Iraqi military and special police preparing assault to retake Ramadi.

Link: Iraqi government forces close in on Ramadi.


With recent events in Syria and Paris dominating the international press, the Iraqi government's much-publicized offensive to retake Ramadi is no longer front-page news.  Actually, the struggle to retake Ramadi has taken much longer than the government and the Iraqi people expected.  Combat around Baiji and in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq have made for much more interesting journalism, as the average person begins to consider that the Ramadi campaign has become a stalemate.  Fortunately, in the last few days, news reports from the Iraqi government and the Pentagon indicate that the Iraqi Armed Forces are getting very close to recapturing the capital city of Anbar Province.  It is estimated that ISIS has roughly 600 to 1000 fighters still hunkered down in the few downtown neighborhoods that government forces have yet to reoccupy.  The fact that the Iraqi government is determined to complete this operation according to plan, with minimal casualties and damage to infrastructure, is very encouraging.  Its true that the campaign to retake the city has not followed the most ideal timetable, but the Iraqi authorities have been able to carefully search areas formally occupied by ISIS, in order to remove any improvised explosive devices or abandoned munitions.

Last Wednesday, Iraqi forces took possession of the Palestine Bridge in the northwest part of the city.  The bridge, which spans the Euphrates River, was a vital link to food and other supplies for ISIS.  The coalition air campaign continues to harass ISIS by strafing supply routes and bombing key defensive positions.  In fact, air support has proven particularly effective in destroying explosives that were purposely planted in abandoned structures in the downtown part of the city.  Aggressive action by the coalition air support has been instrumental in saving the lives of ground troops, as explosives disposal teams prepare to enter neighborhoods that have been cleared of ISIS snipers.  Iraqi authorities fully expect the remaining ISIS operatives to fight to the death.

Once the military campaign to liberate Ramadi is complete, the Iraqi military will focus on bringing relief to Haditha, which although occupied by Iraqi forces, has been under assault by ISIS for most of the year.  In recent weeks, coalition air attacks have successfully targeted ISIS positions and prevented the delivery of supplies to ISIS operatives near Haditha.  Al-Asad Air Base in outside of Haditha, and presents a valuable target for ISIS.  U.S. troops have been present at Al-Asad for some time, providing important training to Iraqi personnel.  For some inexplicable reason, the Obama Administration made no attempt to keep this particular bit of information confidential.  Once the international media got wind of the presence of U.S. troops at Al-Asad, ISIS wasn't far behind.  Can you imagine if ISIS were to overrun that base and take our young men and women prisoner?  Fortunately, recent combat in the Haditha area has severely compromised ISIS' ability to conduct offensive activity.  No doubt the Iraqis are also determined to remove ISIS from Fallujah, which sits northeast of Ramadi and is actually closer to Baghdad (as the crow flies).  The various Shi'a militias were more-or-less assigned the task of retaking Fallujah, while the Iraqi Regular Army and Special Police targeted Ramadi.  At various times over the past six months, it appeared that Fallujah would fall first.  The fact that Ramadi will indeed be reoccupied by government forces before the Iranian-backed militias have removed ISIS from Fallujah will be celebrated in Baghdad, where the populace has begun to voice its annoyance at what is perceived to be Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs.

Blame to go around as the Anbar Offensive against ISIS sputters to a halt on the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: The Anbar offensive appears to be failing.

Over the past few weeks, we've scoured news sources coming from Iraq, trying to get an accurate perspective on the offensive in Anbar Province that the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) launched in May.  The offensive operation, which included a simultaneous attack on ISIS-held Fallujah by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), had been planned to the smallest detail and included the training and equipment to deal with remote detonation explosives, booby-traps and urban warfare.  The last few days of May slipped away, then June.  In July, the Iraqi government started hinting that progress was being made, and that bit-by-bit, landmarks on the outskirts of the two cities had been secured.  In July, the government responded to questions about the slow pace of the offensive by reminding the media that the ISF wasn't singularly tasked with removing ISIS from Ramadi; the ISF was also responsible for locating and removing/defusing all the explosives and booby traps being left by ISIS to greet the returning residents of Ramadi.  The Iraqi government added that all the lessons learned from the last ISIS occupation of Ramadi were being considered in the staging of the current offensive.  That explanation sure sounded good to me, especially when the Iraqi government also took the time to thank the coalition air campaign for its accurate and decidedly helpful bombing sorties.  As August started to roll by, I was distracted by ISIS attacks in Diyala Province and the concerns regarding Baiji and Haditha.  Then the government announced its reform agenda, which immediately pushed Ramadi from the front page, and temporarily from my mind.  So we've waded through the reform issue, knowing as we did beforehand that Nouri al-Maliki would call in every marker owed to him to fight off this assault on his power base.  Now that the militias have cast their lot with Maliki, the political battle-lines are drawn.  But with the militias in the mix, we may end up seeing more violence on the streets of Basra than we are seeing on the streets of Ramadi.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's bold moves to reform the Iraqi political system will play out as a backdrop to developments in Anbar.  The Iraqi government's most immediate concern must be the growing impression that ISIS has not only fought off the Anbar offensive, but has started harassing the outlying villages around Baghdad as they had done before.  Iraqi Major General Qasim al-Mohammadi, the head of Anbar Operations Command, is quick with assurances that the offensive is still on track, and that it takes time to clear out every housing cluster, every shop, and every abandoned structure, taking care to remove all unexploded ordinance.  The fact that we've heard this line before doesn't make it any less accurate. From the beginning, our sources stressed that the Iraqi operational plan was built on lessons learned from previous encounters with ISIS.  Also, the Iraqi Army had a serious morale problem that had to be addressed before the Anbar operation.  One of the most frequent complaints was that officers showed indifference to the lives of the frontline troops.  The training modules for the Iraqi Army, including officers, now address that issue.  The slow rate of advance could be a reflection of Iraqi officers being more careful when putting troops in danger.  But Major General al-Mohammadi also expressed frustration with the allied air campaign.  He was very clear, as he was interviewed from his hospital bad after surviving a suicide bomb attack, that the allied air resources are stretched too thin, that there are too many competing targets.  The Pentagon was quick to deny this claim, pointing out that the U.S. spends roughly ten million dollars everyday on the allied air campaign, and that over the last year, coalition warplanes have carried out over four thousand airstrikes in Iraq. 

If history is any indication, then bad news is just around the corner.  Normally, when fingers get pointed, accountability is a no-show, and vital questions remain unanswered, then something is about to fall apart.  We were surprised to learn from the linked Washington Post article that ISIS maintains contact between its Fallujah and Ramadi cells, through the continued existence of a well-known road.  Why hasn't this road been obliterated by airstrikes?  How is it, that after months of news releases from not only the Iraqi government but on occasion by the Pentagon, pointing out the growing encirclement of ISIS units in Ramadi and Fallujah, that we now learn that ISIS forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are not isolated and are actually in regular contact with each other.  Given the ground resources poured into this operation, and the complete lack of heavy armor and very limited use of artillery on behalf of ISIS, how is it that after almost four months, the enemy is still able to re-enforce and re-supply its forces in Ramadi?  What about the F16s delivered to Iraq a few months back- its my understanding that their pilots spent years in the U.S. learning to fly those birds.  So why aren't they out there, bombing the hell out if ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah?  More training?  I know that only four planes are being delivered at a time, but when the enemy has NO air resources and very limited anti-aircraft equipment, I would imagine that those F16s would be out there everyday.  True, they will face the same obstacles as the allied air coalition, including unpredictable weather shifts and sandstorms, so maybe they are out there, doing as much as mother nature will allow.  I hope so.  At the end of the day, I don't see how the Abadi Administration can survive a failure of this magnitude.  A crippled government may be the smallest problem, though, as ISIS appears to be ready in a moments notice, to jump back on the offensive.

Block by block, Iraqi forces begin to dislodge ISIS from the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: ISIS kills two Iraqi generals in separate attacks on the same day outside Ramadi.


Everyday brings more news from Iraq regarding both the military situation in Anbar Province, and political developments generated by the reforms of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.  The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that are presently engaging ISIS in Ramadi, consist of Iraqi Army units, specialized police, and members of various Sunni militias, and they are pressuring ISIS forces from both the east and the west.  For all practical purposes, ISIS is hemmed in, and the regular use by ISIS of SVBIEDs is an indication that the ISF has penetrated ISIS' exterior line of defense.  In a somewhat urban setting like the outlying neighborhoods of Ramadi, which consist of some low-level residences and businesses, and also four and five story structures, ISIS will utilize snipers and ambushes at every opportunity.  At this stage, ISIS is both unwilling and unable to engage the ISF in a conventional battle; the use of SVBIEDs and VBIEDs are ISIS' usual modus operandi, because they do not have the numbers or the equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, mobile artillery, etc.) to confront the enemy in a conventional fashion.  Besides, ISIS believes civilian casualties are worth more than military deaths on the battlefield.  Civilian deaths terrorize the population, making it difficult for the government to administer.  People try to flee the area, which clogs up the transportation network and creates more opportunities for SVBIEDs with greater casualties.  Civilian casualties can also lead to pressure on the government to compromise (see Ukraine).  All in all, ISIS will always want to encourage destabilization in areas occupied by its enemies; destabilization distracts the enemy from what should be the primary goal: the destruction of ISIS.  The ISF appears to have played this one properly from the beginning of the offensive in July.  Almost as soon as the offensive to retake Anbar was announced, ISIS began an SVBIED campaign in Diyala Province, later to extend to Salad ad-Din.  As further means of distraction, ISIS stepped up efforts to seize Haditha, and also turned the heat up on Baiji.  The Provincial Administrations began screaming for military help, demanding that the ISF return provincial soldiers who were part of the Anbar Offensive (playing into ISIS' hands).  Credit goes to the Iraqi government and the military High Command for not budging, and staying on course regarding the long-term strategic goals of the offensive.

Now that the battle for Ramadi has started to focus on neighborhoods and other urban areas, including industrial sites, universities, and hospitals, ISIS will continue to make use of SVBIEDs, but the ISF will be forced to go building to building, block to block, all the while being harassed by snipers.  The ISF has gone down this road before, clearing out Ramadi once before, but it appears that ISIS has booby-trapped and mined everything short of the cockroaches.  This is where the Army bomb-squads and the specially trained police units will prove most valuable.  With Ramadi being squeezed on all sides, it is unlikely that ISIS will be able to resupply or reinforce its forces.  The question remains, how long will the ISIS fighters hold out?  Are they as determined as the last bunch were, to die firing an AK-47?  The ISF will certainly accommodate, but it would be great to see the remaining defenders surrender en masse.  It would send a message to all who fight for ISIS, that it isn't necessary to give up your life for the cause.  Inevitably, if fewer ISIS fight to the death, then fewer Iraqi soldiers die as well.

The news from Fallujah has been sparse as of late.  The Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) that have been tightening the noose on ISIS in Fallujah, have been not surprisingly less-accessible to the press.  But ISIS has its hands full in Fallujah as well; will Fallujah fall before Ramadi?  If ISIS in both towns decides to fight to the bitter end, the clean-up operation will take some time.  You can bet that the ISF will not rest on its laurels, as Haditha is next in line for a house-cleaning.  This last week, ISF units in Haditha actually took to the offensive, clearing out ISIS from the outlying sub-district of Baghdadi.  Again, the allied air support has been on-target and very welcome in the last month, as the current situation appears to favor the ISF and its allies.  But we have been lulled into a false sense of optimism before.  ISIS can rebound from defeats like no military organization we have seen.  In fact, its very construction allows it to recover quickly from setbacks, like an animal that has its foot caught in a trap.  ISIS will chew off the foot, and regrow it later on its own schedule.  ISIS occupied Ramadi once before, only to lose it, and re-occupy it again.  One of the keys to ISIS success is its mobility and the apparent self-sufficiency of its units.  ISIS has a presence in every Iraqi Province, even though it does not have a guaranteed method of resupplying and reinforcing those units.  It is up to the units, which are purposely small, to equip themselves from the enemy, or to put themselves into position to be re-equipped.  What makes ISIS so dangerous is its ability to adapt, because we have seen ISIS fight conventional battles in Syria and in northern Iraq.  At different times in 2013 and 2014, ISIS captured all sorts of heavy military equipment from the Iraqi Army.  Previously, ISIS had captured a Syrian Air Force Base, with Migs sitting on the runway, fueled-up and ready to go.  We don't know what ISIS has done with all of the military booty that it has collected, although a good deal has been destroyed from coalition air attacks.  At the end of the day, ISIS is a very dangerous enemy; it can sneak up on you in the desert and it can give you hell fighting street-to-street.  We are very encouraged by the recent disciplined and united approach that the ISF and the PMUs are presenting as they methodically pound away at ISIS positions.

The Iraqi Parliament Council of Representatives have approved Speaker Salim al-Juburi's reforms, which were introduced on 11 August alongside Prime Minister Abadi's reform package.  On August 27, the Council of Representatives passed the Political Parties Law, which bans political parties from receiving foreign funding and maintaining paramilitary wings.  No doubt the later of the restrictions will be met with strong opposition by a number of the Shi'a parties, who are inseparable from particular militias.  The reform wave has also attempted to sweep up the Iraqi judiciary, but the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Mehdat al-Mahmoud, an ally of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, vigorously defended its integrity.  Mahmoud has some clout, and he will certainly attempt to keep some level of influence in government for Maliki and his supporters.  Whether or not he will be able to keep the Iraqi Judiciary reform-free is another question altogether.

Abadi encouraging continued anti-corruption, pro-reform demonstrations.

Link: Abadi serious about reforming Iraqi government.

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has made it obvious that his attempts at reforming the Iraqi government aren't limited to sacking a few corrupt ministers and eliminating a redundant post or two.  Abadi is determined to reshape the government, and in doing so, will no doubt strengthen his own political base.  At the moment, Abadi is controlling the conversation, and has yet to meet with any focused opposition.  On 21-22 August, the Babil Provincial Government imposed a curfew to frustrate the efforts of demonstrators.  Abadi promptly ordered the Babil Operations Command to cancel the curfew, and ordered the Iraqi Army to provide security for the crowd.  Abadi has carefully maneuvered around a number of political minefields, as he plays the demonstrators off against his political rivals.  But Abadi has to be careful not to be lulled into a false sense of security.  As of today, popular and sometimes reactionary Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his followers (practically the entire population of the huge Shi'a slum to the northeast of Baghdad known as "Sadr City") to participate in Friday's anti-corruption demonstration in central Baghdad.  But Sadr has always been a wildcard, at times proving difficult even for his Iranian handlers to control.  Most political analysts are supportive of the Abadi reforms; the Iraqi government that evolved out of the ashes of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party was often ineffectual, redundant and practically encouraged corruption.  So far, every step taken by Abadi will simplify the governing process, increase accountability, and safe money.  But when a government makes changes that result in financial savings, then someone isn't getting their "take".  The functionaries, civil servants and politicians who have made a living sucking on the teat of Iraqi corruption, will no doubt attempt to thwart Abadi, and opportunities to cause problems are plentiful.

The planned demonstration in central Baghdad on Friday, 28 August, will be the largest demonstration yet.  Not only will the Iraqi Police and related security forces have their hands full keeping ISIS SVBIEDs from crashing this party, but the potential for conflict between political groups is also a serious concern.  Sadr's people and the folks from Ahl-al Haq (League of the Righteous) may be protesting corruption together, but neither side will pass up a chance to make trouble for the other, and a huge public demonstration will provide ample opportunity.  Also, Maliki's supporters in Dawa and SLA (State of Law Alliance) can cause the Abadi Administration great embarrassment if the security arrangements go south.  Lets face it, Abadi has signed off on this demonstration, and he needs it to come off without too much drama.  Eventually, opposition to Abadi will coalesce, probably around Maliki; but by then, he may be too strong to defeat.

ISIS fighters continue to make the ISF pay a high price for every bit of ground gained in the neighborhoods of Ramadi.  The ISF has yet to puncture ISIS' main defensive perimeter around Ramadi, choosing to roll-up neighborhoods block-by-block, street-by-street.  True to their modus operandi, ISIS fights tooth-and-nail for territory, and then before retreating, they wire and booby-trap everything including stray dogs and urinals.  The Iraqi government is determined that when the actual residents of Ramadi return, they may find nothing but piles of rubble, but at least their won't be an IED hidden amongst the rubble.  While the attention of the world seems to be focused on Ramadi, ISIS continues to cause headaches in Baiji and probe Iraqi defenses in Haditha and Samarra.  ISIS has proven time and again, that it can conduct operations on numerous fronts simultaneously.  In the past, one of the reasons why ISIS has been able to survive high-profile defeats is because they are able to mount offensive operations simultaneously in other areas.  This type of strategic distraction has a habit of making the enemy take their eye of the ball, so to speak.  In the last few weeks, as the clashes around Ramadi and Fallujah have intensified, ISIS has been able to launch spectacular VBIED attacks in both Diyala Province and Baghdad.  The key for the Iraqi government, the military High Command, and the militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), is to step up the pressure when ISIS conducts an operation aimed at distraction.  ISIS has been astonishingly effective at predicting the actions of the enemy, in both Syria and Iraq.  The goal of the offensive in Anbar which commenced in July, was the liberation of both Fallujah and Ramadi, followed by the breaking of the siege of Haditha.  Once the ISF and its allies reach this point, then they can turn north to Salad-ad-Din Province and Baiji, and roll-up isolated ISIS units along the way.

*(One more than a few occasions, we have been critical of the allied air campaign that President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2014.  For an extended period of time, it appeared as if this united effort, which included the Air Forces of the United States, Kuwait, Iraq, U.A.E., Qatar and Bahrain, was severely handicapped by the political sensitivities of some of the Arab members.  One country would expressly forbid its jets to participate in the bombing a particular group, and another nation would forbid its planes to target some other group.  This development received a good deal of airtime in the western press; probably more than it actually deserved.  Be that as it may, there also seemed to be an ongoing problem getting real-time reporting on the actions of the allied air units.  But in the last two months, these issues seem to have been addressed, as the air campaign has really started to inflict serious casualties on ISIS, and successfully disrupt its attempts at movement and resupply.  The arrival of Iraqi Air Force F-16s has invigorated the Iraqis, and together these military air resources have become an invaluable part of the effort to push ISIS out of Anbar, and out of Iraq altogether.)

Iraqi Security Forces prepare for final push to retake Ramadi, as ISIS continues use of suicide bombers.

Links: A. ISIS suicide attacks target ISF forces in eastern Ramadi.
           B. ISF prepares final push to retake Ramadi.

In early July, the Iraqi government announced with a bit of fanfare that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), alongside the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), would begin a military offensive dedicated to liberating Anbar Province from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).  Almost simultaneously, ISIS increased random fire and SVBIED attacks in Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, to distract from the ISF operation in Anbar, and to encourage Provincial Administrations to request a return of their troops from the Ramadi front.  The Iraqi government has faced a great deal of pressure because of the time it has taken to liberate both Ramadi and Fallujah.  In reality, the ISF and the PMUs have rationally adhered to the strategic plan originally agreed upon, which requires the removal of all explosives and booby traps, so that the civilian population of Ramadi that has been living in exile in Baghdad, can return in safety.  Also, the ISF, which consists of both special police units and the Iraqi Army, has been very deliberate in its movements, taking care to consolidate all strategic gains and discourage a return by ISIS.  The Iraqi people have been subject before to the occupation by ISIS, liberation, and re-occupation by ISIS, and it is important that the groundwork is laid to make the departure of ISIS permanent.  On Sunday, ISIS launched SVBIED attacks and fired artillery at ISF positions, killing 17 soldiers and 6 Sunni militiamen.  The ISF responded with heavy shelling of ISIS positions, alongside what has become a stepped-up presence by the allied air coalition, which has left ISIS occupied areas of the city in rubble.  Also, as mentioned in Link A, a major commander in the Iraqi Army serving on the Anbar front, was removed from duty by officials in Baghdad.  The announcement from the government would only comment that the general in question was guilty of dereliction of duty.

On Saturday, the Iraqi government has announced the formation of a joint police and Iraqi Army force, 10,000 strong, to renew the offensive to liberate Iraq.  Plans to transfer these troops to Anbar had been underway for some time, and the second wave of the offensive which began in July, was about to commence.  Some neighborhoods in eastern Ramadi have become intense battlegrounds, as city blocks change hands repeatedly.  In particular, ISIS has focused its attention on retaking the Husaibiya District, but so far its efforts have been unsuccessful.  The Iraqi military command is optimistic that the increase in troops will help the ISF to overwhelm ISIS positions in relatively short order, and that within the next few weeks, the ISF will be able to focus its operations on completing the liberation of Fallujah; presently, ISIS positions in Fallujah are under intense pressure from allied air attacks and regular attacks from the PMUs. 

Iraqi civilians in Baghdad are increasing pressure on the government for the relief of Haditha, which is located to the northwest of Ramadi, and has been under siege by ISIS since mid-July.  Up to now, the city has withstood the attempts at occupation by ISIS forces, and any positive developments from eastern Anbar can only increase pressure on ISIS to take Haditha, which they publicly declared as a target in July. 

Iraqi parliament blames loss of Mosul to ISIS on Maliki; ISF making slow progress in its operations to retake Ramadi.

Links: A. Maliki to blame for loss of Mosul to ISIS.
           B. Operation to retake Ramadi continues.

On Monday, an Iraqi Parliamentary panel recommended that former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki face trial regarding his actions during the ISIS operation to take Mosul last year.  In particular, the panel pointed out that Maliki fanned sectarian tensions, which encouraged many Iraqi Sunnis in Mosul to welcome ISIS.  The panel's recommendation comes on the heels of another administrative shake-up in the government, as Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi eliminated eleven ministerial posts, reducing the size of the cabinet by a third.  Last week, Abadi proposed the elimination of the offices of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President, currently held my Maliki.  Abadi's efforts to slim-down the Iraqi government are an effort to eliminate redundancy and corruption, as the country continues to experience protests in all the major cities.  Instead of attacking one political party or the other, these protests are focused on changing the mindset of Iraqi politics, and ending the tradition of patronage, bribery, nepotism, and other forms of corruption that have long been part of all levels of government.  The focus isn't singularly on the cabinet level positions, as calls are made for changes in provincial and local governmental structure as well.  Abadi is prudent to respond with examples of real reform, as up to now the proposed changes will only strengthen the position of President.  The Iraqi political system has complicated government efforts to recruit, train and deploy troops, as each separate province looks to redefine its own authority.

There has been little news from Ramadi in recent days, as questions are raised about the probability of success in the operation.  The Iraqi Security Forces, which include the Army and the Police, have been careful to consolidate gains and search for booby traps before deciding to push forward.  In the past, initial successes have been followed up by a number of high-casualty incidents involving booby traps and other explosives.  The ISF and its allies in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) vastly outnumber the ISIS fighters in Ramadi and Fallujah.  Some estimates have the total number of ISIS personnel in Anbar Province to be less than 10,000.  ISIS multiplies its effectiveness through unconventional warfare, especially the use of SVBIEDS- suicide vehicular bombs/improvised explosive device.  Again, the effort to retake Ramadi and Fallujah, and also consolidate its position in Baiji, includes the methodical inspection of all vehicles, to prevent an SVBIED attack from succeeding.  The detailed, organized approach to this offensive may be an indication that the Iraqi leaders intend to push ISIS out of Anbar Province completely.  The events of the next week will be a strong indication of just how much progress has been made.  Keep in mind, ISIS continues to press home its attacks on Haditha, whose fall would be a serious blow to the Iraqi Sunni community, if not necessarily strategically important.

Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.

Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
           B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
           C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.

In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks.  On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people.  ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned.  All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage.  Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late.  People are very enterprising.  In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine.  Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand.  If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill.  ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.

No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces.  Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now.  In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use.  As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal.  ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah.  From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals.  They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance.  On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University.  However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself.  By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.

On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament.  Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement.  All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best.  Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations.  Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS.  As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling.  We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best.  Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi?  Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks?  What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month?  Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?

We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah.  No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases.  Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate.  The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.

Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.

The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies.  In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi.  With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive.  Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.

as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province.  By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege.  The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province.  To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives.  One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS.  While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad.  ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself.  ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.

In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community.  Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support.  The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.

Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK.  Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list.  What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments.  Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass.  I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power.  Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support".  Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?

Iraqi forces facing serious challenges from ISIS in Diyala and Babil provinces.

Link: ISIS attack on market leaves 115 dead.

As expected, ISIS has responded to the offensive with a variety of distracting SVBIED attacks, mostly in Diyala Province.  ISIS is determined to establish a permanent presence in Diyala, which would allow for the eventual encirclement of Baghdad.  Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the militias/Popular Mobilization Forces (PMUs) have had some success retaking areas of Fallujah and hemming in the ISIS units in Ramadi, its apparent that ISIS believes this development will be temporary.  In the past, fighting in Anbar has gone back and forth, and there is no reason to believe that ISIS will not be able to mount another offensive to retake lost ground, especially if Haditha falls.

The issue in Diyala is the most pressing, as the Provincial Governor has requested that provincial troops serving in Anbar be returned.  According to Governor Musana Tamimi, fifty percent of Diyala's provincial troops have been drafted to fight with the ISF in Anbar.  The Governor of Babil Province has also made the same complaint, as ISIS begins to expand its presence there.  Tamimi noted that there are large tracts of land just east of Baghdad that have been infiltrated by ISIS, and that Baqubah and Khan Beni Saad are two communities in Diyala that have come under tremendous pressure.  Although the ISF has had recent success stopping intended SVBIEDs in eastern Anbar, it appears that ISIS has been expanding its resources and manpower in Diyala for some time.  The SVBIED at a market in Khan Beni Saad that killed 115 people and injured over 170 on July 17, was the exact type of attack that Iraqi authorities were concerned might coincide with the end of Ramadan.

And to add to the headache, violent demonstrations in Basra Province (unrelated to ISIS) also highlight the difficult security situation in the provinces when so many soldiers have been forwarded to the operations in Anbar.  What we find most disturbing is ISIS ability to project military operations (albeit SVBIEDS and limited free-fire attacks) to the provinces, when its resources are allegedly tied up in Haditha and Fallujah/Ramadi.  It implies that ISIS has a long-term plan to consolidate its presence in Anbar, Salah ad-Din and Diyala, in order to eventually encircle and strangle Baghdad.  The Iraqi authorities will need military and related specialized aid to counter these efforts by creating a permanent supply system for Baghdad, and bolster its defensive posture.  The Iranians seem content to limit their involvement to political machinations and domination of the PMUs.  How long will Iran continue to let ISIS terrorize Diyala Province, which actually borders Iran?