Update on military developments in Anbar and Diyala Provinces, Iraq; Ayatollah Sistani continues providing vital support for PM Abadi's reforms.

Links: A. ISIS claims responsibility for deadly attacks in Diyala.
           B. Iraq Parliament votes in support of Abadi's reforms, abolishing Maliki's post.
           C. Allied air attacks hit ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq.

In the last week, ISIS has demonstrated both its ability and determination to continue terrorizing the people of Diyala Province with SVBIED attacks.  On Monday at a market in Huwaider, at least 58 persons were killed by an ISIS terror attack, which comes on the heels of last months attacks which killed over 115 people.  ISIS has chosen the SVBIED as the most effective method of delivering terror because of its relatively cheap cost and the ease with which an attack can be planned.  All that is needed is a vehicle, explosives, and a lunatic suicide driver/bomber to deliver the carnage.  Given the plethora of vehicles of all varieties that choke the roads of Iraq's cities and towns, it is very difficult for security officials to intercept these attacks before its too late.  People are very enterprising.  In Kosovo, I once a saw a washing machine that had been turned into a vehicle with the edition of a drive train, four wheels, gas tank, and a small tractor engine.  Some of the interesting patched-together vehicles I saw in Iraq were just as unique, as people make do with what equipment is at hand.  If the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were to stop and inspect every vehicle that looked unusual, traffic would come to a standstill.  ISIS has found its method of choice for delivering terror, and it appears that the only way to eradicate the problem is to remove ISIS.

No doubt ISIS continues its reign of terror in Diyala in an effort to force the government to remove troops from the Anbar front for duty in other Provinces.  Although the ISF expected ISIS to contest Ramadi to the last, the government and the General Staff expected the city to have fallen by now.  In fact, it appears as if the ISF has been able to make no progress in Ramadi over the past few weeks, which will only increase calls from the Provinces to return soldiers for local use.  As the ISF struggles outside Ramadi, the Badr Organization, one of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) attempting to encircle Fallujah, has also been unable to close the deal.  ISIS would like nothing more than to see units from the ISF Ramadi front withdrawn to Diyala, alongside the Badr Organization outside Fallujah.  From the beginning of the Anbar offensive, ISIS made clear that it was developing Diyala as a secondary front, to distract the ISF and PMUs from their operational goals.  They may just succeed with their intention, as the attempts to retake Ramadi and Fallujah meet stiff resistance.  On July 26, the ISF recaptured Anbar University.  However, four weeks into the operation, the government forces have failed to make inroads into Ramadi itself.  By contrast, during the operation to retake Tikrit, the goal was accomplished within four weeks.

On a positive note, Grand Ayatollah Sistani continues to lend his support to the Abadi government, as it moves to institute political reforms approved by the Iraqi Parliament.  Included in these reforms is the abolition of the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Given that Nouri al-Maliki was Iraq's Vice President, and he had been using his position as a bully puppet to denounce the government, Abadi's success at pushing these reforms through the sticky Iraqi political system is quite an achievement.  All things being equal, which they never are in this part of the world, Abadi should be able to consolidate his victory by unifying the Shi'a political movement and using the Parliamentary vote of confidence and Sistani's approval, to continue conducting the war as he believes is best.  Abadi has been very careful with regards to conducting military operations.  Unlike Maliki, who wouldn't hesitate to involve himself in military matters, Abadi seems content to let the General Staff and their U.S. advisors formulate the plans to defeat ISIS.  As a bit of a balancing act, Abadi has allowed the Iranian advisors currently embedded with the PMUs, to provide aggressive strategic counseling.  We have been waiting patiently for word of the allied air campaign and its efforts regarding the Anbar offensive, but updates have been sporadic at best.  Link C mentions a number of attacks approved by the Iraqi government and conducted in early August, but given that ISIS has no Air Force, why hasn't the allied air campaign flattened ISIS positions in Ramadi?  Has ISIS blended in with the local community, in order to discourage air attacks?  What of the new Iraqi F-16s delivered last month?  Have any Iraqi pilots been operational with these new fighters?

We can hope that the quick response by the Iraqi Parliament and the continued support by a variety of Shi'a leaders will allow Abadi to move forward from this political victory, and lead the military to re-energize itself in the battles to retake Ramadi and Fallujah.  No news from Haditha, where the local population is faced with daily random free-fire and artillery attacks from ISIS; as the offensive in Anbar continues to target Fallujah and Ramadi, ISIS focuses on secondary fronts in Haditha, and in Diyala and other Provinces, in an attempt to force the Iraqi government to return troops to their Provincial bases.  Abadi must stay strong and not dilute his forces, which will almost certainly allow for the Ramadi front to evolve into a stalemate.  The ISF must find the resolve (and, ideally, reinforcements) to push through and take both targets, which will logically lead to the relief of Haditha, and make it more difficult for ISIS to provide resources for continued attacks in the eastern Provinces.

Shi'a in Iraq in conflict as reforms being introduced by Abadi threaten to create a schism within the community.

It was too good to be true.  The Americans were leaving, the Iraqi government was controlled by the Shi'a political parties, and the crisis involving the Islamic State was providing an opportunity for even more direct Iranian involvement in Iraqi affairs.  For all practical purposes, it appeared as if the Iranians, supported by the majority Shi'a population, might be able to mold the new Iraq into a client state, under the guise of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).  But as we have seen played out time and time again in politics, success breeds jealousy and corruption.  Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, with the all-important support of Shi'a Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has decided that the time has come to enact sweeping political reforms and to reshuffle his cabinet.  In particular, Abadi is asking for Parliamentary approval to remove the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Vice President.  Since the current Vice President is former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Abadi is, for all practical purposes, calling for a Civil War within the Iraqi Shi'a community, to determine if the future will be under his guidance, or under the leadership of Maliki.  The timing is not ideal, as the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Shi'a militias/Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) are currently throwing everything but the kitchen sink at ISIS in Anbar Province, to attempt to dislodge the terrorists from Fallujah and Ramadi once and for all.  Iraqi allies in Washington DC and Europe are becoming more and more concerned everyday with the length of time it is taking to push ISIS back into the western deserts of Anbar.  If the military campaign fails, it will send warning signals all the way to Diyala Province and down to Basra, that the ISF and the PMUs have lost the battlefield, and that Baghdad is at serious risk.  Would Maliki handle the military situation better than Abadi has?  Would the Shi'a unite more effectively under one as opposed to the other?  Sistani, who has always wielded tremendous influence in the Iraqi Shi'a community, has thrown his entire weight behind Abadi, and still the situation seems unresolved.

Last month, we wrote a post regarding former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's not-so discrete efforts to discredit the Abadi government.  Maliki took every opportunity to paint Abadi as a Sunni puppet, and to criticize his handling of the war.  Obviously Maliki was aware of Abadi's legislative intentions, and was trying to pre-empt the Prime Minister.  The question on everyone's mind should be, who will the Iranians support? The answer is simple: the Iranians will support whoever will give them more influence over the governing of the country.  The fact that Iraq has, until recently, been governed by Sunni royalty followed by a Sunni despot, is not lost on Iran.  During the 1982-1988 Iran/Iraq war, Iran's revolutionary leaders regularly preached about the Holy War to free the oppressed Iraqi Shi'a population, and to this day, the Shi'a continue to constitute a majority.  Many of the most revered Shi'a Holy Sites are in Iraq, and Iran is being very pragmatic and careful vis-à-vis Iraq.  In reality, the Iranian Armed Forces could have eliminated the ISIS presence in Iraq in short order, but an outright military intervention of that magnitude would be condemned internationally and in the United Nations.  Instead, Iran is showing great patience, as its image and reputation internationally continues to be upgraded.  The as-yet unratified nuclear treaty with the United States will go a long way in that regard.  Iran wants its presence in Iraq to be viewed positively by the international community, therefore any heavy-footed actions are to be avoided.  The PMUs consist of Iraqi Shi'as, aided by Iranian military advisors; as opposed to Russia in Ukraine, there is no evidence of Iranian military hardware crossing over the border.  Its possible that the situation may become so dire that the United Nations and the international community welcome Iranian military intervention to save Iraq from ISIS.  I can only imagine....Iran, with a history of funding terrorist activity in the Levant, defeats the worst terrorist threat the world has yet faced.  The word "Irony" just doesn't cover it.

Back to the present and the current Iraqi government's determination to isolate and minimize the influence of Nouri al-Maliki.  There is no question that Abadi's efforts to combat ISIS and keep Iraq from splintering have been made more difficult by Maliki. Abadi's political reforms are not solely designed to cripple Maliki; these reforms are necessary to make governing less cumbersome and battle corruption.  As things are today, Iraq has a President, Fuad Masum, a Vice President, Nouri al-Maliki, a Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, and three Deputy Prime Ministers.  Today, one of those Deputy Prime Ministers resigned, in what is widely believed to be part of Abadi's anti-corruption initiative.  The truth is, the Executive Branch of the Iraqi government needs to be streamlined.  It also needs an independent investigator-general in the worst way.  Even in the midst of the threat from ISIS, the Iraqi people are clamoring for an end to what has become endemic corruption in government and politics.  The real reason Abadi chose to enact these reforms at this time, is because he had no choice.  How long before the Iraqi people, who must pay a tax for this, and a bribe for that, finally get the red-ass and start stringing up these thieves from the nearest trees?

How much influence and debts-owed Nouri al-Maliki continues to possess will be determined within the next month or so.  Abadi sees the opportunity to create a united Shi'a political movement, to represent the majority population in an appropriate manner.  Maliki does have influence with the Sadr movement and certain militias.  I have always awarded tremendous authority to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and he has made it clear that he supports Abadi and his reforms.  Am I overestimating Sistani's power?  Does Maliki command the loyalty of enough movers and shakers in the Iraqi Shi'a community, to defeat the reform effort?  If so, Abadi will be forced to call for new elections, and then its anybody's guess what happens. 

With regards to Abadi's reforms, how with the Sunni respond?  They spend so much time lamenting their loss of power that they probably haven't really considered a responsive strategy.  With Anbar under siege, and ISIS establishing itself deeper into Diyala and Salah ad-Din Provinces, I can't imagine what the Sunni community must be going through.  This war was originally fought in the backyard of the Kurds, but since has made the contagion of Sunni communities in central Iraq its battlefield.  The Shi'a towns and villages of Hillah, Najaf, Kut, Samawah, Nasiriyah and Basra have yet to endure an ISIS occupation.  But the Sunnis have suffered terribly.  I'm sure the Sunni parliamentary representatives will represent the best interests of the Sunni community, with regards to political reform.  But the political fight that threatens to split the Shi'a community doesn't appear to involve them, at least not at the moment.  The military events next month will probably determine the fate of Anbar Province, and the political developments of the next month will give us an indication of what kind of government Iraq will have as it continues, in fits and spurts, to hold itself together and fight a war of survival.