Iran patiently winning battle of influence in Iraq.

Link: U.S. losing battle of influence in Iraq to Iran.


For some time, analysts, were trying to understand the Iranian strategy regarding the current conflict in Iraq.  The Iranians, with so much to win or lose, appeared content to allow the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) tackle ISIS, with the only assistance from Iran coming in the form of the Badr Corps and a few other Shi'a militias.  For roughly the last decade, the Shi'a militias have existed solely (or so they claim) for the purpose of protecting holy Shi'a sites in Iraq and for the personal safety of His Eminence Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Husseini Al-Sistani, who holds a tremendous amount of influence among the Shi's community of Iraq.  In fact, Sistani is an important figure to the United States and Europe as well.  He has always been a pragmatic, moderating presence and manages to keep the popular and dangerous Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in a bit of a box.  Sadr is very dangerous; he is tied to the most anti-U.S. elements in the Qom-based Iranian religious leadership, and appears to be waiting for Sistani to expire, when he will take his place as a real trouble-maker in the region.  During the current conflict, Sadr has been conspicuous in his good behavior, although some could argue that he hasn't done enough to support the Iraqi government and military.  We expected much more involvement from Iran, given the Shi'a make-up of the present government in Baghdad.  From our optic, serious Iranian military intervention would have pushed ISIS out of western Iraq, but its possible that we are overestimating the strength of the Iranian military or even underestimating the staying power of ISIS.  Either way, it now appears that the Iranians made the smart choice by utilizing the militias in both a diplomatic and military manner.  The militias voiced opposition to the U.S.-led air campaign (which was reciprocated), and laid low while ISIS retook Ramadi.  Then, when it became necessary for the ISF to organize a multi-pronged offensive operation, which required the assistance of ground support more than air cover, the militias made themselves available, and have been performing admirably in both Anbar and Salah al- Din provinces.  The current successful military operations have had more to do with the militias than the air coalition, which continues to be hampered by not only weather anomalies, but by political constraints (it is our understanding that all the members of the coalition reserve the right to beg-off any operation after learning its intended target, a circumstance that speaks volumes).

U.S. Secretary of Defense served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy under President Clinton from 1993-96, and as Deputy Secretary of Defense from Oct 2011 to Dec 2013 under President Obama.  Carter (no relation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter) studied Physics and Medieval History, and was a research associate in Theoretical Physics at Rockefeller University from 1979-80.  Although he has accumulated an admirable amount of experience working in the Department of Defense over the past three decades, he has never been in uniform and has never held a command.  He has become more visible in the public eye since becoming Secretary of Defense, and appears to be sincerely engaged to fully implement U.S. policy regarding the conflict in Iraq.  The problem is, the United States doesn't seem to have much of a policy.  We have sponsored a hit-and miss air coalition that has proven to be ineffective against ISIS use of complex Suicide Vehicle attacks.  Certainly the recent ISIS offensive in Anbar and Salah al-Din were in no way impacted by air coalition activity.  Carter has been given very little to work with, while the Iranians continue to use the militias like chess pieces on a game board.  The Iranians can easily resupply the militias and continue to supply strategic advisors to assist the militia leadership.  They work closely with the ISF, while the U.S. is limited to a host of intel folks and diplomats in the big cities, and a contingent of instructors sitting out at al-Asad Airbase in central Anbar Province.  The Iraqi people see he Iranians as being much more engaged in the struggle, and the U.S. as sniffing around, waiting for the orders to leave (again).

 

Why Is Kobani So Important To The Islamic State?

Links: Lots Of Targets For U.S. Air Force
           Islamic State Air Force?
           Ramadi Under Seige

The spokesmen for the Allied effort to defeat the Islamic State in the Levant (IS) has informed us that the IS is pouring men and resources into the effort to take Kobani.  Has anyone asked why?  What is so important to the IS, that they would sacrifice so many resources for its possession?  True, Kobani is strategically located, in the far north of Syria, on the Turkish border.  Would occupying Kobani improve the IS supply network?  Is it possible that Kobani has become a must-win situation for the IS from a public relations perspective?  You know what they say: no one likes a loser.  Maybe the IS believes it must win in order to keep up morale amongst the faithful.  It's a very interesting question that I assume the Pentagon has been pondering as well.  As for the situation on the ground, it's still David versus Goliath, with a small number of Peshmerga hanging on against the IS onslaught. Still nothing from the Turks.  I am pleased with the havoc visited upon the IS by our heroes in the air.  I hope we will keep it up, and even make things hotter for the bad guys, if possible.  We have an unfair advantage: a handful of air forces against....nothing.  But I'll take it, because a similar unfair balance exists on the ground, but in reverse.  And the sad truth is that for the Kurds defending Kobani, there is no other hope for relief unless we can magically stand-up a Kurdish army over the weekend and deliver them by airlift. This is because our surrogate army won't be finished cooking for another three or four months (did you set the timer?).  The naked truth is that when it comes to a ground battle in this conflict, the United States will not deploy forces and that means the Kurds are left to their own devices on the streets of Kobani.  The message from the United States and her allies to the Kurds in Kobani?  We will bomb the shit out of the bad guys, and try to keep you supplied, but when it comes to bleeding, you guys are on your own.

Speaking of air forces, the second link has me a bit excited that the IS may try and add some offensive air capability.  The link mentioned three Migs (a combination of 21s and 23s, I believe). These birds are probably not much younger than Snoopy's Sopwith Camel doghouse, but I have it on reliable authority that the IS is in possession of more than three workable Migs.  A search on Google Maps  for "Taqba Dam, Syria", will take you to Al-Taqbah, Syria (don't try diving in with a direct search for "Al-Taqbah, Syria" . . . it got me nowhere).  Just south of the lovely desert oasis of Al-Taqbah is a (former) Syrian Air Force Base.  Flip your view from map to satillite photo, zoom in, and observe the eight to ten Migs sitting on the tarmac.

Again, my trusty source tells me that those planes were present when the IS captured the Al-Taqbah Air Base.  The IS has also captured a few other airbases, so it's no wonder that the Syrian Conflict rumor mill has former Iraqi Air Force pilots training IS operatives to fly Migs.  The minute the IS came into possession of jets, they started searching for pilots and trainers.  But I don't think we have anything to worry about here directly.  What, exactly, will the IS do with ten or fifteen old Migs?  I can't imagine that they would attempt combat with a U.S. F16 (or Qatari for that matter) or a French Eurofighter.  What concerns me more is that they have the opportunity to create more than a handful of jet pilots.  And it doesn't take much to fly a jumbo jet after you've had even limited flight training (the killers on September 11 had little to no real flight experience with a jumbo jet).  My real concern is that the Syrian Air Force has provided the IS with the best kind of teaching tools for wannabe pilots . . . real jets.

The last link I've provided gives us our daily update on the situation in Anbar Province, in western Iraq.  After reading the article, one might be tempted to adopt a more optimistic perspective about the effort to save Baghdad.  According to the Iraqi spokesman, efforts are underway to eliminate any pockets of IS infiltrators in the city of Ramadi.  The article quotes the Shia's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani as calling all the tribes in the area to rally behind the Iraqi Army to defeat "the Daesh (IS)".  Well, I have a newsflash for everyone involved: Al-Sistani is preaching to Sunni Shaykhs and Sunni Tribal Leaders.  Al-Sistani is a Shia, and the Shia tend to be found a bit further south than the Ramadi-Fallujah line.  Does anyone really expect the Sunni Shaykhs to rise up against a Sunni movement (IS), at the behest of a Shia spiritual leader?  During Operation Enduring Freedom, when the Sunni-supported insurgency became a serious threat, the United States Army and the CIA went to the Shaykhs, met them face to face, and provided them with a much more positive vision for the future than what Al-Qaeda in Iraq was able to do.  Sunni leaders knew that Al-Qaeda had become too violent, and that it had become more of an enemy-to than a representative of the Sunni community.    The few Sunni tribes who have currently moved against IS have done so out of self-preservation; no "save-Baghdad and Iraq" about it. Somehow or another, the government in Baghdad (or the Allies) must find a way to deliver this same message now, and not from a Shia cleric who in the past has advocated the slaughter of Sunnis.

Has Iraq Become A Failed State?

Link: Blog Of Anglican Minister Andrew White In Baghdad


("The creed of the desert seems inexpressible in words, and indeed in thought".)*

During my tour in Baghdad I had the opportunity to meet Canon Andrew White, and Anglican Minister who resides in Baghdad.  He has been a prolific voice for the Christian community in Iraq, and is considered by many to be the "Vicar of Baghdad".  I remember being very impressed with Canon White, who expressed optimism that Iraq would rebuild after Saddam Hussein was a distant memory.  I'm sad to say that he was mistaken, and his blog posts bear evidence to the collapse of security for both Christians and Muslims (see link).  Although the U.S. military shows video of Islamic State (IS) targets being destroyed, and the numbers of successful sorties is provided, persons on the ground claim that the airstrikes have done nothing to slow the IS advance.  A quick examination of the current circumstances may clear up this picture.

The Iraqi Army is a mess.  Training, reorganization, and collecting new equipment are priorities.  Daily bombs rock Baghdad and discourage any type of commerce.  Just a few years ago, the markets had reopened, the streets were full of kids going to school, and Karadah was noisy with traffic.  My Iraqi friends tell me that the days of 2003 have returned, with daily car bombs depositing body parts up and down the streets.  Shops are empty as people are scared to leave their homes.  Recently, mortars have been fired into Sadr City, the large, desperately poor Shia community in northeast Baghdad.  Everyone in Baghdad blames the IS for the car bombs and the mortar attacks.  Rumor on the street is that IS guerillas, working in groups of two and three, have already infiltrated the city.  Government ministers travel everywhere in armored vehicles, surrounded by dozens of bodyguards and related security.  Unfortunately the average Iraqi, who must walk to the store to buy bread, can't afford that kind of protection.  The Christian community in Baghdad has swelled to four times is usual size, as Chaldeans and Yezidi from the Mosul area add to the number of refugees.  The normal route out of Baghdad is to the west (Jordan and Syria), but that territory is controlled by the IS.  The only way out of the city is east to Iran, our south to the Shia marshes and Basra (not a promising option for Christians and peaceful Sunni).

In August, when the Iraqi Army deserted the battlefield and there was real concern for the safety of Baghdad, the venerated Shia cleric, His Eminence Ali Al-Sistani, issued a call to arms for the Shia faithful.  True, Al-Sistani appeared to be more concerned with the safety of the Shia Holy Cities of Najaf and Hillah, but the call resonated and 15,000 Shia volunteered to fight the IS.  As the Iraqi Army does what it can to equip and organize the Shia, the fear of the IS continues to mount.  Baghdad is home to many embassies and NGOs, and the International Airport is busier than ever (Iraqi Airways is a tremendous success story in a sea of disasters).  In fact, its impossible to get a seat on a commercial flight out of Baghdad.  Most Europeans in Baghdad believe if an IS attack on the capital city was imminent, that their governments would guarantee their safe evacuation.  This is where the game gets tricky, folks.  Is anyone out there old enough to remember the fall of Saigon?

The international community in Baghdad looks to the United States to determine when Baghdad must be evacuated.  I'm worried that the current Administration will play a dangerous game with the order to withdraw, because an order to evacuate the U.S. Embassy is an admission that neither the military support given to the Iraqi Army nor the air strikes had any impact on the IS' ability to conduct offensive operations.  Most military analysts don't believe that the IS has the resources to launch an assault on Baghdad.  I fear that they are making the cardinal mistake of anticipating a conventional assault. I believe the IS attack on Baghdad has already begun.  In fact, the mortars fired into Sadr City could have only been fired from somewhere else in Baghdad.  The bombings and the assassination attempts will increase as more and more IS operatives move in.  During the worst of the insurgency, the United States managed to convince the Sunni Shaykhs (and other prominent Sunnis) to isolate the insurgents (especially Al-Qaeda in Iraq...AQI) and support the new legislative and electoral process.  Guess what, folks...AQI is back, only now they call themselves the Islamic State of the Levant (IS), and we are way past the deadline for getting the Sunni in line.  The current Iraqi government's only hope is to mobilize the Sunni community that has not already sided with the IS (my sources tell me that almost all Baghdad Sunnis are vehemently opposed to the IS, thank goodness).

Former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki seems to be on everyone's naughty list (including mine).  At best, his term in office can be described as "sectarian" (thanks, Wikipedia).  When Maliki took office he followed the tradition of most politicians in this part of the world.  He filled every job, every office, every military uniform and every bureaucratic position with someone from his political movement.  Since Maliki is Shia, this action was not seen in a very positive light by the Sunni of Iraq.  He would have been much better served (at least Iraq would have been better served) if he had presented a diversified cabinet of Shia, Sunni and Christian officials.  It doesn't help that Maliki has always been followed by rumors of corruption and is believed to be a  puppet of the CIA (just something I heard folks, that's all). When the shit hit the fan (early August 2014, Maliki was very hesitant to resign (in favor of a cabinet that included a few Sunni and maybe a couple of Christians to open and close the doors).  Personally, I think its hard to get a thief to let go of the purse before the purse is empty.  Iraq's true wealth is in its oil industry.  Maliki wasn't in office long enough (and Iraq's refining capacity is still recovering) to find a permanent way to siphon off a percentage of the state oil revenues.  Believe me, another six months and he might have succeeded.

Currently, Iraq is governed by a coalition of well-meaning Sunni and Shia (and Kurdish) leaders who are trying desperately to rebuild the national army.  But old habits can be hard to break.  Most Iraqi soldiers joined the army because they needed a paycheck, and they had no interest in fighting other Sunnis in support of a Shia (Maliki) government.  The timetable established by the U.S. military in its original schedule for training and organizing the new Iraqi Army, would have been successful.  Unfortunately, the rush was on to get out of Iraq, and the Iraqi forces were not yet prepared to die for their country.  For the life of me, I can't envision how a handful of U.S. military personnel (who were here just last year) will be able to build an Iraqi army in even less time.  I am encouraged by the chutzpah (I don't think they would appreciate me using that word, but they can go to hell) of the Shia volunteers, who will be sorely needed if the IS starts moving from house-to-house and street-to-street.  Its obvious that the IS does not have the numbers necessary to sack Baghdad, but making the city ungovernable is a first step to occupation.  I am very concerned that not too long from now we will witness a Saigon-like nightmare, with Europeans and Iraqis alike desperately trying to find a way out of the city.  Its one of those rare times I would love to be wrong.

*T.E. Lawrence