Since The start of the new year, the world seems to be paying less attention to ISIS. So many of us were sitting on pins and needles during the various New Year's celebrations in New York, Paris, London, and other great cities around the globe, hoping not to hear any breaking news stories about terrorist attacks. We made it through the new year basically unscathed, and I think that with a huge sigh of relief, many of us went back to "business as usual" before the October 2015 Paris attacks and the December 2015 shootings in San Bernardino. The fact that the mainstream press in the United States seems intent on pushing the narrative that ISIS is being beaten on the battlefield, so its OK to do non-stop new stories about Donald Trump and the circus that has become the Republican nomination process (the Republicans are the circus, even though the Democrats are going to nominate a potential felon in Hillary Clinton or an outright lunatic in Bernie Sanders). Why is the press so intent on downplaying the threat by ISIS? Because Barack Obama told us that the threat was being exaggerated. The press always responds in a defensive posture to everything Barack Obama does. No doubt if he farted at a State Funeral, the press would blame the White House Chef. So Obama says that we aren't headed to World War III, and that ISIS is not a threat to the United States. I assume that the family members of U.S. citizens killed in San Bernardino, California, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, by persons claiming allegiance to ISIS would disagree; I know I do. ISIS has a series of strategies, each one going into effect after the previous has been accomplished (or altered by events). ISIS has reviewed the current state of the battlefield, which has it in possession of one-third of Iraq and one-half of Syria, and decided that the time is ripe to exploit its surprisingly successful international outreach efforts. The monsters making the decisions at the top of this organization are no dummies, nor will they put their equities at risk for ideology's sake (are you listening, President Obama?) We are entering a new phase in the battle with ISIS, and it includes the introduction of a new strategy.
ISIS believes that the key to successfully expand its brand of worldwide-revolution is to dedicate resources to its budding operations in nations with strong Islamic traditions. This includes all the nations of North Africa, and it includes Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Most of these nations are in no military position to fight off a serious ISIS invasion, at least not without assistance in the form of "troops on the ground". ISIS rakes in an incredible amount of money on a daily basis. Why the Obama Administration has not been able to dent this flow of financial assistance is a mystery to me, because so many pundits in the media seem to know the various sources of this support. Regardless, ISIS is intent on spreading the conflict outside of the borders of Syria and Iraq. It has been testing its ability to project itself with operations in Libya, West Africa, and Indonesia, and results have been encouraging. ISIS knows that any attention drawn to Southeast Asia or North Africa, will draw the enemy away from the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. So by increasing recruitment and eventually, attacks in Tunisia, Libya, and Pakistan, ISIS will be not only spreading the Caliphate revolution, but also forcing the United States and its lock-step European partners to devote resources and attention to other allies and battlefields. I'm still not sure where Russia fits into the picture; with all the hubbub and hardware that Putin brought to his Syria adventure, I expected much more in the way of battlefield victories by now. Assad's internal opposition will eventually disappear completely under the weight of daily Russian attacks, and Putin will be obliged to either leave Syria or attack ISIS.
Obama must be aware that ISIS is expanding all over the globe, and yet he still makes public claims diminishing the threat that ISIS actually poses. If they are so "insignificant", Mr. President, then why haven't we been able to defeat them? True, we haven't really tried. What a joke this Administration's entire Syria policy has been. We still don't know what became of the millions of taxpayer dollars and the "Free Syrian Army" we were training in Jordan to take the place of U.S. infantry. Obama still has one more year in office; no doubt it will be dedicated to domestic politics. We all know that an Executive Order of some sort will be in place before the November election. The uproar this will cause will certainly distract us all from the activities of ISIS in North Africa and Southeast Asia, but what a mess it will leave for his predecessor.
Showing posts with label Free Syrian Army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Free Syrian Army. Show all posts
Monday, February 1, 2016
Friday, July 10, 2015
Hezbollah keeping Assad regime from rapid contraction.
Link: Hezbollah assists regime forces to retake Syrian border city.
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
We have been noting for the past few months that recent losses to Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) and the Islamic Front (IS) have effectively ended any regime threat in eastern Syria. The Syrian Army still controls a few widely dispersed communities in the east (including Hasaka), but Assad's only real area of influence and control is far west Syria, from Aleppo down south to Damascus. The regime continues to control the air (except when the U.S.-led, anti-IS air coalition is operational), which has limited recent attempts by the rebels to take Aleppo. We have also noted that, along with a decreased regime presence in the east, Assad no longer seems to be receiving much support from Russia. We opined that without his Russian benefactor, that Assad would eventually be obliged to throw in the towel. I'm sorry to say that we didn't take into account the impact of increased aid from Hezbollah, and by proxy, Iran. Hezbollah fighters were instrumental in the regime's capture of Zabadani, a town located on the Syria/Lebanon border that until recently was held by rebels.
If Iranian support for the Assad regime continues (or increases), he will likely survive any offensive by JN or the IS to take Damascus or even Aleppo. Hezbollah has no problem moving fighters from Lebanon to Syria, and former rebel supply lines that went through Lebanon have been eradicated. It will be interesting to see if Hezbollah increases its military presence in Syria, or if we might start to see Iranian advisors among Assad's troops, as we have occasionally seen in Iraq. Depending on how ambitious Iran wants to be, the IS is presently confronted by Iranian-backed regime elements in Syria, and Iranian-supported militia in Iraq. Given that the IS is a Sunni-based movement, we note the extension of the conflict between Shi'a and Sunni. Iran has already influenced the rise of the Houthi movement in Yemen, and the activities of the Shi'a militias in Iran. With the involvement of Hezbollah and the increased support by Iran for the Assad regime, Iran seems intent on setting the stage for another Sunni-Shi'a conflict. As this situation develops, the United States is faced with the difficult task of identifying who is the more dangerous enemy: the IS, with its growing conventional army and its network of affiliates around the globe, or Iran, which is bound and determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability, and can't seem to stop fomenting Shi'a unrest in various hotspots in the Middle East.
All things considered, this might be a good time for the United States to allow both the Shi'a extremists and the Sunni hot heads to "whittle" each other down a bit. Not very long ago, the CIA might take the opportunity to create a covert "influence campaign", to utilize social media and other resources to agitate the two groups, and get them to go after each other. It would certainly keep their focus away from sponsoring international terrorism for a while, or at least that would be the intention. But those type of operations are a thing of the past. The Obama Admnistration would never use the CIA to conduct an operation of that nature. As things stand, we find ourselves supporting the Free Syrian Army, which when we last checked, was actively engaging regime elements, as opposed to the IS, and continuing this nebulous air campaign, that seems to generate no intelligence or news whatsoever. How much are we spending on those two initiative? When Bush was in office, didn't we hear a never-ending cacophony from the left about the taxpayers dollars being wasted? Isn't this a bit of waste as well? If not, then great, but I want to know the details: how hs it been a success?
(Separate Comment)
The Reality of Illegal Immigrant Felons in the U.S.
We have noticed a rash of news stories lately regarding illegal immigrant felons who have been allowed to stay in the United States after being released from jail, only to offend again. Because sensational news gets more attention, the stories that involve children or loss of life will always be the priority. Do you know what a "Sanctuary City is"? For those who don't, a Sanctuary City is a community that purposely choses to NOT inform Federal Law Enforcement when a foreign national felon has served their time and is being released to the street. The law requires the community local law enforcement to notify Homeland Security Deportations, so these felons can be returned to their country of nationality. But some cities, including just about all the big ones on the west coast, allow for something called "Sanctuary" to exist in their cities, because they believe that it is cruel and wrong to deport these individuals, regardless of the crime or how many times that they have re-entered the U.S. illegally.
Statistics show that certain felons are very likely to re-offend, but this doesn't matter to the Sanctuary folks. Who cares if a teenager is shot dead outside a grocery store, or a mother of two is raped and strangled to death on a bike path? The only thing that matters are the INVISIBLE rights of the foreign national who presence in our country is predicated on the fact that broke our Immigration Law, and has since racked up a few more violations. No doubt the groups opposed to Amnesty will use every one of these stories as a means to frighten and mobilize the population, but the truth is the truth. We do have a problem in this country with an outrageously high number of illegal immigrant felons, the majority of which are not presently incarcerated.
Do you know where your children are?
Sunday, May 24, 2015
How do we fix this mess that we are in overseas?
Presently, the United States has involved itself in three conflicts raging overseas. I'm sure some folks actually believed President Obama when he paid lip service to the Elizabeth Warren click within the Democratic Party and promised to end foreign U.S. military involvement. I can't really pin the blame for the crisis in the Ukraine on Obama, because Russian President Vladimir Putin has obviously been the one calling all the shots. I can, however, call into question his strategy of implementing sanctions on Russia, and keeping the sanctions in place long after it has become apparent that Russians don't give a shit about sanctions. But Putin's ballsy decision to scoop up the Crimea practically overnight was a surprise to just about everyone. When the move in Crimea coincided with an outbreak in separatist activity in Donbas (ESE Ukraine), it was apparent to us that Putin was looking for a bargaining chip, something he could trade in exchange for recognition of Russia's claim to Crimean sovereignty. But Putin was taken as much by surprise as we were by the weak and limp-wristed response by the European Powers, NATO, and the United States. Putin annexed territory belonging to a foreign state and began fomenting rebellion elsewhere, and the response from the free world is little more than a 5-minute stay in time out. Don't agree? Well, explain it to me then. I am in serious need of educating. How has the sanctions regime impacted the Russian decision to invalidate the territorial integrity of a UN and NATO member state? It appears to me, that as of May 22, 2015, the Russians/Separatists (it will continue to get more and more difficult to tell them apart, as Russia decides to end the charade) are again on the offensive, moving further west into Ukraine, consolidating their hold on Luhansk and Donetsk, and preparing to lay siege to Mariupol. What can be done? Europe and the United States seem content to talk about more sanctions (you would think that they would be a bit embarrassed by now, talking about additional sanctions when the ones in place have had no impact on Russian policy whatsoever), so its up to us to talk about solutions.
First and foremost, when dealing with Putin, a foreign leader with any hope of success must call Putin's bluff. Inform Putin that if Russia does not evacuate Crimea and Donbas within a week, that the U.S. and NATO will begin full military deployment in the Baltic Republics, Poland, and Ukraine. By deployment, I don't mean actual U.S. Marines, I'm talking about full military support, in equipment, tanks, planes, anti-aircraft batteries, surface to air missiles, and, if possible, implementation of the defensive, anti-ballistic missile "Dome" that everyone nicknamed "Star Wars". Putin cannot accuse the west of militarizing Russia's borders, not when Putin is in the middle of doing it himself. The only language Putin understands is the language of force. His only choice for diplomacy is diplomatic aggression. On the other hand, if he makes a move in the right direction, and starts to de-militarize eastern Ukraine, then the United States and NATO should take appropriate, similar action. Dealing with Putin is like trying to stop a flood. The only way to be successful is by building a dam, and saying, "no further".
The situation in Iraq and Syria is more complicated. Formerly we would evaluate the scenarios as separate battlefields. We have abandoned that perspective. The Islamic Front (IS) continues to surprise analysts and military leaders alike in its ability to rebound from defeats and its ability to transport men and equipment so quickly and effectively. Granted, the IS has become masterful at taking full advantage of sandstorms and other weather anomalies, but recent events in Anbar and also Syria have made it apparent that the IS views the conflict as one battlefield, and regroups, resupplies and conducts offensives accordingly. Today, the Iraqi military is taking drastic measures to present an all-out disaster with the loss of the Baiji refinery. There has been some discussion of an offensive to retake Ramadi, but if resources are allocated for just such an operation, don't be surprised to see Tikrit again fall to the IS. It has become apparent to us that the Iraqi military has a limited number of effective, reliable troops, and they are shuttled from one crisis area to the next. No doubt the 1500 U.S. instructors are tasked with increasing that number, but so far they haven't had much peace, with al-Asad Airbase under constant threat. We are most concerned, as we have always been, with the security of U.S. personnel, and the possible occupation of Baghdad by the IS. We would like to take the opportunity to repeat our warning to either move all non-essential U.S. personnel out of Iraq, or, evacuate it completely, hook, line, and sinker. As it is, with State Dept., Intel folks, USAID, multiple private security contractors, etc., all over the place, from Mosul to Basra, I am petrified that the IS is going to get its hands on any number of U.S. persons. We all can only imagine what would happen.
Syria is a bit different. We don't have the same concerns regarding U.S. personnel, although given the nebulous nature of the Free Syrian Army, we may be mistaken. We have been convinced for a few months now that Assad and the Ba'ath regime is living on borrowed time. We cannot envision a scenario in which Assad can pull defeat from the jaws of victory. It does appear as if Assad has been forsaken by his Russian friends, as the influx of weapons and equipment we anticipated never materialized. Is it possible that Putin's addition of one naval port (Crimea) allowed him to shelve his designs for a Mediterranean naval base, at least for the time being? The IS and its surrogates, including the burgeoning Jabhat al-Nusrah, are sitting in the catbird seat, with regime forces only in control of areas west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Sure there are outposts and isolated units in the east, but lets be realistic: Assad needs to decide if he is going to go down with the ship, a la Gadhafi, or when its best to vacate Damascus for friendlier environs (a Black Sea Dacha, maybe?). It appears as if the IS is in no hurry to settle things in Syria, probably because it currently has the full military initiative in Iraq.
How can something positive be delivered of this difficult predicament? Firstly, the decision must be made in the capitals of Europe and Washington DC, that there will be no negotiating with the Islamic State. If the member States of the EU and the United States were to sign such a pledge, it would send the right kind of message to the IS, and be a move in the right direction. The battlefield in Iraq is the key to the conflict with the IS. They have proven to be much more strategic and adept at military planning than expected, but it shouldn't be difficult to take advantage of their limited military experience. What the IS can ill-afford to lose is fighters. Make the IS bleed in Iraq; make every inch, every foot, every mile carry a tremendous price tag. This can't be achieved by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) alone, although if the Iranians were keen on a full engagement against the IS, we believe that they would win the day handily, as would the Marines that we believe should be deployed in Iraq in targeted operations, with the sole purpose being to kill as many IS fighters as possible. Sure, we could give the Iraqis the equipment that our Marines would use, but I don't trust them. In a week, there would be another evacuation, and all that equipment would end up in IS hands...again. The Marines know the job, and they will clean up. Within a month of targeted operations involving the U.S. Marines, with heavy Air Support, the IS will be on the run from Baiji and from Anbar itself. More importantly, they will be suffering a manpower issue, which can only assist whatever policy is formulated in Syria. We can't hypothesize about possible U.S. action in Syria because we still have no clue who or what the Free Syrian Army is, and where they are. Its possible that the IS could be bled enough in Iraq to allow a large-enough neutral army like the Free Syrian Army, to pacify the countryside for possible elections and the arrival of UN Peacekeepers. At this stage, in Iraq, we believe that the time has come to remind the Iraqi people that we do believe in their future, and we are willing to fight alongside them against the IS. This effort should be worth at least two permanent Air Bases and at least one, huge Army facility.
First and foremost, when dealing with Putin, a foreign leader with any hope of success must call Putin's bluff. Inform Putin that if Russia does not evacuate Crimea and Donbas within a week, that the U.S. and NATO will begin full military deployment in the Baltic Republics, Poland, and Ukraine. By deployment, I don't mean actual U.S. Marines, I'm talking about full military support, in equipment, tanks, planes, anti-aircraft batteries, surface to air missiles, and, if possible, implementation of the defensive, anti-ballistic missile "Dome" that everyone nicknamed "Star Wars". Putin cannot accuse the west of militarizing Russia's borders, not when Putin is in the middle of doing it himself. The only language Putin understands is the language of force. His only choice for diplomacy is diplomatic aggression. On the other hand, if he makes a move in the right direction, and starts to de-militarize eastern Ukraine, then the United States and NATO should take appropriate, similar action. Dealing with Putin is like trying to stop a flood. The only way to be successful is by building a dam, and saying, "no further".
The situation in Iraq and Syria is more complicated. Formerly we would evaluate the scenarios as separate battlefields. We have abandoned that perspective. The Islamic Front (IS) continues to surprise analysts and military leaders alike in its ability to rebound from defeats and its ability to transport men and equipment so quickly and effectively. Granted, the IS has become masterful at taking full advantage of sandstorms and other weather anomalies, but recent events in Anbar and also Syria have made it apparent that the IS views the conflict as one battlefield, and regroups, resupplies and conducts offensives accordingly. Today, the Iraqi military is taking drastic measures to present an all-out disaster with the loss of the Baiji refinery. There has been some discussion of an offensive to retake Ramadi, but if resources are allocated for just such an operation, don't be surprised to see Tikrit again fall to the IS. It has become apparent to us that the Iraqi military has a limited number of effective, reliable troops, and they are shuttled from one crisis area to the next. No doubt the 1500 U.S. instructors are tasked with increasing that number, but so far they haven't had much peace, with al-Asad Airbase under constant threat. We are most concerned, as we have always been, with the security of U.S. personnel, and the possible occupation of Baghdad by the IS. We would like to take the opportunity to repeat our warning to either move all non-essential U.S. personnel out of Iraq, or, evacuate it completely, hook, line, and sinker. As it is, with State Dept., Intel folks, USAID, multiple private security contractors, etc., all over the place, from Mosul to Basra, I am petrified that the IS is going to get its hands on any number of U.S. persons. We all can only imagine what would happen.
Syria is a bit different. We don't have the same concerns regarding U.S. personnel, although given the nebulous nature of the Free Syrian Army, we may be mistaken. We have been convinced for a few months now that Assad and the Ba'ath regime is living on borrowed time. We cannot envision a scenario in which Assad can pull defeat from the jaws of victory. It does appear as if Assad has been forsaken by his Russian friends, as the influx of weapons and equipment we anticipated never materialized. Is it possible that Putin's addition of one naval port (Crimea) allowed him to shelve his designs for a Mediterranean naval base, at least for the time being? The IS and its surrogates, including the burgeoning Jabhat al-Nusrah, are sitting in the catbird seat, with regime forces only in control of areas west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Sure there are outposts and isolated units in the east, but lets be realistic: Assad needs to decide if he is going to go down with the ship, a la Gadhafi, or when its best to vacate Damascus for friendlier environs (a Black Sea Dacha, maybe?). It appears as if the IS is in no hurry to settle things in Syria, probably because it currently has the full military initiative in Iraq.
How can something positive be delivered of this difficult predicament? Firstly, the decision must be made in the capitals of Europe and Washington DC, that there will be no negotiating with the Islamic State. If the member States of the EU and the United States were to sign such a pledge, it would send the right kind of message to the IS, and be a move in the right direction. The battlefield in Iraq is the key to the conflict with the IS. They have proven to be much more strategic and adept at military planning than expected, but it shouldn't be difficult to take advantage of their limited military experience. What the IS can ill-afford to lose is fighters. Make the IS bleed in Iraq; make every inch, every foot, every mile carry a tremendous price tag. This can't be achieved by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) alone, although if the Iranians were keen on a full engagement against the IS, we believe that they would win the day handily, as would the Marines that we believe should be deployed in Iraq in targeted operations, with the sole purpose being to kill as many IS fighters as possible. Sure, we could give the Iraqis the equipment that our Marines would use, but I don't trust them. In a week, there would be another evacuation, and all that equipment would end up in IS hands...again. The Marines know the job, and they will clean up. Within a month of targeted operations involving the U.S. Marines, with heavy Air Support, the IS will be on the run from Baiji and from Anbar itself. More importantly, they will be suffering a manpower issue, which can only assist whatever policy is formulated in Syria. We can't hypothesize about possible U.S. action in Syria because we still have no clue who or what the Free Syrian Army is, and where they are. Its possible that the IS could be bled enough in Iraq to allow a large-enough neutral army like the Free Syrian Army, to pacify the countryside for possible elections and the arrival of UN Peacekeepers. At this stage, in Iraq, we believe that the time has come to remind the Iraqi people that we do believe in their future, and we are willing to fight alongside them against the IS. This effort should be worth at least two permanent Air Bases and at least one, huge Army facility.
Friday, May 22, 2015
Thoughts and observations on Iraq and Syria.
[ALink: Washington Post blames Iraq for ISIS success.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
A quick read of the Washington Post's latest analysis of the conflict in Iraq has left me a bit disappointed. The Post seems content on laying the blame for the disaster that is Iraq at the feet of the Iraqi government. They would be absolutely correct in their assessment. They would also be displaying a sad lack of journalistic integrity and follow-through. Once the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) retook Iraq without the assistance of the Shi'a militia, the Obama Administration was quick to take as much credit as the press corps would allow. Its probably accurate to opine that Tikrit would not have fallen as quickly if it weren't for the air support provided by the Obama Air Coalition. The fact that Tikrit was retaken without the militias gave support to the idea that the ISF and the Air Coalition could successfully defeat the Islamic State (IS) alone. All the while, analysts with a bit of experience and patience to their credit, were politely reminding the excited Administration folks that trouble was brewing in Anbar. The truth is, trouble never stopped brewing in Anbar. The IS had every intention of an offensive to take Ramadi and isolate Haditha and the al-Asad Air Base, long before the retaking of Tikrit. If anything, it made the task easier by withdrawing the more experienced and reliable elements of the ISF (undeniably necessarily now that the militias have lost favor) from defensive positions in Anbar to the assault on Tikrit. As we expected, Joe Biden's celebration of the fall of Tikrit was short-lived, as everything since has turned to shit. Baiji will probably fall (the Obama Administration is already negating the importance of Baiji by reminding the press that the facility does not have the adequate professional staff on hand to properly function), as will other small pockets of ISF resistance, and Baghdad will begin to sense the noose.
Today we learned that IS had taken Palmyra, and if the Islamic State follows its usual game plan, then antiquities from the time of the Old Testament are likely to be destroyed. We've heard this refrain before, as every sacred archeological site in Mesopotamia seems to either be ruined on or the chopping block. Call me uncaring and cold-hearted, but the loss of Nineveh, Babylon and Palmyra aren't what gives me a case of the Red-Ass. What really burns me up learning about all the vehicles and equipment that the ISF left in Ramadi! I want to know, was this equipment LOANED to Iraq, or was it sold to them? We went through this once before, in the Battle for Tikrit Part I. At that time, the equipment that was deserted on the battlefield and picked up by IS fighters, was all donated to the Iraqi military. But this time around, I expect some accounting! Anyone in the Democratic Party ever heard of financial accountability? How about, "once-burned, twice shy"? I know at least twenty Humvees were left for the IS to confiscate, but what really worries me is, what about artillery, rocket launchers, mortars, ammunition? Did the U.S. taxpayer AGAIN pay for equipping the IS? From this point forward, I suggest we require payment UP-FRONT for any military equipment.
Lets chat a bit about the "Free Syrian Army" (FSA). That's all we can do, is chat a bit, because no one has ever really spoken about it. True, the FSA has a nice introduction, which provided a narrative which the press corps was supposed to read between the lines. The not-so discreetly hidden message in the narrative was that this FSA was supposed to act as the surrogate ground force that the Obama Administration was unwilling to introduce into the conflict. Its my understanding that extensive training was undertaken in Jordan, with careful steps taken not to rush the issue. Well, folks, the issue appears to have rushed itself. I have no clue where the FSA is located and if they have actually seen any action. In fact, I was relying on some form of engagement, so that I would have an idea what side they would be fighting. We can assume that the FSA would not engage regime forces, so would IS forces be the main target? Well, they might want to get moving, because the IS seems about ready to pin-the-tail on this donkey.
I wouldn't advise anyone to keep a lookout for the FSA. I assume that given recent developments, it would be difficult to stop the IS and Jabhat al-Nusrah from finishing off the Assad regime. Certainly the FSA, if it had the numbers, could cause all sorts of problems for the IS in the area south of Damascus and near the Jordan border and the Golan Heights, but I wouldn't advise getting too close to areas patrolled by the Israelis. So yes, the FSA could cause trouble for the IS in the area of Damascus (and south), but what would be the point? All it would accomplish is possibly provide a lifeline to Assad, although even that seems unlikely. The smart move is to disband this army of modern-day mercenaries and give them a bit of cash for their troubles. What worries would be some brilliant military strategist in the Administration making the argument that the FSA should be used in Iraq to fight the IS. Ideally, forcing the IS to defend its western border in Anbar sounds like a smart move. But I have always been opposed to surrogate armies. If the cause isn't important enough to use U.S. troops, then it must be someone else's war.
Saturday, May 2, 2015
What can we expect if Bashir al-Assad is forced to abandon Damascus?
Links: A. Assad forces losing more ground in Syria.
B. Assad's weaknesses being exploited.
Everyday the headlines bring news of more territory lost to pro-government forces, as the hodge-podge of various anti-Assad groups push closer and closer to Damascus. In recent weeks, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a well-organized group that many identify as Al-Qaeda's proxy in the Syrian conflict, has taken the lead, and delivered a string of defeats to the regular Syrian Army near the northwest town of Idlib. Syria's second-largest city of Aleppo, which is just north of Idlib, presently is not controlled by either side. Within the last year, regime forces have suffered losses in every corner of the country. The Iraqi border area is controlled by the Islamic State, while the northeast border with Turkey appears to be under mostly Kurdish control. The Jordanian border area in the southwest has seen a successful push by Jabhat al-Nusrah as of late, with the regime no longer able to claim control of any of the towns.
Although I have argued on numerous occasions that the IS, JN, and the Khorosan group were basically separate digits connected to the same hand, the hand of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda. I have always based my opinion on the strong historic links between all the groups and Al-Qaeda, and the usefulness of having the enemy imagine ten separate opponents on the battlefield as opposed to one. In truth, I'm sure these groups do have certain issues of ideology or ceremony that aren't the same, but at the end of the day, they share they same basic goal: creating an Islamic Extremist state in Syria (and the entire Levant, for that matter). Interestingly enough, now that the Kurds have solidified their defensive positions in the north eastern border region, all of these groups can focus exclusively on regime military targets. I would imagine that if they truly were opposed to each other, then we would eventually see some sign of conflict; it's human nature. Even the nebulous "Free Syrian Army", equipped and trained by the United States, appears to be focused on Syrian military units. In a nutshell, Its all against one.
If the regime is unable to respond effectively, what can be expected? Right now, Assad's control basically is limited to everything west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range, which includes the entire Mediterranean coast, and the area around Damascus, although the Yarmouk refugee camp just outside Damascus has apparently been co-opted by the IS. As difficult as it is to imagine, Assad controls roughly one-eighth of Syria, the enemy is collecting at the gates. No doubt, when it becomes necessary, Assad and his family will be able to find asylum in Iran, Oman, or some friendly country, and plenty of money has been squirrelled away in various banks to keep him and his henchmen living comfortably for the remainder of their days. The question is, will Assad recognize the moment, when the time has come to abandon ship? He has shown a great deal of determination in the past, and he has stayed in Damascus when many others would have left.
Who picks up the pieces? Will it be Jabhat al-Nusrah? Or possibly Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State? Don't put your hopes on the Free Syrian Army. As soon as the U.S. money goes away, these guys will disappear into the hills. I believe that the Islamic State will take charge, and the experts will begin to consider that maybe these groups weren't so far apart after all. While the IS solidifies its position, maybe Angela Merkel and President Obama and convene a summit to enact sanctions. One thing is certain; whatever military resources that will be made available because of the end of hostilities in Syria, will quickly make their way to the battlefields of Iraq.
B. Assad's weaknesses being exploited.
Everyday the headlines bring news of more territory lost to pro-government forces, as the hodge-podge of various anti-Assad groups push closer and closer to Damascus. In recent weeks, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a well-organized group that many identify as Al-Qaeda's proxy in the Syrian conflict, has taken the lead, and delivered a string of defeats to the regular Syrian Army near the northwest town of Idlib. Syria's second-largest city of Aleppo, which is just north of Idlib, presently is not controlled by either side. Within the last year, regime forces have suffered losses in every corner of the country. The Iraqi border area is controlled by the Islamic State, while the northeast border with Turkey appears to be under mostly Kurdish control. The Jordanian border area in the southwest has seen a successful push by Jabhat al-Nusrah as of late, with the regime no longer able to claim control of any of the towns.
Although I have argued on numerous occasions that the IS, JN, and the Khorosan group were basically separate digits connected to the same hand, the hand of Ayman al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda. I have always based my opinion on the strong historic links between all the groups and Al-Qaeda, and the usefulness of having the enemy imagine ten separate opponents on the battlefield as opposed to one. In truth, I'm sure these groups do have certain issues of ideology or ceremony that aren't the same, but at the end of the day, they share they same basic goal: creating an Islamic Extremist state in Syria (and the entire Levant, for that matter). Interestingly enough, now that the Kurds have solidified their defensive positions in the north eastern border region, all of these groups can focus exclusively on regime military targets. I would imagine that if they truly were opposed to each other, then we would eventually see some sign of conflict; it's human nature. Even the nebulous "Free Syrian Army", equipped and trained by the United States, appears to be focused on Syrian military units. In a nutshell, Its all against one.
If the regime is unable to respond effectively, what can be expected? Right now, Assad's control basically is limited to everything west of the Anti-Lebanon Mountain Range, which includes the entire Mediterranean coast, and the area around Damascus, although the Yarmouk refugee camp just outside Damascus has apparently been co-opted by the IS. As difficult as it is to imagine, Assad controls roughly one-eighth of Syria, the enemy is collecting at the gates. No doubt, when it becomes necessary, Assad and his family will be able to find asylum in Iran, Oman, or some friendly country, and plenty of money has been squirrelled away in various banks to keep him and his henchmen living comfortably for the remainder of their days. The question is, will Assad recognize the moment, when the time has come to abandon ship? He has shown a great deal of determination in the past, and he has stayed in Damascus when many others would have left.
Who picks up the pieces? Will it be Jabhat al-Nusrah? Or possibly Al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State? Don't put your hopes on the Free Syrian Army. As soon as the U.S. money goes away, these guys will disappear into the hills. I believe that the Islamic State will take charge, and the experts will begin to consider that maybe these groups weren't so far apart after all. While the IS solidifies its position, maybe Angela Merkel and President Obama and convene a summit to enact sanctions. One thing is certain; whatever military resources that will be made available because of the end of hostilities in Syria, will quickly make their way to the battlefields of Iraq.
Wednesday, December 31, 2014
The Islamic State: Have We Lost Our Opportunity?
Links: A. Jihadists Building Training Camps In Iraq & Syria
B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq
We all have our routines. In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news. I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media. For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq. Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically. As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth. When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy. Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network. Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail. The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces". Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria. Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army". The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only. About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush. An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.
For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope. In other words, its a mess. Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered. I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three. Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive. In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area. I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am. As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran. No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat. This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well. The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad. Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.
I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army. I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin. Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus. I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad. Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria. I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad. But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon. This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.
Back to my simple list of questions:
B. IS Kills Iranian Revolutionary Guard General In Iraq
C. Leader Of Shia Militia Killed By IS In Iraq
We all have our routines. In the morning, before I take a shower or have anything to eat, I hop online and read email and a bit of news. I usually scan the Drudgereport, which is very effective at relaying certain "trends" in the U.S. media. For instance, lately I can't find any news about our involvement in Syria and Iraq. Thank goodness for the Long War Journal, which not only has the pulse of every hot spot, but keeps relevant stories accessible chronologically. As for the mainstream media, the issue has dropped off the face of the earth. When President Obama announced a U.S.-led air campaign against Islamic State (IS) targets in Iraq and Syria, the media was giddy. Even I expected daily stories of bombing sorties and missions to cripple the IS supply network. Respected military strategists, and probably the Pentagon itself, were quietly not optimistic that an air campaign not operating in concert with ground forces would ultimately fail. The knee-jerk reaction on behalf of the administration was loud enough to shatter glass, and on September 10, President Obama announced a continuation of the air campaign alongside an effort to train, equip, and stand-up an ethnic Syrian army, which would ideally become the missing "ground forces". Since that announcement on September 10, the details released by the administration on this force have been scant, confusing and sometimes contradictory. We were told by the Pentagon that this ethnic Syrian force would be led by former Syrian Army officers, whose goals were a secular, free political society in Syria. Later we were told that it would take three, possibly four months to stand-up this army, which eventually adopted the moniker "Free Syrian Army". The strangest announcement I recall claimed that the Free Syrian Army would not be allowed to engage in offensive operations, that it would be limited to defensive actions only. About the same time, a news report from Agency France Press announced that an effort by forces opposed to the IS, including the Free Syrian Army, had been soundly defeated after attempting an ambush. An ambush stretches the limits of defensive action about as far as it can be stretched, I think.
For those of you familiar with the term, the U.S. involvement in Syria and Iraq has become a complete Goat Rope. In other words, its a mess. Two months ago I asked a set of questions that weren't answered. I repeated those questions last month, and it appears I will be going for month number three. Reports from both Iraq and Syria appear to indicate that the IS in on the offensive. In Iraq, the IS has chosen to solidify its hold on Fallujah (and Ramadi?) and continues to swallow up town after town in the greater Baghdad area. I half-expected an IS attack on Baghdad by now, but the bad guys are obviously thinking a bit more strategically that I am. As the Iranians become increasingly involved, the IS has stepped up its presence in Diyala Province, which borders Iran. No doubt the Ayatollahs and the Muftis and the Grand Poobahs in Qom are freaking out that these Sunni Apostates are just a cow patty toss away from Iran, and will demand that Iranian resources be coalesced to meet the threat. This will leave the Shia militias leaderless (a few are already leaderless, as detailed in links 2 and 3), not to mention a militia or two may scurry over to Diyala as well. The Iraqi Army has been relying on the Shia militias, which have been instrumental in the defense of the Baiji Refinery and the Iraqi Army's efforts to defend greater Baghdad. Without Iranian assistance, the Iraqi Army doesn't stand a chance against the IS.
I had predicted that Syrian de-facto President Bashir al-Assad would take full advantage of the allied bombing campaign against the IS, to repair and re-equip the regular Syrian Army. I opined about the reconstitution of armor (heavy tanks) units and even the possibility of a few new helicopter gunships, courtesy of Assad's best buddy, Vlad Putin. Instead, I continue to read story after story of IS units kicking the shit out of regime forces in the far east provinces and also near Aleppo and even Damascus. I assumed that the dream of having a Russian naval base in the Mediterranean would inspire Putin to throw in all his chips behind Assad. Ideally, the Russians should have taken the break provided by the commencement of the allied air campaign (and the headline-grabbing Kobane struggle) to resupply and equip Assad's regular army, which would then be in a position to defeat a weakened IS and keep control of Syria. I know this will come as a surprise to many in the west, but the urban populations of Syria (Christian, Muslim, and whatever else) actually support Assad. But once Turkish President Erdogan decided that Assad wasn't his "cup of tea", many regional leaders jumped on Erdogan's bandwagon. This explains why the local media refuses to broadcast the fact that urban Syrians, including the majority of Christians, support Assad and believe he has taken positive steps to protect them throughout his time in office.
Back to my simple list of questions:
- What is the status of the Free Syrian Army?
- Has the FSA been stood up?
- Does the FSA have the option to undertake offensive operations or is it intended exclusively for defense?
- What is the status of the air campaign?
- What percentage of missions has been flown by our allies, compared to the number of missions flown by the U.S. Air Force?
- If the IS occupies Baghdad, will this trigger greater military involvement on behalf of the United States?
- If the IS were defeated in Syria, and the FSA and regular Syrian began a struggle for control of the country, would the U.S. military get involved?
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
Extremists On The Offensive In Syria
Links: A. Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar al Sham Advance In Syria
B. Islamic State Advances On Deir al Zour
Lately I've had to come to grips with the fact that I was wrong regarding certain events in Syria. Last month I repeatedly raised expectations that forces loyal to de facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad would have had the opportunity to refit and reorganize. I opined that Russian military aid would have allowed the Syrian Armed Forces to reconstitute its armor brigades and possibly rebuild the Syrian Air Force. The Allied air campaign should have occupied the Islamic State (ISIL) and the various other armed groups enough to allow the regular Syrian Army an opportunity to regain the strategic initiative, I hypothesized. It appears that I was mistaken. Even though in late November the international media printed a number of stories indicating a slow down in ISIL military advances, the reality is that the extremist groups were on the move just about everywhere.
For some reason, the press and media continue to separate the groups who make up the Islamic extremist element in Syria. Wasn't there a recognition in October that Al-Nusra, ISIL, Ahrar al Sham (and whoever else wants to throw their hat into the ring) are loyal to Al-Qaeda? And yet we continue to see Al-Nusra being given the mantle of "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria", as if we are referring to a Lodge meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Unless I see some usefulness in doing so, I will not refer to separate Islamic extremist factions in Syria. I have a good idea why the U.S. media (eager to do the bidding of this administration) continues to perpetrate the falsehood that their is some significant difference between these groups. Qatar (and possibly the UAE as well), who has a couple jets involved in the "anti-ISIS" air campaign, has been suspected of supporting some of these other groups in the past. Qatar wants to be seen as only bombing ISIL targets, because ISIL's message of an enlarged Caliphate is dangerous to the existing Gulf royal families. Qatar wants to continue its "clandestine" support for these other groups, though, so they will only participate in ther bombing of ISIL targets. If someone has evidence that Qatar and the UAE contingents in the air campaign have indeed participated in action against non-ISIL targets, please let me know. Actually, I'm not even sure of the United States is bombing non-ISIL targets (although you would think that "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria" would be in line for some sort of attention).
What a mess. We can be certain of one thing: the regular Syrian forces have been taking a beating in the northwestern province of Idlib and eastern province of Deir al Zour. Interestingly enough, the extremists have been making effective use of American-made TOW anti-tank missiles in action against Syrian armor. Will I be the first to consider just how the TOW anti-tank missiles ended up the hands of the extremists? Were they originally the property of the Free Syrian Army that is being supported and armed by the United States? Assad can only be ringing his hands in despair as the U.S.-led air campaign seems to be having no impact on the Islamic extremists offensives against the few remaining government positions outside of Damascus. I'm one of those folks who likes to look at a big map and envision the various military elements and positions accordingly. I have spent a decent amount of time focusing on the regular Syrian Army, and I think I'm beginning to get a grasp on the three main groups that constitute the Islamic extremist forces. But I'm totally in the dark regarding the army that the United States government was planning on training in place of U.S. ground forces. Last summer we were told that the United States military would be training and equipping the "Free Syrian Army" (sometimes called the "New Syrian Army"). If my memory serves me correctly, this military force was led by a group of former regime officers who were both secular and opposed to Assad. Money was allotted for the training and equipping of this army, and I recall the Pentagon supposing that it would take somewhere around four months to stand-up the Free Syrian Army. In October, my understanding of the situation was shaken like an Etch-a-Sketch. The Pentagon released a statement declaring that the Free Syrian Army would be a force utilized for defensive operations only. Then a few days later, I recall news reports indicating that elements of the free Syrian Army had been involved in a battle with ISIS, and came away the worse for it. Was this a "defensive only" engagement?
If I could get the answers to a few simple questions, my understanding of the conflict would be increased measurably. What is the state of the Free Syrian Army? Does it exist, is it active, and will the Pentagon confirm its previous statement that the Free Syrian Army has definite rules of engagement that limit is capabilities to defensive action only? Is it true that the Qatari government requested rules of engagement for its contribution to the air campaign, which would exempt Qatari jets from bombing any targets other than ISIL? If so, does the UAE, Kuwait or Bahrain have the same prohibition sewn into their agreement to be part of the Allied air coalition? I can't help but feel a bit lost on the Syrian front. The last time I spent much time on this part of the map, the Kurds were besieged by ISIL in Kobane; has this situation in Kobane changed? Its true I have been keeping a closer eye on developments in Iraq, as the growing Iranian involvement has me reconsidering my prediction that Baghdad would eventually fall to ISIL. The Iranians have the capacity to defeat ISIL hands-down. At the same time, the Iranian government might decide to climb back into its hole and pull back its resources. When it comes to efforts to obtain weapons-grade Uranium, the Iranians are easy to predict. But when it comes to the deployment of its military, Iran can vacillate with the best of them.
B. Islamic State Advances On Deir al Zour
Lately I've had to come to grips with the fact that I was wrong regarding certain events in Syria. Last month I repeatedly raised expectations that forces loyal to de facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad would have had the opportunity to refit and reorganize. I opined that Russian military aid would have allowed the Syrian Armed Forces to reconstitute its armor brigades and possibly rebuild the Syrian Air Force. The Allied air campaign should have occupied the Islamic State (ISIL) and the various other armed groups enough to allow the regular Syrian Army an opportunity to regain the strategic initiative, I hypothesized. It appears that I was mistaken. Even though in late November the international media printed a number of stories indicating a slow down in ISIL military advances, the reality is that the extremist groups were on the move just about everywhere.
For some reason, the press and media continue to separate the groups who make up the Islamic extremist element in Syria. Wasn't there a recognition in October that Al-Nusra, ISIL, Ahrar al Sham (and whoever else wants to throw their hat into the ring) are loyal to Al-Qaeda? And yet we continue to see Al-Nusra being given the mantle of "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria", as if we are referring to a Lodge meeting in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Unless I see some usefulness in doing so, I will not refer to separate Islamic extremist factions in Syria. I have a good idea why the U.S. media (eager to do the bidding of this administration) continues to perpetrate the falsehood that their is some significant difference between these groups. Qatar (and possibly the UAE as well), who has a couple jets involved in the "anti-ISIS" air campaign, has been suspected of supporting some of these other groups in the past. Qatar wants to be seen as only bombing ISIL targets, because ISIL's message of an enlarged Caliphate is dangerous to the existing Gulf royal families. Qatar wants to continue its "clandestine" support for these other groups, though, so they will only participate in ther bombing of ISIL targets. If someone has evidence that Qatar and the UAE contingents in the air campaign have indeed participated in action against non-ISIL targets, please let me know. Actually, I'm not even sure of the United States is bombing non-ISIL targets (although you would think that "Al-Qaeda's representative in Syria" would be in line for some sort of attention).
What a mess. We can be certain of one thing: the regular Syrian forces have been taking a beating in the northwestern province of Idlib and eastern province of Deir al Zour. Interestingly enough, the extremists have been making effective use of American-made TOW anti-tank missiles in action against Syrian armor. Will I be the first to consider just how the TOW anti-tank missiles ended up the hands of the extremists? Were they originally the property of the Free Syrian Army that is being supported and armed by the United States? Assad can only be ringing his hands in despair as the U.S.-led air campaign seems to be having no impact on the Islamic extremists offensives against the few remaining government positions outside of Damascus. I'm one of those folks who likes to look at a big map and envision the various military elements and positions accordingly. I have spent a decent amount of time focusing on the regular Syrian Army, and I think I'm beginning to get a grasp on the three main groups that constitute the Islamic extremist forces. But I'm totally in the dark regarding the army that the United States government was planning on training in place of U.S. ground forces. Last summer we were told that the United States military would be training and equipping the "Free Syrian Army" (sometimes called the "New Syrian Army"). If my memory serves me correctly, this military force was led by a group of former regime officers who were both secular and opposed to Assad. Money was allotted for the training and equipping of this army, and I recall the Pentagon supposing that it would take somewhere around four months to stand-up the Free Syrian Army. In October, my understanding of the situation was shaken like an Etch-a-Sketch. The Pentagon released a statement declaring that the Free Syrian Army would be a force utilized for defensive operations only. Then a few days later, I recall news reports indicating that elements of the free Syrian Army had been involved in a battle with ISIS, and came away the worse for it. Was this a "defensive only" engagement?
If I could get the answers to a few simple questions, my understanding of the conflict would be increased measurably. What is the state of the Free Syrian Army? Does it exist, is it active, and will the Pentagon confirm its previous statement that the Free Syrian Army has definite rules of engagement that limit is capabilities to defensive action only? Is it true that the Qatari government requested rules of engagement for its contribution to the air campaign, which would exempt Qatari jets from bombing any targets other than ISIL? If so, does the UAE, Kuwait or Bahrain have the same prohibition sewn into their agreement to be part of the Allied air coalition? I can't help but feel a bit lost on the Syrian front. The last time I spent much time on this part of the map, the Kurds were besieged by ISIL in Kobane; has this situation in Kobane changed? Its true I have been keeping a closer eye on developments in Iraq, as the growing Iranian involvement has me reconsidering my prediction that Baghdad would eventually fall to ISIL. The Iranians have the capacity to defeat ISIL hands-down. At the same time, the Iranian government might decide to climb back into its hole and pull back its resources. When it comes to efforts to obtain weapons-grade Uranium, the Iranians are easy to predict. But when it comes to the deployment of its military, Iran can vacillate with the best of them.
Friday, October 10, 2014
What's Up With The Republic Of Turkey Nowadays?
Links: War Moves Into Turkey
Wikipedia On Turkey
Where have you been, Turkey? Every few days I am obliged to create a post about the struggle against the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIS, ISIL or IS); bad news seldom takes a holiday. How did we get to this place? Following the ritualistic beheading of two Americans, President Obama announced that the United States was taking military action against IS targets in Iraq and Syria. Obama added that the United States would, under no circumstances, introduce ground forces into the conflict. Instead, the U.S. Air Force would bomb the IS into the Stone Age. For good measure, we are training and arming a surrogate army to finish off the IS with a ground campaign (but not for four, maybe five months because that's how long it takes to train and equip a surrogate army in 2014). The surrogate element identifies itself as the "Free Syrian Army", and consists of many Syrian Army former officers and front-line troops. President Obama was able to enlist France, The United Kingdom, and the Arab Gulf monarchies to join his "Coalition of the Unwilling to use Ground Troops", but some enormously important questions remain unanswered. What will the Free Syrian Army do after the IS has been defeated? Will it turn its weapons on the regular Syrian Army, which is heavily supported by Vladimir Putin and Russia? What about all the other groups the Administration has parade by during press conferences (Al-Nusra Front, Khorasan, Al-Qaeda)? Are they also targets of the Free Syrian Army? And if not, how does the IS tell them apart?
To repeat myself, where are you, Turkey? The Turks share a southern border with both Iraq and Syria. (A large part of that geographical piece is considered by the Kurds to be part of Kurdistan). For centuries, back to the years of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks and the Kurds have struggled for control of this part of the world (since its not Asia Minor, and its not really Mesopotamia, I will just refer to it as "Asia Minopotamia"). Some of the blackest pages in Turkey's personal history book have to do with Kurdistan. On more than a few occasions over the past two centuries, the Turks have committed acts of genocide against the Kurds. I realize that by saying this, I royally piss off a number of very close Turkish friends, but it is my interpretation of history; believe me, I wish it weren't so. The Kurds have always been a thorn in Turkey's side, and when historically bad famines and droughts hit Turkey, the Kurds were last to receive help. I won't spend anymore time on the subject, especially since there is so much open source material available. Fast forward to 2014, the Kurds are fighting for their lives not against the Turks or famine, or even Saddam Hussein, but against the IS. At present, its not really possible to draw a static map of who-occupies-what. The Kurds are in possession of some territory in northern Syria, but the main theater of war at the moment is in Iraq. In the north, the Kurds are fighting the IS, and the central part of Iraq, the Iraqi Army and Shia Brigades are opposing the IS. Back in Syria, the regular Syrian Army continues to occasionally engage IS forces. For the time being, though, all eyes seem to be on very north central Syria and the town of Kobani.
At times I find it difficult to accept that Syria and Turkey share such a continuous, strategic border. For many centuries, the border did not exist, as Syria and Turkey were both part of the Ottoman Empire. Now, for all practical purposes, the border separates wealth from poverty, Europe from the Levant, and West from East. I know many will disagree, and argue (effectively, I'm sure) that Asia Minor is not Europe and that Turkey is not a first-world country. I make my call through personal experience. I was obsessed with Turkey in my younger days, and loved every chance I had to visit. The Turks are a friendly, proud people; you will rarely see beggars or hungry children in Turkey. But the Turkey of my youth is disappearing. Secular Turkey (with its handful of generals ready to take charge if the civilians get too ambitious) has seen a rise in Islamist political activities and a movement to strengthen Turkey's Islamic cultural heritage and traditions. President Recep Erdogan, who was elected in August 2014 with a 51% to 38% margin over his nearest competitor, is not fan of the Army. During the later half of the last century, the Turkish military did not hesitate to remove elected leaders at the slightest sign of movement away from secularism. I believe Erdogan is too popular for the military to act against, so I just keep my fingers crossed that he doesn't allow Turkey to suffer an Islamic revolution like the one that swallowed Iran in 1979.
Regarding the situation in Syria and Iraq, where does Turkey stand? One thing to keep in mind: Turkey has a FORMIDABLE Armed Forces. There was a time when Turkey was only interested in keeping an army larger than Greece's, but membership in NATO changed everything. For all practical purposes, Turkey's military was created, nursed and raised to adulthood by the United States military. Because of the all-important NATO missile sites located in Turkey (and aimed at Russia, I believe, although there may be one aimed at the Eifel Tower), The United States was more than willing to train and equip the Turkish Army. Roughly 15 years ago, the Turkish military took the surprising step of conducting joint operations with Israel (the advent of Erdogan has cooled relations between Ankara and Jerusalem). In equipment, size, and readiness, I believe that the Turkish military is en par with France, the UK and Germany (Greece who?). Where does Turkey stand? Why haven't the Turks taken a stand against the IS, which is about as nasty a group as there is? Allegedly, Erdogan offered to join the Coalition and use the Turkish Army if Obama would guarantee the removal of Assad in Damascus. Obama does not have the testicular fortitude for such a call, which would piss off Putin to no end. At the moment, Turkey sees no strategy that benefits Turkey, with the exception of waiting until the dust settles. If Turkey mobilizes, they would sweep the IS from the face of the earth in a matter of days (Turkish Special Forces....Bad Ass).
But what good does that do if Assad, the thorn in Turkey's backside, stays in power? Maybe Erdogan is thinking that an IS government in Damascus is preferable to the Ba'athists and Assad? Wouldn't that be something...Turkey joins the conflict ON THE SIDE of the IS! Its just a thought; it can't happen. Turkey is a functioning Democracy with a Tiger of an economy (which is headed for a fall, say many forecasters...hope not), a thriving tourist industry and a military that would make Suleyman the Magnificent jealous. An on its southern border Turkey nurses two recurring boils; Kurdistan and the civil war in Syria. Although Erdogan has been willing to snuggle up to the Kurds for political expediency, I don't think he feels compelled to resolve the issue of Kurdistan at the moment. Besides, the Kurds have proven to be reasonable. The IS conflict, though, threatens to spill over into Turkey proper (not to mention the steady flow of refugees). Surprisingly, the Turks have yet to really mobilize militarily. What would happen if one of the combatants (count 'em again, folks: Al-Nusra Front, IS, Khorasan, Kurds, regular Syrian Army, and the free Syrian Army) began using Turkish territory as a staging point for military operations? Unfortunately, I don't see Erdogan acting proactively in this situation. He is content to let the circumstances come to him.
Wikipedia On Turkey
Where have you been, Turkey? Every few days I am obliged to create a post about the struggle against the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIS, ISIL or IS); bad news seldom takes a holiday. How did we get to this place? Following the ritualistic beheading of two Americans, President Obama announced that the United States was taking military action against IS targets in Iraq and Syria. Obama added that the United States would, under no circumstances, introduce ground forces into the conflict. Instead, the U.S. Air Force would bomb the IS into the Stone Age. For good measure, we are training and arming a surrogate army to finish off the IS with a ground campaign (but not for four, maybe five months because that's how long it takes to train and equip a surrogate army in 2014). The surrogate element identifies itself as the "Free Syrian Army", and consists of many Syrian Army former officers and front-line troops. President Obama was able to enlist France, The United Kingdom, and the Arab Gulf monarchies to join his "Coalition of the Unwilling to use Ground Troops", but some enormously important questions remain unanswered. What will the Free Syrian Army do after the IS has been defeated? Will it turn its weapons on the regular Syrian Army, which is heavily supported by Vladimir Putin and Russia? What about all the other groups the Administration has parade by during press conferences (Al-Nusra Front, Khorasan, Al-Qaeda)? Are they also targets of the Free Syrian Army? And if not, how does the IS tell them apart?
To repeat myself, where are you, Turkey? The Turks share a southern border with both Iraq and Syria. (A large part of that geographical piece is considered by the Kurds to be part of Kurdistan). For centuries, back to the years of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks and the Kurds have struggled for control of this part of the world (since its not Asia Minor, and its not really Mesopotamia, I will just refer to it as "Asia Minopotamia"). Some of the blackest pages in Turkey's personal history book have to do with Kurdistan. On more than a few occasions over the past two centuries, the Turks have committed acts of genocide against the Kurds. I realize that by saying this, I royally piss off a number of very close Turkish friends, but it is my interpretation of history; believe me, I wish it weren't so. The Kurds have always been a thorn in Turkey's side, and when historically bad famines and droughts hit Turkey, the Kurds were last to receive help. I won't spend anymore time on the subject, especially since there is so much open source material available. Fast forward to 2014, the Kurds are fighting for their lives not against the Turks or famine, or even Saddam Hussein, but against the IS. At present, its not really possible to draw a static map of who-occupies-what. The Kurds are in possession of some territory in northern Syria, but the main theater of war at the moment is in Iraq. In the north, the Kurds are fighting the IS, and the central part of Iraq, the Iraqi Army and Shia Brigades are opposing the IS. Back in Syria, the regular Syrian Army continues to occasionally engage IS forces. For the time being, though, all eyes seem to be on very north central Syria and the town of Kobani.
At times I find it difficult to accept that Syria and Turkey share such a continuous, strategic border. For many centuries, the border did not exist, as Syria and Turkey were both part of the Ottoman Empire. Now, for all practical purposes, the border separates wealth from poverty, Europe from the Levant, and West from East. I know many will disagree, and argue (effectively, I'm sure) that Asia Minor is not Europe and that Turkey is not a first-world country. I make my call through personal experience. I was obsessed with Turkey in my younger days, and loved every chance I had to visit. The Turks are a friendly, proud people; you will rarely see beggars or hungry children in Turkey. But the Turkey of my youth is disappearing. Secular Turkey (with its handful of generals ready to take charge if the civilians get too ambitious) has seen a rise in Islamist political activities and a movement to strengthen Turkey's Islamic cultural heritage and traditions. President Recep Erdogan, who was elected in August 2014 with a 51% to 38% margin over his nearest competitor, is not fan of the Army. During the later half of the last century, the Turkish military did not hesitate to remove elected leaders at the slightest sign of movement away from secularism. I believe Erdogan is too popular for the military to act against, so I just keep my fingers crossed that he doesn't allow Turkey to suffer an Islamic revolution like the one that swallowed Iran in 1979.
Regarding the situation in Syria and Iraq, where does Turkey stand? One thing to keep in mind: Turkey has a FORMIDABLE Armed Forces. There was a time when Turkey was only interested in keeping an army larger than Greece's, but membership in NATO changed everything. For all practical purposes, Turkey's military was created, nursed and raised to adulthood by the United States military. Because of the all-important NATO missile sites located in Turkey (and aimed at Russia, I believe, although there may be one aimed at the Eifel Tower), The United States was more than willing to train and equip the Turkish Army. Roughly 15 years ago, the Turkish military took the surprising step of conducting joint operations with Israel (the advent of Erdogan has cooled relations between Ankara and Jerusalem). In equipment, size, and readiness, I believe that the Turkish military is en par with France, the UK and Germany (Greece who?). Where does Turkey stand? Why haven't the Turks taken a stand against the IS, which is about as nasty a group as there is? Allegedly, Erdogan offered to join the Coalition and use the Turkish Army if Obama would guarantee the removal of Assad in Damascus. Obama does not have the testicular fortitude for such a call, which would piss off Putin to no end. At the moment, Turkey sees no strategy that benefits Turkey, with the exception of waiting until the dust settles. If Turkey mobilizes, they would sweep the IS from the face of the earth in a matter of days (Turkish Special Forces....Bad Ass).
But what good does that do if Assad, the thorn in Turkey's backside, stays in power? Maybe Erdogan is thinking that an IS government in Damascus is preferable to the Ba'athists and Assad? Wouldn't that be something...Turkey joins the conflict ON THE SIDE of the IS! Its just a thought; it can't happen. Turkey is a functioning Democracy with a Tiger of an economy (which is headed for a fall, say many forecasters...hope not), a thriving tourist industry and a military that would make Suleyman the Magnificent jealous. An on its southern border Turkey nurses two recurring boils; Kurdistan and the civil war in Syria. Although Erdogan has been willing to snuggle up to the Kurds for political expediency, I don't think he feels compelled to resolve the issue of Kurdistan at the moment. Besides, the Kurds have proven to be reasonable. The IS conflict, though, threatens to spill over into Turkey proper (not to mention the steady flow of refugees). Surprisingly, the Turks have yet to really mobilize militarily. What would happen if one of the combatants (count 'em again, folks: Al-Nusra Front, IS, Khorasan, Kurds, regular Syrian Army, and the free Syrian Army) began using Turkish territory as a staging point for military operations? Unfortunately, I don't see Erdogan acting proactively in this situation. He is content to let the circumstances come to him.
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