Showing posts with label AQ. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AQ. Show all posts
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part II)
Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
I believe that Yemen and Iraq, and possibly locations in Pakistan and Africa, are currently being utilized as training locations for the IS foot soldier. Intelligence services have already located a number of locations in Iraq which are suspected of being training centers of IS, but I believe that Yemen should be added to the list. Those who disagree with me with point out that AQ already uses Yemen as a "breaking-in" location for its members. No doubt AQ continues to conduct certain types of training in Yemen, alongside the IS. In fact, I believe that they are one and the same. We will know soon enough. Eventually a few IS prisoners of war from the Iraq and Syria conflict will, during interrogation, mention travel to Yemen for training purposes. If I'm correct, hopefully this will be the catalyst for the west to stop the damaging and wasteful routine of differentiating between these Sunni Muslim extremist groups. I do not buy into the narrative that the leader of Khorasan is angry at al-Baghdadi, so the IS and Khorasan can't be friends, or that AQ is embarrassed by the number of young men who were decapitated by IS this week, so AQ can't be tainted by association. Believe me, at the end of the day, that AK47 will be pointed at you and I and our children, it will not be pointed at another extremist. I might be a bit more sympathetic to the argument that major rifts exist between various Sunni Muslim extremist groups, if I could be presented with hard evidence. Social media captures aren't worth a bucket of shit, and neither are rumors that someone from one group shot up a few people from another group.
Islamic extremism is a giant of a beast, but at present, it has only one head, and that is Ayman al-Zawahiri. Beneath that head, a number of phalanges are jockeying, positioning themselves to move into the void once the sixty-three year old Zawahiri finally floats off to meet his virgins (we might just find him as well). For anyone who argues that these groups are not fighting together with a unique, singular goal in mind, I would ask them to please have look at the state of affairs in the world today. I cannot recall a time in my life when terrorism was so rampant and so conventional. Our military is handicapped by an Administration made up of political appointees and outright amateurs, and every move we make is reactive. Not surprisingly, the same can be said for our efforts and strategy in the Ukraine. When IS originally became aggressive in Iraq, our attempt at being an ally resulted in an entire Iraqi Army Corps deserting the field of battle, and people scurrying out of Baghdad as if it were Atlanta before Sherman came to town. The Iranians step in, and IS appears to be in retreat. The case is different in Syria, which is almost impossible to evaluate effectively. The IS (and AQ) are active in Tunisia, Libya, and various other countries in Africa. Its interesting to note that the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram recently declared its allegiance to the IS. Well guess what folks; Boko Haram has already declared its loyalty to AQ. Really, what is the difference? Both groups are working in the same arena towards the same goal: the destruction of the west and Israel. You can put all that Caliphate bullshit into the backseat. No doubt Mr. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi envisions himself as the Caliph in such a manifestation, but Zawahiri sees it for what it is: just another story in a sea of distractions, that keep the infidels from unifying their aim at the singular target.
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
Just How Much Separation Really Exists Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State? (Part I)
Links: A. Conflict Between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
If I get something wrong, I can rely upon my readers to send enough emails to ensure that I am corrected. I get so little correspondence (the email address is provided below), that I welcome a polite scolding, just for the opportunity to interact with someone who has given consideration to my perspective. And that, basically, is what the blog means to me. It provides an opportunity for me to share my perspective with an unlimited number of people around the world. Now my perspective is biased by definition. I do my best to present a balanced viewpoint, supported by my personal life experiences. But I am a citizen of the United States, and I fully believe in the exceptional nature of our Constitution and the American people; let there be no doubt that I would lay down my life for my country. But I am half-French, and I cherish every part of me that is France. That being said, I have been a world traveler, and I make a supreme effort to give full consideration to all viewpoints. One issue that seems to draw sharp dividing lines is the relationship between the two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). I have included two links that present opinions which are contrary to my own, in an effort to jump-start a conversation which is truly very important. The sources for the links I have provided, continually use information obtained from Social Media as evidence of a rift between the two organizations. We have also heard vague rumors of actual violence between the groups, and also conflict with some of the other players on the ground in Iraq, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group (K). Both links are well-written and ideally sourced. I found both commentaries to be full of well-intended, useful information. But in the end, I disagree with their basic premise. I believe that AQ and IS are closely linked and work within a loose, coordinated Confederation of sorts. And the sooner we recognize this fact, the better.
Its no secret that the IS has evolved from the remnants of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). I see many similarities. The first link above continues to highlight the atrocities committed by IS and its obvious propensity towards violence, as if AQ plays the game differently. The history of the AQ movement begs to differ. AQ brought us televised beheadings from Afghanistan when such demonstrations were still good for a bit of shock value. AQ has ordered the slaughter of entire villages in Afghanistan and whole families in Pakistan. I assume that I don't have to remind anyone about the amount of blood shed on September 11, 2001, or the desecration of the bodies of three U.S. contractors in Fallujah/Ramadi during Operation Enduring Freedom. Osama bin-Laden fully understood the power of violence as a tool in both warfare and perception. Bin-Laden frequently used violence to create fear in his enemies and the public in general, who would in turn acquiesce to his will. Its not a new approach, nor is it Rocket Science (damn to hell all those clichés!). I believe the attacks of September 11 carried a different message, a declaration of war against Christianity, Judaism and the west, as represented by the United States. President George W. Bush recognized the determination in his enemy, and decided upon a course of action that will be debated until the end of time. Bush decided to force AQ into a conventional conflict, in AQ's own backyard. He used the issue of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" as a platform (excuse? justification?) from which to force AQ into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. He correctly deduced that AQ could not avoid the confrontation with the U.S. Army in the heart of Islam, or risk losing legitimacy with the Muslim community internationally. He was also correct in assuming that AQ would suffer logistics and funding crises, which would hamper its ability to stay active elsewhere. I don't believe Bush, Rumsfeld or the Pentagon anticipated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the depth of the Iraqi insurgency, but before leaving office in 2008, he could be satisfied with the status quo in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bin-Laden and his elderly Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Physician-turned sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri (now that was a mouthful) obviously assessed the situation and realized early on that Bush was attempting to paint them into a corner. But for the time being, they were obliged to play the game. But Bin-Laden considered our Democratic habits to be our Achilles tendon, and in this instance he may have been correct. in 2008, the American people voted for a new direction, and a new direction is what we received. Although it didn't begin immediately, you might as well circle President Obama's first day in office as the start of the U.S. military's draw-down and eventual departure from Iraq. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri anticipated this, and focused on rebuilding their movement from the ground-up (I'm frequently including Zawahiri because he now runs the show, and we need to get accustomed to his brand of terrorism. He is methodical, detail-oriented, brilliant and probably a sociopath, and he is the enemy). If the west wanted a conventional war, then the movement was happy to oblige. First and foremost, I believe that sometime in between 2007 and 2009, AQ reviewed and rebuilt its internal security network. Bin-Laden realized that many parts of his network had been compromised and a simpler, more effective plan was put in place. The key to this plan was to limit the amount of time members engaged in face to face contact outside of the battlefield, and to severely limit all contact with Bin-Laden and Zawahiri. Steps were taken to eliminate the need for direct contact. As long as the brain could communicate with the limbs, everything else was almost superfluous. Also, a designation must exist between highly-trained, professional operatives and the continued stream of unskilled volunteers that make there way into the organization. I believe the root of the original AQ, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which trains highly skilled and motivated operatives for complex operations, still functions as it always has. What has changed is the growth of another type of operative, the foot soldier who will give the movement a resource which was sorely lacking in Afghanistan and Iraq: a conventional offensive capability.
B. Are Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State at War?
If I get something wrong, I can rely upon my readers to send enough emails to ensure that I am corrected. I get so little correspondence (the email address is provided below), that I welcome a polite scolding, just for the opportunity to interact with someone who has given consideration to my perspective. And that, basically, is what the blog means to me. It provides an opportunity for me to share my perspective with an unlimited number of people around the world. Now my perspective is biased by definition. I do my best to present a balanced viewpoint, supported by my personal life experiences. But I am a citizen of the United States, and I fully believe in the exceptional nature of our Constitution and the American people; let there be no doubt that I would lay down my life for my country. But I am half-French, and I cherish every part of me that is France. That being said, I have been a world traveler, and I make a supreme effort to give full consideration to all viewpoints. One issue that seems to draw sharp dividing lines is the relationship between the two terrorist groups Al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS). I have included two links that present opinions which are contrary to my own, in an effort to jump-start a conversation which is truly very important. The sources for the links I have provided, continually use information obtained from Social Media as evidence of a rift between the two organizations. We have also heard vague rumors of actual violence between the groups, and also conflict with some of the other players on the ground in Iraq, including Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group (K). Both links are well-written and ideally sourced. I found both commentaries to be full of well-intended, useful information. But in the end, I disagree with their basic premise. I believe that AQ and IS are closely linked and work within a loose, coordinated Confederation of sorts. And the sooner we recognize this fact, the better.
Its no secret that the IS has evolved from the remnants of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). I see many similarities. The first link above continues to highlight the atrocities committed by IS and its obvious propensity towards violence, as if AQ plays the game differently. The history of the AQ movement begs to differ. AQ brought us televised beheadings from Afghanistan when such demonstrations were still good for a bit of shock value. AQ has ordered the slaughter of entire villages in Afghanistan and whole families in Pakistan. I assume that I don't have to remind anyone about the amount of blood shed on September 11, 2001, or the desecration of the bodies of three U.S. contractors in Fallujah/Ramadi during Operation Enduring Freedom. Osama bin-Laden fully understood the power of violence as a tool in both warfare and perception. Bin-Laden frequently used violence to create fear in his enemies and the public in general, who would in turn acquiesce to his will. Its not a new approach, nor is it Rocket Science (damn to hell all those clichés!). I believe the attacks of September 11 carried a different message, a declaration of war against Christianity, Judaism and the west, as represented by the United States. President George W. Bush recognized the determination in his enemy, and decided upon a course of action that will be debated until the end of time. Bush decided to force AQ into a conventional conflict, in AQ's own backyard. He used the issue of "Weapons of Mass Destruction" as a platform (excuse? justification?) from which to force AQ into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan. He correctly deduced that AQ could not avoid the confrontation with the U.S. Army in the heart of Islam, or risk losing legitimacy with the Muslim community internationally. He was also correct in assuming that AQ would suffer logistics and funding crises, which would hamper its ability to stay active elsewhere. I don't believe Bush, Rumsfeld or the Pentagon anticipated Abu Musab al-Zarqawi or the depth of the Iraqi insurgency, but before leaving office in 2008, he could be satisfied with the status quo in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bin-Laden and his elderly Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Physician-turned sidekick Ayman al-Zawahiri (now that was a mouthful) obviously assessed the situation and realized early on that Bush was attempting to paint them into a corner. But for the time being, they were obliged to play the game. But Bin-Laden considered our Democratic habits to be our Achilles tendon, and in this instance he may have been correct. in 2008, the American people voted for a new direction, and a new direction is what we received. Although it didn't begin immediately, you might as well circle President Obama's first day in office as the start of the U.S. military's draw-down and eventual departure from Iraq. Bin-Laden and Zawahiri anticipated this, and focused on rebuilding their movement from the ground-up (I'm frequently including Zawahiri because he now runs the show, and we need to get accustomed to his brand of terrorism. He is methodical, detail-oriented, brilliant and probably a sociopath, and he is the enemy). If the west wanted a conventional war, then the movement was happy to oblige. First and foremost, I believe that sometime in between 2007 and 2009, AQ reviewed and rebuilt its internal security network. Bin-Laden realized that many parts of his network had been compromised and a simpler, more effective plan was put in place. The key to this plan was to limit the amount of time members engaged in face to face contact outside of the battlefield, and to severely limit all contact with Bin-Laden and Zawahiri. Steps were taken to eliminate the need for direct contact. As long as the brain could communicate with the limbs, everything else was almost superfluous. Also, a designation must exist between highly-trained, professional operatives and the continued stream of unskilled volunteers that make there way into the organization. I believe the root of the original AQ, based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which trains highly skilled and motivated operatives for complex operations, still functions as it always has. What has changed is the growth of another type of operative, the foot soldier who will give the movement a resource which was sorely lacking in Afghanistan and Iraq: a conventional offensive capability.
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