Blame to go around as the Anbar Offensive against ISIS sputters to a halt on the outskirts of Ramadi.

Link: The Anbar offensive appears to be failing.

Over the past few weeks, we've scoured news sources coming from Iraq, trying to get an accurate perspective on the offensive in Anbar Province that the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) launched in May.  The offensive operation, which included a simultaneous attack on ISIS-held Fallujah by the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), had been planned to the smallest detail and included the training and equipment to deal with remote detonation explosives, booby-traps and urban warfare.  The last few days of May slipped away, then June.  In July, the Iraqi government started hinting that progress was being made, and that bit-by-bit, landmarks on the outskirts of the two cities had been secured.  In July, the government responded to questions about the slow pace of the offensive by reminding the media that the ISF wasn't singularly tasked with removing ISIS from Ramadi; the ISF was also responsible for locating and removing/defusing all the explosives and booby traps being left by ISIS to greet the returning residents of Ramadi.  The Iraqi government added that all the lessons learned from the last ISIS occupation of Ramadi were being considered in the staging of the current offensive.  That explanation sure sounded good to me, especially when the Iraqi government also took the time to thank the coalition air campaign for its accurate and decidedly helpful bombing sorties.  As August started to roll by, I was distracted by ISIS attacks in Diyala Province and the concerns regarding Baiji and Haditha.  Then the government announced its reform agenda, which immediately pushed Ramadi from the front page, and temporarily from my mind.  So we've waded through the reform issue, knowing as we did beforehand that Nouri al-Maliki would call in every marker owed to him to fight off this assault on his power base.  Now that the militias have cast their lot with Maliki, the political battle-lines are drawn.  But with the militias in the mix, we may end up seeing more violence on the streets of Basra than we are seeing on the streets of Ramadi.

Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's bold moves to reform the Iraqi political system will play out as a backdrop to developments in Anbar.  The Iraqi government's most immediate concern must be the growing impression that ISIS has not only fought off the Anbar offensive, but has started harassing the outlying villages around Baghdad as they had done before.  Iraqi Major General Qasim al-Mohammadi, the head of Anbar Operations Command, is quick with assurances that the offensive is still on track, and that it takes time to clear out every housing cluster, every shop, and every abandoned structure, taking care to remove all unexploded ordinance.  The fact that we've heard this line before doesn't make it any less accurate. From the beginning, our sources stressed that the Iraqi operational plan was built on lessons learned from previous encounters with ISIS.  Also, the Iraqi Army had a serious morale problem that had to be addressed before the Anbar operation.  One of the most frequent complaints was that officers showed indifference to the lives of the frontline troops.  The training modules for the Iraqi Army, including officers, now address that issue.  The slow rate of advance could be a reflection of Iraqi officers being more careful when putting troops in danger.  But Major General al-Mohammadi also expressed frustration with the allied air campaign.  He was very clear, as he was interviewed from his hospital bad after surviving a suicide bomb attack, that the allied air resources are stretched too thin, that there are too many competing targets.  The Pentagon was quick to deny this claim, pointing out that the U.S. spends roughly ten million dollars everyday on the allied air campaign, and that over the last year, coalition warplanes have carried out over four thousand airstrikes in Iraq. 

If history is any indication, then bad news is just around the corner.  Normally, when fingers get pointed, accountability is a no-show, and vital questions remain unanswered, then something is about to fall apart.  We were surprised to learn from the linked Washington Post article that ISIS maintains contact between its Fallujah and Ramadi cells, through the continued existence of a well-known road.  Why hasn't this road been obliterated by airstrikes?  How is it, that after months of news releases from not only the Iraqi government but on occasion by the Pentagon, pointing out the growing encirclement of ISIS units in Ramadi and Fallujah, that we now learn that ISIS forces in Ramadi and Fallujah are not isolated and are actually in regular contact with each other.  Given the ground resources poured into this operation, and the complete lack of heavy armor and very limited use of artillery on behalf of ISIS, how is it that after almost four months, the enemy is still able to re-enforce and re-supply its forces in Ramadi?  What about the F16s delivered to Iraq a few months back- its my understanding that their pilots spent years in the U.S. learning to fly those birds.  So why aren't they out there, bombing the hell out if ISIS in Ramadi and Fallujah?  More training?  I know that only four planes are being delivered at a time, but when the enemy has NO air resources and very limited anti-aircraft equipment, I would imagine that those F16s would be out there everyday.  True, they will face the same obstacles as the allied air coalition, including unpredictable weather shifts and sandstorms, so maybe they are out there, doing as much as mother nature will allow.  I hope so.  At the end of the day, I don't see how the Abadi Administration can survive a failure of this magnitude.  A crippled government may be the smallest problem, though, as ISIS appears to be ready in a moments notice, to jump back on the offensive.

Iraq update: militias, ISF continue to pressure ISIS in Anbar; ISIS causes more trouble in Diyala.

The central line of Iraq continues to be the heart and soul of the ongoing conflict between ISIS and the Iraqi government and it's allies.  In a predictable effort to distract attention away from the Iraqi Security Forces' (ISF) offensive in Anbar to retake Ramadi and relieve Haditha, ISIS has stepped up SVBIED (Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) and random free-fire attacks in Diyala Province. Not to be outdone, the ISF and militias/Popular Mobilization Units (UPMs) have stepped up the pressure on both Ramadi and Fallujah.  The ISF pushed back a frontal attack just outside Ramadi, in which ISIS utilized its usual weapon of choice, the SVBIED (when are they going to use up their supply of suicidal morons?); simultaneously the ISF conducted moderately successful attacks to the north and south of Ramadi.  With ISIS under siege by the ISF in Ramadi and the PMUs in Fallujah, it has become even more imperative that ISIS raise some hell close to Baghdad, which might cause enough of an outcry from the civilian population that the government is forced to transfer some of its troops from the Anbar offensive.  Possibly because of its proximity to Iran, ISIS seems determined to make a statement in Diyala Province.

as we've pointed out, Diyala Province shares an eastern border with the Islamic Republic of Iran.  Recently the Iranians have expressed a growing concern regarding what appears to be ISIS' growing strength in the Province.  By conducting SVBIED attacks on military and police facilities, along with a variety of civilian targets, ISIS has Diyala Province suffering from its own kind of siege.  The governorship, which is controlled by the Shi'a, loudly and repeatedly requested that troops pulled from Diyala for the Anbar offensive be returned to the Province.  To add to the drama, a serious schism is developing between the Shi'a and Sunni, who have in the past lived as one community in most parts of Diyala. The Sunni leaders in Diyala claim that the governorship and the provincial administration is being run by the Shi'a Badr Corps/Organization, which was born in Iran and is seeded with all sorts of fun Iranian advisors and representatives.  One positive move was the reinstatement of the Sunni Deputy Governor, the hope being that now the two groups can start working together again in opposition to ISIS.  While the proximity of active ISIS units to the Iranian border is disturbing, the real threat (and probably part of ISIS' long-term strategy), is the encirclement of Baghdad.  ISIS knows that it will lose some ground during this current offensive in Anbar. What they hope to achieve is to mitigate the amount of territory that they will undoubtedly be obliged to reconquer, in order to eventually complete the isolation of Baghdad itself.  ISIS is also determined to successfully occupy Haditha, which has been under siege for months.

In Anbar and Salah ad-Din, intra-tribal conflict continues to be a problem in the Sunni community.  Tribes and communities who forcefully opposed ISIS are calling out those that didn't,or even went so far as to provide the Islamic State fighters with support.  The government in Baghdad is nervously calling on all its Sunni allies in Anbar to put some water on this dangerous spark.

Another interesting development to keep an eye on is the decision by Turkey to end a two-year informal ceasefire with the Kurdish PKK.  Not surprisingly, the PKK has elected to retaliate, and three Turkish soldiers can be added to the fatalities list.  What is of interest is the attitude of Iran to these developments.  Iran continues to support beleaguered Syrian strongman Bashir al-Assad, which is something that really gives Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a case of the red-ass.  I'm not sure what really went down between these two, but Erdogan seems bound and determined to see Assad totally removed from power.  Im sure the Iranians are thrilled with this possible miscalculation on Erdogan's part, and have already reached out to the PKK to express their "support".  Just how far will Iran go to expand this new round of incidents between Turkey and the PKK?

Iran reconsiders strategy in Iraq following the increase in ISIS activity in Diyala Province.

Link: Bomb attacks in Baghdad and Diyala Province leave scores dead, injured.

As we have been discussing for months, the proximity of ISIS activity in Diyala Province to the Iranian border with Iraq, is causing a great deal of concern in Tehran.  Both the Iranian government in Tehran and the spiritual leaders in Qom are very sensitive to the public perception that Iran itself is "impregnable".  The Iran military, and more importantly, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have always carried so much influence in Iran, because of the public belief (supported by the Iranian media) that Iran's military forces are much too powerful and disciplined to allow an enemy to attack Iranian territory, which hasn't happened since the August 1980-September 1988 Iran/Iraq war.  We are convinced that soon ISIS will be conducting cross-border operations from Diyala Province into Iran, if only to make the point that no enemy is beyond it's reach.

The Iranians are faced with a number of options.  Given the complete control Iran wields over the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), otherwise known as the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib al Imam Ali, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shahuda, Mahdi Army, and Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Iraqi government has little say-so regarding the movements of these Shi'a based militia groups.  The Badr Organization has a historically strong presence in Diyala Province.  If the Iranians suspect that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not up to the job in Diyala, the Badr group could be recalled from Anbar Province to add a layer of security for the Iranian Border.  In fact, the Iranians could instruct more than just Badr to relocate to Diyala, but if they make this choice, and the ongoing ISF offensive in Anbar proves successful, they will lose the opportunity to "play the hero".  The Iranians are in no hurry to provide the ISF and the U.S.-led air coalition any victories.  On the other side of the coin, if the PMUs, either piecemeal or as a whole, are withdrawn to the other theaters and the Anbar operation fails, then the ISF and the Iraq government will have no problem finding a scapegoat.  Obviously, this is the type of conundrum that ISIS likes to create.  Its leaders understand the precarious nature of the various coalitions they make up the opposition, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to sow discord.  The increase in SVBIED and free-fire incidences in Baghdad and Diyala Province over the last week are a perfect example of ISIS attempting to discredit the Sunni/Shi'a coalition that is currently laying siege to both Fallujah and Ramadi.  The Iraqi authorities expected these type of attacks to increase once the offensive began, but there was very little that could be done to counter this type of warfare.

Another option that is seldom given much serious consideration, is the possibility of direct Iranian Army (or IRGC) intervention in Diyala.  The Iranians don't need anyone's permission, and they could certainly contain ISIS in Diyala in short order.  But Iran has been very careful to follow its usual script, which has proven so successful in so many conflicts over the years.  The Iranians appear determined to utilize the PMUs as their military contribution to the anti-ISIS effort (along with military aid to Bashir al-Assad beleaguered regime forces in Syria).  The Iranians have always used surrogates and proxies to fight their battles, as is evidenced by Hezbollah, the Houthis, and on occasion both Hamas and the Taliban.  Although we have always argued that a full-scale Iranian military intervention might be much more successful at not only defeating ISIS, but in bringing Iran out of the shadows and back within the international community of nations.  You see, defeating ISIS would be a much more appreciated achievement internationally, as opposed to the signing of this five-year nuclear treaty the United States is passing around.  One act benefits all, and the other only benefits Iran.  So which one would be most likely to increase Iran's diplomatic bona fides?

Who lost Iraq?

Link: Politico magazine's take on "Who Lost Iraq"?


(Update: Before tackling today's unwieldy subject matter, it's time for a quick update, for any of our readers who have an interest.  The book that actually spawned this blog, Mukhabarat, Baby!, has been available at all the usual places (Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Booklocker, etc.) for roughly three months.  While the blog has proven to be quite popular and continues to grow in viewership, the book has not done well.  The reviews have been tremendous; in fact, we have yet to receive a negative review.  But at the end of the day, the success of a book is measured in how much it is appreciated by readers, especially readers of its particular genre.  Its safe to say that MB has been unsuccessful with every particular genre.  Since the book has received great reviews, and does provide insight into a world that many seem to hold in fascination, what seems to be the problem?  We even have a comedy out this week with Melissa McCarthy playing a spy.  I have to be honest; it does look funny, and she always seems to make me laugh.  As for MB, the problem is simple to diagnose.  I have been unable to gain traction with regards to exposure.  People aren't buying my book because they don't know it exists.  I haven't been reviewed in the NY Times, Wall Street Journal, or Washington Post, and I haven't been invited onto any news programs to discuss my career and the book.  If an author is fortunate enough to have a good agent and publisher, they run a strong likelihood of being successful, like the Housewives from Beverly Hills and the Duck Dynasty folks (both of whom are or were on the Non-Fiction Best Seller List), while self-published authors like me, even if they follow all of the good advice out there, end up with beautiful blogs and amazing internet book sites, and spend their week nights introducing their book to a virtually deserted VFW somewhere in the middle of the desert in Arizona.  But I won't throw in the towel.  I'm still out there, setting up speaking engagements and talking up my book.  Why not hop on to Amazon and buy it?  Better yet, hop on to Amazon and buy a copy for yourself and separate copies for your friends.  Cheers, friends.)

When someone forwarded me a link to the Politico article which attempts to address the question, "Who lost Iraq?", I had no idea what to expect.  Occasionally Politico will throw a curve, and this has been a rather popular subject in recent weeks.  I read the article through twice, and I can't say that they did a bad job.  Politico assembled a group of persons that it has decided are experts on Iraq, and asked them particular questions regarding the insurgency, the surge, the draw-down, and the current conflict involving ISIS.  After taking a look at the lineup assembled to give us our answers, I couldn't help but wonder, how did they decide which questions to ask what person?  And who chose the "experts" to begin with?  For the sake of the argument, lets give Politico the benefit of the doubt, and move on with the conversation.

Let's start with two basic facts.  First, in 2009, Iraq was making great strides in its recovery from three wars and almost five decades of Saddam Hussein.  The economy was growing, the refineries were functioning, the job market was growing, and construction projects were going on everywhere.  The school were open, including a number of new institutions that were built and paid for by the United States.  In fact, we paid for just about everything, including the infrastructure repair.  The roads and bridges were usable, traffic flowed with working signals and traffic cops were around to assist with accidents and back-ups.  International flights were landing at Baghdad International and, most importantly, the job market was growing. Iraq was on its feet and nearly ready to run its own show.  The past remaining piece of the puzzle?  Iraq was in serious need of a reliable police force and a dependable, well-trained and well-supplied army.  The U.S. military can be given all the credit for the positive changes in Iraq, and should have been left alone to complete the training of the Iraqi Security apparati (police, military, border control, customs, etc.) on their own schedule.

The second point that we can all agree on is that Iraq is now in a state of war with the "Islamic State for the creation of a Caliphate in the Levant", or ISIS, as it is commonly known.  ISIS is a terrorist organization that has developed a powerful, mobile, well-armed conventional army, and it is determined to gain effective control of both Syria and Iraq (and eventually the rest of the Levant).  In 2012 and 2013, ISIS, which until then had been content to raise hell with Bashir al-Assad and his forces in Syria, decided to expand its religious war into northern Iraq.  Mosul fell, and Kirkuk and Arbil were threatened.  The Kurds were put on the defensive and had to military repel ISIS with very little assistance from the outside.  Each new bit of territory that ISIS occupied brought with it new victims; Christians or the wrong kind of Muslims, who were lined up and executed by the hundreds.  At present, ISIS controls much of northwest Iraq, including the border crossings into Syria.  ISIS also controls parts of Anbar Province, including both Ramadi and Fallujah.  Although Tikrit was recently retaken by the Iraqi Security Forces, ISIS continues to put pressure on Baiji and its valuable oil refinery, and recently has stepped up suicide attacks in Diyala Province to the east of Baghdad.  Control of Anbar and Diyala Provinces will allow ISIS to pay siege to Baghdad itself.

So given those two points, what happened to turn situation number one into situation number two?  I will save everyone a little time and answer this myself, because its really not very complicated.  The U.S. military had a timetable for all operations dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan.  Because of the success of the surge and the positive involvement of the Sunni community in defeating Al-Qaeda in Iraq, it was imperative that the United States not lose that goodwill by abandoning the Iraqi people before their government and its functions were in place to work effectively.  This is exactly the action that was taken by President Obama.  Ignoring the advice of the Pentagon, Obama ordered an increase in the U.S. military departure schedule.  President Obama was bound and determined that our troops would be out of Iraq by such-and-such date.  Soldiers, including Generals, will only object for so long before they will just shut-up and carry out their orders.  We left Iraq before any of their Security forces were prepared.  In fact, we left before the police were prepared to issue speeding tickets, let alone stand up to ISIS.  In response to the growing alarm in the civilian community, the Iraqi government ordered its army to confront ISIS on the battlefield outside Tikrit.  I don't have to remind everyone about the mass desertions, the equipment left on the battlefield for ISIS to steal, and the prisoners captured for more video of mass executions.  Iraq has fallen to shit because we left before our military had sufficiently trained the Iraqis to successfully defend their country in what is obviously an evolving and very dangerous environment.  Why?  Where was the fire, as my grandma used to say?  Why was it so damn necessary to leave Iraq so quickly, instead of a few years down the road when the Iraqis were in a better position to stand up to ISIS?  Our policy not only let down the Iraqi people, it also played into the hands of Iran, who is now seen as the hero in this unfolding nightmare, because the Shi'a militias they train and advise have come to the aid of the Iraqi Security Forces, and with some success.

Let me leave you with the biggest irony of all: how is the Obama Administration dealing with the collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces?  Why, we are sending in Army trainers and instructors....the same folks who should have been left to do their jobs in the first place.  Que loco.

Back to the Sunni versus Shi'a, a bit of historical perspective.

Links: A. Wikipedia definition of Sunni Islam.
           B. Wikipedia definition of Shi'a Islam.
           C. Wikipedia's take on the all-deciding Battle of Karbala.

When I first arrived in Iraq, I had little background knowledge on the difference between a Sunni and a Shi'a Muslim.  I assumed it would be similar to Roman Catholics and Protestants, and Heaven knows that those two Christian denominations have had a go at each other a few times.  But receiving an education regarding the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq is just as much about observation as it is having a thick book open in front of you.  Throughout Islam (and I'm generalizing; where billions of people are involved, there will always be exceptions), the Sunni have traditionally been perceived as well-mannered and better-educated, which leads to the next logical assumption, that the Sunni are better off financially.  The Shi'a have traditionally been closer to nature; the farmers, the less-educated, less erudite.  I had Shi'a friends in Iraq tell me that regardless of the Muslim country, the discrimination is waiting for you when you arrive, and it will hang around after you leave.  Unlike the historic nastiness between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the schism in Islam has seldom led to large scale violence, at least not until Saddam Hussein decided to gas the Iraqi Shi'a after the first Gulf War in 1991.  As a reminder, the Shi'a of Iraq were under the impression that the U.S. Army was going to finish the job and see that Saddam was retrenched for good.  For some reason, they believed that if they participated in the fighting against Saddam's Army, that George Bush and the Americans would support their effort.  The reality is, they received no support and Saddam used what air power he had available, followed up by T-72s, to gas and crush the Shi'a rebellion.  It was never a fair fight, and as much as it pains me to say this, I can't help but believe that we let those people down.

But the cleft in Islam that leaves the Sunni on one side and the Shi'a on the other, is something much more ingrained than political differences.  Many Sunni believe that they are intellectually superior to the Shi'a.  This idea has been regurgitated for years, and resulted in Sunni communities being built in nicer locations, with nicer homes, better schools, and a better social support network.  In Iraq prior to Saddam, the House of Hashim was Sunni, and it was business as usual.  Saddam Hussein was very much a Sunni, being from Tikrit, and most of the development that occurred during his reign went into the Sunni community, Baghdad and Anbar Province in particular.  This attitude has existed for a long time, with some scholars claiming that its genesis was  the Battle of Karbala, between the small group of supporters of Hussein ibn Ali, grandson of the Prophet and the son of Ali, and the army sent by the ruling Ummayid Caliph Yazid I.  The Shi'a of 2015 consider the date of this battle, the 10th Muharram in the year 61 AH (Anno Hijra, meaning after the departure of the Prophet and his followers from Mecca to Medina) in the Arabic calendar, and October 680 AD in the west, to be a day of mourning and sadness.  If you've ever seen video of large groups of shirtless Muslim men beating themselves bloody with whips and chains, all while slowly marching in step, then you were probably watching an observance of the Battle of Karbala.

We've been speaking about Iraq, but the issue transcends national boundaries.  The Shi'a Houthi in Yemen were so frustrated with years of discrimination that they violently removed the Sunni government.  For centuries the Houthi of Yemen were subjected to discrimination, which manifested itself in 2015 as lack of access to good jobs, entrance into secondary education, and promotion in the civil service and the military.  This glass ceiling exists for Shi'a in most if not all Muslim countries with a Sunni majority (and a few with a Shi'a majority).  The point being, the Shi'a Muslims of the world have a chip on their shoulder, and they have reason to be pissed.  On the other side of the coin, the Sunni have to be concerned, especially after events in Yemen and Iraq.  Everyone is quick to blame Iran, but I think this has as much to do with indigenous frustration than any agitation provided by Tehran.  In fact, I think the Iranians have really dropped the ball when it comes to supporting their fellow Shi'a.  Iraq is a prime example.  The current Iraqi government is pro-Shi'a, the Badr Corps and other Shi'a militias are fighting alongside the Iraqi Army, and the Americans, who have always been a last resort of friendship for the Sunni, are nowhere to be found (at least not in a military sense).  The Sunni of Anbar, Diyala, and Salah al-Din Provinces, along with the Sunni of Baghdad, have no savior at the moment.

For all its nastiness, Daesh is a Sunni movement.  As they continue to occupy Sunni communities in Iraq, I can assure you that they are telling horror stories about what will happen if the Shi'a take over.  What little bit of deference that the Sunnis enjoyed over the Shi'a in the hell hole known as Iraq, will be ever.  In fact, Daesh will tell the residents of Fallujah, Ramadi and Habaniyah that the Shi'a will expect a bit of payback.  With the Iraqi Army currently co-opted by the Shi'a militias and laying siege to Ramadi, the Sunnis would be out of character not to consider the advantages of joining Daesh.