS on Maliki; ISF making slow progress in its operations to retake Ramadi.
Links: A. Maliki to blame for loss of Mosul to ISIS.
B. Operation to retake Ramadi continues.
On Monday, an Iraqi Parliamentary panel recommended that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki face trial regarding his actions during the ISIS operation to take Mosul last year. In particular, the panel pointed out that Maliki fanned sectarian tensions, which encouraged many Iraqi Sunnis in Mosul to welcome ISIS. The panel's recommendation comes on the heels of another administrative shake-up in the government, as Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi eliminated eleven ministerial posts, reducing the size of the cabinet by a third. Last week, Abadi proposed the elimination of the offices of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President, currently held my Maliki. Abadi's efforts to slim-down the Iraqi government are an effort to eliminate redundancy and corruption, as the country continues to experience protests in all the major cities. Instead of attacking one political party or the other, these protests are focused on changing the mindset of Iraqi politics, and ending the tradition of patronage, bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption that have long been part of all levels of government. The focus isn't singularly on the cabinet level positions, as calls are made for changes in provincial and local governmental structure as well. Abadi is prudent to respond with examples of real reform, as up to now the proposed changes will only strengthen the position of President. The Iraqi political system has complicated government efforts to recruit, train and deploy troops, as each separate province looks to redefine its own authority.
There has been little news from Ramadi in recent days, as questions are raised about the probability of success in the operation. The Iraqi Security Forces, which include the Army and the Police, have been careful to consolidate gains and search for booby traps before deciding to push forward. In the past, initial successes have been followed up by a number of high-casualty incidents involving booby traps and other explosives. The ISF and its allies in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) vastly outnumber the ISIS fighters in Ramadi and Fallujah. Some estimates have the total number of ISIS personnel in Anbar Province to be less than 10,000. ISIS multiplies its effectiveness through unconventional warfare, especially the use of SVBIEDS- suicide vehicular bombs/improvised explosive device. Again, the effort to retake Ramadi and Fallujah, and also consolidate its position in Baiji, includes the methodical inspection of all vehicles, to prevent an SVBIED attack from succeeding. The detailed, organized approach to this offensive may be an indication that the Iraqi leaders intend to push ISIS out of Anbar Province completely. The events of the next week will be a strong indication of just how much progress has been made. Keep in mind, ISIS continues to press home its attacks on Haditha, whose fall would be a serious blow to the Iraqi Sunni community, if not necessarily strategically important.
B. Operation to retake Ramadi continues.
On Monday, an Iraqi Parliamentary panel recommended that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki face trial regarding his actions during the ISIS operation to take Mosul last year. In particular, the panel pointed out that Maliki fanned sectarian tensions, which encouraged many Iraqi Sunnis in Mosul to welcome ISIS. The panel's recommendation comes on the heels of another administrative shake-up in the government, as Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi eliminated eleven ministerial posts, reducing the size of the cabinet by a third. Last week, Abadi proposed the elimination of the offices of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President, currently held my Maliki. Abadi's efforts to slim-down the Iraqi government are an effort to eliminate redundancy and corruption, as the country continues to experience protests in all the major cities. Instead of attacking one political party or the other, these protests are focused on changing the mindset of Iraqi politics, and ending the tradition of patronage, bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption that have long been part of all levels of government. The focus isn't singularly on the cabinet level positions, as calls are made for changes in provincial and local governmental structure as well. Abadi is prudent to respond with examples of real reform, as up to now the proposed changes will only strengthen the position of President. The Iraqi political system has complicated government efforts to recruit, train and deploy troops, as each separate province looks to redefine its own authority.
There has been little news from Ramadi in recent days, as questions are raised about the probability of success in the operation. The Iraqi Security Forces, which include the Army and the Police, have been careful to consolidate gains and search for booby traps before deciding to push forward. In the past, initial successes have been followed up by a number of high-casualty incidents involving booby traps and other explosives. The ISF and its allies in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) vastly outnumber the ISIS fighters in Ramadi and Fallujah. Some estimates have the total number of ISIS personnel in Anbar Province to be less than 10,000. ISIS multiplies its effectiveness through unconventional warfare, especially the use of SVBIEDS- suicide vehicular bombs/improvised explosive device. Again, the effort to retake Ramadi and Fallujah, and also consolidate its position in Baiji, includes the methodical inspection of all vehicles, to prevent an SVBIED attack from succeeding. The detailed, organized approach to this offensive may be an indication that the Iraqi leaders intend to push ISIS out of Anbar Province completely. The events of the next week will be a strong indication of just how much progress has been made. Keep in mind, ISIS continues to press home its attacks on Haditha, whose fall would be a serious blow to the Iraqi Sunni community, if not necessarily strategically important.
Thursday, August 13, 2015
Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.
Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.
In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks. On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people. ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned. All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage. Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late. People are very enterprising. In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine. Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand. If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill. ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.
No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces. Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now. In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use. As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal. ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah. From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals. They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance. On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University. However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself. By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.
On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament. Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement. All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best. Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations. Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS. As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling. We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best. Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi? Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks? What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month? Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?
We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah. No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases. Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate. The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.
Tuesday, August 11, 2015
Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.
It was too good to be true. The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs. For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet. In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President. Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki. The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all. Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar. If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk. Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has? Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other? Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government. Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war. Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister. The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country. The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran. During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority. Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq. In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations. Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded. The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard. Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided. The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border. Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS. I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced. The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.
Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki. There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption. As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers. Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative. The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined. It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way. Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics. The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice. How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?
How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so. Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner. Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias. I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms. Am I overestimating Sistani's power? Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort? If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens.
With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond? They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy. With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through. This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield. The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation. But the Sunnis have suffered terribly. I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform. But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment. The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.
Friday, July 31, 2015
Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.
The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies. In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah. The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi. With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive. Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.
as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province. By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege. The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province. To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives. One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS. While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad. ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself. ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.
In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community. Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support. The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.
Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK. Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list. What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments. Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass. I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power. Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support". Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?
as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province. By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege. The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province. To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives. One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS. While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad. ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself. ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.
In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community. Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support. The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.
Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK. Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list. What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments. Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass. I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power. Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support". Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?
Sunday, July 26, 2015
Allies look to the U.S. to expand its military profile in the region; Turkish Air Force bombs both PKK and ISIS targets.
Links: A. Turkish Air Force hits both Kurdish/PKK and ISIS targets.
B. BBC comments on Turkish air strikes.
The current environment in the Middle East and the Levant (can't we just go back to using Mesopotamia?) has evolved so dramatically in the last month that regional players have been obliged to review, adjust, and re-apply strategies. The treaty drafted between Iranian officials and representatives from the United States and various European interested parties (the Foreign Minister of Austria was involved, and I swear to you that I have cans of corn older than he is) has been approved by the United Nations and now must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament. For the most part, the Iranians love this treaty, so the real test will be in the U.S. Congress. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (who, along with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, constitute the Gulf Monarchies) have unleashed their diplomats and foreign friends to investigate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons without having a production facility. Being rich in fossil fuels, The Gulf Emirates have no need for nuclear power; but you can guarantee that they will be looking to purchase a nuclear weapon or three and a delivery system effective enough to at least act as a deterrent (how far are Tehran and Qom from King Khalid Air Force Base?). Not surprisingly, since the United States is responsible for the Iranian nuclear treaty, its allies in the region (including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait and Iraq) fully expect the U.S. to strengthen its military presence and involvement in the region. The argument will be that since the U.S. took it upon itself to make the region all the more dangerous, then the U.S. needs to share in the security responsibility. Obviously the Administration agrees, as diplomats have been scurrying to various capitals, including Baghdad and Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, to discuss the possibility of new arms treaties.
Also, Turkey has decided to become more aggressive on the military front, bombing both PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and ISIS (Islamic State) targets simultaneously. Turkey's attack on the PKK ended an unofficial truce between Ankara and the Kurdish independence organization that had existed since 2013. Before conducting the PKK raid, Turkey concluded an agreement with the United States for the use of the U.S. Air Force Base at Incirlik, Turkey, by the allied air coalition currently active against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Its obvious that Turkey timed its attack on the PKK only after placating U.S. efforts to use Incirlik. Also, Turkey sweetened the pot a bit by also bombing ISIS targets in Syria. We strongly suspect that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning to call for elections in the fall. His decision ratchet up military attacks on PKK targets after a two-year unofficial cease-fire is calculated to appeal to the Turkish voters, who are opposed to the PKK by a large percentage. At the same time, Turkish military action against ISIS, and the relaxation of opposition to the use of Incirlik, will no-doubt help to repair a damaged relationship with the United States, which is another issue that is very important to the average Turkish voter.
If Turkey were to decide to become one-hundred percent involved militarily in the efforts to defeat ISIS, the impact on the battlefield would be staggering. Similar to a full Iranian intervention in Iraq, the Turkish military would make short-order of ISIS, especially given that the Turks do not play with the same rule book as the United States. Turkey would have no hesitation using ISIS tactics to combat ISIS, which is one of the most effective ways to combat organizations of this nature. Any squeamishness or hesitance to act as barbarously as ISIS is automatically accepted as a sign of weakness, and used to ISIS' advantage, especially when utilizing the world press and social media. But Turkey will not be the agent of destruction for ISIS, because that result would leave Bashir al-Assad and his depleted regime military as the next biggest-fish in Syria. Erdogan despises Assad and will do nothing to aid the Syrian de-facto president and his Syrian Ba'ath Party cronies. Ideally, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and military leaders would convene a summit and create a military plan (with the U.S. and its European allies in full support) to destroy ISIS from two directions. Can you imagine two militarily powerful Muslim nations working together to destroy the world's worst terrorist threat of all time? It would send a tremendous message about the power of peace, and set an example for Christian nations to follow (Russia/Ukraine). Again, it won't happen, and not just because Erdogan hates Assad. The deep, ingrained prejudice that Sunnis and Shi'a have for one another will prevent any serious Muslim coalition. The best that can be hoped for is continued cooperation between the much smaller Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Units/PMUs (Shi'a militias). The tripartite grouping of the supposed secular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'a PMUs and Sunni tribal groups, has been kept in a very delicate balance up to now. The reason it has succeeded is because very little pressure has been exerted, i.e. the groups haven't been forced to merge as a fighting unit. Also, every effort is being made to keep one group from getting more credit for battlefield victories than the others. This effort has not always been successful.
B. BBC comments on Turkish air strikes.
The current environment in the Middle East and the Levant (can't we just go back to using Mesopotamia?) has evolved so dramatically in the last month that regional players have been obliged to review, adjust, and re-apply strategies. The treaty drafted between Iranian officials and representatives from the United States and various European interested parties (the Foreign Minister of Austria was involved, and I swear to you that I have cans of corn older than he is) has been approved by the United Nations and now must be reviewed by the U.S. Congress and the Iranian Parliament. For the most part, the Iranians love this treaty, so the real test will be in the U.S. Congress. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (who, along with Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, constitute the Gulf Monarchies) have unleashed their diplomats and foreign friends to investigate the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons without having a production facility. Being rich in fossil fuels, The Gulf Emirates have no need for nuclear power; but you can guarantee that they will be looking to purchase a nuclear weapon or three and a delivery system effective enough to at least act as a deterrent (how far are Tehran and Qom from King Khalid Air Force Base?). Not surprisingly, since the United States is responsible for the Iranian nuclear treaty, its allies in the region (including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., Kuwait and Iraq) fully expect the U.S. to strengthen its military presence and involvement in the region. The argument will be that since the U.S. took it upon itself to make the region all the more dangerous, then the U.S. needs to share in the security responsibility. Obviously the Administration agrees, as diplomats have been scurrying to various capitals, including Baghdad and Jerusalem/Tel Aviv, to discuss the possibility of new arms treaties.
Also, Turkey has decided to become more aggressive on the military front, bombing both PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party) and ISIS (Islamic State) targets simultaneously. Turkey's attack on the PKK ended an unofficial truce between Ankara and the Kurdish independence organization that had existed since 2013. Before conducting the PKK raid, Turkey concluded an agreement with the United States for the use of the U.S. Air Force Base at Incirlik, Turkey, by the allied air coalition currently active against ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Its obvious that Turkey timed its attack on the PKK only after placating U.S. efforts to use Incirlik. Also, Turkey sweetened the pot a bit by also bombing ISIS targets in Syria. We strongly suspect that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is planning to call for elections in the fall. His decision ratchet up military attacks on PKK targets after a two-year unofficial cease-fire is calculated to appeal to the Turkish voters, who are opposed to the PKK by a large percentage. At the same time, Turkish military action against ISIS, and the relaxation of opposition to the use of Incirlik, will no-doubt help to repair a damaged relationship with the United States, which is another issue that is very important to the average Turkish voter.
If Turkey were to decide to become one-hundred percent involved militarily in the efforts to defeat ISIS, the impact on the battlefield would be staggering. Similar to a full Iranian intervention in Iraq, the Turkish military would make short-order of ISIS, especially given that the Turks do not play with the same rule book as the United States. Turkey would have no hesitation using ISIS tactics to combat ISIS, which is one of the most effective ways to combat organizations of this nature. Any squeamishness or hesitance to act as barbarously as ISIS is automatically accepted as a sign of weakness, and used to ISIS' advantage, especially when utilizing the world press and social media. But Turkey will not be the agent of destruction for ISIS, because that result would leave Bashir al-Assad and his depleted regime military as the next biggest-fish in Syria. Erdogan despises Assad and will do nothing to aid the Syrian de-facto president and his Syrian Ba'ath Party cronies. Ideally, Iranian and Turkish diplomats and military leaders would convene a summit and create a military plan (with the U.S. and its European allies in full support) to destroy ISIS from two directions. Can you imagine two militarily powerful Muslim nations working together to destroy the world's worst terrorist threat of all time? It would send a tremendous message about the power of peace, and set an example for Christian nations to follow (Russia/Ukraine). Again, it won't happen, and not just because Erdogan hates Assad. The deep, ingrained prejudice that Sunnis and Shi'a have for one another will prevent any serious Muslim coalition. The best that can be hoped for is continued cooperation between the much smaller Sunni tribal groups in Iraq, and the Popular Mobilization Units/PMUs (Shi'a militias). The tripartite grouping of the supposed secular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Shi'a PMUs and Sunni tribal groups, has been kept in a very delicate balance up to now. The reason it has succeeded is because very little pressure has been exerted, i.e. the groups haven't been forced to merge as a fighting unit. Also, every effort is being made to keep one group from getting more credit for battlefield victories than the others. This effort has not always been successful.
Friday, July 24, 2015
Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.
Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.
As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran. Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable". The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war. We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.
The Iranians are faced with a number of options. Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups. The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province. If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border. In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero". The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories. On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat. Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create. Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord. The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi. The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.
Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala. The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order. But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years. The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria). The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban. Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations. You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around. One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran. So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?
As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran. Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable". The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war. We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.
The Iranians are faced with a number of options. Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups. The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province. If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border. In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero". The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories. On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat. Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create. Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord. The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi. The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.
Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala. The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order. But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years. The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria). The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban. Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations. You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around. One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran. So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?
Tuesday, July 21, 2015
Iraqi forces facing serious challenges from ISIS in Diyala and Babil provinces.
Link: ISIS attack on market leaves 115 dead.
As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province. ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad. Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary. In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.
The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned. According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar. The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there. Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure. Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time. The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.
And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar. What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi. It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture. The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs. How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?
As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province. ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad. Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary. In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.
The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned. According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar. The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there. Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure. Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time. The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.
And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar. What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi. It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad. The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture. The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs. How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?
Saturday, July 18, 2015
Iraqi Security Forces join militia to encircle Fallujah.
Link: Iraqi forces closing in on Fallujah.
Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS). Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah. The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force. If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west. After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi. But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death. Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication. In this theater, nothing would surprise me.
The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts. The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design. Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs. Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad. The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority. In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations. While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire. Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.
The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front. Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time. The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing. Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions. Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq. The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack. At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi. The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces. As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties. Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply. Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult. But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements. Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.
Earlier this week, the Iraqi government announced the commencement of the long-anticipated offensive to retake Anbar Province from the Islamic State (IS). Originally, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) appeared to be focusing exclusively on Ramadi, with the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), previously referred to as "Shi'a militias", were moving to attack Fallujah. The current situation, however, has both the ISF and the PMUs putting heavy pressure on Fallujah, while Ramadi endures the continued attention of both the allied air coalition and the Iraqi Air Force. If the ISF and PMUs are successful in encircling Fallujah, this will fully isolate Ramadi, and cut off any lines of supply from the west. After capturing Fallujah, the ISF should have a less-difficult time with Ramadi. But action in Fallujah has provided a grim reminder that the IS fighters seem content to fight to the death. Very few prisoners are being transported for debriefing, which leaves two possibilities: either the IS fighters are purposely dying for the cause, or the ISF and the PMUs have decided that prisoners are an unnecessary complication. In this theater, nothing would surprise me.
The immediate success of this offensive will have repercussions on other fronts. The IS will have fewer resources to dedicate to offensive maneuvers of there own design. Already there has been a slackening on SVBIEDs. Although Ramadi is usually the name that ends up in the newspapers, Fallujah is only forty miles from Baghdad. The citizens of Baghdad are aware of this proximity, which made it essential from a public relations perspective, that the government appear to be making the security of the capital its highest priority. In the past, when the ISF has conducted offensive operations, the IS had deadened the effect by almost simultaneously conducting operations itself, either through the use of SVBIEDs or attacks on military camps and installations. While the ISF and the PMUs are focusing on Fallujah and Ramadi, the IS continues its assault on Haditha, with both VBIEDs and direct fire. Although the fall of Haditha would be a blow to the government, it would be a reasonable trade-off for the liberation of Fallujah and Ramadi.
The IS is still capable of pulling off offensive operations that will distract from the Ramadi/Fallujah front. Although the ISF and the PMUs continue to make progress in Baiji, a response from the IS is anticipated at any time. The IS is attempting to keep the pressure on in Diyala Province, with low-level attacks against civilian targets continuing. Interestingly enough, the IS has staged the second major assault in two weeks on PUK and Peshmerga positions. Unlike Syria (at present), access to resources are the key to operations by IS in Iraq. The IS already has tenuous supply lines coming from Syria into Iraq, which are constantly in jeopardy from air attack. At the moment, the IS successes (Haditha, Tuz Khurmatu in northern Iraq) are in locations that are more easily resupplied, than for instance, Diyala Province and Ramadi. The key to defeating the IS in Iraq is to continue to put pressure on their ability to resupply their far-flung forces. As each location is rolled up, pressure must continue from air sorties. Each victory must be followed up with another operation; the IS must not be given time to find other avenues of re-supply. Because the IS is in control of vast swaths of Syrian territory, cutting off supply routes will be much more difficult. But no army has ever survived and flourished without supplies and reinforcements. Cut off the IS from its resources and watch it starve to death.
Sunday, July 12, 2015
Iran using Maliki and the Popular Mobilization Units to further its influence in Iraq.
Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Popular Mobilization Units.
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
B. Wikipedia entry for Nouri al-Maliki.
Keeping track of the evolving political scenario in Iraq can be quite a headache. I avoided digging into the "Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs)" issue for some time, electing to use the phrase, "Shi'a-based militias". But recent events have made it apparent to me that these groups of informal, guerilla-type, less-than-disciplined military units have become an important piece on the Iraqi political chessboard. Wikipedia has provided a tremendously useful definition of the PMUs, which we have included in Link A. In 2014, following the fall of Mosul and Ramadi, Shi'a
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani called for Iraqis of all faiths to join together to defeat the Islamic State (IS). The response was as expected, with the Shi'a volunteering by the truckloads, while the Sunnis remained basically unmoved. A number of Shi'a militias already existed, including the Badr Corps (or Brigade), Kata'ib Hezbollah, al-Haq, and interestingly enough, the Mahdi Army. For students of history, the Mahdi Army was the name chosen by the Islamic fanatics who attempted to create a Caliphate in the Sudan in the 1880s. Muhammad Ahmad, a Sudanese religious leader of the Samaniyya Order, proclaimed himself "Mahdi" (messianic redeemer of the Islamic faith) on June 29, 1881. Sudan was a protectorate, or colony of England at the time, and after dispatching the small contingent or Royal troops in Khartoum, the Mahdi and his followers looked towards Egypt. Although Muhammad Ahmad died six months after Khartoum fell, another member of the Samaniyya Order stepped in to become Mahdi #2 (Abdalli ibn-Muhammad). The British did not respond well to this threat, and dispatched an army to the Sudan, which in short order dispatched the Mahdi and his followers. Future British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was present during this war, and his memoirs are fascinating for aficionados of the subject. Back to the subject at hand...
The throng of Shi'a who followed Sistani's call to arms swelled the ranks of the basically five militias that were deploying against the IS threat. Initially, the Iraqi government made an effort to keep the militias under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, with the hope that the groups would engage the enemy with some sense of cohesion. Since the beginning of the conflict with the IS, the ISF has not always impressed on the battlefield, an issue which is the result of the U.S. military being withdrawn from Iraq precipitously, before the ISF training schedule had been fully implemented. In fact, the ISF delivered billions of dollars in military weapons to the IS, simply by deserting the field of battle and leaving behind everything they couldn't stick in their pockets. On the other hand, the militias have always performed with great courage and surprising discipline. The ISF has regrouped and delivered some stinging defeats to the IS, but none of it would have been possible without the militias. The Iraqi government, in its continuing effort to keep control of the militias (which for the most part saw their benefactor as Iran). The Iranians provided advisors, training and equipment to the militias, and the shared Shi'a connection cannot be stressed to highly. The Iranians intend on keeping the militias separate from the ISF and out from under the control of the Iraqi government. Each militia has its own leader, who can depend upon the loyalty of his group. Current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in a futile effort to exercise some control, placed the command of the militias under the direct control of the Prime Minister's office. But its difficult to for Abadi to gain traction when even the usually diplomatic Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani clearly identifies the independent nature of the militias. Marja Ali-al-Sistani (Marja signifying the Islamic legal authority of a Grand Ayatollah) has provided for the conduct of the militias, with a declaration of "Advice and Guidance to the Fighters on the Battlefields". This declaration included twenty points to dictate the conduct of the militias. Most importantly, Islamic Law should be in effect for areas liberated by the militias. To quote a Hadith of the Prophet Muhammed, "do not indulge in acts of extremism, do not disrespect dead corpses, do not resort to deceit, do not kill and elder, do not kill a child, do not kill a woman, and do not cut down trees unless necessity dictates otherwise." Its obvious that the IS and the militias are using a separate Islamic Law Book.
The Iraqi Prime Minister's office is faced with attempting to control the militias (or PMUs), while the PMUs are taking their marching orders from Sistani and the Iranians. Everything is copacetic as long as all three share the same agenda. But what can we expect after the IS is defeated? And to add to the confusion, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a man with a few mistakes to his credit, has started to make noise again. In 2014 Maliki attempted to extend his term in office. His effort failed when his own supporters abandoned him. Now Maliki is making waves by claiming that he is responsible for the creation of the PMUs, as opposed to Ali al-Sistani. At a Shi'a tribal gathering on June 13 in the Holy City of Karbala, Maliki claimed that the fall of the Sunni areas of Anbar province was "a Sunni sectarian revolution against the Shiites". Maliki also seems to believe that the fall of Mosul during his term as Prime Minister was a conspiracy brought on by the Mosul Provincial Council and the Kurds! On June 17, Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for a political role for the PMUs in shaping Iraq's future. We are convinced that the Iranians would like to see the PMUs morph into an Iraqi "Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps" (IRGC), and Maliki is just the man to stir up Sunni/Shia rivalries. With Maliki making speeches to enflame the Iraqi Shia, and the ISF unable to successfully combat the IS without the PMUS, the stage is set for a major escalation in Iranian influence in Iraq. And when did all this happen? While Secretary of State John Kerry was negotiating a Nuclear Treaty with Iran, which if approved would end the Iranian sanctions regime. This Administration just can't get enough of making treaties with unreliable governments. The Iranians openly express disrespect and disdain for our way of life and our values; why in the world would be expect them to abide by a treaty with us? As I see it, and as I understand Islam, their disdain for us actually OBLIGATES them to not abide by the restrictions in the treaty. Quel bordel!
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