Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi continues pushing reforms, as 123 senior government officials are sacked.

Links: A. Abadi dismisses 123 senior government officials.
           B. Iraqi Deputy Justice Minister kidnapped.


Iraqi Prime Minister continues to exhibit a tremendous amount of determination and courage, as his administration has announced the dismissal of 123 senior officials from a number of different ministries.  Abadi has stressed that the reform agenda is not political, and has been careful to evenly distribute the dismissals so that one party does not stand out.  It will be interesting to see if the positions are eliminated altogether, or if there will be attempts to refill them in the future.  Abadi is determined to stick to his agenda, regardless of the saber-rattling on behalf of the various militia groups that have announced their opposition to the reforms.  Last week, eighteen Turkish workers were kidnapped in Baghdad while working on a stadium construction project.  Kata'ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades) is strongly suspected of being responsible.  On Tuesday of this week, Iraq's Deputy Justice Minister, Fares Abdul-Karim al-Saadi, was kidnapped in broad daylight, the day after he opened an investigation into alleged human right abuses by militia groups.  Again, Kata'ib Hezbollah is suspected of involvement.  Its obvious that the militias are determined to erode the security in Baghdad, in order to discourage the pro-reform demonstrations and put into question the Abadi administration's ability to protect Iraqi citizens.

The purpose of the efforts at destabilization on behalf of the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) is to scuttle Abadi's attempts at reform.  The reforms intended by Abadi will deprive former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of much of his influence, as many of his supporters are finding their high-level government positions eliminated.  The militias finally decided to become involved when Abadi started pushing his National Guard Law, which would have placed the militias and all similar groups directly under the authority of the Iraqi government.  In other words, if Iran wants to send fighters to help in the struggle against ISIS, then great.  But while they are in Iraq, they come under the authority of Baghdad, not Tehran.  Under pressure from the militias, who claimed that the National Guard Law was a conspiracy of "The United States, the Ba'ath Party, ISIS, and certain Arab countries", the Iraqi Parliament's Council of Representatives dropped the Bill.  Although the Iraqi government claims that it has authority over the militias regardless of the failure of the National Guard Law, the activities of Kata'ib Hezbollah in Baghdad and the Badr Group in Basra, highlight its limited control.

Fortunately, Abadi does not get easily discouraged.  He will continue to push through various aspects of the reform agenda, and do his best to counter-balance the efforts of the militias.  The majority of the members of the militias should be on the battlefield, as Fallujah was basically "assigned" to them.  They appear to have had just as much difficulty with their target as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) have had with Ramadi.  A major military victory at this moment would be very welcome, to unite the Iraqi people in celebration, and remind both pro and anti reform zealots that the real enemy is ISIS.  Hopefully the retaking of Ramadi is within sight.

Security situation in Baghdad deteriorates as militias and opponents of reform demonstrate their level of control.

Links: A. Washington Post editorial on Iraqi reform crisis.
           B. Gunmen kidnap Turkish workers in Baghdad.

We've been following the evolving reform crisis in Iraq since Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly announced his intention to eliminate the office of Vice President.  At the time, that particular office was held by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and it demonstrated from the very beginning that we were witnessing the opening salvo in a political struggle that will determine if Iraq remains politically independent, or becomes a satellite state of Iran.  Abadi was faced with a very difficult decision.  The lauded Anbar Offensive which began in late May was still bogged down outside of Ramadi, and the Iranian-back militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) were engaging the enemy to the northeast, in Fallujah.  Any action which would upset the militias might lead to a withdrawal of their forces, which would undoubtedly compound whatever problems the ISF was having outside Ramadi.  But Abadi had very little room to maneuver with regards to timing.  A popular groundswell of anger, frustration and determination had swept through the capital, and found its way to many of the other Iraqi cities as well.  People were demonstrating for reform and an end to corruption.  Actually, they were demanding it.  Everyday the crowds grew larger in Basra, Baghdad, Baqubah and al-Kut, and they were protesting the endemic nepotism, bribery and outright theft that they believed existed in the Iraqi government.  This movement was supported by the media, who daily would print articles detailing hard-to-believe examples of kick-backs and "skimming" that was prevalent not only in Baghdad, but in the provincial administrations as well.  Abadi needed to take advantage of this public demand for change, and he bargained that the militias wouldn't walk off the battlefield because by doing so they would walk away from their main source of influence and authority.  Abadi was also helped to a great degree by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose open calls for reform were co-opted by Abadi and the reform movement.  Once Abadi started down the road of abolishing offices, eliminating redundancies, and cashiering thieves, he was determined to finish the job.  Those of us on the outside anxiously waited to see how many friends Maliki could still depend on, and how aggressive would the opposition be.

Any hope that Maliki had lost his influence and that the militias would play nice, ended with the Badr Organization's announcement that they would be enforcing the law in Basra and that illegal gatherings (meaning pro-reform demonstrations) would not be allowed.  The government, with its police fighting alongside the army in Anbar, had few law enforcement resources to counter the move by Badr, which certainly succeeded in shutting down the public cacophony from Basra.  The PMUs sided with Maliki in opposition to the reforms.  Simply put, with reforms, the Iranian government saw the potential for a stronger, independent Iraq.  Tehran is intent on creating a Shi'a client state in Iraq, with the militias forming the basis for an Iraqi Republican Guard Corps.  During his term, Maliki proved to be a dependable yes-man for the Iranians, and the militias, even with the majority of their resources in the field fighting ISIS, still controlled large numbers of armed soldiers in every large Iraqi city.  Once the word came down from Tehran, the militias started acting aggressively in opposition to Abadi's reforms.  By making Baghdad more difficult to govern, the militias damage Abadi's credibility and influence.  With the kidnapping last week of eighteen Turkish workers in Baghdad, Abadi's opponents hope to call into question the Abadi Administration's ability to protect foreign nationals in the nation's capital city.  It is strongly suspected that the kidnappings were carried out by Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the more prominent militias.

The militias have the ability to bring the Abadi government down, but in doing so, they risk benefitting ISIS to a great degree.  The militias, with basically unlimited manpower and a steady flow of money and supplies from Iran, can make Basra, Baghdad, Al-Muqdadiyah, Samarra and Nasiriyah buckle to their authority through the simple use of curfews, and the control of water and electricity.  What could the Iraqi government do in response, given that they invited the militias into Iraq to help fight ISIS?  Certainly the government could pull troops back from the front to retake control away from the militias, but you can be sure that ISIS would take quick advantage of that opportunity to solidify their hold on Ramadi and Fallujah, and complete the occupation of Haditha.  Some heave questions remain: how far will the militias go in opposition to Abadi's reforms?  One of the most important new laws dealing with the National Guard and the entire militia issue altogether, has already been scuttled. Not surprisingly, the militias opposed the law, which would have brought them under the authority of the government in Baghdad.  Another important question: how far will Abadi go, and will he try to mobilize the public to protect his reform movement?  The most unfortunate element to this evolving situation is that the only apparent winner at present appears to be ISIS.    

Blame to go around as the Anbar Offensive against ISIS sputters to a halt on the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: The Anbar offensive appears to be failing.

Over the past few weeks, we've scoured news sources coming from Iraq, trying to get an accurate perspective on the offensive in Anbar Province that the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) launched in May.  The offensive operation, which included a simultaneous attack on ISIS-held Fallujah by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), had been planned to the smallest detail and included the training and equipment to deal with remote detonation explosives, booby-traps and urban warfare.  The last few days of May slipped away, then June.  In July, the Iraqi government started hinting that progress was being made, and that bit-by-bit, landmarks on the outskirts of the two cities had been secured.  In July, the government responded to questions about the slow pace of the offensive by reminding the media that the ISF wasn't singularly tasked with removing ISIS from Ramadi; the ISF was also responsible for locating and removing/defusing all the explosives and booby traps being left by ISIS to greet the returning residents of Ramadi.  The Iraqi government added that all the lessons learned from the last ISIS occupation of Ramadi were being considered in the staging of the current offensive.  That explanation sure sounded good to me, especially when the Iraqi government also took the time to thank the coalition air campaign for its accurate and decidedly helpful bombing sorties.  As August started to roll by, I was distracted by ISIS attacks in Diyala Province and the concerns regarding Baiji and Haditha.  Then the government announced its reform agenda, which immediately pushed Ramadi from the front page, and temporarily from my mind.  So we've waded through the reform issue, knowing as we did beforehand that Nouri al-Maliki would call in every marker owed to him to fight off this assault on his power base.  Now that the militias have cast their lot with Maliki, the political battle-lines are drawn.  But with the militias in the mix, we may end up seeing more violence on the streets of Basra than we are seeing on the streets of Ramadi.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's bold moves to reform the Iraqi political system will play out as a backdrop to developments in Anbar.  The Iraqi government's most immediate concern must be the growing impression that ISIS has not only fought off the Anbar offensive, but has started harassing the outlying villages around Baghdad as they had done before.  Iraqi Major General Qasim al-Mohammadi, the head of Anbar Operations Command, is quick with assurances that the offensive is still on track, and that it takes time to clear out every housing cluster, every shop, and every abandoned structure, taking care to remove all unexploded ordinance.  The fact that we've heard this line before doesn't make it any less accurate. From the beginning, our sources stressed that the Iraqi operational plan was built on lessons learned from previous encounters with ISIS.  Also, the Iraqi Army had a serious morale problem that had to be addressed before the Anbar operation.  One of the most frequent complaints was that officers showed indifference to the lives of the frontline troops.  The training modules for the Iraqi Army, including officers, now address that issue.  The slow rate of advance could be a reflection of Iraqi officers being more careful when putting troops in danger.  But Major General al-Mohammadi also expressed frustration with the allied air campaign.  He was very clear, as he was interviewed from his hospital bad after surviving a suicide bomb attack, that the allied air resources are stretched too thin, that there are too many competing targets.  The Pentagon was quick to deny this claim, pointing out that the U.S. spends roughly ten million dollars everyday on the allied air campaign, and that over the last year, coalition warplanes have carried out over four thousand airstrikes in Iraq. 

If history is any indication, then bad news is just around the corner.  Normally, when fingers get pointed, accountability is a no-show, and vital questions remain unanswered, then something is about to fall apart.  We were surprised to learn from the linked Washington Post article that ISIS maintains contact between its Fallujah and Ramadi cells, through the continued existence of a well-known road.  Why hasn't this road been obliterated by airstrikes?  How is it, that after months of news releases from not only the Iraqi government but on occasion by the Pentagon, pointing out the growing encirclement of ISIS units in Ramadi and Fallujah, that we now learn that ISIS forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are not isolated and are actually in regular contact with each other.  Given the ground resources poured into this operation, and the complete lack of heavy armor and very limited use of artillery on behalf of ISIS, how is it that after almost four months, the enemy is still able to re-enforce and re-supply its forces in Ramadi?  What about the F16s delivered to Iraq a few months back- its my understanding that their pilots spent years in the U.S. learning to fly those birds.  So why aren't they out there, bombing the hell out if ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah?  More training?  I know that only four planes are being delivered at a time, but when the enemy has NO air resources and very limited anti-aircraft equipment, I would imagine that those F16s would be out there everyday.  True, they will face the same obstacles as the allied air coalition, including unpredictable weather shifts and sandstorms, so maybe they are out there, doing as much as mother nature will allow.  I hope so.  At the end of the day, I don't see how the Abadi Administration can survive a failure of this magnitude.  A crippled government may be the smallest problem, though, as ISIS appears to be ready in a moments notice, to jump back on the offensive.

The Shi'a militias line up in opposition to reforms in Iraq, threaten to disperse demonstrators in Basra with bullets.

Link: Voice Of America considers the impact of reforms in Iraq.

In the last few days, a line in the sand has been drawn in Iraq, between those who support anti-corruption initiatives and government reform, and those who are in opposition.  A number of Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) have come out in opposition to the reforms being introduced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  Former Iraqi Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, who exerts a fair amount of influence with the militias, was schedule to lose his job, as the elimination of the position of Vice President was one of the more prominent features of Abadi's reform package.  The reforms are designed to tackle redundancy in various Iraqi Ministries, which would negatively impact Maliki's political party and his overall position of authority.  Abadi did not invent the issue of reform; in the past few months, the Iraqi people have begun to mobilize and demonstrate in every large city, calling for an end to government corruption and the passage of legitimate, effective reform.  The media in Iraq has had a field day highlighting the countless instances of corruption within the Maliki Administration.  Probably the most prolific and often-discussed example was the creation of a 55,000-strong "ghost army" within the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Maliki's government began paying the salaries of 55,000 soldiers who didn't in fact exist.  The money was graft and was spread around to various military officers in an effort to bolster Maliki's support within the military.  Maliki didn't invent corruption in Iraq; much of the waste and bribery that occurred during his administration was just a repeat of business-as-usual during the days of the Ba'ath Party.  Maliki insisted that anyone who was appointed to a useful position in the government must by loyal to him and his political party.  This rule crippled some Iraqi Ministries, as persons with no experience or knowledge about their particular job, found themselves in charge.

Maliki eventually was replaced by Abadi, who seems determined to succeed in his effort to clean up the government and isolate Maliki altogether.  Abadi appeared to have caught some head-wind, with the support of the Council of Representatives in Parliament, and the backing of the huge crowds of demonstrators that continued to choke the downtown areas of Baghdad and Basra. Both Shi'a and Sunni Iraqis were in approval of his reform efforts.  The Abadi Administration made efforts to explain the importance of proceeding with caution with regards to the Ramadi Offensive, because it was also necessary to locate and destroy all the booby-traps and bombs that ISIS had left to greet the returning civilians.  The people seemed to accept the need for patience, even as ISIS continued his campaign of SVBIEDS and VBIEDS in all the provinces surrounding the capital.  Abadi can even count the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'a population, as an ally.  Maliki seemed to be unstoppable, although behind the scenes, we all were whispering about the level of Maliki's influence with Iran and the militias.  During his administration, the relationship was at times strained, at least with certain groups, including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which had trouble trusting Maliki because of his ties to the United Kingdom and the United States.  In the last few days, though, it has become apparent that the militias have come out united in support of Maliki and opposed to Abadi's reform agenda.  Although the militia movement does not have the opportunity to impact the reform issue at the ballot box, they have no problem intimidating people from the end of a machine gun.

One of Abadi's targets in the reform campaign was the Iraqi judiciary.  Historically rife with bribery and the target of countless complaints, , Abadi saw an opportunity to appease the masses and also push along the reform agenda.  Medhat al-Mahmud, the head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council and the first and current Chief Justice of Iraq, is an ally of Maliki, probably only because he wants to keep Abadi from cleaning out Iraq's Judicial Council, so to speak.  Mahmud has been quite fortunate over the past decade, presiding over the creation of the Iraqi Judiciary, then finding himself as its first Chief Justice.  This position has given him tremendous influence and made him a rich man.  Under Mahmud's watch, the Judiciary was subject to no other authority, although the Constitution calls for oversight by Parliament.  Abadi's reforms have made Medhat al-Mahmud and the Shi'a militias strange bedfellows, as the expression goes.  Interestingly enough, the head of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, met with Iraqi President Fuad Masum on August 25, and asked Masum not to finalize the Iraqi Parliament Council of Representative's decision to eliminate Maliki's Vice Presidential post.  We don't often speak of Fuad Masum because his job is usually ceremonial, but every avenue is being used to thwart the reform movement.  There has been no indication that Masum would give in to the request of Khazali, but the issue has yet to be resolved.

Now that the players are in place, the real struggle over the future of reform will begin.  The anti-reform side does not have numbers in its favor, so it will resort to other means to sabotage the reform agenda.  Already, the militias have announced in Basra that any protests or demonstrations were illegal and would be met with an aggressive response from the militias.  Business as usual for those guys, I assume.  We can expect the militias to use whatever is necessary to intimidate the opposition and scuttle the reform agenda.  This development could impact the military situation, as the militias have been vital to the efforts in Anbar Province.

Iraqi parliament blames loss of Mosul to ISIS on Maliki; ISF making slow progress in its operations to retake Ramadi.

Links: A. Maliki to blame for loss of Mosul to ISIS.
           B. Operation to retake Ramadi continues.

On Monday, an Iraqi Parliamentary panel recommended that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki face trial regarding his actions during the ISIS operation to take Mosul last year.  In particular, the panel pointed out that Maliki fanned sectarian tensions, which encouraged many Iraqi Sunnis in Mosul to welcome ISIS.  The panel's recommendation comes on the heels of another administrative shake-up in the government, as Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi eliminated eleven ministerial posts, reducing the size of the cabinet by a third.  Last week, Abadi proposed the elimination of the offices of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President, currently held my Maliki.  Abadi's efforts to slim-down the Iraqi government are an effort to eliminate redundancy and corruption, as the country continues to experience protests in all the major cities.  Instead of attacking one political party or the other, these protests are focused on changing the mindset of Iraqi politics, and ending the tradition of patronage, bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption that have long been part of all levels of government.  The focus isn't singularly on the cabinet level positions, as calls are made for changes in provincial and local governmental structure as well.  Abadi is prudent to respond with examples of real reform, as up to now the proposed changes will only strengthen the position of President.  The Iraqi political system has complicated government efforts to recruit, train and deploy troops, as each separate province looks to redefine its own authority.

There has been little news from Ramadi in recent days, as questions are raised about the probability of success in the operation.  The Iraqi Security Forces, which include the Army and the Police, have been careful to consolidate gains and search for booby traps before deciding to push forward.  In the past, initial successes have been followed up by a number of high-casualty incidents involving booby traps and other explosives.  The ISF and its allies in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) vastly outnumber the ISIS fighters in Ramadi and Fallujah.  Some estimates have the total number of ISIS personnel in Anbar Province to be less than 10,000.  ISIS multiplies its effectiveness through unconventional warfare, especially the use of SVBIEDS- suicide vehicular bombs/improvised explosive device.  Again, the effort to retake Ramadi and Fallujah, and also consolidate its position in Baiji, includes the methodical inspection of all vehicles, to prevent an SVBIED attack from succeeding.  The detailed, organized approach to this offensive may be an indication that the Iraqi leaders intend to push ISIS out of Anbar Province completely.  The events of the next week will be a strong indication of just how much progress has been made.  Keep in mind, ISIS continues to press home its attacks on Haditha, whose fall would be a serious blow to the Iraqi Sunni community, if not necessarily strategically important.