Why Has ISIS/ISIL Been So Successful? (Part II)

(Part II)

Another reason that the IS has been successful is that it Islamic Extremism does not consist of a handful of disparate, arguing, selfish groups that can't ever get on the same page.  I believe that once we get past all the bullshit, we will discover that one command structure exists for Khorasan, Al-Nusra and the IS.  The little identity game they play has already caused problems for the "air campaign" coalition, as certain Gulf States have refused to participate in targeted bombing raids because they weren't comfortable with the target.  The reality is, the IS has grown stronger because the Extremist cause has learned the importance of supporting one another.  AQIM will support Boko Haram, just as the Taliban support Al-Qaeda.  Unfortunately, the bad guys are finally grasping the ancient cliché that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" (from a Muslim prince, by the way).   Recently, the world was focused on Yemen (for about seven minutes).  Al-Qaeda, who control a good part of the southern coast east of Aden and up to the border with Oman, have been utilizing Yemen as a training environment for new recruits.  Once we are in a position to interview (we don't use the word interrogate anymore)some of the IS soldiers who surrender in Syria after a battle, it will be fascinating to determine just how many of them had previous training assignments in Yemen.  Any Islamic Extremist who has trained in Yemen is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, so the discovery of a Syrian battlefield of veterans of the AQ training module in Arabia Felix, will destroy the myth that Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are distinctly separate terrorist groups.

I believe that the willingness and ability of Islamic Extremist groups to modernize and take full advantage of the advances made in telecommunications has been the most important part of their success.  That, and their use of Social Media has positively affected just about everything else they try to accomplish.  I am saving another important factor for last.  The Islamic Extremist cause was forced to adapt in a constantly evolving, modern world.  George Bush recognized this fact, and following September 11, 2001, Bush (and the Pentagon, I assume) realized that to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional war would require all of its resources and would eventually cripple the organization.  And the only way to force Al-Qaeda into a conventional war, was to take the conflict to a Muslim country.  Iraq was the perfect patsy, and even provided justification (let's face it, Saddam had been breaking U.N. prohibitions for years).  The United States invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, and although things did not always go smoothly, (Abu Ghraib, the Sunni Insurgency) The U.S. military left Al-Qaeda crippled and down for the count.  Unfortunately, the American people voted for an Administration with an entirely different perspective regarding U.S. obligation and debt to the Muslim world.  The message that we would be basically inactive for some time (with the exception of finding Bin Laden, which was nothing more than a political tool) was telegraphed to the Gulf States, North Africa and beyond.  Al-Qaeda was allowed to lick its wounds and rebuild.  Bin Laden structured his organization so that his death would not impact the long-term plans of the group.  At this point, something pivotal occurred: Ayman al-Zawahiri became the go-to man.   Why is this so pivotal?  Because Zawahiri is arguably brilliant, and he spent his cave-time as number two, analyzing the history and strategy of the conflict, and creating a map to victory.  First and foremost, the Islamic Extremist cause had to create a conventional military element; and army, for lack of a better term.  AQIM had risen from the dust or far west Iraq and had inserted itself into the Syrian conflict, as "the Islamic State for Iraq and al-Sham", and later to "the Islamic State for the Levant"; but make no mistake - Baghdadi or no Baghdadi, this group looks west to the mountainous region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to a shrunken, tiny old Egyptian Doctor, for their guidance and leadership.

The decision to adopt a more formal approach to the struggle was not accomplished overnight.  In fact, it would be wise to assume that the Islamic Extremist cause continues to keep a smaller, discreet more typical capability on hand.  But after embracing the move to a more conventional model, the call went out for recruits.  A legitimate army must have soldiers, and Yemen was the location chosen to train the new recruits.  Why else would Al-Qaeda be devoting so many resources to that rocky, barren, stinky, qat-obsessed little dump?  The Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Iraq have provided training-under fire at one time or another.  The options have become a bit more limited as of late, with Yemen and Iraq getting special attention.  Surprisingly (at least to me), the bad guys have taken to the idea of conventional warfare quite quickly.  IS units in the field appear to be well-fed, supplied and rested.  Just last week, the IS launched a mini-offensive in Anbar Province that took the Iraqi military by complete surprise.  This offensive was coordinated with attacks south of Tikrit and Samarah.  The IS is attempting to cut off Iraqi military units and Shi'a militia in place around Baiji, and the manner in which the offensive was conducted (the IS waited until the weather was overcast, to limit the impact of coalition air attacks.  As you read this, the IS is causing some serious headaches in Tehran, which is really such a shame.  Just when the Iranians were preparing to storm our embassy a second time (on this occasion, in the guise of a treaty with the United States regarding Iranian nuclear ambitions), the IS has to start making noise in a province that borders the Islamic Republic Of Iran.  What is truly interesting is that all of the Islamic Extremist groups are beginning to show signs of military discipline and planning.  Certainly Boko Haram and AQIM function in this manner.  After the death of Bin Laden, I believe Zawahiri made the decision to start infusing techniques of modern warfare and the benefits of the twenty-first century into the Islamic Extremist gameplan.  Does the current environment support my theory?  Isolated attacks in Paris, London, Boston, Sydney and Copenhagen, Boko Haram acting with impunity in Central and West Africa, the IS running a bit wild in Iraq and pushing the envelope in Syria, and real concerns about a well-funded, organized (surprised?) IS beginning to stretch its legs in Libya.  I guess they were just waiting for the dust to clear.  Certainly the almost complete disappearance of the United States in the battle against Islamic Extremism has contributed to this high-water mark, but the changing of the guard must have had an impact as well.

Why Has ISIS/ISIL Been So Successful? (Part I)

Links A. Stratfor Assessment Of The Islamic State
          B. IS Tweets Itself To Success
          C. Obama Haunted By Yemen Comments

Please take the time to visit the links I have chosen.  Today in particular, they are very useful in support of our discussion. Is this really a discussion?  Well,.....I hope the post will stimulate conversation between you and your colleagues/family/friends, during which you present my perspective, which inserts me into your discussion.  Ideally, that's the way it works.  To be honest, I wouldn't want to be present during everyone's conversations, because people might yell at me and call me a fascist, which would hurt my feelings.

Next to the debate about Bruce/Belinda Jenner, I think the most pondered question has been, how did the Islamic State become so powerful?  Its a truly fascinating issue, one that involves many factors.  I will approach the subject with the confidence of a blogger with six months of my own attitude and opinion to back me up.  Our society has seen Terrorist Groups come and go.  Some have died away, others have ended up in jail.  A few have re-made themselves into peaceful political participants (the Sandinistas, Hamas, Hezbollah), but the peaceful part seems to be a flexible description, especially in the case of Hamas and Hezbollah.  Our friends with Hezbollah have managed to involve themselves in the conflict against the Islamic State (IS).  You see, Hezbollah has been snuggling with de facto Syrian President Bashir al-Assad for some time, and his father before him (gross!).  When Lebanon became a proxy state for Syria, Hezbollah flourished at the discretion of Assad in Damascus.  To their credit, Hezbollah has been on the front lines in Syria, bleeding by the bucketful for Assad.  The IS has given heartburn to just about everyone at one time or another, including the Peshmerga, Syrian Kurds, SAF, IAF, Shi'ite militias, and even the Iranians.  As we've pointed out previously (and was repeated word for word by numerous sites with no attribution......assholes), the Islamic State used to be Al-Qaeda in Iraq, when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was still breathing.  So even the United States military has had its run-ins with the IS.  Another point that I continue to make repeatedly but has yet to catch on, is that all of these Sunni-based Islamic Terrorist Groups are connected.  Assigning different names and creating the impression that one group is actually ten or fifteen, increases fear and knee-jerk reactions from the west, which usually leads to mistakes of one kind or another.  The leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician and former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, is the top dog as far as I'm concerned.  Since these groups operate with such apparent independence, I don't expect Zawahiri to act as the CEO or CIC of Islamic Extremism.  But they do work together.  Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) is aware what is happening is Syria, and Boko Haram is in regular communication with bad guys in Libya.  Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya follows the company line, and has been doing yeoman's work as of late recruiting in the townships of Nairobi.  I see the military wing of Islamic Extremism to be one entity fighting on many fronts, and the sooner our leaders accept this reality, the better off we will be.

When International Terrorism fist made itself known to the west, it was through the hijacking of airplanes, the kidnapping of bankers and industrialists, and attacks in airports.  Even though I was still in short pants, I remember the 1972 Munich Terrorist Attacks.  But even the horror of Munich did not truly bring the reality home (unless, of course, you were Israeli).  September 11, 2001 made everyone feel vulnerable; this was a group of twenty determined young men, who must have been supported by a much wider network.  Terrorism could no longer be thought of as four men with Uzis and one woman with a floppy hat, sun glasses, and a pistol.  Terrorism has arrived into the twenty-first century with a resounding thud.  They network, the plan, they recon, and they practice.  Advances made in telecommunications have made everything easier.  If an operation planned for Lagos is short one explosives expert, relief is a phone call (or text, or email, or Skype) away.  The bad guys have turned Twitter into a huge propaganda loudspeaker, and the ability of just about every cell phone to take and share videotapes has been invaluable as well. The IS can announce that a hostage was just beheaded, and to expect a video within twenty minutes.  The press gets prepared, and the video shows up, right on schedule.  Islamic Extremists use social media to incite fear; they are thrilled with the idea that their disgusted videos are causing people to no longer feel safe in their homes.  Social Media has also been a boon with regards to recruitment.  Today I learned that supporters of the IS (or bored, sick people) have been tweeting the wives of soldiers, and you can imagine what is being said.  Social Media has made planning, organizing, supply, communication, recruitment, and the spread of propaganda so much easier than before.  This is a big part of their success.

Click here to continue on to Part II of this post 

Al-Qaeda In Africa

Link: A. Al-Qaeda Presence In African Countries


(Today's post is the first in a four-part series to begin 2015.  This series will discuss the current state of affairs for the various Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups around the globe.  The next in the series will be the Middle East, followed by Southeast Asia, and concluding with Europe/United States.  Somewhere along the line I will throw out a few comments about Al-Qaeda's presence in Latin America, especially as it relates to drug trafficking, smuggling and the tri-borders region.)

When I originally googled "Al-Qaeda" and "Africa", I expected to find a Wikipedia page full of useful dates and details.  Have a look at the link so you can share in my disappointment. No matter; Al-Qaeda is so active at present that a review of any international news provider should bear fruit.  Surprisingly, the link from Wikipedia doesn't even identify Mali as a location of interest, and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) has been stirring the pot in the north of the country for a few years now.  But enough criticism of Wikipedia.  It is an invaluable resource that I would hate to lose, so follow my example and give them a few dollars whenever they start one of their fund-raising drives.  Back to Al-Qaeda and Africa.

Personally, the U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 were the first time that I connected the terrorist group Al-Qaeda to the African continent.  I was aware of the organization, mainly because I was already employed for an Intelligence Agency, and I was working in a counter-terrorist branch at the time.  Having spent some time in Kenya and Tanzania, I was immediately useful, as street maps were spread out over desks and rolled-up, dusty maps were pulled out from behind cabinets.  Interestingly enough, I can't remember a time when the group Al-Qaeda was not synonymous with Osama bin-Laden.  Even then in the early years pre-9/11, everyone was already referring to the two as inseparable evils, and with good reason.  Bin-Laden carried his organization on his back, figuratively and literally.  He had spent some time in Afghanistan and trained in the Sudan and Yemen.  I can't be sure but I believe the planning for 9/11 was already in place when the embassy bombings occurred.  I believe another attack was intended, one involving multiple airliners that were to be hijacked out of Manila, and these three attacks (Kenya, NYC, Manila) were going to deliver a message to the West.  The third operation never got off the ground, thank goodness.

Since the 1980s, Al-Qaeda has been active in Africa.  When Somalia descended into post Siad-Barre hell, Al-Qaeda positioned itself to become an integral part of the conservative and extremist Islamic Courts Union, which was the de facto government in Moqdishu for a while.  Once the African Union and the Ethiopian Army removed the Courts from Somalia, they found a comfy exile in Eritrea.  I just don't understand the government of Eritrea, why they would want to announce to the world that they are friendly with Al-Qaeda.  Obviously this is just another case of, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", and the Eritreans despise the Ethiopians with a venom that is hard to match.  Presently, with Puntland trying to sort itself out, and the Somali government in Moqdishu just trying to get the power back on, the bad guys, who have morphed from the "Islamic Courts Union", to "Al-Shabaab", are doing what they can to cause trouble in Kenya.  Don't be fooled; Al-Shabaab is an unpolished, illiterate, ill-trained version of Al-Qaeda, and they understand the importance of establishing a presence in Kenya.  The unemployment rate in Kenya is so high, I don't think the Kenyan government bothers to log it anymore.  Most young men, at an age when they are supposed to be the most physically productive, are playing soccer in the townships and smoking hash behind the shabeen. The first time I ever saw someone wearing an Osama bin-Laden t-shirt was in Kibera, the huge township that feeds and feeds off of Nairobi.  They are hungry in Mombasa as well, and in Nakuru and Kisumu.  Al-Qaeda has always intended on taking advantage of the squalor and hopelessness of the third world, to recruit and spread its anti-west, anti-glutton message.  But for some reason they have never really succeeded in appealing to the masses.  But Africa, and Kenya in particular, give them an ideal opportunity.  For Al-Qaeda, Somalia is over.  The question is, to relocate the operatives and resources to Sudan and Yemen (and Eritrea), or to make a real push in Kenya. 

In west Africa, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) has caused quite a bit of heartburn.  A few years back in Mali, the Tuaregs attempted a bit of a revolution.  These usually non-confrontational, private nomads were having their traditional way of life negatively impacted by the activities of various French oil and mineral exploratory operations.  They complained to the government in Bamako, but the Euro talks, and the Camel walks, so to speak.  So the Tuaregs started a bit of a rebellion.  Almost from the start it was hijacked by AQIM, and before long, the Tuaregs had been basically muscled out of the conflict altogether.  AQIM proved too much for the Malian Army, so Mother France was called, and to make a boring story short, the French military sorted out AQIM in short-order.  In the summer of 2014, when all of west Africa was focused on the anti-Ebola campaign, AQIM popped up again, and this time began attacking targets in Niger.  Fortunately the French military always seems to be available, and it is yet to be determined if AQIM will acquit itself in a more positive way this time around.  Unfortunately, the French can only be in so many places at one time, and AQIM has a habit of attacking Malian military targets, separate from a French military presence.

Boko Haram has been described as "Al-Qaeda in Nigeria", which is not far from the truth.  Originally, Boko Haram was created as a method of educating and providing security for Muslim communities in northern Nigeria.  A change in leadership was instrumental in Boko Haram's evolution into an Islamic extremist group, and they have quickly silenced the Islamic opposition (what there was of it).  I have never considered Al-Qaeda to be overly religiously motivated, but they won't pass an opportunity to hijack a conservative Islamic movement, as they have demonstrated many times.  In reality, I don't think Al-Qaeda has any input into the actions of Boko Haram.  They make a bunch of noise and get a good deal of press, but until Boko Haram takes control of the Nigerian Oil Industry and starts pumping that oil to fill Al-Qaeda's coffers, I don't see the possibility of an Al-Qaeda initiative here (unless the U.S. and Nigerian security is lax and the embassy becomes a target of opportunity).

Africa can be a dangerous place for Americans.  Because of the ease in which a person can cross one border after another, the U.S. Diplomatic Security folks have to always be on their game.  Africa is useful to Al-Qaeda for three reasons: targets of opportunity, training, and recruitment.  We know about the first two, but just how much success have the bad guys had at recruiting operatives in Africa?  Up to now, I think it has been negligible.  But that could change this year.  Keep your eye on Kenya.      

Islamic State Expanding Into North Africa

Link: Islamic State Pushes Into North Africa

For decades, north Africa and the Sahel have always been Al-Qaeda territory, at least as far as butchers and beheaders are concerned.  But as the Islamic State (IS) continues to

exhibit a potent growth rate, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) had better make sure they've collected their dues this month;  the IS is the new extremist bad-boy club on the block, and they intend on co-opting everyone within range of a bullet.  In the link above, I paid particular attention to comments made by Thomas Joscelyn, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, who believes that we should expect the IS to become more active in north Africa.  Joscelyn is a treasure trove of knowledge regarding events in the Near East, and his real-time analysis is always spot-on.  He is the main reason I am such a devotee of The Long War Journal (www.longwarjournal.org).

So the IS has decided to expand westward.  I'm assuming that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has his own version of Manifest Destiny.  The truth is, the ground is ripe for seeding, especially in the Sudan and Libya.  But lets start in Egypt.  The IS has a variety of scapegoats to drag out in this country, including the traditional whipping boy: the Coptic Christians.  For the life of me I can't fathom how there can be any Christians left in Egypt, let alone Coptic Christians.  They can jump on the "anti-military" bandwagon, but I think that bus is full.  Personally, I don't see the IS finding a receptive audience in Egypt.  I think Morsi was as a religious of a leader as the Egyptian people would like.  Egypt is a country with a modern communications infrastructure.  The people understand the difference between progress and trading in the used Renault for a camel.  I believe the people of Egypt, the vocal young populace in particular, want both a democratic system of government and economic progress.  The IS stands for neither.  On the other hand, Libya is the perfect breeding ground for giant fleas (like the folks we refer to as the IS).  When authority has broken down, and I mean packed up and completely left town, people will look to just about anyone for leadership.  The IS has recently become the governing body for the town of Darna. What the hell is Darna?  It's a start, that's what it is; and the Islamic State will take measures in Darna that will be observed by other communities.  We all know that the Islamic State is well-funded.  All they have to do is feed the people of Darna, maybe get the power turned back on, and keep the muggers and rapists off the streets (and back in the IS camp where they belong).  The IS has used this recipe to co-opt communities in Syria and Iraq, and the formula will work just fine in Libya.  What absolutely amazes me is that western companies are still able to keep their petroleum operations functioning.  I imagine that a huge amount of money is being paid to private security armies, but just how much longer are these operations going to be feasible?  And here comes the IS.  Let Mookie make a prediction.  In roughly six months or less, Libya is going to return to the headlines.  No one wants the IS to take possession of the petroleum set-ups in Libya anymore than the ones they fight for in Baiji, Iraq, where the battle continues on currently.

Let move south to the Sudan.  The government currently sitting in Khartoum would make great badminton partners for al-Baghdadi and his herd.  President Omar al-Bashir, who is wanted by the International Court in the Hague, loves to send his minions on "Christian

slaughtering" expeditions.  The Sudan (force of habit...I say "the Sudan" and "the Cameroon" and a few other left-over examples of colonial bad manners) is no longer what it used to be.  We now have a South Sudan, but don't ask me who is President, or even the name of the capital city (Juba, maybe?).  I believe that the IS would find a warm welcome in Khartoum, as al-Bashir and al-Baghdadi seem to adhere to the same brand of extreme Islam.  I can't imagine that the IS would stretch its Caliphate map to include the Sudan, and al-Bashir would welcome any opportunity to stick his finger in the eye of the EU and the United States.  Khartoum would be an ideal staging ground for an IS expansion into Chad, Niger and Mali.  The people of Saharan Africa would probably welcome the IS, since no one else seems to give a damn about them.  Mali is already dealing with a re-emergence of AQIM (who, interestingly enough, keep stirring up shit in Niger).  With the west focused almost exclusively on Ebola, and AQIM a shadow of its former self, a bit of a vacuum does exist.  North of Boko Haram in Nigeria, west of Khartoum, and east of Mauritania is where the IS will find its most fertile recruitment locations.  Folks will look at the map and say, "Mookie, have you lost your mind?  The only thing east of Mauritania is the Sahara Desert!"  Believe it or not, people live in that desert.  But its the communities on the very periphery of the Sahara that cause me concern.  A strict form of Islam is enforced, which promotes reliance on family ties and inter-dependence.  In many ways, adherence to strict principles of Islam have helped many of these villages and communities survive.  Al Qaeda had no trouble taking route here, and I can't imagine that the IS will either.  The bunch of filthy rich investors with money in the gold and diamond mines of west Africa had better keep an eye on this potential problem.

Boko Haram and The Lord's Resistance Army

As the blog evolves I will introduce features that I feel enhance the overall product.  On Mondays I will comment on issues that are a bit distant from the mainstream news.  I did not include any links today because the subject matter can be researched on any variety of sources on the internet, including Wikipedia.  In fact, the information I present will probably not differ with what is available from a simple Google search.  But since this is my blog, and I find both of these groups fascinating, I exercise blogger's prerogative and introduce to you Boko Haram, an Islamic fundamentalist group, and The Lord's Resistance Army, a terror organization that claims adherence to Christian principles.

Boko Haram is a Sunni Islamic Fundamentalist Sect based in northern Nigeria, that advocates strict Sharia Law.  In order to understand the genesis of this organization, a quick review of Nigerian history is necessary. After achieving independence from Great Britain in 1960, Nigeria suffered through a period of confusion as attempts were made to continue the regular functions of a state (as exemplified by the British during colonial rule).  Like most African states, Nigeria is comprised of many different tribes who speak different languages and practice different religions.  Northern Nigeria has always been home to a majority of the nation's Muslim population.  Nigeria itself suffered through a Civil War from 1967 to 1970, as certain eastern states seceded from Nigeria and formed the short-lived state of Biafra.  This fractious, bloody war left behind a distrust throughout Nigeria for the idea of a central government based in Lagos.  Since independence, corruption has always been an issue in Nigerian society, particularly in politics and the military. Many northerners resent the fact that the majority of wealth in Nigeria is centered in the southern states, particularly around Lagos.  Lack of economic development has resulted in great suffering in many northern districts.  A number of Muslim-based groups became involved in providing assistance to those in need.  This assistance was accompanied by an education in fundamentalist Islam.  No one can blame the people of the north from aligning themselves with these groups.  The government was seen as totally corrupt and disinterested in the welfare of the people.
Nigeria suffered through a series of military dictatorships from 1960 until 1999.  The advent of Democracy did little to end the suffering of the northern districts, and a number of the Islamic Fundamentalist groups began to look for a military solution.  Boko Haram (BH) was formed in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf.  The group did not declare itself in open rebellion until 2009.  Yusuf was arrested and died in police custody.  He was succeeded by his first lieutenant Abubakar Shakau.  The name "Boko Haram" is translated as "Western Education is Forbidden".  BH has never been a large movement, but has many supporters throughout the Muslim north of Nigeria.  The group states that its goal is the creation of an Islamic State under Sharia Law in Nigeria (not just in northern Nigeria).  BH has been able to purchase arms and supplies through a campaign of bank robberies and kidnappings/ransoms.  BH traditionally moves  in small units, and is intent on consolidating it hold on the northern districts of Nigeria through fear and intimidation.  As kidnappings and aggressive actions have become common, BH lost much of its support from northern Nigerians.  But the Nigerian Army, which is obliged to defend Nigerian citizens from terrorist groups, commands no respect whatsoever.  The Army has conducted repeated military operations against BH, not only to free hostages but to damage the organization to the point of ineffectiveness.  But every military effort has met with either limited success (whatever territory cleared of BH was quickly reoccupied immediately following the Army's departure) or complete failure.  The problems within the Nigerian military stem from a culture of corruption and a complete lack of discipline.  Although the Nigerian Parliament votes substantial funds for the military in every budget, most of that money is skimmed off and into the pockets of one military official or another (or politician).  Sometimes troops go extended periods of time with no pay, and weapons are carried w/o ammunition.
The recent kidnapping of hundreds of young girls by BH brought the problem to the international stage for a limited period of time.  The Nigerian Army has vowed to rescue the girls and a number of operations have been conducted.  But the story seems to have fallen from even the last page of western newspapers, and the parents of the missing girls are left with little hope.  At one time the Nigerian military was respected and trusted by the people.  But the issue of corruption in Nigeria goes far beyond the military. Most Nigerians are honest, hard-working folks who deserve an honest, representative government that does not utilize Sharia Law as its system of justice.  Lets hope a leader exists just beyond the horizon who can bring the Nigerian people together regardless of religion and institute a government dedicated to serving the people and fighting corruption at its source.

The Lord's Resistance Army is a quasi-religious movement that many also consider to be a cult.  It was originally based in northern Uganda but has since extended its presence into southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC).  During the 1970's Uganda was engulfed in one civil war after another.  The only period of relative calm was the beginning of the Idi Amin Administration, which quickly descended into a quagmire of violence and repression itself.  After Amin's ouster, a number of factions fought for control of Uganda.  The lack of stability and complete ineffectiveness of whatever government sat in Kampala at the time led the people of Uganda to lose faith in centralized government.  The administration of Dr. Milton Obote was rampant with corruption and tribal nepotism.  Obote was overthrown by the current President of Uganda (and sometime darling of the West), Yoweri Museveni, in 1986.  During the strife which brought Museveni to power, another personality was creating a niche for herself in the far north of Uganda.  Her name was Alice Lakwena, and she claimed to be the recipient of messages from The Holy Spirit.  The repeated conflicts had left a vacuum of authority in the north of the country, and Lakwena filled the space with her own particular civil resistance movement.  She was able to raise an Army (by then Lakwena was a self-identified Prophetess who could make her adherents impervious to bullet fire) and after a few surprising initial successes, met defeat at the hands of the regular Ugandan Army at Jinja in 1988.  Her followers dispersed and Lakwena sought asylum in Kenya.  During this time another group of civil resistance fighters was evolving, led by the charismatic Joseph Kony.  Kony was able to rally what remained of Lakwena's forces and set up camp in Acholi tribal land in north Uganda.  Kony immediately established his own "cult-of personality" and led his supporters in acts of violence against government and civilian targets.
Kony and his group, now calling itself "The Lord's Resistance Army" (LRA), decided to copy the methods of the Ugandan Army by forcibly "conscripting" children (kidnapping) into the ranks of the organization.  During the 1990s an occasional story reached the western press about massacres of children who refused to join LRA.  At the time, though, Rwanda was about to descend into genocide and Africa as a whole seemed to be at war with itself.  President Museveni proved to have something no previous Ugandan leader had.....staying power.  Buoyed by a growing economy and a booming capital city, Museveni became the darling of the IMF and the west.  Ugandan elections appeared to be much more free and Democratic than what was routine in sub-Saharan Africa, and Museveni actually kept corruption down to a minimum.  Even the once-proud University of Kampala regained some of its former glory.  But as was the case in Nigeria, the largesse created by the economic good times seldom reached the northern districts.  Nevertheless, the people stayed relatively loyal to the central government, which brought regular retaliation from the LRA.
Eventually, a well-funded and organized military operation pushed the LRA out of Uganda and into Southern Sudan.  In return for support against Christian elements in southern Sudan, the Muslim-fundamentalist government in Khartoum agreed to assist the LRA.  The LRA set up shop in the border region between Sudan and Uganda, and indiscriminately raided settlements on both sides of the border. Eventually the LRA became active in the never-ending conflict in eastern DROC, attacking a Catholic Church-sponsored concert, killing 143 and kidnapping 180 in 2008.
Some of the real mysteries surrounding the LRA are its motivations and aspirations.  In the beginning, the struggle was couched as an effort to redistribute Uganda's wealth more evenly, instead of allowing the south to grow richer and richer.  Since the turn of the century, Kony has become more and more of a cult figure to his followers.  He is seen less and less, but will occasionally make an appearance in order to remind us all that hes still alive.  The LRA continues to be a thorn in the side of the Museveni government, but their lack of resources and adequate supply mechanism has diminished their ability to create havoc. But for the poor, suffering Acholi of northern Uganda, the LRA remains the greatest threat to peace and stability. The big questions remains...what does Kony want?