Security situation in Baghdad deteriorates as militias and opponents of reform demonstrate their level of control.

Links: A. Washington Post editorial on Iraqi reform crisis.
           B. Gunmen kidnap Turkish workers in Baghdad.

We've been following the evolving reform crisis in Iraq since Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi publicly announced his intention to eliminate the office of Vice President.  At the time, that particular office was held by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and it demonstrated from the very beginning that we were witnessing the opening salvo in a political struggle that will determine if Iraq remains politically independent, or becomes a satellite state of Iran.  Abadi was faced with a very difficult decision.  The lauded Anbar Offensive which began in late May was still bogged down outside of Ramadi, and the Iranian-back militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) were engaging the enemy to the northeast, in Fallujah.  Any action which would upset the militias might lead to a withdrawal of their forces, which would undoubtedly compound whatever problems the ISF was having outside Ramadi.  But Abadi had very little room to maneuver with regards to timing.  A popular groundswell of anger, frustration and determination had swept through the capital, and found its way to many of the other Iraqi cities as well.  People were demonstrating for reform and an end to corruption.  Actually, they were demanding it.  Everyday the crowds grew larger in Basra, Baghdad, Baqubah and al-Kut, and they were protesting the endemic nepotism, bribery and outright theft that they believed existed in the Iraqi government.  This movement was supported by the media, who daily would print articles detailing hard-to-believe examples of kick-backs and "skimming" that was prevalent not only in Baghdad, but in the provincial administrations as well.  Abadi needed to take advantage of this public demand for change, and he bargained that the militias wouldn't walk off the battlefield because by doing so they would walk away from their main source of influence and authority.  Abadi was also helped to a great degree by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose open calls for reform were co-opted by Abadi and the reform movement.  Once Abadi started down the road of abolishing offices, eliminating redundancies, and cashiering thieves, he was determined to finish the job.  Those of us on the outside anxiously waited to see how many friends Maliki could still depend on, and how aggressive would the opposition be.

Any hope that Maliki had lost his influence and that the militias would play nice, ended with the Badr Organization's announcement that they would be enforcing the law in Basra and that illegal gatherings (meaning pro-reform demonstrations) would not be allowed.  The government, with its police fighting alongside the army in Anbar, had few law enforcement resources to counter the move by Badr, which certainly succeeded in shutting down the public cacophony from Basra.  The PMUs sided with Maliki in opposition to the reforms.  Simply put, with reforms, the Iranian government saw the potential for a stronger, independent Iraq.  Tehran is intent on creating a Shi'a client state in Iraq, with the militias forming the basis for an Iraqi Republican Guard Corps.  During his term, Maliki proved to be a dependable yes-man for the Iranians, and the militias, even with the majority of their resources in the field fighting ISIS, still controlled large numbers of armed soldiers in every large Iraqi city.  Once the word came down from Tehran, the militias started acting aggressively in opposition to Abadi's reforms.  By making Baghdad more difficult to govern, the militias damage Abadi's credibility and influence.  With the kidnapping last week of eighteen Turkish workers in Baghdad, Abadi's opponents hope to call into question the Abadi Administration's ability to protect foreign nationals in the nation's capital city.  It is strongly suspected that the kidnappings were carried out by Kata'ib Hezbollah, one of the more prominent militias.

The militias have the ability to bring the Abadi government down, but in doing so, they risk benefitting ISIS to a great degree.  The militias, with basically unlimited manpower and a steady flow of money and supplies from Iran, can make Basra, Baghdad, Al-Muqdadiyah, Samarra and Nasiriyah buckle to their authority through the simple use of curfews, and the control of water and electricity.  What could the Iraqi government do in response, given that they invited the militias into Iraq to help fight ISIS?  Certainly the government could pull troops back from the front to retake control away from the militias, but you can be sure that ISIS would take quick advantage of that opportunity to solidify their hold on Ramadi and Fallujah, and complete the occupation of Haditha.  Some heave questions remain: how far will the militias go in opposition to Abadi's reforms?  One of the most important new laws dealing with the National Guard and the entire militia issue altogether, has already been scuttled. Not surprisingly, the militias opposed the law, which would have brought them under the authority of the government in Baghdad.  Another important question: how far will Abadi go, and will he try to mobilize the public to protect his reform movement?  The most unfortunate element to this evolving situation is that the only apparent winner at present appears to be ISIS.    

The Shi'a militias line up in opposition to reforms in Iraq, threaten to disperse demonstrators in Basra with bullets.

Link: Voice Of America considers the impact of reforms in Iraq.

In the last few days, a line in the sand has been drawn in Iraq, between those who support anti-corruption initiatives and government reform, and those who are in opposition.  A number of Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) have come out in opposition to the reforms being introduced by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  Former Iraqi Prime Minister and current Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, who exerts a fair amount of influence with the militias, was schedule to lose his job, as the elimination of the position of Vice President was one of the more prominent features of Abadi's reform package.  The reforms are designed to tackle redundancy in various Iraqi Ministries, which would negatively impact Maliki's political party and his overall position of authority.  Abadi did not invent the issue of reform; in the past few months, the Iraqi people have begun to mobilize and demonstrate in every large city, calling for an end to government corruption and the passage of legitimate, effective reform.  The media in Iraq has had a field day highlighting the countless instances of corruption within the Maliki Administration.  Probably the most prolific and often-discussed example was the creation of a 55,000-strong "ghost army" within the Iraqi Armed Forces.  Maliki's government began paying the salaries of 55,000 soldiers who didn't in fact exist.  The money was graft and was spread around to various military officers in an effort to bolster Maliki's support within the military.  Maliki didn't invent corruption in Iraq; much of the waste and bribery that occurred during his administration was just a repeat of business-as-usual during the days of the Ba'ath Party.  Maliki insisted that anyone who was appointed to a useful position in the government must by loyal to him and his political party.  This rule crippled some Iraqi Ministries, as persons with no experience or knowledge about their particular job, found themselves in charge.

Maliki eventually was replaced by Abadi, who seems determined to succeed in his effort to clean up the government and isolate Maliki altogether.  Abadi appeared to have caught some head-wind, with the support of the Council of Representatives in Parliament, and the backing of the huge crowds of demonstrators that continued to choke the downtown areas of Baghdad and Basra. Both Shi'a and Sunni Iraqis were in approval of his reform efforts.  The Abadi Administration made efforts to explain the importance of proceeding with caution with regards to the Ramadi Offensive, because it was also necessary to locate and destroy all the booby-traps and bombs that ISIS had left to greet the returning civilians.  The people seemed to accept the need for patience, even as ISIS continued his campaign of SVBIEDS and VBIEDS in all the provinces surrounding the capital.  Abadi can even count the Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, spiritual leader of Iraq's Shi'a population, as an ally.  Maliki seemed to be unstoppable, although behind the scenes, we all were whispering about the level of Maliki's influence with Iran and the militias.  During his administration, the relationship was at times strained, at least with certain groups, including the Badr Organization and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which had trouble trusting Maliki because of his ties to the United Kingdom and the United States.  In the last few days, though, it has become apparent that the militias have come out united in support of Maliki and opposed to Abadi's reform agenda.  Although the militia movement does not have the opportunity to impact the reform issue at the ballot box, they have no problem intimidating people from the end of a machine gun.

One of Abadi's targets in the reform campaign was the Iraqi judiciary.  Historically rife with bribery and the target of countless complaints, , Abadi saw an opportunity to appease the masses and also push along the reform agenda.  Medhat al-Mahmud, the head of the Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council and the first and current Chief Justice of Iraq, is an ally of Maliki, probably only because he wants to keep Abadi from cleaning out Iraq's Judicial Council, so to speak.  Mahmud has been quite fortunate over the past decade, presiding over the creation of the Iraqi Judiciary, then finding himself as its first Chief Justice.  This position has given him tremendous influence and made him a rich man.  Under Mahmud's watch, the Judiciary was subject to no other authority, although the Constitution calls for oversight by Parliament.  Abadi's reforms have made Medhat al-Mahmud and the Shi'a militias strange bedfellows, as the expression goes.  Interestingly enough, the head of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Qais al-Khazali, met with Iraqi President Fuad Masum on August 25, and asked Masum not to finalize the Iraqi Parliament Council of Representative's decision to eliminate Maliki's Vice Presidential post.  We don't often speak of Fuad Masum because his job is usually ceremonial, but every avenue is being used to thwart the reform movement.  There has been no indication that Masum would give in to the request of Khazali, but the issue has yet to be resolved.

Now that the players are in place, the real struggle over the future of reform will begin.  The anti-reform side does not have numbers in its favor, so it will resort to other means to sabotage the reform agenda.  Already, the militias have announced in Basra that any protests or demonstrations were illegal and would be met with an aggressive response from the militias.  Business as usual for those guys, I assume.  We can expect the militias to use whatever is necessary to intimidate the opposition and scuttle the reform agenda.  This development could impact the military situation, as the militias have been vital to the efforts in Anbar Province.

Thoughts on the Nuclear Treaty with Iraq and partisanship in general.

Link: Netanyahu voices concern over removal of sanctions.

Ever year our nation seems to become more politically partisan, with everyone claiming to be independent, but Independent candidates getting no traction whatsoever.  No doubt if an Independent (meaning not Democrat, Republican, or Libertarian) candidate arrived on the scene who had Donald Trump's bank account, we might see a very competitive election.  But the system is built to support the two existing parties and the established methods for raising campaign funds.  Independent candidates can never expect to come close to raising the kind of money that a serious Republican or Democrat can.  Aside from that fact, we don't believe an Independent candidate would be representative of the United States electorate, anyways.  In 2015, we are an opinionated nation, and people feel very strongly about the validity of their perspectives.  w guess we're no different.  When we hear someone expressing an opposite viewpoint, we do my best to give them a fair shake. But at the end of the day, after almost half-a-century on this planet, we have confidence in our opinions.  And something important we've learned along the way: don't get mouthy and loud about issues in which you have no knowledge or experience.  Here at "Mukhabarat, Baby!", we have made a point to avoid posting opinionated commentaries regarding the United States economy.  Sure, we have opinions, but I'm not an economist.  I do, however, consider myself to be knowledgeable on issues of diplomacy and foreign policy.  Some readers may consider our site to be partisan,  but you can be sure that we support our positions with evidence.

I recently read an article which introduced ten retired U.S. Army Generals who had come out in support of the Obama Administration's Nuclear Treaty with Iran.  Its our understanding that the United States Army has hundreds of certified, true Generals among us, the vast majority of them retired.  Something tells me, that if I made a bit of an effort (and you know, to protect this president, the media would make the effort), I could round up ten Generals who believe that the Reptilian People live amongst us.  In other words, finding ten Generals to agree on something doesn't get you very far, especially when we are considering something as patently awful as this Treaty.  The three issues that bother me the most about this treaty have nothing to do with the controversial subject of nuclear proliferation.

My first complaint has to do with a handful of U.S. citizens that are currently locked away in Iranian prisons.  Not surprisingly, each one is being accused of having insulted Islam, being an enemy of the Islamic Republic, or a spy for the Zionists, or just a plain spy, period.  The charges are bogus; they are in jail because they are U.S. citizens, and the Iranians thought that they might come in handy someday as bargaining chips of some sort.  Normally, given the seriousness of the negotiations between the United States and Iran, you would have expected U.S. negotiators to have tried tooth-and-nail to make the release of our citizens part of any agreed-upon treaty.  Can you believe that this president was so obsessed with the issue of his legacy that he allowed the Iranians to remove the subject of the prisoners/hostages from the negotiations, without the slightest complaint?  How can a sitting U.S. president agree to a treaty with a foreign power that holds U.S. citizens in its jails, as hostages?  The Administration has gone on record stating that the charges against the prisoners are false, and yet they were forsaken.  What if that were your parent, or your sister, sitting in that Iranian jail?  I wonder if they had promised to vote Democrat in the next election, if he might have tried a bit harder to have them included........

My second complaint: what steps has Iran taken that justify the lifting of weapons sanctions?  A nation EARNS removal from a weapons embargo, at least that's the way it's been up to now.  Does Iran continue to financially support terror groups around the world?  Absolutely, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen (dumping the Houthis in with Hezbollah is a bit of a stretch...we ask your indulgence).  Iran also provides tremendously important support to the flailing regime of Bashir al-Assad in Syria.  Where else does Iran export weapons and warfare?  Iraq is a good example; the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), which have become so important in the struggle against ISIS in Iraq, include the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah.  Each group is trained and supplied by Iran.  As for the Iranian Armed Forces, they are in serious need of updated materials.  The Iranian Air Force is still flying a combination of ancient U.S.-made F5s (from the days of the Shah), and Migs that it stole from Iraq during the initial Gulf War.  And unlike the Chinese, Indians, Israelis and South Africans, the Iranians have had little success utilizing older equipment, and creating an indigenous weapon by incorporating home-grown innovations and technologies.  The Iranians need radar, jets, bombers, cargo planes, tanks, armored personnel carriers, computerized targeting equipment, missiles, and artillery, and their navy needs submarines and frigates.  Luckily, the economic sanctions will make it difficult for Iran to go on a shopping spree, now that the weapons-sanctions have been lifted.  Wait....ALL sanctions are being lifted, aren't they?  That means billions of dollars for Iran to buy what it wants.  And once the Saudis and the U.A.E. realize that Iran is not only closer to a nuclear weapon, but that they are modernizing their Armed Forces as well, we will see a nice little arms race develop in the Persian Gulf.  Its not Rocket Science, folks.

For all practical purposes, our last major complaint has already been covered.  We believe that the Iranians should have been obliged to disavow the exportation of terror and the support of terrorist groups.  It may have been just show, but at least we could make them look a bit foolish on an international stage.  In reality, Iran should have been required to limit its aid to groups like Hezbollah and the Houthis to strictly humanitarian goods.  In the end, nothing was asked of Iran.  They were not asked to disavow terror, and they were not asked to dismantle certain facilities in Iran whose sole function is the processing of weapons-grade nuclear material.  They were asked to halt all research into nuclear weapons-related projects, and to permit regular inspections.  The Iranians refused to agree to the inspections, until Secretary of State John Kerry took a knife and severed the last set of balls that existed in this treaty, which was the option for unannounced inspections.  What did Kerry agree to instead?  The inspectors must request the opportunity to inspect each respective site, and that request must be made three weeks in advance of the actual inspection.  To add to the absurdity, the Iranians reserved the right to DENY the request.  In truth, what would we do?  If the Iranians said, "we don't give you permission to inspect that particular site", would we automatically re-apply the sanctions?  Would be take back the money that would have poured into Iran by then?  And what about all the new upgraded military hardware....do you think they will return it, no questions asked?

Previously, we were convinced that the 2010 New Start Treaty was the worst treaty ever negotiated by a U.S. Secretary of State.  John Kerry has proved us wrong, and in the same administration, no less. 

Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.

Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
           B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
           C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.

In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks.  On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people.  ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned.  All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage.  Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late.  People are very enterprising.  In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine.  Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand.  If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill.  ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.

No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces.  Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now.  In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use.  As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal.  ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah.  From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals.  They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance.  On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University.  However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself.  By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.

On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament.  Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement.  All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best.  Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations.  Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS.  As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling.  We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best.  Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi?  Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks?  What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month?  Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?

We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah.  No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases.  Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate.  The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.

Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.

The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies.  In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi.  With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive.  Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.

as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province.  By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege.  The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province.  To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives.  One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS.  While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad.  ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself.  ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.

In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community.  Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support.  The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.

Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK.  Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list.  What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments.  Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass.  I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power.  Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support".  Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?