Does Khorasan Exist? Does It Really Matter?

Link: Is There An Actual Group Calling Itself Khorasan In Syria/Iraq?


Wikipedia Definition Of Khorasan


Well, I certainly didn't see this coming.  According to Andrew C. McCarthy and National Review, no group calling itself "Khorasan" exists.  Andrew boldly accuses the Obama Administration of inventing Khorasan to provide an enemy with an unknown wrap sheet; a target that exemplifies the threat as the Administration wants it to appear.  This astounding accusation has taken me by complete surprise.  The commentary is not lengthy but still manages to provide a disturbing amount of supporting evidence.  McCarthy alleges that last week's bombing targets were in fact "Al-Nusra Front" locations as opposed to Khorasan.  Last week I argued that we needed to avoid getting caught in the weeds with all the various branches and groups of Islamic extremists.  I remain convinced that sunni groups with extremist religious affiliations are connected.  McCarthy believes that the Administration is disseminating the incorrect idea that Iraq, Syria, and the Near East in general are home to dozens of separate and distinct Sunni extremist groups ("Jabhat al-Nusrsa", "Al-Qaeda in al-Sharm", "Al-Qaeda in -Magreb", "Al-Qaeda on the Indian Sub-Continent", "Al-Qaeda in Yemen", and on and on) who don't coordinate their activities.  During the 2012 presidential election campaign, President Obama made great hay from the death of bin-Laden and the apparent crippling of Al-Qaeda.  This narrative supported other pillars of his foreign policy.  The enemy is splintered into a herd of squabbling, locally focused, unprofessional groups.  The U.S. military is no longer needed in Iraq or Afghanistan if Al-Qaeda is toast.  The reality is that we evacuated Iraq at a record-setting pace as our enemies, not fifteen or twenty feuding, distinct organizations but a handful of groups united under one cause, rested and watching.

Andrew managed to squeeze a ton of information and argument into a two-page commentary.  I tried to summarize it in the previous paragraph, and I fear I have not succeeded.  The first link is Andrew McCarthy's actual National Review piece.  I'll do everything I can to disseminate this commentary in social media because I believe it to be incredibly insightful.  The key to winning a war begins with knowing your enemy.  Right now we seem to be a bit confused on the matter.  Why did coalition air elements avoid all of the targets identified as "Khorasan" (U.S. jets only, no Qatari or Saudi jets, bombed Khorasan targets)?  Is it because Khorasan is actually the Al-Nusra Front, and our allies Qatar and Saudi Arabia support Al-Nusra's efforts to topple Assad in Syria?  Again, it brings me back to something we discussed last week.  The United States (note that I did not say "The Coalition") must have solid intelligence regarding the players in Syria and who they represent.  If we truly intend to build and equip an army to tackle the Islamic State on the ground, will a U.S. Officer be in command (at a distance, maybe offshore on an aircraft carrier, so his boots aren't on the ground)?  Without that type of hands-on discipline and authority, how can we expect this Army to do our bidding?  Occasionally I'm overwhelmed by this nightmare scenario of the New Syrian Army, weapons et al, deserting to the IS immediately upon completion of training.  Without troops, how can we prevent something like this taking place?  The burr in my saddle has to do with what becomes of the New Syrian Army after the job is done.  Will they turn on Assad and the regular Syrian Army?  you can bet your ass they will, and then the Russians jump into the picture.

I agree with McCarthy's assessment, but I'm not part of the "told ya so" crowd.  I want the IS wiped from the face of the planet and I want the Obama Administration to accomplish this task and add to his legacy.  I don't believe that the religious extremist terrorist groups are separate, distinct entities that seldom communicate.  I believe the network of cooperation and communication is similar to organized crime.  The goal of keeping numerous small units out in the field confuses the enemy and allows for wider access.  If a former British soldier with highly specialized explosives training is recruited on the streets of Ipswich or York or Harrogate, he will not end up swatting flies out in the middle of the Syrian desert.  He will be utilized to train operatives heading out into the field.  The communication network that the extremist community has created is probably impossible to destroy completely (especially in the UK).  We can hope to intercept calls, steal transmissions, and even occasionally bug the correct phone, but the only real way to listen in on the bad guys is through recruited assets.  We are still living in the world dominated by human intelligence (eventually it probably will be run by artificial intelligence, but who am I, Stanley Kubrick?), so lets hope that our Intelligence Organizations are having success penetrating this monster.

When I read "Vengeance: The true Story Of An Israeli Counter Terrorist Team", by George Jonas, I picked up a tremendous amount of useful information regarding Terrorist Cells in the 1960s and 1970s.  What is most fascinating is that the bad guys still do things the same way.  Old habits are hard to break, says the old cliché. Reading this book I learned that the German Terrorist Cell the "Baader-Meinhof Group" had direct contact with Palestinian and Japanese terrorists.  There is no doubt in my mind that the terrorist groups active in Syria and Iraq are bonded to each other through agenda and necessity....and hatred for the enemy.  I do not support the plan to create a surrogate army to fight the ground campaign against the IS, but since we appear to be committed to that plan, then I want it to succeed 100 percent.  Although we can't have U.S. soldiers of any rank on the front lines with the new Syrian Army we are training, I hope we will be able to direct their movement from a centralized location, i.e. offshore or from a nearby friendly country.  Giving authority to make strategic decisions to Officers within the New Syrian Army would be a mistake until they have proven that they won't immediately about-face on the battlefield and head to Damascus to settle old scores with Bashir.  We will not succeed until this coalition, and the United States diplomatic, intelligence and military elements in particular, accept the fact that we are truly facing only one enemy.  That enemy will grow stronger each time we use foreign affairs to score political points, as the minority Republicans are want to do at the moment.  National Security MUST trump all of that bullshit.

Everything you wanted to know about ISIS but (understandably) were afraid to ask.....

Anyone who spent the summers of 2003 and 2004 chasing intelligence in the wasteland that is Iraq is familiar with the group "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" (AQI), and its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  After arriving in Iraq following the successful capture of Baghdad, it was up to the various U.S. intel groups (military and otherwise) to chase down the folks on the most-wanted list (which also became a deck of cards, you might recall).  Saddam Hussein was number one on that list.  From Saddam on down the names became more and more unfamiliar, but it didn't take long for our joint efforts with the military to track down most of the list.  In reality, Saddam was not on everyone's mind. The terrorist group AQI had made its presence known, and its founder, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was a serious character.

Zarqawi was Jordanian by birth and spent his youth getting in trouble with the law.  After a particularly unpleasant stint in jail, he decided to focus his energy in a different direction.  In 1989 Zarqawi traveled to Afghanistan hoping to get in on the action against the Soviets.  But Abu Musab had just missed the bus.  The war between the U.S.-backed Mujahedeen and the Soviets was coming to an end.  But something monumental did occur in Zarqawi's life at this time.  He was introduced to Osama Bin-Laden.  Zarqawi left Afghanistan with a new focus and a clear mission: to overthrow the Hashemite Family in Jordan and create an Islamic State.  It is believed that at this time he created the al-Tawhid (doctrine of oneness, or "monotheism" . . . you can Google it if you are interested).  He was unable to avoid the attention of Jordanian authorities, and spent six years in prison for possession of illegal weapons.

Upon his release in 1999, he stepped up his activities.  He was involved in attempting to blow up The Radisson Hotel in Amman before relocating to Peshawar, Pakistan and then Herat, Afghanistan.  Zarqawi attempted to set up a training camp (with $200,000 provided by Bin-Laden) but his efforts were frustrated by successful Jordanian infiltration of his latest organization, Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant).  Zarqawi found himself back in Jordan in 2001 and was picked up by the police, but for some reason, he was released.  It was only after his release and subsequent disappearance that a warrant was issued for his arrest for involvement with the Radisson bombing.
Zarqawi and a few followers made their way back to Afghanistan in time to join the Taliban and Al-Qaeda efforts to  repel the U.S. invasion.  He was seriously injured and it is believed in convalesced in an Iranian hospital (the enemy of my enemy is my friend).  After recovering from his wounds, Zarqawi made his way to Iraq, and in 2004, after swearing allegiance to Bin-Laden, created AQI (also known by its longer and less sexy name, "The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers").  During this time Zarqawi planned and participated in a number of very bloody attacks against U.S. military targets and also Iraqi Civil Administration.  Zarqawi also released a video of his participation in the beheadings of two U.S. citizens.  When it became apparent that the Shia religious leaders of Iraq were going to allow for the participation of Iraq's Shia population in Iraqi elections, Zarqawi began targeting Shia communities and gatherings.  Zarqawi was killed in 2006 during a targeted U.S. bombing raid on an AQI safehouse in Baqubah, Iraq.

I provided this background information on Zarqawi because I believe that ISIS/ISIL as it exists today is a direct reflection of Zarqawi, his tactics and his motivations.  In 2006, conflict began between AQI and some of the other Sunni militant organizations in Iraq.  There was a growing concern among these groups that Zarqawi and his gang were too quick to target civilians, and too bloody in their methods. This heralded a period of decline for AQI which continued until the beginning of U.S. troop withdrawals in 2009.  In 2010 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was appointed leader of AQI, which was now calling itself the "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI).  Attacks against Iraqi military and civilian targets increased, and volunteers, including persons from European nations and the United States, were welcomed.  In August 2011, Baghdadi, taking note of the growing insurgency in Syria, began sending ISI fighters to Syria to establish an ISI presence.  ISI immediately began recruiting members and establishing cells throughout Syria.  The ISI initiative in Syria declared itself the "Al-Nusra Front", and was fully supported by ISI.  Baghdadi ran afoul of Al-Qaeda leaders when he attempted to merge Al-Nusra and ISI. This schism resulted in Al-Qaeda actually repudiating ISI, its leaders and its activities.  The merged group was now known as either the "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham" (ISIS), or alternately the "Iraqi State of the Levant" (ISIL); hence the confusion between ISIS and ISIL.  In previous posts I have attempted to demonstrate the danger this group poses so forgive me for not repeating myself.  Suffice to say this group is well-funded, well-armed, and has no qualms with wholesale butchery.  As I have stressed previously, I believe the two keys to combating the growth of ISIS/ISIL is controlling the recruitment of trained individuals who can assist ISIS/ISIL in taking full advantage of the weaponry it has captured in both Syria (Migs for goodness sake) and Iraq, and controlling the resupply network.  With Russia taking this opportunity to be everyone's asshole, I can't say how successful we can expect to be controlling the northern border of ISIS/ISIL-occupied territory.  But by denying ISIS/ISIL the skill and the ammunition/parts it will inevitably need, it is possible to neutralize the damage done by the recent well-documented weapons hauls.

Bringing this post full circle, I think its obvious that ISIS/ISIL is exactly was Zarqawi would have wanted from an organization that traces its roots to his efforts.  All we need to do is remember the disturbing scene of Zarqawi beheading a non-combatant and refresh that horrible memory with the video of the beheading of non-combatant James Foley.  Hagel and General Dempsey are both absolutely correct when they state that ISIS/ISIL is the most dangerous terrorist group the United States, and the free world for that matter, has faced.  Another bit of bad news: Al-Qaeda, which seemed to be jealous of all the attention the new kid on the block was getting, appears to be mending fences with ISIS/ISIL.